Louis Ngor v. Nyabet Kak

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0711
Filed January 28, 2026
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Louis Ngor,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
Nyabet Kak,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable David Nelmark, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Sarah M. Yaske of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., West Des
Moines, attorney for appellant.

Jason S. Rieper of Rieper Law, P.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

1
SANDY, Judge.

Louis Ngor and Nyabet Kak are the parents of two children: T.L.N.,
born in 2010, and N.L.N., born in 2015. Ngor appeals from the district
court’s decree establishing custody, visitation, and support over the children.
He contends the district court erred in not placing the children in the parties’
joint physical care and in ordering retroactive child support, and abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Kak. Finding no error or abuse of
discretion, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Ngor and Kak entered a romantic relationship and began living with
each other in 2009. The two lived together with their children until
December 2020. Following their separation, Ngor did not provide financial
support for the children until a child support order was entered in 2023
setting Ngor’s monthly child support at $1,394 following Kak’s filing of an
Iowa Code chapter 252C action.

In March 2024, Ngor petitioned for custody and support, requesting
the district court grant the parties joint legal custody and joint physical care
of the children, as well as a modification of Ngor’s child support obligation
to reflect the requested joint physical care arrangement. Kak answered that
petition by counterclaiming for back child support beginning from the time
the parties separated. There was no temporary-matters order entered during
the pendency of this case. Instead, the parties have operated under the same
care arrangement they have used since the 2020 separation. Under that
arrangement, Ngor cares for the children beginning on Friday evenings
through Sunday mornings. Kak cares for the children all other days.

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In April 2025, the district court entered an order giving the parties
joint legal custody but granting physical care to Kak and requiring Ngor to
pay back child support.

The district court ultimately gave the parties joint legal custody due to
“both parents [being] suitable custodians” and the record lacking “evidence
that they are incapable of communicating if and when it would be necessary
on an educational, medical, or legal issue involving the children.” On physical
care, the district court found that since Ngor has only cared for the children
on weekends, “[a] shift to 50/50 shared physical care would be a significant
change to the arrangement the children have been accustomed to for years.”
It further noted that “the parties’ communication is infrequent and poor,”
citing T.L.N.’s involvement in a car accident that Ngor did not learn about
directly from Kak, as well as instances where Ngor has taken care of T.L.N.
for an entire day before informing Kak the child was in his care.
Although the Court found the parties’ communication was not sufficient
to deny [Ngor’s] rights as a joint legal custodian, the Court finds it would
be a barrier to a shared care arrangement that requires regular
communication about the day-to-day aspects of parenting. Even if it was
feasible, it would not be in the children’s best interests as it would be a
significant departure from the arrangement they are used to.

By his own testimony, [Ngor] only saw kids “on weekends.” [Kak]
testified that it was never more than two nights in a row. [Ngor]’s
interrogatory answers suggest he saw the children only on Fridays.
Although he testified that the girls stayed over until church, the
interrogatory answers indicated [Kak] did not allow the children to go to
church. Further, [Ngor] has not been involved in the day-to-day aspects of
parenting when he has not had the children. For example, since the parties’
separation he has rarely, if ever, attended medical appointments or parent-
teacher conferences for the children.

....

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. . . [T]he children have spent significantly more time in the care of [Kak]
than they have in the care of [Ngor]. [Kak] has been serving as the de facto
primary care parent. The Court sees no basis to disturbing that
arrangement and believes it is in the best interests of the children.

On retroactive child support, the district court noted that Ngor had
not provided any financial support for the children for a period of thirty-one
months. During that thirty-one-month period, Ngor was earning around
$100,000 annually while Kak was earning between $30,000 and $45,000
annually. It noted that, after the most recent child support order, Ngor did
take a buyout from his employer, Bridgestone, in the amount of $35,000 in
anticipation of a potential layoff. But Ngor still owns a $350,000 home, which
the district court believed indicates a lack of major financial hardship
incurred by the child support order or subsequent change in employment.

So the district court decreased Ngor’s current child support obligation
but found that $1,394 of monthly child support over the thirty-one months
following the parties’ separation amounted to $43,214, 1 which it rounded
down to $40,000 as Ngor’s retroactive support obligation. The court arrived
at this figure due in part to the “nominal support” Ngor provided such as
“occasional clothes shopping or paying for [the children] to order in dinner.”
The court further found that Ngor’s recent $35,000 buyout payment from
Bridgestone supported a finding that Ngor possesses the financial means to
pay his retroactive obligation.

1
The court also remarked that, had this monthly support obligation “been
calculated at the time of the parties’ separation, the amount would likely have been
higher” given that Kak’s income was higher at the time child support was assessed in 2023
in contrast to at the time the parties separated in 2020.

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Ngor now appeals the district court’s decree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review child custody and support orders de novo. Iowa R. App. P.
6.907; In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). We give
weight to the district court’s factual findings, especially when considering
witness credibility, but are not bound by them. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 247.
The best interests of the children is our overriding consideration. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(n).

