John J. Ahlen v. Tyrell Letre Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0235
Filed February 25, 2026
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John J. Ahlen,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Tyrell Letre Williams,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County,
The Honorable Clinton R. Boddicker, Judge.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED
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Nathan R. McConkey and James M. Heckmann of Huber, Book, Lanz &
McConkey, PLLC, West Des Moines, attorneys for appellant.

Erik A. Luthens of Parrish-Sams Luthens Law, P.C., West Des Moines,
attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

John Ahlen filed this action against Tyrell Williams seeking damages
Ahlen claims to have sustained in a motor vehicle collision between the
parties.1 Ahlen tried to attain personal service of original notice of this action
on Williams, but he was not successful. Believing Williams lived in Texas,
Ahlen then attempted to serve the original notice by using Iowa’s statute for
actions against nonresident motorists. See Iowa Code §§ 321.498-.513
(2024). Williams filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss claiming service was
inadequate and untimely. The district court denied his motion. Williams
sought appellate review. Our supreme court granted Williams an
interlocutory appeal and transferred the case to our court.

I. Background

Ahlen filed the petition that started this action on February 15, 2024.
Our rules of civil procedure required him to serve Williams with original
notice within ninety days of the petition’s filing—that is by May 15. See Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.302(5).

On May 15, Ahlen filed a motion asking to extend the service deadline.
He included details about his efforts to serve Williams. Those details
included that the process server Ahlen hired unsuccessfully tried service at
the address stated on the accident report prepared by a law enforcement
officer investigating the collision (the first address). The process server
notified Ahlen of the unsuccessful attempt, including informing Ahlen that

1
Also in this action, Ahlen brought a claim against the insurance company that
provides Ahlen with underinsured motorist coverage. As this appeal does not involve the
claim against the insurance company, we do not include that defendant in the caption of
or discussion in this opinion. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.152(2) (“Parties not involved in the
appeal may be omitted from the caption.”).

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the process server “[s]poke to a lady who stated she has lived in the home
with her family for the past five years [and] [h]as no idea who . . . Williams
is.”

The process server also notified Ahlen that it had done a search and
found a possible new address at which to serve Williams (the second address).
Ahlen authorized an attempt to serve at the second address. This attempt
was also unsuccessful. The process server notified Ahlen of the unsuccessful
attempt, including informing Ahlen that “[s]ubject[’]s sister stated subject
does not reside.”

Based on those efforts at service, the court found good cause for
extending the service deadline and gave Ahlen an additional sixty days—that
is until July 14. See id. (directing the court to grant an extension for an
appropriate period upon a showing of good cause). Neither party challenges
the propriety of this extension.

Ahlen eventually started the statutory process for serving a
nonresident motorist. See Iowa Code §§ 321.498–.513. Specifically, he
attempted service under Iowa Code section 321.501, which permits service
using this procedure:
The plaintiff in any action against a nonresident shall cause the
original notice of suit to be served by doing all of the following:

1. By filing a copy of the original notice of suit with the director,
together with a fee of two dollars.

2. By mailing to the defendant, and to each of the defendants if
there are more than one, within ten days after said filing with the director,
by restricted certified mail addressed to the defendant at the defendant's
last known residence or place of abode, a notification of the filing with the
director.

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Ahlen complied with section 321.501(1) by filing a copy of the original notice
with the director of the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) and
paying the required fee. He attempted to comply with section 321.501(2) by
sending a notification of the filing with the DOT to Williams at the first
address by restricted certified mail through the United States Postal Service
(USPS). The USPS attempted to deliver the notice on July 24 but failed
because there was “No Authorized Recipient Available” at the address. Five
days later it sent a “Reminder to Schedule Redelivery of [the] item.” On
August 24, the USPS designated the mailing as “Unclaimed” and returned
it to Ahlen.

On September 6, Ahlen filed documents purporting to show
compliance with service under section 321.501. He later filed notice of intent
to apply for entry of default judgment. Williams responded with a motion to
dismiss the petition, contending Ahlen did not adequately and timely serve
him with original notice. The court denied the motion, finding Ahlen “fully
complied with the procedure outlined in Iowa Code Sections 321.501 through
321.503” and “Williams rejected the restricted certified mail sent to him” by
failing to claim it. The court also denied Williams’s subsequent Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion to reconsider, enlarge, and amend.

In this interlocutory appeal Williams raises two claims. He claims the
motion to dismiss should have been granted because service was not timely.
He also claims the district court erred by finding Ahlen had complied with
section 321.501 and thus erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

II. Analysis

We find it unnecessary to decide Williams’s timeliness challenge
because resolution of his inadequate-service claim is dispositive. So, we start

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with that second issue, beginning with the standard of review.

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
serve original notice in a timely manner for correction of errors at law. Carroll
v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Iowa 2000). The district court’s factual
findings are binding on us “unless they are not supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. But we are not bound by the district court’s application of
legal principles or conclusions of law. Id.

B. Merits

Williams argues the court erred by finding Ahlen complied with
section 321.501. So, he contends we should reverse its denial of his motion
to dismiss.

