In the Interest of B.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1408
Filed February 11, 2026
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In the Interest of B.M., Minor Child,
B.M. Sr., Father,
Appellant
J.S., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Kimberly Ayotte, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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B.M. Sr., Waterloo, self-represented appellant father.

Lynn Vogan, Des Moines, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie L. Moran, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Teresa Pope of Pope Law PLLC, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A police raid in the summer of 2023 showed that a seven-year-old son
and his siblings were living in a home with marijuana, cocaine, and a loaded
gun all within arm’s reach. The son was removed from his mother’s custody
and briefly placed with his father, although he was quickly removed from his
father’s custody after the father refused to cooperate with the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). After a year of no
progress toward reunification—the mother was in federal custody and the
father never complied with HHS’s requirements or recommendations—the
State petitioned to terminate both parents’ parental rights. And several
months of hearings later, the juvenile court agreed.

Both parents now appeal, taking different approaches. The mother’s
appeal is straightforward—she believes she has made enough progress while
incarcerated that termination is not in the son’s best interest. The father’s
appeal is more complicated—he has filed many motions seeking to strip us
of jurisdiction and generally assails the legitimacy of both the child-in-need-
of-assistance and termination proceedings.

On our de novo review, we affirm both terminations. We will not delay
permanency for the son while the mother travels the long road of
imprisonment and recovery. As for the father, we have carefully reviewed the
record and find no jurisdictional, statutory, or evidentiary errors that require
reversal. And we agree that the State proved that termination was warranted
and in the son’s best interest. As a result, we affirm the juvenile court and
deny all the father’s pending motions.

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I. Factual Background and Proceedings

A seven-year-old son—along with three of his siblings who are not the
focus of this case—was removed from his mother’s1 custody in July 2023
after a police raid discovered marijuana, baggies of cocaine, and a loaded gun
in her home within easy reach of the children. He was later adjudicated in
need of assistance.

The mother was promptly arrested and has remained in custody ever
since, eventually pleading guilty to the federal offenses of straw purchasing
of firearms and unlawful user in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 932(b), 922(g)(3) (2023). As for the father, HHS briefly placed the son in
his custody. But that was short lived—the father refused to cooperate with
HHS workers and tried to move the son to Colorado. So the son was removed
from the father’s custody and placed with his half-sister’s parents, and then
later in the care of fictive kin.

For the next year, the father largely rebuffed HHS services, refusing to
obtain psychological evaluations, submit drug screens, or receive mental-
health treatment. He contested many hearings and was often disruptive or
noncompliant while attending. And he flooded the docket with filings and
motions.

With no progress toward reunification, the State moved to terminate
the mother’s and father’s parental rights to the son in October 2024. The
case then stalled as the court waded through the father’s slew of filings,
delaying the matter until March 2025. And even then, the substantive

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We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with
id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25.

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termination hearing spanned roughly five months—the parties convened in
March, April, June, and July, and filed written closing arguments in August.

The juvenile court ultimately terminated both parents’ rights to the
son under paragraph “f” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2024). The court
reasoned that the mother’s imprisonment prevented an immediate return to
custody and the father’s noncooperation precluded any finding that he could
provide the son with a safe home. Indeed, the father never provided his home
address; “has not demonstrated the ability to maintain a stable home or
maintain employment”; and was “unwilling to work with HHS, engage in
services, or follow court expectations.”

Both parents now appeal, and we review all issues de novo. In re W.T.,
967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021).

II. Mother’s Appeal

To permanently sever the parent–child relationship, the State must
prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one or more
statutory grounds for termination, and (2) termination is in the child’s best
interest. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). Here, the mother only
contests the second element, so we focus our analysis there. See In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

The mother disputes that terminating her rights to the son is in his best
interest, pointing to her participation in services while incarcerated and her
successful telephonic visits with the son. But like the juvenile court, we agree
that termination is best for the son. The mother was sentenced to fifty-four
months of prison. While incarceration alone does not justify termination
here, incarcerated parents are not immune from the consequences of
choosing to “engage in crimes, resulting in [their] convictions and

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incarceration, at the expense of building a relationship with” their children.
In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 101–02 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). Nor do we make
children wait for years in the hope that a parent will correct course. In re L.L.,
459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Children simply cannot wait for
responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It
must be constant, responsible, and reliable.”). And beyond her prolonged
separation from the son, the mother’s underlying misconduct—buying guns
for her teenage son, keeping loose marijuana and cocaine in the home, and
having a loaded gun in arm’s reach of the son—shows she has a long road to
recovery. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Iowa 2017) (finding
termination was in child’s best interest when the incarcerated mother’s
“journey is likely a long one and it is far from complete”). With no path to
reunification on the near horizon, termination best serves the son.

