State of Iowa v. Max Amyda

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1563
Filed January 28, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Max Amyda,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
The Honorable Steven J. Andreasen, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy (argued),
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry (argued),
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Max Amyda appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse,
challenging the admission of a digital video that was sent to the victim online
and purportedly shows him sexually abusing the victim while she was asleep.
He argues that the State failed to authenticate the video under Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.901 because it did not present testimony of a witness who
personally observed the conduct depicted in the video or who could describe
the process or system that made the video. And he argues that the video’s
admission violated the best-evidence rule because it was not an original under
rule 5.1001 and a duplicate should not have been admitted under rule 5.1003
because he raised a genuine question about the original’s authenticity—
alleging that the video was a “deepfake.”

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video.
The path to authentication of a video is not so narrow as Amyda contends.
Circumstantial evidence based on the “distinctive characteristics” and other
contents of the video and all the surrounding circumstances can also be
sufficient to support a finding that the video is what it claims to be—a
depiction of the victim being sexually abused by Amyda in early May 2023.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(b)(4). So the court was within its discretion to conclude
that the State made such a showing with the victim’s detailed testimony that
she recognized her body, her partial clothing, the room, and Amyda’s hand—
all consistent with the only time that he was in her room in early May 2023.

So too was the court within its discretion to reject Amyda’s best-
evidence challenge. Assuming the rule applies to this video and that the video
is not an original, it was still admissible as a duplicate because Amyda’s
speculative claims that the video was a “deepfake” without any evidentiary
support did not raise a genuine question about the video’s authenticity.

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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On May 5, 2023, a woman—the victim in this case—reached out to
her life-long friend to make plans to hang out. But the friend was busy and
suggested that the victim ask the friend’s uncle—Amyda—to hang out
instead. The victim had never spent time alone with Amyda before. But he
had been to her sister’s house—where the victim lived with her sister and her
sister’s husband and young kids—once before with another friend. The
victim took the suggestion and reached out to Amyda through Facebook
Messenger to invite him over. And that night, Amyda visited the house.

First, the victim and Amyda listened to music and drank alcohol
together in the garage. Late into the night, she became tired and they went to
her bedroom. They were both drunk and began kissing. Then Amyda took off
his clothes and repeatedly asked the victim to have sex with him. But she
rejected Amyda and never took her clothes off. She eventually fell asleep.
When she woke, Amyda was sleeping next to her, and they were both fully
clothed. Amyda left later that evening.

A few weeks later in mid-June, the victim received a message through
Facebook Messenger from her sister. The message included a roughly one-
minute-long video that her sister had received from another family member.
The video started by showing a woman’s vaginal and surrounding pubic area.
It then panned up to show the victim’s torso and face. She was lying down on
her bed asleep or unconscious—her eyes were closed and steady breathing
could be heard in the video’s audio. And she was wearing only what appears
to be a sports bra. Then, a person’s hand started manipulating her vagina and
spread apart her labia while the video zoomed in close to the vagina and at
other times again panned up to show the rest of the victim’s body and face.
After nearly a minute of this, in the final ten seconds, the video focused on

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the victim’s pubic hair and showed the hand pointing at the hair and giving a
thumbs-down gesture. The hand then scratched the hair, as if shaving it, and
concluded with a thumbs-up gesture. For parts of the video, the back of the
left hand could be seen with a tattoo on it. The tattoo appeared to be in the
shape of an “X” with one of the lines replaced by an arrow pointing toward
the wrist and a few other small numbers or letters under the “X.”

The victim was devastated. She recognized herself, her clothes, and
her room. She recognized Amyda’s hand and his tattoo. And she was shocked
to learn that he had touched her that way without her permission.

The victim immediately reached out to Amyda through Facebook
Messenger again “to find out why he did this kind of thing to me.” But rather
than responding, Amyda blocked her so she could not communicate with him
further.

The next day, the victim and her sister went to the police and gave
them the video. A detective investigating the sexual abuse phoned Amyda at
least twice, telling him that a complaint of sexual abuse had been made and
trying to schedule an in-person meeting. But Amyda did not cooperate. And
the State eventually charged Amyda with third-degree sexual abuse.

