Stephen Shawn Keyes v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 24-1489
January 7, 2026
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Stephen Shawn Keyes,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
_______________

Appeal from Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Justin Lightfoot, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED
_______________

Erica Nichols Cook (argued) of the State Public Defender Wrongful
Conviction Unit, and Tara Thompson (pro hac vice) of The Exoneration
Project, New York, New York, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Heard at oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

1
SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Stephen Keyes, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after
the 1996 deaths of his wife and two-year-old child, appeals the district court’s
grant of the State’s motion for summary judgment and the denial of his own
motion for summary judgment in his second postconviction-relief (PCR)
proceeding. Keyes asserts there is newly discovered evidence showing actual
innocence; the State failed to produce evidence when challenging Keyes’s
motion for summary judgment; the district court misapplied the Brady rule
in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment; a nexus exists between
the newly discovered evidence and Keyes’s conviction, which satisfies the
exception to the statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2022);
and his counsel was ineffective at the underlying criminal trial as well as his
first PCR trial. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In the early morning hours of December 26, 1996, a fire started in the
garage of Keyes’s home that he shared with his wife, Sandra, and three young
children. Keyes escaped the fire with two of the children. Sandra and the
youngest child died from injuries caused by the fire. There were several
witnesses to the fire, including motorists who saw the fire in the garage while
driving by the home. Some witnesses stopped at the scene in attempts to
assist the family or call emergency services.

While investigating the fire, State Fire Marshal Agent Hiles used his
dog, Sax, to identify potential accelerants, which would indicate the fire was
set intentionally. Sax identified accelerants in nine areas within the garage.
Based on this and other evidence, Keyes was charged with two counts of first-
degree murder.

2
At trial, the State offered evidence suggesting that Keyes and Sandra’s
marriage was on the rocks and that Keyes had been involved with one of his
female co-workers. The State also offered evidence that Keyes started the fire
by pouring gasoline on several bags of garbage within the garage. The State
alleged that Keyes exited the house while the fire spread, sat in his van, and
only returned inside to retrieve two of the children after a passing motorist
stopped to assess the situation. Additional evidence alleged that a table was
wedged into the base of the staircase to prevent Sandra from escaping the
fire.

Agent Hiles testified that in his opinion the fire was started using an
accelerant, and another fire marshal also testified to his belief the fire was not
accidental. Keyes’s son, M.K., who was eight years old at the time, testified
Keyes woke him up that morning, that the house “wasn’t very smoky” while
exiting, and that he only noticed the fire after sitting outside. M.K. also
testified that Keyes waited for fifteen minutes before calling emergency
services.

Doug and Barbara Lint, Sandra’s parents, testified about Keyes’s
perpetual financial difficulties and the marital strain between Keyes and
Sandra. Other evidence showed that Keyes obtained renter’s insurance on
the home and its contents eleven days before the fire. Keyes was also the
beneficiary of life insurance for his wife and two children. And although
Sandra’s parents learned that Keyes and Sandra did not have money to buy
Christmas gifts for the three children, evidence was offered that Keyes
purchased a tennis bracelet for his girlfriend, paying with a personal check.

A first responder testified about Keyes’s behavior at the scene, which
many found suspicious. An emergency room nurse also testified about his
behavior while at the hospital, including the fact that his girlfriend picked him

3
up from the hospital, that Keyes and this woman kissed at the hospital, and
that the pair “kind of chuckled.” When they walked away, the two were
holding hands. A fellow inmate at the Linn County jail, Young, testified that
he overheard Keyes tell another inmate that he started the fire using gasoline.

The owner of the home installed three smoke detectors just before
renting the home to the Keyes family. Before the fire, the second story smoke
alarm had been taken down and placed in a drawer under articles of clothing.

At trial, Keyes’s defense expert, Bruce Johnson, testified that the
damage caused by the fire precluded identification of the origin and cause of
the fire. On rebuttal, Agent Hiles stated that Johnson’s assessment was in
error because Sax had the ability to differentiate between accelerants and
other synthetic odors.

