In the Interest of E.S., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-1385
Filed January 28, 2026
_______________

In the Interest of E.S., Minor Child,
B.S., Mother,
Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County,
The Honorable Joan M. Black, Judge.
_______________

APPEAL DISMISSED
_______________

B.S., Anamosa, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie L. Moran, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Robert Davison, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for minor child.

Joseph Pavelich, Iowa City, attorney for minor child.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, J.

1
GREER, Judge.

A mother appeals from a permanency order following a joint
permanency and termination hearing. She does not appeal from the portion
of the order that dismissed the termination-of-parental-rights petition,
although the juvenile court found that a ground for the termination of B.S.’s
rights existed.1 Instead, the mother appeals the determination that the best
interests of the child would be served by changing the permanency goal from
reunification with the mother to placing the child in the sole custody of his
father pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(d)(1).2

Before we reach the merits of the mother’s appeal, we must decide if
we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The State did not file a responsive
brief but instead filed a statement that it disagreed with the juvenile court’s
decision to not terminate the mother’s parental rights and instead transfer
sole custody to the father. Further, the State noted that it “continues to
maintain the position that [the] delayed appeal should not be granted.” After
reviewing the filings in this appeal, we conclude that based upon the mother’s
failure to timely appeal, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. Thus,
we are required to dismiss the appeal.
The history of the proceedings leading up to this appeal is not quite
straightforward, but that does not impact our final analysis. A joint
permanency–termination trial involving the termination of the mother’s

1
The juvenile court found the grounds under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f )
(2025) supported termination of the mother’s rights to E.S.
2
Once a permanency hearing is held, as an option for the juvenile court, it can
“[t]ransfer sole custody of the child from one parent to another parent.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(d)(1).

2
parental rights to E.S. took place over three days in May and June 2025. At
the trial, the mother represented herself, with standby counsel.

The juvenile court entered its order on August 15. In the order, the
juvenile court found that the State met its burden to show clear and
convincing evidence supporting termination of the mother’s parental rights
under section 232.116(1)(f ). But, the court concluded that the child’s best
interests would not be served by termination. So, instead of terminating the
mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court dismissed the termination
petition and changed the permanency goal. It ordered the child placed in the
sole custody of the father, with the court retaining jurisdiction over the
matter under section 232.104(2)(d)(1).

On July 30, before the juvenile court made its ruling, in appellate case
number 25-1247, the mother filed an appeal from a July 15 order that
addressed and denied the mother’s motion for reasonable efforts because it
was considered during the trial and the juvenile court “has yet to rule on the
termination of parental rights/reasonable efforts matters.” On August 1,
noting that the challenged order was not a final order for purposes of appeal,
our supreme court treated the mother’s filing as an application for
interlocutory appeal and denied it.3

On August 27, although the juvenile court had filed the ruling on the
permanency–termination matter on August 15, the juvenile court vacated its
ruling, stating:

As the Court was reviewing the motion and the record of the case,
the Court noted that [the mother] had filed a notice of appeal regarding a
July 15, 2025, order entered by the Court. The Court of Appeals entered
an order on August 1, 2025, dismissing [the mother]’s appeal.

3
Procedendo from this first appeal issued on August 20, 2025.

3
The Court filed the Ruling Re: Termination of Parental Rights
order on August 15, 2025. The Procedendo order was not filed until
August 20, 2025. Although [the mother] did not raise the issue in her
motion to vacate, the Court believes, in an abundance of caution, that the
Ruling Re: Termination of Parental Rights order should be vacated as on
August 15, 2025, the Court did not have proper jurisdiction to enter such
an order.

Therefore, solely on the basis of the timing of the filing of the order,
the Ruling Re: Termination of Parental Rights order filed on August 15,
2025, is hereby VACATED.

The same day, following vacation of the August 15 order, the juvenile
court then filed an identical ruling to the one filed on August 15 regarding the
termination of parental rights. But, on August 26, the day before this second
final order was filed, the mother filed a notice of appeal, which now
referenced the August 15 “final Permanency Order.”