Before trial, Amyda moved in limine to exclude the video or any
testimony about the video. He argued that the State could not authenticate
the video because none of the witnesses listed in the minutes of testimony
“observed the video being shot” and so there was no evidence of “who shot
it, where it was shot, when it was shot and whether the video is an accurate,
unaltered representation of the events depicted in it.” He also argued that
“The Best Evidence Rule Precludes the Admissibility of the Video.” But
while Amyda quoted the rules of evidence and cases applying the best-

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evidence rule, he did not make any specific argument as to how admission of
the video violated that rule.1

The district court held an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
authentication objection as a preliminary question, “so that the parties will
know at least whether that foundation is established for” the video before
trial. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.104. The State presented testimony from the victim,
her sister, and the detective to whom they turned over the video.

Four days later, the district court denied Amyda’s motion in a
thorough written ruling. While the court agreed with Amyda that no
witnesses could authenticate the video by testifying that they observed the
conduct shown on the video or the process by which it was shot, the court
still concluded that Amyda’s authentication objection failed because there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence “establishing that the video depicts a
sex act being performed on [the victim]” and that it “depicts [Amyda]
performing such sex act on or about May 5, 2023.” The court reasoned that
this evidence included the victim’s detailed testimony that: (1) “the video
shows her face, her body, and specifically her vaginal area,” including
“stretch marks and other distinctive features of her body”; (2) “the bed and
other items on the video accurately depicted her bedroom”; (3) “the
appearance of her, her bed, her bedroom, and the like depicted in the video
appear to be in the same condition as existing on May 5, 2023”; (4) “she
observed a tattoo on [Amyda’s] hand when they were together May 5, 2023,
that looked similar to the tattoo observed on the hand in the video”; and
(5) Amyda “was lying next to her on the bed when she fell asleep and was
there when she woke up the following morning, indicating that [Amyda] not

1
Amyda also raised other evidentiary and constitutional objections to the video
and testimony about the video that he no longer pursues on appeal.

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only had the opportunity to do what is depicted in the video but was also
arguably the only person with that opportunity.”

The court also rejected Amyda’s best-evidence objection, concluding
that the video received by the victim through Facebook Messenger “is
arguably the ‘original’” because “[i]t is what they received and viewed.”
Alternatively, the court reasoned that even “[i]f the video captured by the
phone, camera, or device at the time it was being taken is the original, the
Court concludes that such original is either lost or destroyed not due to bad
faith of the State or otherwise cannot be obtained by any available judicial
process.”

During the August 2024 jury trial, the district court admitted the video
over Amyda’s renewed objections. The court also admitted a photograph
taken from the video that showed the tattoo on the back of the left hand as it
was touching the victim’s vagina. And the jury heard testimony from the
victim, her sister, and the detective to whom they turned over the video—all
generally consistent with their testimony at the motion-in-limine hearing.

After the State rested, Amyda presented photos of his hands taken a
few weeks before trial and a stipulation authenticating the photographs.
These photos showed a different tattoo on his left hand than the left hand in
the video. Rather than the simple “X” with an arrow pointing toward the
thumb joint, the tattoo was an elaborate skull wearing a hood.

In rebuttal, the State submitted booking photos of Amyda’s hands that
were taken when he was arrested at the end of July 2023—a little more than
a month after the victim received the video, reached out to Amyda for an
explanation, and reported the video to the police in mid-June. The photo of
Amyda’s left hand also showed the skull tattoo on Amyda’s left hand. But the

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State called an experienced tattoo artist who provided his expert opinion that
the skull tattoo was “new” and had been placed on Amyda’s hand in the two
weeks before the photo was taken. The tattoo expert explained that the
July 2023 photo showed “peeling and flaking skin around the more intense
dark areas,” which was “a dead giveaway” that it was still in the first two
weeks of healing. The expert also explained that when a good tattoo artist
puts a tattoo over an earlier tattoo, the earlier tattoo is not visible anymore—
and that he could not tell from the photo whether the new skull tattoo had
been put over another tattoo.

The jury found Amyda guilty of third-degree sexual abuse. And the
district court sentenced him to a ten-year indeterminate prison sentence.
Amyda now appeals his conviction, challenging only the district court’s
decision to admit the digital video.

II. Authentication of the Digital Video

Amyda first argues that the district court should have excluded the
digital video because the State failed to authenticate it with a proper
foundation. We review this evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. See
State v. Manning, 26 N.W.3d 385, 390 (Iowa 2025). “A district court abuses
its discretion when it bases its decisions on grounds or reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent that is clearly unreasonable or if it bases its
conclusions on an erroneous application of the law.” State v. Thoren, 970
N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up).

