State of Iowa v. Antoine Pendleton Sr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0676
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Antoine Pendleton Sr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County,
The Honorable Elizabeth O’Donnell, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Stuart Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions following a jury trial for operating
while intoxicated, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code sections 321J.1 and
321J.2(2)(c) (2024), and driving while barred in violation of sections 321.560
and 321.561, alleging the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a mistrial based on a tainted jury pool, culminating in a
constitutional violation. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Law enforcement observed a vehicle stopping and starting continually
in the middle of the road as if it were having mechanical issues. An officer
drove behind the vehicle and tried to verify its registration but was unable to
because his radio was not functioning. The officer stopped his car to try to
use the radio and lost sight of the vehicle.

The officer eventually learned the registration on the vehicle was
expired and relocated the vehicle. When the officer turned his patrol car
around to make a traffic stop, the driver, Antoine Pendleton, exited the
vehicle at a stop sign and quickly walked away. The officer followed Pendleton
on foot, commanding Pendleton to stop. But Pendleton continued to walk
away.

After catching up with Pendleton, the officer detained him until other
officers arrived. The officers had suspicions that Pendleton was intoxicated
because of his bloodshot eyes and an odor of alcohol. The officers then
applied for a search warrant to obtain a blood sample. The result of the blood
test showed Pendleton’s blood alcohol content was 0.143, above the legal
limit to operate a vehicle. And law enforcement also learned that Pendleton’s
license was barred.

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Prior to trial, the court granted defense counsel’s motion in limine to
exclude any evidence or statements referencing Pendleton’s prior
convictions.

During voir dire at trial, the State asked the potential jurors if there
was anything they wanted to say before the State passed for cause. One of the
prospective jurors stated:
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I probably—I don’t know the Defendant
personally, per se, but I am a correctional officer in Scott County.

PROSECUTOR: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: And I feel like maybe he’s been there
before, so I don’t know if that would make a difference.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. So let’s separate that into two parts. Your
job as a correctional officer, would you have concerns about sitting on a
jury and being impartial?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I mean, yeah, maybe, per se, on the other
side, I mean.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. So, yeah. And would you—Let me be
blunt, then. So would you worry if you thought the State hadn’t done its
job and you’re going back to your coworkers and saying, yeah, I found him
not guilty, that maybe like, what’s the deal with that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I mean, yeah, per se.

The State moved to strike the prospective juror for cause, which was
unopposed by defense counsel, and the court granted the strike. Then,
during the next break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the
prospective juror’s statements. The State resisted the motion. The court
denied the motion based on the “speculative nature of her statements that
she may recognize him.” Defense counsel then conducted his voir dire of the

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jurors and did not ask the other jurors about the effect of the statements or
whether they had any bias against Pendleton.

After the conclusion of trial, the jury found Pendleton guilty as
charged. Pendleton was sentenced to five years incarceration on the
operating-while-intoxicated conviction and two years on the driving-while-
barred conviction, to be served consecutively.

Pendleton now appeals, asserting the statements from the prospective
juror tainted the jury pool because of alleged reference to prior incarceration,
denying his constitutional right to a fair trial.

II. Error Preservation

After the State questioned the prospective juror, during a recess,
defense counsel made a motion for mistrial, which was denied by the court.
Pendleton accordingly preserved error on his constitutional claim. See State
v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 699–700 (Iowa 2016). But Pendleton failed to
preserve error on his newly raised argument regarding a ground for a new
trial under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(b)(2). Motions for a new
trial are posttrial motions, and Pendleton never filed such a motion, so the
district court did not rule on a motion for a new trial. Pendleton failed to
preserve this issue. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002)
(“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them
on appeal.”).

Pendleton also asserts the district court should have polled the jurors
concerning bias. This issue was not raised at trial, and the court did not rule
on it. It is thus not preserved. See id. Even if this issue were preserved, it is in

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the discretion of the district court whether to poll the jurors for inquiries of
bias sua sponte. See State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 417–18 (Iowa 2022).

III. Standard of Review

We turn to the issue preserved for our review. We review a district
court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Brown,
5 N.W.3d 611, 614–15 (Iowa 2024). We afford the district court “considerable
discretion in ruling upon motions for mistrial.” Id. at 615 (citation omitted).
“[W]e ordinarily only find an abuse of discretion upon the denial of a mistrial
‘where there is no support in the record for the trial court’s determination.’”
Id. (citation omitted).

Pendleton urges us to apply de novo review because of his alleged
constitutional violation based on a tainted jury. He bases this argument on
Liggins, which discussed, but did not resolve, whether de novo or abuse-of-
discretion review was appropriate. See 978 N.W.2d at 417-18 (noting that
some authority could support de novo review but ultimately declining to
reach the issue because “even applying the more stringent de novo review
standard,” the defendant’s claim failed). But we agree with the State that this
issue is to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Christensen, 929
N.W.2d 646, 682–84 (Iowa 2019) (Waterman, J., concurring) (stating issues
concerning juror-bias claims are to be reviewed for abuse of discretion).

IV. Discussion

Pendleton asserts that the statements made by the prospective juror
implying Pendleton was previously incarcerated created bias within the jury
pool and prejudiced him. Generally, “[e]xpressions of bias or prejudice by a
single prospective juror ordinarily do not constitute a sufficient ground for
disqualification of an entire jury panel.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 701. But that is

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not to say that all statements would be insufficient for disqualification, as
“remarks made during voir dire could become so inflammatory and
potentially prejudicial that [a] . . . panel could be disqualified.” Id. (citation
omitted). Juror bias “focuses on the ability of a juror to impartially consider
questions raised at trial.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 232 (Iowa 2015).
“It is a bedrock component of our system of justice that an accused charged
with a criminal offense receives a fair trial before an unbiased decision-
maker.” Id. at 233 (citing Iowa Const. art. I, § 9).

Here, the statements by the prospective juror were not specific as far
as actually identifying Pendleton, or stating where exactly the juror worked
as a correctional officer. The prospective juror simply stated that maybe she
had seen Pendleton before, without additional context. These statements
were speculative at best, and do not necessarily rise to the level of bias. See
Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 701.

And even if this juror’s statements indicated bias that prejudiced
Pendleton, his counsel could have examined the issue of implied bias during
voir dire. “[T]o the extent particular jurors may be substantially prejudiced
against a defendant, rigorous voir dire can be trusted to expose these
prejudices.” State v. Misner, 410 N.W.2d 216, 219–20 (Iowa 1987); Ary, 877
N.W.2d at 702 (“[H]ad defense counsel taken advantage of readily available
avenues for exploring whether the statements affected the other panel
members, he might have been able to discern whether the statements actually
had any impact.”). Here, defense counsel chose not to investigate whether
the statements affected the other jurors, so there is no available indication of
bias resulting in prejudice within the record.

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We find the district court committed no error in denying Pendleton’s
motion for mistrial based on juror bias. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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