State of Iowa v. Ricardo Velez Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1212
Filed February 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Ricardo Velez Jr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County,
The Honorable Kathryn E. Austin, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Badding, P.J., Sandy, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Badding, P.J.
BADDING, Presiding Judge.

Richard Velez Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for second-
degree harassment from what he said was a “family argument” with his
brother’s girlfriend, L.G. While Velez questions whether the weight of the
evidence supported the jury’s verdict, he also makes an argument about the
sufficiency of the evidence. Velez further contends that the district court
failed to provide adequate reasons for ordering his sentence to run
consecutively to the sentence in another case.

Unpacking Velez’s first claim, we conclude that he failed to preserve
error on a challenge to the weight of the evidence because he did not file a
motion for new trial. See State v. Kramer, No. 16-2048, 2018 WL 346454,
at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (“[I]n order to preserve a challenge to the
weight of the evidence, [the defendant] must have filed a motion for new trial
alleging the same.”); State v. Kucharo, No. 22-1881, 2024 WL 2842307, at *1
n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024) (same). As a result, we turn directly to the
merits of Velez’s sufficiency challenge.

We review that challenge for the correction of errors at law. State v.
Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022). We are “highly deferential to
the jury’s verdict,” which “binds this court if [it] is supported by substantial
evidence.” State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).
“In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d
at 256 (cleaned up).

The marshaling instruction for harassment in the second degree
required the State to prove:
1. On or about March 12, 2024, the defendant purposely and
without legitimate purpose had personal contact with [L.G.].

2. The Defendant did so with the specific intent to threaten,
intimidate, or alarm [L.G.].

3. The Defendant communicated a threat to commit bodily injury.

Velez contests the third element, arguing the evidence showed that he
only made one statement to L.G: “Let’s go outside and I’ll fuck you over.”
He contends “that a reasonable person of at least ordinary intelligence”
would not “think of [that statement] as a threat to inflict some form of bodily
injury.” But as Velez recognizes in his appellate brief, “threats need not be
explicit; they may be made by innuendo or suggestion and need only be
definite and understandable by a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence.”
State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). In determining
“whether a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would interpret
another’s statement as a threat, the statement is viewed in light of the
surrounding circumstances.” Id. (cleaned up). We agree with the State that
it was apparent from the circumstances “that Velez was threatening physical
violence.”

L.G. testified that she had been at her neighbor’s house the night of
the argument. She left her four children asleep in the apartment with Velez.
When she returned home, L.G. said that Velez was upset: “He just started
threatening me. He was in my face, and by then my kids were awake crying.”
She called her neighbor for help, who quickly came over with her phone and
began to record the argument. The recording captured Velez yelling and
screaming at L.G. After Velez “just basically threatened [them] and then
went to the knife drawer,” which was empty, L.G. called the police. She
testified that Velez continued “just wanting to be physical” and wanting her
to “go outside to fight him,” even though they were asking him to leave. By
the time officers arrived, L.G. was “very scared” and crying.

While Velez contends that his statement—“Let’s go outside and I’ll
fuck you over”—could have multiple other meanings, that determination was
for the jury. See Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256 (“It is not our place to resolve
conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to
determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such
matters are for the jury.” (cleaned up)). Given the context of the statement,
the jury could rationally conclude that Velez was threatening to commit a
bodily injury. See Lacey, 968 N.W.2d at 804 (finding the statement, “I’m
gonna beat you,” was sufficient to establish a threat to commit bodily injury).

We also agree with the State that “even without that statement,” the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The neighbor testified
that Velez “threatened to kill” them during the argument. Although Velez
argued that threat could not be heard on the recording, it was “for the jury to
decide which evidence to accept or reject.” Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256. For
these reasons, we find sufficient evidence to establish that Velez
communicated a threat to cause bodily injury and affirm his conviction for
harassment in the second degree.

As for Velez’s sentencing challenge, the record shows that the district
court provided adequate reasons for its decision to impose consecutive
sentences. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g) (requiring the court to
“particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence”).
After ordering Velez to serve 365 days in jail for the harassment conviction,
the court explained:
I have made this decision because I believe it provides for Mr. Velez’s
rehabilitation as well as his protection of the community. I have considered
his age, criminal history, as well as the facts and circumstances of the case
and the argument of the parties. I have determined the consecutive sentence is
appropriate based on the charges that Mr. Velez was on probation for and then
was back in for another harassment case.

(Emphasis added.)

Velez argues the court “does not appear to have provided any reason,
beyond stating that [he] was on probation for harassment when he was
charged in the instant offense.” But that was sufficient. See, e.g., State v.
Wiles, No. 22-1391, 2023 WL 8801795, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2023)
(finding no abuse of discretion where the court relied on the fact that the
defendant was on probation and committed another offense in determining
consecutive sentences were appropriate). Iowa law does not require a long or
detailed recitation—only that the record reveals the court’s reasoning. See
State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Iowa 2015) (“a ‘terse and succinct’
statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement
does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing
discretion.’” (citation omitted)). Because the record complies with that
standard, we affirm Velez’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.