In the Interest of K.T. and S.T., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1652
Filed January 7, 2026
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In the Interest of K.T. and S.T., Minor Children,
D.S., Mother,
Appellant,
T.S., Legal Father,
Appellant,
K.T., Biological Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County,
The Honorable Patrick J. McAvan, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS
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Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorney for appellant mother.

Patrick C. Brau of Brau Law Office, Mount Pleasant, attorney for appellant
legal father.

Larry Brock of Brock Law Office, Washington, attorney for appellant
biological father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

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Katherine E. Lujan of Washington Law Office, Washington, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

A mother and two fathers—one biological and one legal—appeal the
juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to their two daughters, born
in 2020 and 2022. The court found that the girls could not be returned to
any of the parents and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
The mother and legal father challenge those findings on appeal. All three
parents contend that the court erred by declining to grant additional time for
reunification. Our review is de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa
2022).

I. Statutory Grounds

The juvenile court terminated each of the parents’ rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h) (2025). 1 These grounds are nearly
identical, except for the age of the children involved and the length of
removal. The mother and legal father challenge the final common element
of both paragraphs,2 which require clear and convincing evidence that the

1
The court also terminated the biological father’s rights under Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(e) and (l). But because he does not contest the statutory grounds for the
termination of his parental rights, we confine our analysis to those challenged by the
mother and legal father. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (limiting review to
the steps challenged by parents on appeal).
2
The State suggests that the legal father waived any challenge to the statutory
grounds for termination by failing to specifically invoke paragraphs “f” or “h” in his
petition on appeal. We disagree. Our court has often warned about the risk of waiver for
parents who do not sufficiently identify the statutory finding they challenge on appeal.
See, e.g., In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). But here, the
legal father expressly contests the juvenile court’s conclusion “that the children could not
be returned,” arguing he fulfilled each of the expectations in the department’s case plan.
The State’s failure to address the legal father’s statutory-grounds challenge on its merits
has deprived us of the benefit of full adversarial briefing.

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children cannot be returned to their parents’ custody “at the present time.”
See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(1)(f )(4), (h)(4); see also In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162,
168 (Iowa 2021) (interpreting the words “present time” to mean “the time
of the termination hearing”). After more than three years of services, the
court found the “record is clear” that the parents “cannot provide a safe
home for the children.” We agree.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services became
involved with the family in April 2022—before the youngest child was
born—on a report that the mother and biological father were using drugs in
the apartment they shared with the legal father. The mother admitted that
she regularly used marijuana to treat her anxiety, even while pregnant.
Unsurprisingly, when the youngest child was born in July, her umbilical cord
was positive for marijuana. Sweat patches placed on the mother and
biological father were also positive for marijuana—and for
methamphetamine. Around the same time, the legal father overdosed on his
prescribed oxycodone.

The children were adjudicated in need of assistance in October but
allowed to remain in the parents’ custody until April 2023, when the mother
and biological father again tested positive for methamphetamine and
marijuana. They made little progress toward reunification over the next year.
The State petitioned to terminate all three parents’ rights, and a hearing was
held in September 2024. The mother and biological father continued to
struggle with substance use, employment, and stable housing. They lacked
enough money to meet their basic needs, and they relied on friends for shelter
and transportation. On top of those issues, the biological father was arrested
in July for domestic abuse assault against the mother, resulting in a no-
contact order.

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The juvenile court found the children could not be safely returned to
either of their biological parents. It reached a different conclusion for the
legal father, who had been overlooked by the department. A parent to these
girls because of his marriage to the mother, see Iowa Code § 232.2(45), the
legal father lived with the biological parents for most of this case. He testified
that he supported the girls before their removal and that he believed they
could live with him. Crediting his account, the juvenile court found the legal
father was entitled to additional time and services, although it warned he
would need “to demonstrate that he can provide for . . . these girls on his own
if necessary.” The court dismissed the termination petition and granted each
of the parents a six-month extension to work toward reunification.

That goal only slipped further away. A series of probation violations
landed the biological father in prison,3 and the mother spent a week in jail
after violating her no-contact order with the biological father. The mother
continued to test positive for THC, even though she was on probation for
operating while intoxicated. She also temporarily revoked the releases that
had allowed the department to communicate with her mental-health and
substance-use counselors. 4 Meanwhile, neither the mother nor the legal
father had a steady source of income. And their visits with the girls remained
fully supervised. After a second termination hearing in July 2025, the
juvenile court found “that neither child can be returned to the custody of any
of their parents at this time.”

3
The biological father was still incarcerated when the second termination hearing
was held, at which time he conceded that, “given [his] current situation,” the children
could not be returned to his custody.
4
The mother later signed a new release that restored the department’s access to
her mental-health and substance-use information.

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Challenging this conclusion, the mother and legal father assert that
they demonstrated their commitment to the children by participating in
supervised visits and other services in the months after the first termination
hearing. They also point out that they secured a suitable home for the girls.
Although we applaud these efforts, they are outweighed by other concerns.

Clear and convincing evidence shows that the mother has failed to
address the drug problem that required the girls’ removal. During the three
years that this case was pending, she never provided a test sample that was
negative for all substances. Although the mother testified that her positive
THC results were from medical cannabis she bought at “a dispensary in Iowa
City,” she refused to provide further details when questioned at the hearing.
Given that lack of candor, as well the mother’s attempt to withhold her
treatment information from the department, we decline to assume that she
uses marijuana in a safe and responsible way. See In re J.K., 495 N.W.2d 108,
112 (Iowa 1993) (drawing an adverse inference about a mother’s drug use
where she refused to submit to an evaluation and withdrew the release
allowing her drug counselor to communicate with her caseworker).