To authenticate the video, like any item of evidence, the State had to
“produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a). The State was not required to
explain “all the circumstances surrounding” the video. Manning, 26 N.W.3d
at 392 (cleaned up). Nor did it have to produce “[c]lear, certain and positive

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proof.” Id. (cleaned up). Rather, circumstantial evidence can be enough. Id.
And ultimately, the State was merely required to “provide sufficient
information that could allow a jury to determine the evidence is what the
proponent claims.” Id. at 393 (cleaned up).

Among rule 5.901’s non-exhaustive list of examples “of evidence that
satisfies the” authentication requirement, is: “Distinctive characteristics and
the like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the
circumstances.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(b)(4). Although this method of
authentication may be used in combination with other examples in the rule,
authentication of a photo or video with rule 5.901(b)(4) evidence does not
rest on a witness who personally witnessed the depicted activities or created
the photo or video. See State v. Farnum, 397 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Iowa 1986)
(relying in part on rule 5.901(b)(4) to hold that five photos were properly
authenticated by a detective’s testimony that “the decor of the room” shown
in the photos matched his personal observations of the defendant’s bedroom
even though the detective was not “a direct witness to the depicted
activities” but also relying on rule 5.901(b)(3) because the photos were
“graphically similar” to other photos that had already been authenticated by
direct witnesses who were depicted in the photos); see also State v. Deering,
291 N.W.2d 38, 39 (Iowa 1980) (“[T]he basic principles which govern the
admission of photographs also apply to the admission of motion picture films
taken without artificial reconstruction.”).

Our supreme court discussed this type of authentication evidence
most extensively in State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1980). There,
the State sought to admit a photo—taken on a roll of film from a camera that
was stolen in a burglary—which the State claimed was “a picture of the

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burglar,” apparently accidentally taken by the burglar himself while
crouching outside the victim’s garage. Id. at 228, 234. The photo was the only
evidence identifying the burglar. Id. at 230. And the State had no witness who
observed what the photo depicted or could describe how the photo was
taken—although the victim who owned the camera gave limited general
testimony about the reliability of the camera “and the photographic process.”
Id. at 231.

But the victim could testify about the short time window between
when his camera was stolen and a neighborhood boy returned to him “a roll
of film of the kind which he had in the camera.” Id. at 228, 234. He testified
that he took the first eight pictures from that roll. Id. at 227. And he
recognized his boat and trash can appearing in the background of the photo
of the purported burglar. Id. at 228. The court acknowledged that
“[c]onventionally,” a photo is authenticated “by the direct testimony of a
person who, although perhaps not connected with the photography, observed
the scene and testifies that the picture fairly shows it, or who describes the
photographic process employed and testifies it produces accurate pictures.”
Id. at 230. And it reasoned that “[t]he harder cases are those in which direct
testimony is not available and the proponent must rely on circumstances to
lay a foundation for admission.” Id. Yet relying on nearly identical language
to rule 5.901(b)(4) in the Federal Rules of Evidence and precedent from other
jurisdictions,2 the court held that the mostly circumstantial evidence from
the testimony was “sufficient to support a finding that the photograph is what
the State claims.” Id. at 234 (cleaned up). And so, the court affirmed the
district court’s admission of the photo. Id.

2
Holderness was decided a few years before the adoption of the Iowa Rules of
Evidence, which were modeled after the federal rules.

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Similarly here, the State claimed that the video depicts Amyda sexually
abusing the victim in her bedroom on or about May 5, 2023. And much
circumstantial evidence, including from distinctive characteristics shown in
the video, would support a finding that the video is what the State claims.

To start, the victim testified that she invited Amyda to hangout with
her and that he stayed the night with her on May 5, 2023, that they drank
alcohol and became drunk, and that she fell asleep and woke up with Amyda
beside her. These circumstances place Amyda in her room while she was
asleep, giving him the opportunity to do the acts in the video. Indeed, given
her testimony that this night was the only time she was ever alone with him,
a jury could find that around May 5, 2023, was the only time that the acts
could have occurred.

The victim also testified that she recognized many details of her
bedroom in the video, including her bed, pillow, and clothing. She testified
that the clothes she has on in the video are the same clothes she had on the
night that Amyda stayed with her. She also recognized her own body and
specific, extremely personal details—including her face, vagina and its
internal coloring, her pubic hair, stretch marks, and hair stubble on her legs.

And the victim recognized the hand—and the distinctive tattoo on the
hand—in the video as Amyda’s. Her identification of Amyda as the sexual
abuser in the video is further supported by her testimony that she
communicated with Amyda through Facebook Messenger, that the video was
circulated through Facebook Messenger, and that when she reached out to
Amyda on Facebook Messenger asking for an explanation, he blocked her.

