In the Interest of E.S., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2211
Filed March 11, 2026
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In the Interest of E.S., Minor Child,
T.S., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County,
The Honorable Kimberly K. Shepherd, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Sara D. Davenport of Schoenthaler, Kahler, Reicks & Petersen, Maquoketa,
attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Taryn R. McCarthy of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

A disestablished father, T.S., seeks to have the juvenile court’s order
overcoming paternity overturned. On appeal, T.S. argues that the court
abused its discretion and did not consider factors outlined in Iowa Code
sections 232.3A and 600B.41A(7) (2025) in disestablishing him as the child’s
father. Further, he argues the ruling was not in the child’s best interests.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

E.S. was born in October 2021. T.S. signed a paternity affidavit stating
that he was the child’s legal father, and he was listed as the child’s father on
the birth certificate.

In November 2024, the child came to the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services’ (HHS) attention due to substance-use allegations
against the mother. After a child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petition was
filed, the child was removed from the mother’s care and was placed with his
maternal grandmother in December 2024.1 At the time, T.S. was
incarcerated for assault charges against the child’s mother. For most of the
time of the child’s removal, T.S. was incarcerated, but when he was not
incarcerated, he exercised supervised visits with the child and the child’s
older sibling.2 The child was adjudicated a CINA in July 2025.

In the spring, the mother shared with HHS that T.S. was not the
child’s biological father. In October, the State produced a genetic test report
confirming that T.S. was not the child’s biological father. The State then

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At the time of the disestablishment hearing, the child was still in the care of the
maternal grandmother.
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T.S. is the biological father of the older sibling.

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moved to disestablish paternity along with an amended CINA petition.3 At
the December hearing to overcome paternity, the child’s guardian ad litem
(GAL) stated that disestablishing T.S. would be in the child’s best interests.
Over T.S.’s objection, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion to
disestablish paternity. T.S. appeals.

II. Error Preservation.

The State contends that T.S. failed to preserve error on his argument
that disestablishment was not in the child’s best interests. To preserve error
for appellate review an issue must have been both presented to the district
court and ruled on. In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003). At the
hearing, T.S.’s attorney argued that T.S. and child had an ongoing father-son
relationship. The GAL testified that the relationship was not in the child’s
best interests. Following arguments at the hearing, the juvenile court granted
the request to disestablish paternity “[b]ased on the results of the paternity
testing.” Later, the juvenile court’s order overcoming paternity stated that it
was “in the best interests of the child to overcome [T.S.]’s paternity for
reasons stated on the record, including the objection of the [GAL] to an
ongoing relationship between [T.S.] and the child.” On this record, we find
error was preserved, and so we proceed to the merits of T.S.’s appeal.

III. Standard of Review.

Our review of proceedings to overcome paternity is for correction of
legal error. Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538, 539 (Iowa 1996). “[W]e are bound

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See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1999) (Iowa Code 600B.41A
anticipated enforcement proceedings could be initiated by the mother, or other interested
person, or state authorities).

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by the [juvenile] court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.

IV. Analysis.

On appeal, T.S. argues that the juvenile court erred in disestablishing
his paternity by failing to (1) follow the requirements under Iowa Code
section 232.3A and (2) consider the factors in Iowa Code
section 600B.41A(7). On this issue in the order, the juvenile court simply
put that: “[T.S.] objects to having his paternity overcome but the Court finds
that it is in the best interests of the child to overcome [T.S.]’s paternity for
reasons stated on the record, including the objection of the [GAL] to an
ongoing relationship between [T.S.] and the child.”

