In the Interest of C.R., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1880
Filed February 11, 2026
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In the Interest of C.R., Minor Child,
J.B., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Erica Crisp, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Ryan Gravett, West Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Jeremy Evans, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to C.R. (born
2018).1 The mother argues that the State did not prove the statutory grounds
for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2025) and that
termination was not in the child’s best interests. The mother made progress
in this case by participating in therapy, however she continued to associate
with her paramour who had committed domestic violence against her. The
mother’s continued association with the paramour remained a concern
throughout this case. On appeal, the State argues that the mother had not
sufficiently addressed her trauma, she continued to allow the paramour to be
part of her life, and the child’s mental health was negatively impacted
because of witnessing violence between the paramour and mother.

Upon our review, we agree that the child could not be returned to the
mother at the time of the termination hearing and it was in the child’s best
interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights, so we affirm the
termination of parental rights.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Most recently, the family came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in August 2022, when
the child’s older sibling became involved with the juvenile court due to a
delinquency action. The older sibling had allegedly threatened to burn down
the family home with the mother and the child inside and threatened a
neighbor with a knife. Law enforcement was called to the home to respond

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The juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights but he does not
appeal. The child also has an older sibling, who is not the subject of this appeal, so when
we refer to “the child” we mean C.R.

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to crises multiple times until ultimately the mother requested the older
sibling be removed from the home. The removal of the older sibling occurred
in August 2023, and the child remained placed with the mother. In October,
the child and older sibling were adjudicated children in need of assistance
(CINA) so that services could be offered to address the mother’s failure to
exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising her child under Iowa Code
232.96A(3)(b).

As the case progressed, other issues were discovered. For over a
decade, the mother has had a tumultuous relationship with her paramour.
The mother testified that her paramour began to physically abuse her in the
first two years of the relationship and the physical abuse has continued ever
since, evolving into both emotional and financial abuse as well. The
paramour is the responsible party for founded or confirmed reports of child
abuse against the child and the older sibling dating back to 2018. The
allegations include physical abuse, denial of critical care, and exposure to
dangerous substances.

In one occurrence, the paramour physically assaulted the mother while
the older sibling and child were in the home. After this assault, the paramour
was convicted of two counts of domestic abuse assault by strangulation with
bodily injury, domestic abuse assault second offense, and two counts of child
endangerment and was sentenced to a term in prison not to exceed five years.
There was a five-year no-contact order (NCO) put in place beginning in May
2021 between the paramour and the mother; the older sibling was included
as well. The paramour served approximately two years of his sentence. After
his release, the mother established contact with him prior to the NCO being
removed.

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In December 2023, the mother reported that she wanted to have the
NCO removed. The mother had the NCO modified and dropped in January
2024, but not as to contact between the older child and paramour. Yet, she
allowed her paramour to move into the family home without first consulting
HHS. After learning of this, the HHS social worker required the mother to
sign a safety plan focused on keeping the paramour out of the family home
and away from the child, but the mother did not adhere to it and the paramour
continued to contact the child. When the guardian ad litem (GAL) visited
the child in early February, the child told the GAL that she had seen the
paramour and the mother said not to tell anyone at HHS.

Additional concerns with the family were that the child missed eight
out of thirty-two days of school, the mother had tested positive for marijuana
in January, and the mother failed to submit to both a substance-use or mental-
health evaluation. In light of these concerns, HHS petitioned for temporary
removal of the child from the mother’s custody. The juvenile court granted
the removal and the child was placed in the custody of HHS “for purposes
of family foster care.”

Shortly after the child was placed outside of the home, the mother
began to have supervised two-hour visits twice a week with the child. The
Family-Centered Services (FCS) reports stated that the mother began
attending the recommended services of substance-use counseling and
mental-health counseling. The April report from FCS stated that the mother
could identify that domestic violence had occurred but “she was not able to
see where the children would be in danger if [the paramour] were around.”
The mother failed to understand why the paramour could not attend visits
with the child and did not think that the paramour was “a dangerous person.”

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The paramour and mother reported that on April 9 their relationship
ended and the paramour moved out. The paramour claimed it was his
choice, and he felt it was for the best for the mother’s relationship with the
child. The HHS report after this still noted the relationship as a concern
because in the past the mother had agreed to no longer see the paramour but
still did. The mother had a “history of appearing to choose men and
diminishing the concern for the children’s safety.”

