State of Iowa v. Jessy Ryan Demoss

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1968
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Jessy Ryan DeMoss,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County,
The Honorable Shayne Mayer, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, P.J.

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CHICCHELLY, Presiding Judge.

Jessy DeMoss appeals his convictions for three counts of second-
degree sexual abuse and one count of lascivious acts with a child. He argues
the district court erred when it admitted one of the victim’s statements to a
sexual abuse nurse examiner identifying him. Upon our review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
DeMoss had one daughter, C.D., and was a father figure to another
girl, M.M., whose mother he had dated. Every other weekend, he had
visitation with C.D. at his home. During these visits, he began to sexually
abuse her. C.D. recalled this continued regularly until she turned eleven
years old.

After the final time DeMoss abused her, C.D.’s vagina began to bleed.
C.D.’s behavior and obvious discomfort raised a red flag for her mother who
asked C.D. what was wrong. At that point, C.D. told her mother about
DeMoss’s abuse. Her mother informed the Iowa Department of Human
Services who then involved law enforcement. C.D. had a forensic interview
and a sexual abuse examination by a sexual abuse nurse examiner (SANE).
During this examination, C.D. disclosed what happened to her and identified
DeMoss as the perpetrator.

M.M. had a similar experience with DeMoss. He began touching
M.M. both over and under her clothes and engaging in inappropriate sexual
behaviors. These instances included DeMoss wrestling with M.M.,
removing her pants, and touching her vagina; and “pressing his penis up
against [her] butt.” DeMoss’s other behavior included pulling up M.M.’s
shirt exposing her chest and asking M.M. for a mirror picture of her full body.
When DeMoss sensed M.M. getting uncomfortable, he told her not to tell

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her mother. Eventually M.M. told her teacher what was happening, and the
teacher alerted the authorities.

As a result, the State charged DeMoss with two counts of second-
degree sexual abuse of C.D. in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b)
(2014), one count of second-degree sexual abuse of M.M., and one count of
lascivious acts with a child in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(2)(a). The
case proceeded to trial. Both C.D. and M.M. testified at trial. The jury also
heard testimony from the SANE who described the sexual assault
examination and testified to C.D.’s identification of DeMoss. DeMoss
objected to the identification at trial, and the district court admitted the
identification as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis under
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). The jury ultimately convicted DeMoss as
charged. DeMoss now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of evidentiary rulings on hearsay is for the correction of
legal error. State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 2019). “Although we
normally review evidence-admission decisions by the district court for an
abuse of discretion, we review hearsay claims for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2016). While reviewing the district
court’s decision for legal error, the court “give[s] deference to the district
court’s factual findings.” State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001).

DISCUSSION
DeMoss argues the district court erred when it admitted C.D.’s
identification statements to the SANE under the medical treatment hearsay
exception. He argues the State failed to lay the proper foundation for the
statements to be admitted. The SANE testified “I had asked [C.D.] if

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something happened to her body, and she said yes. So she talked about her
dad touching her bad spot, which to her her bad spot she pointed to her front
genital area. She identified his bad spot touching her bad spot on skin.” The
district court admitted the statement under the exception for medical
diagnosis or treatment. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(4). A statement falls within this
exception if:
(A) Is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical
diagnosis or treatment; and

(B) Describes medical history, past or present symptoms or
sensations, or the inception or general cause of symptoms or sensations.

Id. The State has the burden to establish the testimony comes within the
exception to the rule against hearsay. See Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 189.

In State v. Tracy, our supreme court held that a child victim’s
identification of the perpetrator during treatment would fall within the
exception when (1) “the declarant’s motive in making the statement [was]
consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment” and (2) was of the type
“reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis.” 482 N.W.2d
675, 681 (Iowa 1992) (en banc) (citation omitted).

First, we must identify whether C.D.’s motive was to promote medical
treatment. See id. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to show C.D.’s
motive was medical treatment. The statement was made during the medical
history portion of the examination and was outside the presence of her
mother. The question the SANE asked was not intended to elicit DeMoss’s
name. The SANE testified that they asked C.D. “if something happened to
her body.” C.D.’s identification came in response. Based on that, we
conclude C.D.’s motive was to seek medical treatment.

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Second, we must determine whether the identification is the type of
statement medical professionals reasonably rely on. The SANE testified
about their examination of C.D. She described the purpose of the
examination is to assess the medical needs of the child including needing the
identity of the perpetrator to assess the “safety risk of the child.” The nurse
described why identity was a necessary part of the examination by stating:
We want to know who the person is, who the alleged offender is, and what
is the contact going to be or what has it been like. For example, she talked
about a step-mom, I believe, that she still has visitation with or sees on
occasion, but that was not the person that was actually with her dad at that
time. So we really don’t always know what that looks like. So we do ask
who the offender is for the safety. And as well we will talk to parents or
like the mom in this situation about concerns for infections by—if it’s
someone she was married to or a boyfriend or something like that, to find
out if they were concerned of sexually-transmitted infections and things
like that. That then would—we would want to have mom take her child to
their family practice doctor, their primary physician and maybe have more
lab work, HIV, hepatitis, and things like that based on a history.

This testimony is consistent with Iowa law. See Walker, 935 N.W.2d at 879
(“In cases of child sexual abuse, ascertaining the identity of the abuser is
important for medical purposes because the child’s age prevents her from
implementing self-care and because parents are often ill-equipped to elicit the
abuser’s identity.”). Therefore, we find the State laid sufficient foundation
to satisfy both prongs of Tracy and the district court did not err in admitting
the statement.

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CONCLUSION
Because there was proper foundation to admit the victim’s
identification of DeMoss as a statement of medical diagnosis, we find the
district court did not err and affirm DeMoss’s convictions.

AFFIRMED.

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