Our resolution of this issue is guided by our supreme court’s decision
in the factually similar case of Emery Transportation Company v. Baker. 119
N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1963). In Emery, the supreme court held that
extraordinary methods of service of process, like the method outlined in Iowa
Code sections 321.498 to 321.513, require strict compliance with the service
procedure. Id. at 276. In that case, the plaintiff served the appropriate official
(now the director of the DOT) and used the appropriate method (then
restricted registered mail) to mail notice to the defendant. Id. at 275–76. The
defendant did not sign the return receipt, and the mailing was returned to the
plaintiff marked “unclaimed.” Id. at 276. The court found mailing notice
under section 321.501 alone was not sufficient to strictly comply with the
code’s provisions. Id. at 277; see also Iowa Code §§ 321.501, .505. Instead,
actual delivery, typically shown by return receipt or refusal of delivery of the
notice, is required. Emery, 119 N.W.2d at 276–77. The court expressly

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rejected the contention that return of the mailing as “unclaimed” constituted
refusal of delivery. Id. at 276. Likewise, the court rejected any notion that a
defendant’s failure to “to call at the post office for the letter when requested
by the postal authorities” constituted refusal of delivery. Id. So, when the
mailing is returned as “unclaimed,” the plaintiff remains obligated to “seek
other means of notification, i.e. service on defendant[] personally under
section 321.504.” Id. at 277. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not
strictly complied with the statute because he did not obtain a return receipt
showing delivery and the return of the mailing marked “unclaimed” was not
sufficient to show refusal of delivery.2 Id.

Here, we have a fact pattern strikingly similar to that in Emery. Just as
in Emery, Ahlen sent the notification of filing of original notice with the
appropriate officer (i.e., the director of the DOT) to Williams. See id. at 275–
76. Williams did not sign a receipt acknowledging that he received it. Nor
did Williams respond to any notices we assume for the sake of discussion the
USPS left at the first address asking Williams to pick up the mailing at the
post office. As a result, the mailing was returned marked as “unclaimed.”
Just as the Emery court did with similar facts, we find Ahlen failed to strictly
comply with section 321.501, so Ahlen still has not been served with original
notice. See id. at 277. The district court’s findings that Ahlen fully complied
with the procedure outlined in section 321.501, that Williams received notice
of the restricted certified mail from the USPS, and that he failed to claim it is
not supported by substantial evidence. The district court’s legal conclusion
that Williams’s failure to go to the post office to pick up the mailing

2
Our supreme court recently cited Emery favorably as it confirmed that strict
compliance with the requirements of section 321.501(2) is required and “the plaintiff must
show the notice was either (1) actually received by the defendant or (2) offered to the
defendant but refused.” Lucas v. Warhol, 23 N.W.3d 19, 31 (Iowa 2025).

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constituted rejection of the mailing contradicts our supreme court’s edicts in
Emery and Lucas, so we find the court erred in reaching that conclusion.

In short, the district court erred in determining that Ahlen had
properly served Williams.

III. Remedy

Having concluded that Ahlen failed to properly serve Williams via the
procedure in section 321.501, we turn to the question of remedy. Williams
contends the remedy is to remand with directions to dismiss Ahlen’s petition
without prejudice. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302(5). Ahlen contends the remedy
is to grant him a further extension of time.

We find the appropriate remedy to be remand with directions for
dismissal. As a starting point, Ahlen failed to preserve error on his request
for an extension because he failed to ask for such an extension to the district
court. See Eikenberry v. Owens, No. 19-1723, 2021 WL 210754, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (refusing to grant additional time or an alternate
manner of service when the plaintiff didn’t ask the district court for the
same). Further, Ahlen makes no substantive factual argument and cites no
authority supporting his request for an extension of time, so he has forfeited
this issue. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (noting a party
forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a
perfunctory argument or fails to cite any authority in support of an issue).
And, even if Ahlen had preserved error and not forfeited the issue, our case
law supports declining the relief Ahlen requests. For example, in Butler v.
Nalvanko, after determining the plaintiff failed to successfully follow the
procedure for service under section 321.501, our court remanded for
dismissal of the petition. No. 10-0965, 2011 WL 441483, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct.

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App. Feb. 9, 2011). And that was the outcome even though the plaintiff asked
the district court for an extension of time after the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss pointing out the deficiencies in following the procedure for service
under section 321.501. Id. at *4. Here, even after Williams filed his motion
accurately highlighting the deficiencies in service, Ahlen didn’t ask for an
additional extension as alternative relief as he resisted the motion. This detail
makes an even more compelling case for declining Ahlen’s requested relief.

IV. Conclusion

Ahlen failed to strictly comply with the requirements for service under
section 321.501 because the mailing he sent was neither received nor refused
by Williams. As such Williams was not properly or timely served, and the
district court erred in concluding otherwise. We find the appropriate remedy
to be dismissal without prejudice.

We reverse the district court’s order denying Williams’s motion to
dismiss. We remand for an order dismissing Ahlen’s petition without
prejudice.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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