During the June reporting period from FCS, the mother progressed to
semi-supervised visits with the child. But the mother’s therapy was
disrupted due to her new full-time employment. In addition to maintaining
her own therapy appointments, HHS wanted the mother to be involved in
the child’s therapy and treatment.

In July, the paramour arrived at an appointment for the child with food
for the child and the mother. After the FCS worker informed them that the
paramour needed to leave, the mother threatened that if the paramour had to
leave then she would be leaving too. The FCS worker pointed out that the
child needed the mother present at that time, but the mother stated what the
child needed “was to be home” as she disagreed with the child being at the
appointment. Both the mother and paramour left before the child’s
appointment was concluded.

When the child’s therapist asked if the child had been seeing the
paramour on visits, the child replied yes but that the mother told her to tell
others he was not there. This concerned the child’s therapist as it put the
child in a “situation where she has to lie and keep secrets.” The mother
claimed that the paramour had only shown up during one semi-supervised
visit and he left when the mother asked him to because the child was there.

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After the event where the paramour showed up to the child’s
appointment, the mother returned to fully supervised visits with the child.
Other concerns were that the mother slept though several visits or arrived
late to visits. Also, the mother stopped attending therapy.

In August, the child was moved to a placement approximately ninety
miles away from the mother’s home. The child was then placed with fictive
kin and, less than a month later, the child was again placed in a family foster
home due to the fictive kin’s medical issues. While the child was placed with
the fictive kin, the mother did not utilize all possible opportunities to meet
with the child even when gas assistance was provided to the mother.

In January 2025, the mother committed theft with her paramour, but
she reiterated that they were not in a relationship.

In February, the mother was granted an additional six months to work
toward reunification. The mother was given specific conditions to meet prior
to the child returning to her custody, including “demonstrat[ing] the ability
to maintain a safe, stable living environment free of violence, substances and
illegal activities.”

In April, the older sibling returned to the mother’s custody. Concerns
remained that the mother was still interacting with the paramour, even
though the NCO was still in effect between the paramour and the older
sibling. At some visits with the child held at the mother’s home, FCS
workers were not allowed in a room in which the mother was overheard
having a conversation. She claimed she was speaking to herself or the cat. In
May, the mother’s paramour was found to be living in the home. The
paramour was subsequently arrested for violating the NCO and pled guilty to
the charges. The paramour listed the mother’s address as his home address

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when applying for counsel for the NCO violation. HHS removed the older
sibling from the mother’s custody. The same month the State filed a petition
to terminate the mother’s parental rights to the child.

A termination trial occurred in September. The mother testified about
her progress in therapy. She began therapy with a new provider less than
three months before the trial. Additionally, the mother testified she had
talked to the paramour shortly before the trial. This interaction turned sour
and the mother “hit a cigarette out of his mouth.” The paramour then filed
for an NCO against the mother and she was served with it a few days prior to
the termination trial. At the trial, the HHS social work case manager testified
that it would be in the child’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be
terminated.

After the trial, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental
rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ). The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo. In re
A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile
court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing
the credibility of witnesses.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).
Our primary concern is the child’s best interests. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793,
798 (Iowa 2006).

“We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is clear
and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706. “Evidence is clear and
convincing when there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the

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correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. (cleaned
up).

III. Analysis.

On appeal the mother argues that the State did not meet their burden
of proof under Iowa Code section 232.115(1)(f ) and that the termination was
not in the best interests of the child. We address each of her arguments in
turn.

A. Statutory Framework. The juvenile court terminated the
mother’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ). That section allows
for termination when: (1) the child is four years of age or older, (2) the child
has been adjudicated CINA, (3) the child has been removed from the physical
custody of the parent for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for
the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less
than thirty days, and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at the present time. Iowa
Code § 232.116(1)(f ); see also In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2024) (defining “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the
termination hearing” (citation omitted)). Under Iowa Code section 232.102,
a child cannot be returned to the parent if the child would be exposed to any
harm amounting to a new CINA adjudication. In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812,
814 (Iowa 1992) (noting that a “threat of probable harm will justify
termination”).

The mother only challenges the fourth element. She argues that the
State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not
be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing.