To clear the confusion, on September 10, our supreme court issued an
order confirming that it was unnecessary for the juvenile court to vacate its
original August 15 order. The supreme court also stated it would treat the
mother’s August 26 notice of appeal as timely, but noted “for the mother’s
appeal to proceed, a notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days of the juvenile
court’s August 27, 2025 order in the termination-of-parental-rights case. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.101(1)(a).” (Emphasis added.)

On September 11, the mother filed another notice of appeal. By order
on September 15, the supreme court addressed this notice by ordering that:
“[t]he mother’s deadline to file her petition on appeal shall run from the filing
date of the September 11, 2025 notice of appeal pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Appellate Procedure 6.201(1)(b), which provides the petition on appeal shall
be filed within 15 days of the notice of appeal.” (Emphasis added.) The
mother filed a petition on appeal on September 27 and then amended it on
October 1.

4
The supreme court again weighed in and, on October 2, noted that the
petition on appeal was filed one day past the deadline established in the
September 15 order. Because Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.201(3)
requires the supreme court clerk to dismiss the appeal, 4 the mother was
ordered to file a statement addressing why the appeal should not be
dismissed. This order also struck both the mother’s petition on appeal and
amended petition for failing to comply with the appellate rules and noted that
“only the record on appeal will be considered by the court.” The mother was
directed to file an amended petition, complying with the appellate rules,
within seven days of the order.

On October 3, both the mother and the State filed responses to the
delayed appeal issue. On October 4, the mother filed an amended petition on
appeal. Our supreme court directed that the delayed appeal issue be
submitted with the appeal.

In the mother’s statement related to the untimely filing she contended
that (1) she experienced a technical issue in converting the petition on appeal
to a PDF format; (2) her standby counsel verified an incorrect date for filing
and the mother in good faith relied upon that error; (3) there was a clear
intent to appeal; (4) the merits of the appeal “have far-reaching implications
for future cases and the administration of justice in Iowa’s juvenile system”;
and (5) case precedent supports the appeal where the failure to perfect the
appeal was outside the control of the parent and the delay is negligible.

4
Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.201(3), “[i]f the petition on
appeal is not filed with the clerk of the supreme court within 15 days after the filing of a
notice of appeal . . . the supreme court shall dismiss the appeal, and the clerk will
immediately issue procedendo.”

5
The State asserted that the mother failed to demonstrate her
entitlement to a delayed appeal, citing In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 318–22
(Iowa 2021), which confirms that to avoid dismissal involving a delayed
appeal, the appellant must show: (1) she clearly intended to appeal, (2) her
failure to timely perfect the appeal was outside of her control, and (3) the
delay was no more than negligible. Conceding the mother showed she clearly
intended to appeal, the State asserted that, as a self-represented party, the
mother failed to show that converting the filings to a PDF fell outside of her
control, thus she failed to establish the second requirement because her
failure to timely appeal was directly in her control. The State also maintained
that the delay that resulted from all of the mother’s filings was more extensive
than one day and should be part of the consideration under the third factor.

In considering the three factors related to our delayed-appeal analysis,
we look at the mother’s performance under the lens of the duties of legal
counsel as she chose to be self-represented in this case. As we have
previously stated regarding self-represented litigants,

[w]e do not utilize a deferential standard when persons choose to represent
themselves. The law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and
another for lay persons. Rather, all are expected to act with equal
competence. If lay persons choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their
own risk.

Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations
omitted).

Thus, “our delayed appeal analysis should not turn on the strength or
weakness of counsel’s explanation for missing the appeal deadline.” W.T., 967
N.W.2d at 320–21 (emphasis added). And we are to “strictly circumscribe[]”
the delayed appeal standard. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 292 (Iowa 2021).
To that end, when the cause for the delay and untimeliness is the parent’s
fault, we have dismissed the appeal. See In re K.W., No. 24-1607, 2025
WL 271370, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2025) (distinguishing cases where

6
delayed appeals are caused by counsel and applying the directive that an
appeal would be denied if the failure to timely appeal resulted from the
mother’s actions).

Unlike the cases where legal counsel’s actions impede the timely
appeal, here the failure to timely appeal was in the mother’s control and thus,
we cannot grant a delayed appeal. See A.B., 957 N.W.2d at 293 (analyzing
whether the two-day delay in filing the petition on appeal caused by the
father’s attorney would require dismissal of the appeal).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

7