The victim’s sister backed up the victim with her own testimony about
the circumstances of Amyda’s visit to her house. And she too recognized

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distinctive details in the video, including the victim, her clothing, the
bedroom and bed sheets.

Amyda offers no counterargument against the sufficiency of all this
circumstantial evidence aside from his claim that the State had to present
testimony of a witness who personally observed the conduct depicted in the
video or one who could describe the process or system that made the video.
But this narrow view of rule 5.901’s authentication requirement is wrong. To
be sure, those are permissible methods of authentication. See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.901(b)(1), (9). But so is using circumstantial evidence from the
distinctive contents of the video and surrounding circumstances. See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.901(b)(4); Holderness, 293 N.W.2d at 230–34.

What’s more, other states with similar authentication rules have also
approved of authenticating videos mainly through circumstantial evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Anglemyer, 691 N.W.2d 153, 159–63 (Neb. 2005) (affirming
authentication of videotape showing defendant’s sexual conduct with a dog
in a motel room based on testimony about distinctive features of the room, a
date stamp on the video, motel guest records, and identification of the dog);
State v. Sapp, 332 P.3d 1058, 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming
authentication of digital videos showing sexual abuse of a child who did not
testify based on testimony of the victim’s grandmother—who did not
observe the abuse—identifying the victim, the victim’s age in the video, the
location shown in the video, and the defendant); State v. King, 626 S.W.3d
828, 841–42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (affirming authentication of video showing
sexual assaults of unconscious victim); State v. A.S., No. A-5420-13T1, 2015
WL 6442387, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2015) (affirming
authentication of video showing sexual assault of sleeping victim). And this
remains so even though videos are “susceptible to alteration, and the

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increased availability of new technology, particularly the advent of image-
generating artificial intelligence, may present unique challenges in
authenticating videos and photographs.” Mooney v. State, 321 A.3d 91, 110–11
(Md. 2024) (reaffirming authentication of digital video by circumstantial
evidence and noting that “photographic manipulation, alterations and
fabrications are nothing new, nor are such changes unique to digital imaging,
although it might be easier in this digital age” (cleaned up)).

Bottom line, the State’s circumstantial evidence of authentication was
sufficient for a jury to find that the video is what the State claims—a depiction
of Amyda sexually abusing the victim in her bedroom around May 5, 2023.
So the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video over Amyda’s
authentication objection.

III. Best Evidence of the Digital Video

Amyda next argues that the district court should have excluded the
digital video under the best-evidence rule because it was not an original and
a duplicate was inadmissible since he raised a genuine question about the
original video’s authenticity. The State counters by questioning whether the
best-evidence rule applies to videos like this one at all, contending that an
identical copy of a video should be treated as an original rather than a
duplicate, and arguing that it is admissible as a duplicate because Amyda
raised no genuine issue about the video’s authenticity. Again, we review for
abuse of discretion. See Manning, 26 N.W.3d at 393.

Iowa’s best evidence rule—codified in Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.1001
through 5.1004—provides that “[a]n original writing, recording, or
photograph is required to prove its content, unless these rules or a statute
provides otherwise.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.1002. And the rules otherwise provide
that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a

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genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the
circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.1003;
see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.1001(e) (defining a “duplicate” as “a counterpart
produced by a[n] . . . electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that
accurately reproduces the original”).

We need not resolve all the interesting issues raised by the parties.
Assuming without deciding that the best-evidence rule applies to this video
and that the video received by the victim is not an original, it is a duplicate
“admissible to the same extent as an original.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.1003. True,
Amyda argued at the motion-in-limine hearing and throughout trial that the
video may have been a “deepfake”—created through generative artificial
intelligence when the underlying conduct never actually occurred. But
Amyda pointed to no evidence in the record supporting this speculative
theory. And nothing about the video gives even the slightest hint that it is an
artificial creation. Bare conjecture is not enough to raise “a genuine question
. . . about the original’s authenticity” or to make it “unfair to admit the
duplicate.” Id.; see also Manning, 26 N.W.3d at 393 (rejecting best-evidence
challenge where defendant “did not seriously dispute the content of the
video,” despite an authentication challenge, and agreeing with the district
court that “any editing or manipulation of that video would go to the weight
of that evidence and not to its direct admissibility” (cleaned up)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the digital
video over Amyda’s best-evidence objection. We thus affirm Amyda’s
conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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