In re the Marriage of Larson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0017
Filed January 28, 2026
_______________

In re the Marriage of Kimberlee Larson and Steven Larson
Upon the Petition of
Kimberlee Larson,
Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning
Steven Larson,
Respondent–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County,
The Honorable Shayne Mayer, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
_______________

Jamie Hunter of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, attorney
for appellant.

Jessica A. Zupp of Zupp and Zupp Law Firm, P.C, Denison, and
Michael L. Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, attorneys for
appellee.
_______________

1
Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. Sandy, J., takes no part.
Opinion by Badding, J.

2
BADDING, Judge.

Steven and Kimberlee Larson divorced in 2018 after a thirty-year
marriage. As part of their stipulated dissolution decree, Steven agreed to pay
Kimberlee $1,500 per month in spousal support for fifteen years.

Five years later, Steven petitioned to modify his spousal support
obligation due to his decreased income and worsening health. The district
court denied the petition, finding there was “no evidence offered to show
that Steven’s change in employment was anything other than voluntary.”
The court also found Steven’s medical conditions were either known by the
parties when they divorced or did not impact his earning capacity. Steven
appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Steven and Kimberlee married in 1988. They had three children
together, all of whom were adults at the time of the dissolution. Steven
worked full-time during the marriage at sow farm operations. In 2009,
Steven accepted a job with New Fashion Pork, eventually working his way up
to become the director of grow finish production. Meanwhile, Kimberlee
stayed home with the children or worked flexible jobs that allowed her to be
off when the children were not in school.

When Steven and Kimberlee divorced in 2018, Steven was earning
$90,841 gross per year at New Fashion Pork. Kimberly was employed as the
director of a daycare center, where she earned a gross annual salary of
$48,700. The final decree incorporated the parties’ stipulation that Steven
would pay $1,500 per month in spousal support for fifteen years. Kimberlee
testified they agreed to “a little bit higher amount for a shorter time so
[Steven] would be done paying by the time he hit retirement” at age sixty-

3
seven. Steven also agreed to maintain a $250,000 life insurance policy
naming Kimberlee as the sole beneficiary for the duration of the support
period. The policy costs Steven $1,195 per year.

In January 2020, Steven relocated to Indiana to help with a New
Fashion Pork facility that was having management issues. Although he sold
his house in Iowa, Steven testified the move was temporary: “Instead of me
living here, I would live out there for two years to train, coordinate, and help
the production unit out.” But in October 2021, the company restructured its
leadership and hired someone to fill his job in Iowa. Steven testified that he
was permanently reassigned to a supervisor position in Indiana—a demotion
from his director role—which came with a thirteen percent salary reduction.

Unwilling to remain separated from his fiancée and family in Iowa,
Steven applied for a supervisor position with New Fashion Pork that was
based out of northwest Iowa and paid the same as what he was earning in
Indiana. Steven was not hired for that position, but the company agreed to
move him back to Iowa and start him in an auditing position. But in
January 2022, after he relocated to Iowa, Steven testified that he was called
into his supervisor’s office and told “they were not going to give me that
position of auditor, that if I wanted to keep my job with New Fashion, I was
going to be a feed truck driver through Round Lake, Minnesota.” The truck
driving position was a further demotion and reduced his pay to $20 per hour.

In December 2022, Steven slipped on ice while delivering feed and
sustained a rotator cuff injury that required surgery the next year. Around
the same time as the surgery, Steven’s doctor informed him of an arterial
blockage in his heart. These conditions were on top of a spinal cord injury
Steven suffered in 2016 that led him to receive a twenty percent disability
rating.

4
Steven left New Fashion Pork in January 2023 to become a supervisor
at a family-owned hog operation, where he earns a gross annual salary of
$61,000. That same month, Steven petitioned to modify his spousal support
obligation. He was fifty-eight years old and remarried by the February 2024
trial on his petition. Despite his reduced income and ongoing health issues,
the record shows that Steven and his wife have traveled to Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin for vacations.
The couple have also taken “four or five” Caribbean cruises, an Alaskan
cruise, and visited Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, Kimberlee stayed in her director position at the daycare
until the fall of 2020, when she left because of the stress that came with the
COVID-19 pandemic. She was briefly employed with another organization
before returning to the daycare in 2022. By 2023, fifty-six-year-old
Kimberlee was earning $58,594 per year. But she does not have any
insurance, retirement, or other benefits through her employment. Kimberlee
lives in a home that she owns but shares with her significant other. Although
they are not married—and keep their finances separate—Kimberlee testified
that her partner pays her between $600 to $1,200 per month to help with
household expenses.

At the trial on his modification petition, Steven asked the court to
reduce his spousal support obligation to $500 a month, with payments ending
in five years.1 The district court denied that request and ordered Steven to
pay $4,150 towards Kimberlee’s attorney fees. Steven appeals, challenging
the court’s failure to modify his spousal support obligation and its order

1
Steven also sought to end the life insurance policy naming Kimberlee as the
beneficiary, but he does not challenge the court’s denial of that request on appeal.

