State of Iowa v. John Robert West

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1845
Filed March 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John Robert West,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,
The Honorable Tom Reidel, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

This is a child sex-abuse case. In 2020, when the child was eleven
years old, his mother agreed to let him go on two road trips of approximately
one month each with a long-haul truck driver named John Robert West. The
first trip occurred in June and did not involve any claimed sexual abuse, but
during that trip, West rubbed baby oil on the child in lieu of allowing him to
bathe. Things changed with the second trip, which started in early July.

The second trip began when the child was dropped off at a motel in
Muscatine where West resided when he stopped in Iowa. At the motel, West
directed the child to take a bath. When the child refused, West “ripped off”
the child’s clothes and shaved the child’s body, including his genitals. The
two left Iowa the next morning.

About a week into the trip, West began performing sex acts on the child
and forcing the child to perform sex acts on him. The child endured near
daily abuse thereafter during the nearly month-long trip. The child estimated
West put his mouth on the child’s penis fifteen to twenty times, West forced
the child to put his mouth on West’s penis five or more times, and West put
his penis in the child’s anus approximately twenty-five times. The abuse
occurred in the cab of West’s truck, but the child was unsure what states the
truck was in when the abuse occurred because they were constantly on the
move and West denied the child access to a phone. But the child was sure
the shaving incident took place at the motel in Muscatine.

Following a bench trial, the district court found West guilty of seven
counts of second-degree sexual abuse and four counts of lascivious acts with

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a child.1 The court sentenced him to indeterminate terms not to exceed
twenty-five years for each count of sexual abuse in the second degree and not
to exceed ten years for each count of lascivious acts with a child. The
sentences for two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree were run
consecutively to each other and concurrently to the sentences for the other
nine charges. The resulting indeterminate sentence not to exceed fifty years
was also ordered to be served consecutively to West’s sentence in another
case that is not before us in this appeal.

West appeals. He claims (1) there was insufficient evidence that his
crimes were committed in Iowa, so Iowa lacks territorial jurisdiction to
prosecute him; (2) there is insufficient evidence supporting three of the
counts of sexual abuse in the second degree because the State failed to prove
West committed the abuse in the manner alleged in the trial information;
(3) there is insufficient evidence that West was at least sixteen years old (a
required element to support the charges for lascivious acts with a child); and
(4) the district court abused its discretion by failing to give reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences. We address each claim in turn.

I. Sufficiency Challenges

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for correction of
errors at law. State v. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d 203, 207 (Iowa 2025). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We review the district

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The district court found West not guilty of a twelfth charge of indecent contact
with a child related to the shaving incident, not because the court found that West didn’t
engage in the conduct, but because the State failed to put on evidence that West was
eighteen years old or older at the time. See Iowa Code § 709.12(1) (2020) (requiring proof
of the defendant being eighteen years of age or older to constitute the crime of indecent
contact with a child).

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court’s ruling following a bench trial the same as we would a jury verdict,
which is to affirm if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Iowa 2019). Substantial evidence is evidence
that could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d at 207.

A. Territorial Jurisdiction

West contends the State failed to prove that his actions occurred in
Iowa, so Iowa lacks territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him for those actions.
“Territorial jurisdiction refers to a state’s power to create criminal law [and]
the permissible geographic[] scope” of its enforcement of those laws. State
v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652, 661 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). Iowa’s
territorial jurisdiction statute provides, in pertinent part:
1. A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense
which the person commits within or outside this state, by the person’s own
conduct or that of another for which the person is legally accountable, if:

(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within this
state.

....

2. An offense may be committed partly within this state if conduct
which is an element of the offense, or a result which constitutes an element
of the offense, occurs within this state.

Iowa Code § 803.1. Territorial jurisdiction is an essential element of every
crime and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Serrato, 787
N.W.2d 462, 468 (Iowa 2010).

West contends that, because the child testified that West’s acts that
constituted sexual abuse in the second degree and lascivious acts with a child
all occurred outside of Iowa, the State failed to prove Iowa has territorial

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jurisdiction. But West’s contention ignores how our supreme court has
interpreted section 803.1.