Pointing to the limited analysis found in the ruling, T.S. contends the
juvenile court failed to conduct a proper inquiry and that the record supports
preserving his paternity. See Dye, 554 N.W.2d at 539 (addressing the statutory
analysis that “permits a father whose paternity has been legally
established . . . to overcome that legal presumption when genetic testing
indicates he is not the biological father.”). Under section 232.3A a “juvenile
court may enter an order overcoming paternity of an established father
pursuant to section 600B.41A” when the following conditions have been
satisfied:
a. The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance in an
active juvenile court case and a dispositional order in that case is in place.

b. Paternity of the child has been legally established, including by
one of the methods enumerated in section 252A.3, subsection 10, or by
operation of law due to the established father’s marriage to the mother at
the time of conception, birth, or at any time during the period between
conception and the birth of the child.

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c. Pursuant to section 600B.41, the conclusion of the expert as
disclosed by the evidence based upon blood or genetic testing
demonstrates that the established father is not the biological father of the
child.

d. The established father agrees that the established father’s
paternity should be overcome or the established father objects to having
his paternity overcome but the court finds that it is in the best interest of
the child to overcome the established father’s paternity.

Iowa Code section 232.3A(2).

T.S. only challenges the last condition, that overcoming his paternity
was in the child’s best interests. But to consider if it is in the best interests
of the child to preserve the paternity of the established father, we consider
factors set out in Iowa Code section 600B.41A(7)(a)(2):
(a) The age of the child.

(b) The length of time since the establishment of paternity.

(c) The previous relationship between the child and the established
father, including but not limited to the duration and frequency of any time
periods during which the child and established father resided in the same
household or engaged in a parent-child relationship as defined in
section 600A.2.

(d) The possibility that the child could benefit by establishing the
child’s actual paternity.

(e) Additional factors which the court determines are relevant to
the individual situation.

At the time of the hearing the child was four years old. On appeal, T.S.
highlights an HHS report noting that he acted appropriately with the child.
But, during that same interaction two concerns were observed about T.S.’s
behavior. The Family-Centered Services (FCS) worker who supervised the
interaction found that T.S. was “giving the children false hope in regards to

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the speed of interactions and being returned to his care.” Additionally, that
he advised “others to not have children, in front of” the children, and the
FCS worker was concerned that “this may cause emotional or mental harm.”

Likewise, at the hearing, the GAL voiced concerns about ongoing
visitation with T.S. because of behaviors the child was exhibiting that were
presumed to stem from T.S. and the violence that the child had witnessed in
the past. The GAL noted that the child had suffered “significant trauma”
from witnessing T.S.’s behaviors and thus, discontinuing visits was in the
child’s best interests. The maternal grandmother also reported the child
showed negative emotional and behavioral responses following visits with
T.S. She also was concerned that the child often described incidents of
domestic violence the child witnessed with T.S. as the perpetrator.

As for the domestic violence concerns, the child was diagnosed with
posttraumatic stress disorder due to witnessing years of violence between
T.S. and his mother. The child drew T.S. hurting his mother with a sad face,
and he acted out a scene when he had witnessed T.S. “slicing a man in the
neck with a knife.” The child has also had other behavioral outbursts related
to T.S. that are being addressed through weekly therapy. And although there
was a no-contact order between T.S. and the mother, there were reports the
two remained in communication.

To support his position, T.S. noted that the child and he had a father-
son bond and the biological father was not yet able to even visit the child.
While that was true, the relationship with the biological father, standing
alone, is not determinative of the best interests of the child related to the
relationship with T.S. As to the relationship with the biological father, the
child’s therapist recommended that the biological father send a letter and
only proceed with interactions when the child is “ready.” The child is aware

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of who his biological father is but the two do not yet share a bond. Although
the biological father is currently incarcerated, there is a possibility that the
child could benefit by establishing actual paternity as his biological father has
expressed interest in building a relationship with the child and expressed a
willingness to share letters and build up to video visits with the child. While
we do not know how that relationship may play out with the biological father,
there remains substantial evidence that it is in the best interests of the child
to overcome paternity of T.S.

Based on our review of the record, we find no error of law in the
juvenile court’s analysis and thus, find that that T.S.’s paternity should be
disestablished to serve the child’s best interests.

V. Conclusion.

Because disestablishing T.S.’s paternity was in the child’s best
interests, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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