We review district court awards of attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 247. “The court has considerable
discretion in awarding attorney fees.” In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824
N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2012). “We reverse the district court’s ruling only
when it rests on grounds that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” In re
Marriage of Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
I. Physical Care Determination

Ngor first appeals the district court’s decision to grant Kak physical
care of the children. The district court makes its physical care determination
pursuant to the requirements of Iowa Code section 598.41(5) (2024) and will
consider the factors enumerated by our supreme court in In re Marriage of
Hansen. 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). Those factors include
approximation, the parents’ ability to communicate and demonstrate mutual
respect, the degree of parental conflict, and the extent to which the parents
agree about general child rearing practices. Id. at 697–99. Although
approximation alone cannot define the physical care determination, “where
one [parent] has been the primary caregiver, the likelihood that joint physical

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care may be disruptive on the emotional development of the children
increases.” Id. at 698.
In considering whether to award joint physical care where there are
two suitable parents, stability and continuity of caregiving have
traditionally been primary factors. Stability and continuity factors tend to
favor a [parent] who, prior to divorce, 2 was primarily responsible for
physical care.

We continue to believe that stability and continuity of caregiving
are important factors that must be considered in custody and care
decisions. As noted by a leading scholar, “past caretaking patterns likely
are a fairly reliable proxy of the intangible qualities such as parental abilities
and emotional bonds that are so difficult for courts to ascertain.” While no
post-divorce physical care arrangement will be identical to predissolution
experience, preservation of the greatest amount of stability possible is a
desirable goal. In contrast, imposing a new physical care arrangement on
children that significantly contrasts from their past experience can be
unsettling, cause serious emotional harm, and thus not be in the child's
best interest.

Id. at 696–97 (internal citations omitted).

Ngor argues that the district court’s decision to grant Kak physical
care of the children “directly contradicts” its finding of suitability,
referencing the district court’s findings that “[b]oth parents are suitable
custodians for the children” and “have the ability to provide adequate care
for the children.” But we do not find the district court’s findings and decree
contradictory.

Although suitability is a relevant factor to consider, the decision to
grant one parent physical care is not dependent on a finding that the other

In making a physical care determination, we apply the same factors to parents
2

who were never married as we would to married parents. See Lambert v. Everist, 418
N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1988); see also Iowa Code § 600B.40.

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parent is an unsuitable caretaker. See id. at 696 (“Although Iowa Code section
598.41(3) does not directly apply to physical care decisions, . . . the factors
listed here as well as other facts and circumstances are relevant in
determining whether joint physical care is in the best interest of the child.”).
Indeed, while the court considered parental suitability as a relevant factor
here, it found that stability and continuity of caretaking outweighed those
relevant factors, noting that “the children have spent significantly more time
in the care of [Kak] than they have in the care of [Ngor]. [Kak] has been
serving as the de facto primary care parent.” It is undisputed that Kak has
been the primary caretaker since the parties’ separation and the district court
was not wrong to give this factor weight.

Ngor further contends that his living arrangement, which is a ten-
minute drive from the children’s school and allows for each child to have their
own bedroom, 3 would minimize disruption. He also argues that he has a
better history of communicating with Kak, has been denied parenting time in
the past, and “is the sole parent who consistently transports the children to
extracurricular activities.” But the district court expressly found both parties
to be poor communicators and that Ngor “has rarely, if ever, attended
medical appointments or parent-teacher conferences for the children.” We
do not find Ngor’s extracurricular-activities argument to be especially
compelling in light of the district court’s factual findings about his attendance
at the children’s medical and educational events. We affirm the district
court’s physical-care determination.

3
The children share a bedroom in Kak’s home.

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II. Retroactive Child Support

Ngor argues the district court incorrectly assessed back child support
for the thirty-one months between the month of the parties’ separation and
the month that Ngor was ordered to pay child support starting in 2023. He
argues, as he did below, that back child support is prevented by res judicata,4
or alternatively, that it is unreasonable.

He argues that the prior court had “original jurisdiction to determine
all child support matters, including claims for retroactive child support.” The
district court agreed but found “nothing in the record to suggest that it
considered [ordering back child support] or that any party even requested it.”
Ngor fails to explain why the district court was wrong in finding that back
child support was never litigated or considered in the prior case.

And the order was not unreasonable. The district court found, and we
agree, that Ngor occasionally purchasing dinner or school supplies for the
children was insufficient support to outweigh the over $40,000 in child
support he would have otherwise paid during that time. Ngor additionally
provides no evidence that Kak “unreasonably delayed asserting her right to
collect back child support from him” and that “he was prejudiced by the
delay.” See Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Iowa 2005). We affirm the
order for back child support.

4
Although “[t]he doctrine of res judicata embraces the concepts of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion,” Ngor does not specify which doctrine he is relying on.
Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). The district court
interpreted his argument to invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion, which “requires the
issue to have been actually litigated.” Id. We do the same.

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III. Attorney Fees

Ngor argues the district court’s award of trial attorney fees was an
abuse of discretion because he does not have superior ability to pay. But this
is not the only factor the court will consider when assessing attorney fees, see
In re Marriage of Guyer, 522 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1994), and the district
court here agreed that the parties “earn roughly the same income . . . but the
receipt of the [$35,000] lump sum payment clearly places [Ngor] in a better
position to cover attorneys’ fees in this matter.” As the court concluded, “[t]o
allow him to keep this full payment while not imputing the former
Bridgestone income into the child support calculations would create an
injustice.” The district court was not unreasonable in so concluding and did
not abuse its discretion in ordering Ngor to pay attorney fees. We accordingly
affirm the district court decree in whole.

AFFIRMED.

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