We reject the mother’s request for a guardianship for the same
reason—the son deserves permanency now. See In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29,
32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable
alternative to termination.”). What’s more, the grandparents do not agree to
be guardians, believing the son needs a stable home and that a guardianship
would ultimately confuse and disrupt him. See In re W.L., No. 20-0880, 2020
WL 5229199, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2020) (declining guardianship as
an alternative to termination for eight-year-old son who had been in foster
care for over two years and suggested placement was not willing to serve as
guardian). We thus affirm termination of the mother’s parental rights.

III. Father’s Appeal

Like he did below, the father has filed a slew of motions in this appeal
attacking the child-in-need-of-assistance and termination proceedings. And
his petition on appeal similarly echoes his frustrations with the underlying

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proceedings, while also briefly addressing the termination standards. The
father is clearly frustrated by this action, feels proper procedures were not
followed, and believes that justice requires returning the son to his custody.
We appreciate the father’s concerns—the parent–child relationship is
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the
United States Supreme Court.” In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 291 (Iowa 2021)
(cleaned up). We never sever that bond lightly or contrary to our statutory
scheme. So we will briefly try to respond to the father’s arguments in his
petition and motions, with the aim of clarifying the procedures followed and
assuring overall compliance with our child-welfare laws.

First, both we and the juvenile court have jurisdiction over this case.
The father believes that HHS’s failure to identify him in its initial ex parte
removal application, and its purported failure to timely serve him, stripped
the court of jurisdiction over him for all future proceedings. Not so. Our
legislature granted the juvenile court jurisdiction over all cases involving
children in need of assistance, including those that involve ex parte removal
orders. See Iowa Code § 232.78. The juvenile court similarly has “exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings under [chapter 232] to terminate a parent-child
relationship and all parental rights with respect to a child.” Id. § 232.109
(emphasis added). And when a juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights, we
have appellate jurisdiction to review that order. See id. § 602.5103(2)(a); Iowa
R. App. P. 6.205(1). So the juvenile court at all times acted within its
jurisdiction, as do we when resolving this appeal. And the record here shows
the State filed an amended child-in-need-of-assistance petition naming the
father about ten days after the initial ex parte removal application, properly
bringing the father into that case and before the juvenile court.

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Second, we cannot resolve the father’s challenges to several aspects of
the child-in-need-of-assistance case. Our legislature instructed that
termination actions and child-in-need-of-assistance actions proceed as
separate cases. See Iowa Code §§ 232.87, 232.11. The child-in-need-of-
assistance case has concluded, and this is an appeal from the separate
termination case. This two-track scheme does not leave the father without a
remedy, as he already appealed most of these issues during the child-in-need-
of-assistance case. See In re B.M., No. 24-0252, 2024 WL 3518296, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2024). In that prior appeal, we “agree[d] with the
juvenile court’s actions, including its decision to adjudicate B.M. as [in need
of assistance], remove the child from the parents’ custody, and order the
father to participate in paternity testing.” Id. So the father has been heard,
and this court has already confirmed that the proper procedures were
followed during the child-in-need-of-assistance case.

Third, we see no reversible error in any failure to electronically file the
son’s birth records during the termination case or any erroneous labeling of
the father as “incarcerated.” The father believes the son’s birth records
would confirm he is the son’s biological father and the exhibit should have
been accepted, but the juvenile court presumed that fact when it terminated
his parental rights. He also argues that he was improperly listed as
“incarcerated” on some filings, but it was apparent to the juvenile court and
all parties involved that the father was not incarcerated. Thus, the father’s
claimed electronic-filing or labeling errors—to the extent any existed—did
not impact the juvenile court’s termination decision or prejudice the father.

Finally, the State proved that the child could not be returned to the
father’s custody at the time of the hearing. The father believes the initial ex
parte removal order was void, rendering the whole period the son was out of

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his custody similarly void. Again, not so. The juvenile court’s dispositional
order adjudicated the son in need of assistance, and the son was validly
removed from his father’s custody. Any possible errors in the ex parte
order—and to be clear, we find none—were cured by the later dispositional
order. In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1994). And the father was
given many chances to demonstrate he could provide a safe and stable home
for the son. Instead, he chose to refuse most of HHS’s recommendations.
The juvenile court thus correctly held that the son could not be returned and
termination was appropriate under paragraph “f” of Iowa Code
section 232.116(1).

We have scrutinized this case and its thousands of pages of filings.
Conducting a thorough de novo review, we reach the same conclusion as the
juvenile court: the State proved termination was warranted and in the son’s
best interest. We thus affirm the juvenile court and deny all the father’s
pending motions.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

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