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As noted by the court appointed special advocate for the child,
domestic violence was the “main factor” in this case. The mother had an
inability to end the ongoing relationship with her paramour and provide a safe
home for the child. During the nineteen months that the child was removed
from the home, the mother could not end the decade-long relationship with
the paramour. Throughout this case the mother participated in varying levels
of therapy but has had the most success with her recent therapist. The
mother only began seeing this therapist less than three months before the
termination hearing. During therapy she claims to have begun to address her
trauma and patterns of domestic violence. Testimony at the termination
hearing revealed there were improvements made by the mother over the
weeks leading up to the hearing. Still, a few weeks before the hearing the
mother interacted with the paramour which resulted in him obtaining an
NCO against her. She testified at the termination trial that she was in the
process of filing sexual assault charges against him as well. Thus, the juvenile
court could not be assured the toxic relationship had ended as of the
termination trial date.

We commend the mother for her recent progress made in therapy, but
the improvements made are too little too late. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,
495 (Iowa 2000) (finding that “changes in the two or three months before the
termination hearing, in light of the preceding eighteen months, [were]
insufficient”). As described by the HHS social worker, the mother
“displayed problematic decision making” when she allowed her paramour to
have contact with the family prior to the NCO being removed and allowed
him to move into the family home without first contacting HHS. She even
instructed the child not to tell anyone about having contact with the
paramour. Instead, the mother allowed the paramour to have contact with
the child in violation of the HHS safety plan.

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Additionally, when the older sibling returned home, the mother
allowed the paramour in the home despite the existing NCO between the
paramour and the older sibling. This resulted in HHS again removing the
older sibling from the mother’s custody. The mother had progressed from
fully supervised to semi-supervised visits with the child but after the
paramour was found to be at the mother’s home again her visits regressed
back to fully supervised. The mother never progressed beyond fully
supervised visits after that point. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2024) (finding failure to progress beyond fully supervised visits
“prevented an immediate return of custody”).

In considering any progress made by the mother the GAL remained
concerned about the mother’s lack of “accountability for the role she has
played in her children’s struggles and their removals has made it difficult to
impossible to make progress in the matter.” The GAL opined that the
mother’s efforts were “superficial in nature” and that she lacked a
“recognition of the issues that have brought us before the court.”
Throughout the case the mother could not show a genuine commitment to
creating a safe home for the child. See In re S.O., 483 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Iowa
1992) (finding that if the child was placed in the mother’s custody the child
would be “in imminent risk of harm” due to the mother’s “pattern of
sporadic cohabitation and visitation” with the abusive father and the
mother’s “failure to protect the children from abuse”), superseded on other
grounds as recognized in, In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 2019).

For these reasons, we find the evidence supports termination of the
mother's parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f ).

B. Best Interests. “Even after we have determined that statutory
grounds for termination exist, we must still determine whether termination

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is in the children’s best interests.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa
2012). We “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.”
Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

The mother argues that termination is not in the child’s best interests
because of “the positive reports from family therapy, it can only be assumed
that suddenly ending such a positive service and the progress made will have
negative consequences on [the child’s] mental health.” But we read the
reports from the child’s therapist as contending that the child needs stability
and permanency. The child’s therapist reported that permanency will assist
the child in “gain[ing] a sense of security and safety in order to begin to
engage further in healing from . . . trauma.” The child has met the criteria
for post-traumatic stress disorder and has voiced her fear of the paramour.
And the school professionals involved with the child emphasized that the
ongoing improvement with the child’s behaviors and educational progress
would require stability going forward which was happening with the pre-
adoptive foster family. See In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 153 (Iowa 2017)
(noting that a child raised in a “violent home[] may also experience impaired
social competence and even post-traumatic stress disorder” (citation
omitted)).

A parent’s past performance can offer a preview of the future care that
the parent might provide. In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App.
2005). At the time of the termination hearing, the child had been removed
for nineteen months. In that time the mother failed to fully utilize services
and recognize the impact of domestic violence so that the child could safely
be returned to her custody. Throughout this case the mother has been

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repeatedly untruthful about her relationship with the paramour and unable
to set proper boundaries. Although the older child had trauma issues related
to the paramour as well, the mother allowed the paramour to reenter the
family home despite the NCO between him and the older sibling.

After the State has proven a ground for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1), we cannot deprive the child of permanency by hoping that
the mother will someday “learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). We find that
the termination of the mother’s rights is in the child’s best interest.

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude the State proved the statutory grounds for termination
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) by clear and convincing evidence and
that termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interests.
Upon our de novo review, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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