State of Iowa v. Luke Adam Klonglan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0028
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Luke Adam Klonglan,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable David Nelmark, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

1
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Luke Klonglan pleaded guilty to the
class “D” felony offense of possession of methamphetamine, third or
subsequent offense. In return, the State agreed not to pursue a habitual-
offender enhancement and dismissed a count of driving while barred. The
parties agreed they would jointly recommend imposition of an indeterminate
five-year prison sentence, but both parties remained free to argue whether
the sentence should be imposed concurrently or consecutively to a parole-
revocation sentence Klonglan faced in another county. The district court
imposed the agreed-upon prison sentence. It then rejected Klonglan’s
request for concurrent sentences, chose to follow the State’s
recommendation, and ordered Klonglan to serve the sentence consecutively
to his parole-revocation sentence.

Klonglan appeals. He contends the district court improperly
considered unproven offenses and improperly focused on the lack of
“additional punishment” if it ran his sentences concurrently.

Because Klonglan challenges his sentence and not his plea and the
sentence he received was neither mandatory nor agreed-upon, he has
demonstrated good cause to appeal, which gives us jurisdiction over his
appeal even though he pleaded guilty. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2024);
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). As Klonglan’s sentence
falls within statutory limits, there is a strong presumption in its favor, and the
sentence will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion or the
consideration of improper factors. See State v. Pirie, 18 N.W.3d 238, 249
(Iowa 2025). To overcome the strong presumption, it is Klonglan’s burden
to affirmatively demonstrate that the court relied on an improper factor.
See id.

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As to his first claim, Klonglan is correct that relying on an unproven
offense constitutes consideration of an improper factor that requires
resentencing unless the defendant admits the offense or facts are presented
to prove them. See State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024). But
the sole basis for Klonglan’s claim that the court considered an unproven
offense was its statement—in the context of whether this sentence should be
served concurrently or consecutively to his prior sentence for which
Klonglan’s parole was being revoked—that a concurrent sentence would
“essentially have [Klonglan] serve no additional time for these additional
offenses.” Klonglan contends the reference to “additional offenses” shows
the court considered unproven offenses, as he only pleaded guilty to one
offense. We disagree.

There is nothing about the court’s comments suggesting that it was
punishing Klonglan for offenses to which he did not plead guilty. The
reference to “additional offenses” can easily be chalked up to being a slip of
the tongue given that there is no indication, either in the context surrounding
the reference or at any other time during the court’s explanation of the
sentence, that it was punishing Klonglan for anything other than the charge
to which he pleaded guilty. See State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313–14 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that “unfortunate phraseology” and
“unintended or misconstrued remarks” sometimes result from the
extemporaneous nature of detailing the reasons for a sentence). Klonglan has
not met his burden to show the court considered an proper factor when it
referenced “additional offenses,” so his claim based on this statement fails.
See Pirie, 18 N.W.3d at 249 (placing the burden on the defendant to show
consideration of an improper factor).

3
As to his second claim, Klonglan contends the court considered an
improper factor when it focused on what additional punishment Klonglan
would receive from concurrent sentences. He bases this contention on the
court asking Klonglan’s counsel to explain what additional punishment
Klonglan would receive with concurrent sentences and then, when
explaining the sentence imposed, stating:
But to give you a little more time to try to be away from the use of drugs
and to balance your opportunity for rehabilitation with protecting the
public, I find it would be inappropriate to run these concurrent and
essentially have you serve no additional time for these additional offenses.

Klonglan acknowledges that it was proper for the court to consider that
he committed the instant offense while on probation or parole. See, e.g., State
v. Sinclair, No. 19-0592, 2020 WL 2487616, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 13,
2020). But he contends (1) the court should not have considered concurrent
sentences to be a lack of punishment and (2) the court’s approach was akin
to imposing consecutive sentences to thwart an earlier parole date. See State
v. Remmers, 259 N.W.2d 779, 784–85 (Iowa 1977) (holding that a sentencing
court cannot fashion a sentence with the purpose of interfering with a parole
release date).1

We disagree with both premises of Klonglan’s argument. First,
nothing about the reasons the court gave for imposing consecutive sentences
suggests that it did not consider concurrent sentences punishment. Instead,
the court focused on the fact that the sentence in the parole-revocation
matter and the crime in this matter were separate offenses, in different
counties, on different dates, so separate punishment in the form of

1
The State argues for overturning Remmers. As Remmers is controlling supreme
court precedent, we cannot overrule it. See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2014) (“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.”).

4
consecutive sentences was appropriate. It also highlighted that Klonglan has
had multiple past opportunities to be law-abiding but has not done so. So, to
provide for Klonglan’s rehabilitation and to protect the public, the court
imposed consecutive sentences. There was nothing improper about the
court’s reasoning.

Second, we reject Klonglan’s contention that the court’s decision was
akin to attempting to thwart parole eligibility, as prohibited by Remmers. The
court said nothing about parole. Of course, because the court imposed
consecutive sentences, Klonglan will most likely serve more time in prison.
That’s the point of imposing consecutive sentences. If Klonglan’s reasoning
prevailed, every consecutive sentence imposed would run afoul of Remmers.
But that is clearly not the case, as consecutive sentences are permissible. See
Iowa Code § 901.8. Though, by its nature, the consecutive sentence the
court imposed potentially extended Klonglan’s term of incarceration, the
court did nothing to thwart Klonglan’s parole eligibility. Therefore, nothing
the court did violated the prohibitions recognized in Remmers. See 259
N.W.2d at 783–85 (prohibiting the sentencing court from choosing a length
of sentence within a range of allowable sentences in order to thwart parole
eligibility). Accordingly, we reject Klonglan’s claim that the court considered
an improper factor.

Having rejected both of Klonglan’s challenges, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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