The mother also failed to end her relationship with the biological
father after his conviction for domestic abuse assault. Her communication
with him—in the form of a sexually explicit video exchange—violated their
no-contact order and resulted in her own incarceration. She denied being in
a relationship with him at the terminating hearing. But when asked whether
she intended to rekindle one, the mother answered, “At this moment, I don’t
know anything.” Her conduct and testimony suggest that she does not
understand the risk that domestic violence poses to the children. See In re
T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (noting a mother’s ongoing
contact with her abuser in violation of a no-contact order showed she had

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“gained very little insight . . . about her domestic violence issues and the
dangers they pose to the children”).

As for the legal father, his ability to care for the girls on his own was
still untested at the time of the second termination hearing. The juvenile
court found that despite his stated interest in assuming a custodial role, the
legal father had largely chosen to “follow [the mother’s] lead.” We agree.
Although he regularly joined the mother for visits, he declined to schedule
his own time with the girls. Only once—during the mother’s stint in jail—
did he attend an individual visit. At the hearing, the legal father
acknowledged that he had not kept up with the girls’ medical and educational
needs, and he conceded that he had never cared for both children without
assistance. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (affirming
termination where “after a year of services, the parents were still not in a
position to care for [the child] without ongoing [department] involvement”);
A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169 (finding paragraphs “f” and “h” satisfied where,
among other things, there was no indication a mother had “ever cared for the
children alone overnight”). Although the legal father claimed that he would
be able to care for the girls on his own, he was applying for social security
disability benefits because of his serious health problems—which included
blood cancer and heart issues—and was prescribed more medications than
he could remember.

Despite six months of additional services, neither the mother nor the
legal father seized the chance to prove their parenting abilities. Their
window of time was not unlimited. See A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169 (explaining
that by enacting section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h), our “legislature has
established a limited time frame for parents to demonstrate their ability to be
parents” (citation omitted)). We find clear and convincing evidence that the

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children could not be safely returned to the mother or legal father’s custody
at the time of the hearing. The State proved grounds for termination under
section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h).

II. Best Interests

The mother and legal father also challenge the juvenile court’s finding
that termination of parental rights was in the girls’ best interests. Even where
a statutory ground exists, we only affirm termination when that outcome
serves the best interests of the child. In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa
2020). In examining that question, we give “primary consideration to the
child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition
and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). A child’s integration with
their foster family is another important factor. See id. § 232.116(2)(b).

At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been removed
from their parents for twenty-seven months. They spent most of that time in
a placement with the mother’s cousin. Both girls were thriving under her
care. The older child had recently graduated from preschool, while the
younger child had completed speech therapy and was rapidly expanding her
vocabulary. According to the guardian ad litem, the girls were bonded with
the cousin, who was prepared to adopt them in the event of termination.

The mother contends that termination is not in the girls’ best interests
due to the strength of their parent-child bond and other available permanency
options, such as transferring guardianship to the cousin. 5 We are

5
Blurring the lines of our familiar three-step analysis, the mother also suggests her
bond with the girls supports a “permissive exception[] to termination.” A passing
reference to Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) is typically insufficient to merit a separate
permissive-exception analysis. L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 534 n.2. But to avoid any doubt, we

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unpersuaded. Although “the parent-child bond is a relevant consideration in
the best-interests analysis,” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App.
2025), it is not controlling here. The girls also share a bond with the maternal
cousin, who has been their primary caretaker for most of their young lives.
See id. at 535 (finding termination was in a child’s best interests,
notwithstanding a father’s professed bond, where the young child was “more
bonded with [her] current caretakers”). And as for a guardianship, our
supreme court has made it clear that a “guardianship is not a legally
preferable alternative to termination,” especially for young children. In re
A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018).

We see no signs that the girls’ short- or long-term needs would be
better served by preserving the parents’ rights. None of the parents provided
financial support for the girls during their placement with the cousin. And
they were mostly uninvolved in the children’s medical and educational
decisions. The cousin also testified that the girls showed signs of emotional
distress on nights before and after visitation. As the juvenile court put it,
these girls are “crying out for permanency.” We will not extend their time in
limbo. Accounting for all the factors set out in section 232.116(2), we find
that termination of parental rights is in their best interests.

III. Additional Time

Lastly, all three parents claim that the juvenile court should have
allowed them another six months to work toward reunification rather than
terminating their parental rights. See Iowa Code §§ 232.117(5),

find the mother has not carried her burden to show that termination would be detrimental
to the children because of the closeness of her relationship with them. See A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 476 (explaining the burden is on the parent to establish a permissive exception
to termination).

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232.104(2)(b). To grant that relief, the court must find that “the need for
removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’”
In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(b)). It is the parents’ burden to make that showing. Id.

The mother and legal father failed to establish that additional time
would have fixed the problems that prevented the girls’ return in July 2025.
In the months after the first termination hearing, the mother continued to
prioritize marijuana and an unhealthy relationship with the biological father.
The legal father took a passenger-seat approach to parenting. Given this
record, we cannot find that a second second-chance would result in a
different outcome for the mother or legal father. The girls have waited for
permanency much longer than required by section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h). At
this point, the “termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of
urgency.” A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169 (citation omitted).

As for the biological father—who challenges the denial of additional
time as his only claim of error—our conclusion is no different. He argues
that an extension is warranted because he was released from prison after the
termination hearing. That development was not known by the juvenile court
at the time of termination, and it is not a part of our record on appeal. But
even if we could properly consider it, the biological father’s incarceration was
just one reason why the children could not be returned to his custody.
Equally concerning are his failures to comply with his probation
requirements, his violation of the no-contact order, and his failure during the
years this case was open to meaningfully engage in substance-use treatment.
With that performance, the juvenile court properly denied the biological
father’s request for more time.

AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS.

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