5
requiring him to pay attorney fees. Both parties request an award of appellate
attorney fees.

II. Standard of Review

Equitable proceedings, such as a modification of spousal support, are
reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Sisson, 843 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2014).
“We give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning
the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings are not binding upon us.”
In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). The court’s
ruling will be disturbed “only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id.
(citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Spousal Support

Courts may modify a spousal support order upon a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances. Iowa Code § 598.21C(1) (2023). The
party seeking modification must prove the change in circumstances by a
preponderance of evidence. In re Marriage of Rietz, 585 N.W.2d 226, 229
(Iowa 1998).

In determining whether that burden has been met, we consider
statutory factors that include changes in employment, medical expenses,
physical or mental health, remarriage, and financial support by another
person. Iowa Code § 598.21C(1). We also consider the following principles
from our modification case law:
(1) there must be a substantial and material change in the circumstances
occurring after the entry of the decree; (2) not every change in
circumstances is sufficient; (3) it must appear that continued enforcement
of the original decree would, as a result of the changed conditions, result

6
in positive wrong or injustice; (4) the change in circumstances must be
permanent or continuous rather than temporary; (5) the change in
financial conditions must be substantial; and (6) the change in
circumstances must not have been within the contemplation of the trial
court when the original decree was entered.

In re Marriage of Walters, 575 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).

When a reduction in a payor’s income is at issue, like it is here, a
primary factor to be considered in determining whether support
obligations should be modified is whether the obligor’s reduction in
income and earning capacity is the result of activity, which, although
voluntary, was done with an improper intent to deprive his or her
dependents of support. This is because we have held that an obligor’s
voluntary reduction in income or earning capacity may be a basis for
refusing to modify support obligations.

Rietz, 585 N.W.2d at 229–30 (internal citation omitted).

The district court denied Steven’s petition for modification, finding
that his reduction in income was not a substantial change in circumstances
for four reasons: (1) Steven voluntarily left his employment in Indiana to
return to Iowa, resulting in reduced income; (2) the changes in Steven’s
health did not substantially impact his earning capacity; (3) the reasons for
Steven’s income reduction were within the parties’ contemplation when they
divorced; and (4) Kimberlee’s receipt of financial assistance from her partner
was also contemplated.

To start, we agree with the district court that Steven failed to prove his
“health is substantially different from what the parties expected or
contemplated in 2018, or that the changes in Steven’s health since the
dissolution have substantially impacted his earning capacity.” Steven’s
twenty-percent disability rating from his 2016 spinal injury was known by the
parties when they divorced. And although Steven tore his rotator cuff in

7
2022, he continued working full-time after that injury, albeit on light-duty
restrictions. As for his heart blockage, Steven testified that his “general
doctor told [him] just to be aware of that.” Kimberlee is accordingly correct
in arguing that Steven’s medical conditions are “insufficient to justify
modification.”

But we disagree with Kimberlee’s assertion that Steven’s income
historically fluctuated. Steven’s income stayed relatively stable—with an
upward trend—during the years that he worked with New Fashion Pork.
That dramatically changed after Steven’s first demotion in 2021, when his
income dropped from $96,065 to $61,307 in 2022. We find this sudden
decrease is a substantial change not within the contemplation of the court at
the time of the dissolution. See In re Marriage of Hayes, No. 18-0156, 2018
WL 5292099, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018) (“While some fluctuation
in income may be a reasonable and ordinary change in circumstance, the
steady increase in [the payee’s] income and sudden decrease in [the payor’s]
income qualify as substantial changes not within the contemplation of the
court at the time of the decree.”).

The real question is the impact of Steven’s job changes on his request
for modification. Steven argues the reduction in his income was neither
voluntary nor intended to deprive Kimberlee of support. He contends that
when informed of his permanent reassignment to Indiana—after his pay was
already reduced by thirteen percent—he sought a lateral transfer back to Iowa
to be closer to his fiancée, children, and grandkids. Our case law supports
Steven’s argument.

This court has consistently held that a reduction in income caused by
the desire to stay close to family is not necessarily self-inflicted or voluntary.
See In re Marriage of Blum, 526 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (finding

8
that where a parent lost his job and refused to move to another town to take
a higher paying job because he wanted to stay where his children lived, the
reduction in salary was not self-inflicted or voluntary); In re Marriage of
Fidone, 462 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding a parent’s refusal
to accept relocation as an alternative to discharge did not constitute a self-
inflicted reduction in salary for purposes of determining whether child
support provisions of divorce decree should be modified); see also In re
Marriage of Sliger, No. 18-0458, 2019 WL 478833, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb.
6, 2019) (collecting cases that modified support obligations due to a payor’s
reduced income).

