State of Iowa v. Korey Richard Miller

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0939
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Korey Richard Miller,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Erica Crisp, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Timothy F. McCarthy II of McCarthy & Hamrock, P.C., West Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Korey Miller appeals from a conditional guilty plea following the
district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-
indictment violation. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

On December 28, 2024, Miller was arrested for operating while
intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(b)
(2024). Law enforcement filed a criminal complaint the same day. On
December 31, Miller’s counsel filed an appearance with the district court.
Miller completed and filed a substance-use evaluation as ordered on January
14, 2025. Miller’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss on February 24, asserting
the State failed to file an indictment within the required forty-five-day
deadline. The State resisted the motion to dismiss and filed a trial
information. The State’s resistance to the motion to dismiss attached
confirmation from the clerk of court that the State was not indexed in the file
until February 25, which resulted in the State not receiving notice of the
pending case until that date.

A separate judge, unaware of the pending motion to dismiss, approved
the trial information and set an arraignment date. On March 11, the district
court denied Miller’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the failure of the
State to timely file the trial information was due to a unique clerical error,
which constituted sufficient good cause.

Miller later entered a conditional written guilty plea reserving his right
to appeal. Following sentencing, Miller appeals.

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II. Analysis.

Miller argues the clerical error that led to the State’s failure to timely
file a trial information did not constitute good cause to deny his motion to
dismiss and that the district court improperly considered a lack of prejudice
in finding good cause. The State counters that because it was unaware of the
existence of Miller’s case due to the clerical error, good cause existed to deny
the motion.

We review the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss based
on lack of speedy indictment for correction of errors at law. State v. Williams,
895 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Iowa 2017), superseded by court rule on other grounds.
“We review rulings on rule 2.33(2) good cause determinations for abuse of
discretion.” State v. Watson, 970 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Iowa 2022), superseded by
court rule on other grounds.

Iowa’s speedy-indictment requirement is governed by Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a), which states in relevant part:
When an adult is arrested for the commission of an offense . . . and
an indictment is not found against the defendant within 45 days, the court
must order the prosecution be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary
is shown . . . . [T]he 45-day period commences for an adult only after the
defendant has been taken before a magistrate for an initial appearance or a
waiver of initial appearance is filed.

An indictment is equivalent to the State filing a trial information with the
district court. State v. Harris, 12 N.W.3d 333, 335 (Iowa 2024). The forty-five-
day deadline to file an indictment is strict and “cannot be violated . . . without
a showing of good cause.” State v. O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1994).

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It is the State’s burden to show good cause exists for the delay when
speedy trial deadlines are violated. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 706
(Iowa 2012). “[F]actors such as the length of delay and the lack of prejudice
to the defendant bear on the question of whether there was ʻgood cause’ for
the State’s failure to properly ʻfind’ the information.” Id. at 705. In evaluating
good cause, we “focus[] on only one factor: the reason for the delay.” State v.
McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 704 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). But we must
“also consider surrounding circumstances such as the length of the delay,
whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether
prejudice resulted from the delay.” Id. Concerning the length of delay,
“most, if not all, cases justifying reversal based on speedy-trial violations
involve delays numbering weeks or months, not days.” Id. (citation omitted).
“If the delay has been short and the defendant was not prejudiced by it and
the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial, a weaker reason will
constitute good cause.” O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d at 106.

Here, it is undisputed that the trial information was found after the
forty-five-day deadline. The State argues that good cause existed because the
clerk of court failed to index the case several times after each filing by Miller,
which precluded notification to the State of the charge.

Miller asserts that because the clerk of court is a part of the judicial
branch, then the clerical error is also attributable to the State, citing Iowa
Code sections 602.1201(1) (stating “[t]he supreme court has supervisory and
administrative control over the judicial branch and over all judicial officers
and court employees”), and 602.1215(5) (describing a clerk of court’s
appointment and removal processes). But Miller cites no other authority to
support imputation of a clerk’s clerical error to State prosecution. Clerical
errors are a factor to consider in determining whether good cause exists. See

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Ennenga, 812 N.W.2d at 706 (noting “[o]ur precedents disfavor allowing
generalized clerical difficulties to qualify as good cause for a delay,” but
clerical difficulties “arising out of unique, nonrecurring events which create
a particular scheduling problem” may factor into a good cause analysis).

Miller asserts that supreme court precedent shows that rule 2.33
“does not require a showing of prejudice.” He cites State v. Braun, which is
factually distinguishable. See 495 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Iowa 1993). In Braun, the
issue that Miller cited involved whether an amendment to the minutes of
testimony prejudiced the defendant. Id. And Braun appears to state the
opposite regarding prejudice, “We generally will not reverse on the ground
of technical defects in procedure unless it appears . . . to have prejudiced the
complaining party . . . .” Id. But it is apparent from other cases that an
appellate court may consider prejudice to a defendant in its good cause
analysis, even though a defendant is not required to show such prejudice. See
State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2016); see O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d
at 106 (“The surrounding circumstances affect the strength of the reason for
the delay. If the delay has been short and the defendant was not prejudiced
by it . . . , a weaker reason will constitute good cause.” (internal citation
omitted)); see Ennenga, 812 N.W.2d at 705; see State v. Deases, 746 N.W.2d 91,
95 (Iowa 1991).

The record shows that the delay in the instant appeal was twenty-three
days from the deadline. Miller did not demand speedy trial, nor does he argue
that he was prejudiced by the delay. See O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d at 106.
Accordingly, “a weaker reason” constitutes good cause in this circumstance,
that reason being the State was unaware of Miller’s arrest, initial appearance,
and filings due to the failure of the clerk of court to index the case. See id.
This failure resulted in a lack of any notification to the State of the case and

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was a “specific circumstance[] arising out of unique, nonrecurring events,”
rather than a result of “generalized clerical difficulties.” See Ennenga, 812
N.W.2d at 706. We find the district court neither abused its discretion nor
committed an error at law.

AFFIRMED.

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