In Serrato, our supreme court interpreted section 803.1 to be satisfied
“if the defendant, with the requisite intent, does a preparatory act in Iowa
that is more than a de minim[i]s act toward the eventual completion of the
offense.” 787 N.W.2d at 471 (cleaned up). Here, the evidence establishes
that West, with the requisite intent, engaged in preparatory acts in Iowa that
were more than de minimis toward the eventual completion of the crimes of
sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. Specifically, his actions of using
his hands to shave the penis and testicles of the eleven-year-old child
demonstrate his intent to engage in criminal conduct and constitute
preparatory acts in the form of grooming2 that were more than de minimis.
Further, taking the child out of state away from the protection of his mother
and providing West with the opportunity to be alone with the child
constituted preparatory acts that were more than de minimis. See People v.
Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 893 (Cal. 2005) (“Defendant’s acts of driving the girls
across the state in his truck constitute sufficient conduct to establish
California’s jurisdiction over his crimes. These acts were not merely de
minim[i]s; they furthered the completion of the charged offenses by removing
the girls from the protection of their mother and providing defendant with
opportunities to be alone with each of them.”).

The above-described preparatory acts were more than de minimis
toward the eventual completion of the crimes of which West was found

2
Here, we refer to “grooming” in the sense of “gain[ing] the trust of or influence
over (a child) . . . as preparation for sexual abuse, exploitation, or trafficking,” rather than
in the sense of “giv[ing] (a person, oneself ) a clean, neat, or smart appearance” or
“arrang[ing] or styl[ing] (one’s hair, nails, clothes, etc.).” See Groom, Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed. 2023), https://perma.cc/SG3W-2FDC.

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guilty, so they were enough to meet the requirements of section 803.1 and
give Iowa territorial jurisdiction over West’s crimes. See Serrato, 787 N.W.2d
at 471. Accordingly, we reject West’s challenge to his convictions based on a
claimed lack of territorial jurisdiction and conclude that the district court did
not err in finding that the State established such jurisdiction. See id.

B. Challenge to Three Counts of Second-Degree Sexual Abuse

Next, West challenges three of his convictions for sexual abuse in the
second degree, claiming the proof at trial did not match the theory of how
the crimes were committed as stated in the trial information. Specifically, he
contends that the trial information charged two counts (counts V and VI)
based on the claim that West placed his finger in the child’s anus and one
count (count VII) based on the claim that West ejaculated in the child’s
mouth. He contends the State failed to present evidence that these three
counts were committed in the ways described.

While West attempts to frame the issue as a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge, we agree with the State that West is really making a
variance challenge. 3 Generally, when there are multiple ways to violate a
statute and the State specifies the way the defendant committed the offense,
the State must prove the defendant violated the statute in the manner alleged.
State v. Willet, 305 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Iowa 1981). If there is a variance

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To the extent West is making a sufficiency challenge, given the evidence that
West committed at least twenty sex acts involving oral sex and approximately twenty-five
sex acts involving anal sex, there is ample evidence supporting his convictions for seven
counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. As we understand his argument, West’s
complaint is that there was a variance between how three of the sexual-abuse counts were
charged in relation to the proof, not that there is insufficient evidence supporting a finding
that he committed sexual abuse in the second degree in some way at least seven separate
times.

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between how the crime is charged in the trial information and the proof at
trial, the remedy is a new trial. Id. But we only require a new trial if a
substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced, which occurs if the defendant
is not fairly notified of the charges such that the defendant may prepare a
defense.4 Id.

We find no prejudice here. As the State points out, the minutes of
testimony included details of multiple ways the State alleged West violated
the statute. See State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1994) (“Iowa courts
consider both the indictment or information and the minutes filed when
determining the adequacy of the allegations to apprise the accused of the
crime charged.”). While the minutes and trial information allege digital
penetration of the child’s anus and ejaculation in the child’s mouth, the
minutes also note that the other ways West committed sexual abuse (i.e.,
West performing oral sex on the child, forcing the child to perform oral sex
on West, and West putting his penis in the child’s anus) happened multiple
times and the exact number of sex acts was unknown. This put West on
notice that the State intended to pursue claims of multiple ways West
committed sexual abuse and that he committed each way multiple times.

Perhaps more importantly, West’s defense at trial did not challenge the
evidence that West sexually abused the child multiple ways, multiple times.
Instead, the defense focused on trying to highlight that the sex acts did not
occur in Iowa. Given this defense strategy, we do not see how West’s defense
would have changed had he known that the sexual-abuse-in-the-second-
degree charges in counts V through VII would be established by proof that
the abuse was perpetrated by oral or anal sexual abuse rather than by digital

The State contends West failed to preserve error on his variance challenge. We
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assume without deciding that West has preserved error and proceed to the merits.

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penetration and ejaculation sexual abuse. And West does not articulate how
his defense was hamstrung by this variance, so we find no prejudice. See State
v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 552 (Iowa 2003) (finding no prejudice when the
defendant anticipated and defended against the variance between the way the
crime was charged in the trial information and how it was proved at trial). As
such, we decline to grant West a new trial based on that variance.