Likewise in In re Marriage of Etnyre, a father earned $95,000 in
Nebraska but moved to Iowa to be close to his girlfriend and children after
finding a job that paid the same. No. 06-0432, 2006 WL 3436474, at *3 (Iowa
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). However, that job was eliminated less than a year
later. Id. He could not find a job with similar pay, so he accepted one that
paid substantially less. Id. On appeal, we disagreed with the district court
that “[the father] has an obligation to leave Iowa where he can enjoy a
substantial relationship with his children to find a job that pays him an annual
salary of $95,000.” Id. at *4.

We find that Steven’s situation falls within these cases. He reasonably
believed his assignment to Indiana was temporary, and upon learning
otherwise, tried to find a position with the same company in Iowa. When
submitting his request for a lateral transfer, he stated the decision was
motivated by a desire to be close to his family. The position that he applied
for in Iowa, but did not get, would have paid the same as what he was earning
in Indiana. Steven did not learn that he would be further demoted until he
was already back in Iowa. Cf. In re Marriage of McKenzie, 709

9
N.W.2d 528, 534 (Iowa 2006) (denying a child support modification when
the payor quit his job and moved to a different state with his girlfriend without
having another job lined up). Although the district court found that the
“record is absent any mention of a demotion,” Steven’s personnel file from
New Fashion Pork shows that his pay was reduced in October 2021 and
January 2022. The reason listed for both compensation changes is
“demotion.” See Boquette v. Boquette, 247 N.W. 255, 256 (Iowa 1933)
(determining an obligor’s demotion with resulting lower salary justified
reduction of support obligation). In short, nothing in the record indicates
that Steven’s decision to move back to Iowa was an attempt to deprive
Kimberlee of support.

We also disagree with the district court’s conclusion that because
“Steven’s employment had repeatedly required Steven and Kimberlee to
relocate during their marriage,” it is “improbable” the parties “did not
consider the possibility that Steven would again need to choose between
moving for work or moving his family when the parties agreed to the
stipulation.” The parties did move four or five times during their thirty-year
marriage. But they have lived in northwest Iowa since 2002. Their moves
after that were all within the same area of the state. And when the parties
divorced, their children were adults. So relocating with the family was no
longer an option for Steven.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Steven’s reduced
income is a substantial change of circumstances that is continuous and not
contemplated by the parties or the court when the dissolution decree was
entered. That said, we do not find that Steven’s support obligation should be
reduced by as much—or for as long—as he requests.

10
Steven earns $61,000 annually and resides in a home owned by his
current wife. Although she is not obligated to contribute to Steven’s support
of Kimberlee, her income may be considered in evaluating his overall
financial condition. Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 1974). Similarly,
Kimberlee’s cohabitation and the financial support she receives from her
significant may be considered, see In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 703
(Iowa Ct. App. 1999), although it is not a significant factor in our analysis.
See In re Marriage of Gust, No. 21-1088, 2022 WL 3907732, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Aug. 31, 2022) (finding that a recipient spouse’s cohabitation alone did
not support modification where her boyfriend contributed “a small amount
of money for food and pays part of the rent”).

We have also considered that since the dissolution, Steven has enjoyed
several cruises and international trips. This pattern suggests that although
his income has declined, his lifestyle remains largely unchanged. Steven’s
itemized expenses include monthly charges for travel, gifts, and Hilton
Grand Vacations. While he is free to enjoy such discretionary spending,
these expenses should not be used to justify a reduction to the support owed
to Kimberlee by as much as Steven requests.

Given the parties’ respective financial positions and the change in the
income gap between them, we conclude that Steven’s spousal support
obligation should be reduced to $1,000 per month. See In re Marriage of
Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Iowa 2013) (modifying spousal support
obligation based on the same considerations). Steven shall begin paying the
reduced amount of support on the first of every month after procedendo is
issued. See In re Marriage of O’Brien, No. 22-0621, 2022 WL 17829114, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2022); see also In re Marriage of Wessels, 542 N.W.2d
486, 490 (Iowa 1995) (stating retroactive modification is inappropriate

11
“when the level of alimony is decreased or terminated”). We do not,
however, shorten the support period.

B. Attorney Fees

Next, Steven challenges the district court’s award of $4,150 in
attorney fees to Kimberlee. This court gives the district court broad
discretion in such matters and will not disturb an award of attorney fees
absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743
(Iowa 1993). “The test is whether the fee is reasonable and based on the
parties’ respective abilities to pay.” Id. After considering these factors, we
find no abuse of discretion in the court’s attorney fee award.

Both parties also request an award of appellate attorney fees. Such an
award is not a matter of right but lies within this court’s discretion.
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687. “Again our decision is guided by the needs
of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the
relative merits of the appeal.” Geil, 509 N.W.2d at 743. Considering the
parties’ comparable salaries and ability to pay, we find that neither is entitled
to an award of appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

12