C. Proof of Age

For his final challenge to his convictions, West attacks the sufficiency
of the evidence of his age supporting the charges for lascivious acts with a
child. Such charges require proof that West was sixteen years of age or older.
See Iowa Code § 709.8(1) (defining the crime of lascivious acts with a child
to include acts done by a defendant who is sixteen years of age or older). For
reasons unknown, the State did not present direct evidence of West’s age.
But the district court found that the State established that West was sixteen
or older based on the evidence that he was an over-the-road truck driver—
noting that such employment would require a driver’s license and the
commonly known fact that one must be at least sixteen to obtain a driver’s
license—and West’s physical appearance at trial.

West contends the district court’s finding on the element of West’s
age is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Our case law
establishes that a factfinder can rely on a defendant’s physical appearance to
determine a defendant’s age when there is corroborating circumstantial
evidence. See State v. Thompson, 365 N.W.2d 40, 42–43 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that proof that a defendant is eighteen years old or older can be
established by the defendant’s appearance so long as there is “some other
evidence in conjunction with the appearance of the defendant” (citation
omitted)). Here, the district court discerned corroborating circumstantial

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evidence of West’s age based on his occupation as an over-the-road truck
driver, which would require a driver’s license that cannot be obtained until
one is sixteen years old. See id. at 43 (recognizing the nature of the
defendant’s employment as corroborating evidence that the defendant was at
least eighteen). We also note that the evidence established that West lived
independently, which is additional corroborating evidence recognized by our
case law. See State v. Schaefer, No. 09-0586, 2011 WL 768817, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 7, 2011) (listing “he was apparently living independently from any
parents” as part of the corroborating evidence supporting a finding that the
defendant was at least eighteen).

A reasonable factfinder, using its common sense and life experiences,
could conclude that West was at least sixteen years old at the time he
committed the acts charged based on his physical appearance along with
evidence that he lived independently and was employed at a job that would
require a driver’s license, which West could not get without being at least
sixteen. So we reject his challenge to his convictions for lascivious acts with
a child based on claimed lack of proof of his age.

II. Sentencing

West also challenges his sentence, contending the district court abused
its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. We review a court’s
sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d
402, 405 (Iowa 2015). The court must give reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 456 (Iowa 2024). The reasons can
be terse and succinct, so long as the brevity does not prevent review of the
exercise of the sentencing discretion. State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 303
(Iowa 2025). The sentence chosen is “cloaked with a presumption in [its]
favor.” Luke, 4 N.W.3d at 458 (cleaned up).

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Here, after explaining the reasons generally for the sentence imposed,
the court gave this reasoning for consecutive sentences (consecutive both in
relation to counts in this case and in relation to another case):
The Court finds that the reason being that the multitude of offenses
deserves consecutive sentencing to protect the community, to maximize
Mr. West’s own rehabilitation, and to deter this type of conduct in others.

Additionally, as this is a separate victim, the Court finds it’s
appropriate once again to protect the community, maximize rehabilitation,
and to deter this type of conduct in others, and to recognize that each of
the victims has a right to see proper punishment for the offenses that
Mr. West has committed, his sentence in this matter shall be consecutive
to the sentence in [the other case].

Contrary to West’s claim, the stated reasons are not boilerplate and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. Compare State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d
302, 304–05 (Iowa 2001) (finding the sentencing court abused its discretion
by using boilerplate language that read, “The court has determined that this
sentence will provide reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied
because it is unwarranted.”), and State v. Cooper, 403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1987) (finding the sentencing court abused its discretion by using
boilerplate language stating, “The court has reviewed the circumstances of
the offense, and the defendant’s prior background.”), with State v. Gurisho,
No. 24-0466, 2025 WL 1704387, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding
the sentencing court did not abuse it discretion because it considered the
seriousness of the charge, the harms done to separate victims, and the best
opportunity for rehabilitation and protection of the community).

The stated reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, though terse
and succinct, were sufficient to allow us to assess the exercise of the court’s
discretion. As such, we reject West’s claim that the district court abused its

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discretion by failing to provide adequate reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences.

III. Conclusion

West’s territorial jurisdiction claim fails based on the evidence of
preparatory acts that occurred in Iowa and application of the standards
established in Serrato. See 787 N.W.2d at 471. His claim that there was a
variance between how three counts were described in the trial information
and how they were proved at trial fails because the variance did not prejudice
his substantial rights. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s
finding that West was at least sixteen years old based on the observations of
West at trial coupled with corroborating circumstantial evidence. And his
sentencing challenge fails because the district court provided adequate
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. Having denied all of West’s
claims, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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