During closing arguments, the State described Keyes’s inactions and
actions as proof of his guilt. The State also asserted that the type and origin
of the fire and the subsequent damage was proof that Keyes started the fire
intentionally with a liquid accelerant. The State also argued that because
Sandra and J.K.—the child who died in the fire—failed to escape, it was
evidence that Keyes started the fire, intending to kill them.

Following deliberations, the jury found Keyes guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of
parole. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in 1999,
preserving his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for potential PCR
proceedings.1

1
State v. Keyes, No. 97-1997, slip op. (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 1999).

4
Keyes filed a PCR application in 1999 based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. Trial was not held until 2014.2 The PCR application was denied
by the district court, and our court affirmed that decision in 2017.3

Keyes filed the PCR action subject to this appeal in 2022, alleging his
convictions violated both the Iowa and United States Constitutions. Keyes
also argued there was new evidence which showed the fire started
accidentally within the wall between the garage and the house, allegedly
supported by new scientific understandings of fire toxicology and behavior
which were unavailable at the initial trial and the first PCR trial. And Keyes
argued that the State was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed
to put forward evidence in support of its motion; that the district court
incorrectly applied Brady v. Maryland when granting the State’s motion for
summary judgment due to the allegedly newly discovered “Strobel Letter”
in the possession of the Attorney General’s Office; 4 that a nexus existed
between the newly discovered evidence and Keyes’s convictions which
should except him from the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa
Code section 822.3; and that his counsel was ineffective in prior proceedings.

II. Analysis

We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law.
Kunde v. Est. of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 2018). “Evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”

2
The delay appears to be primarily due to multiple attorney withdrawals.
3
Keyes v. State, No. 15-0383, 2017 WL 1086781 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017).
4
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.”).

5
Id. When summary judgment is based on a constitutional issue, our review is
de novo. Weizberg v. City of Des Moines, 923 N.W.2d 200, 211 (Iowa 2018).
“[T]he principles underlying [a] summary judgment procedure apply to
motions of either party for disposition of an application for postconviction
relief without a trial on the merits.” Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784
(Iowa 2018) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Summary judgment
is proper if the moving party demonstrates the nonexistence of a disputed
material fact and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. (citation omitted). “We also draw all legitimate inferences from the
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

A. Newly Discovered Evidence and Timeliness of Second PCR
Application

Keyes argues that newly discovered evidence exists which proves his
actual innocence and that his convictions are unconstitutional due process
violations under both the Iowa and United States Constitutions. See Iowa
Code § 822.2(1)(a), (d); Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798. Keyes also argues that
because of this newly discovered evidence, he has satisfied the ground-of-fact
exception to the three-year statute of limitations for initiating PCR
proceedings. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (“[T]his limitation does not apply to a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable
time period.”).

A PCR applicant who relies on “the ground-of-fact exception must
show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction,” the “nexus
requirement.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798 (citation omitted). A ground of
fact is relevant if the fact “has the potential to qualify as material evidence for
purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2.” Id. at 798–99 (citation
omitted). For limitations purposes, an applicant need not demonstrate that

6
the ground of fact would have changed the outcome of the underlying
criminal case. Id. at 799.

To succeed on an actual-innocence claim in the context of a dispositive
summary judgment ruling, Keyes must show that there exists no issue of
material fact that “no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the
crimes for which . . . the applicant [was found] guilty in light of all the
evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 797. To prevail in
a PCR proceeding based on newly discovered evidence, the applicant must
show:
(1) that the evidence was discovered after the verdict; (2) that it could not
have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence; (3) that the
evidence is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or
impeaching; and (4) that the evidence probably would have changed the
result of the trial.

More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016). “The standard for whether
the evidence probably would have changed the result of the trial is a high one
because of the interest in bringing finality to criminal litigation.” Id.

Keyes asserts that evidence offered for an actual-innocence claim need
not strictly be “newly discovered” but can also be “newly presented
evidence.” Either way, for claims raised in a second PCR application, the
applicant must show the evidence pertaining to the claim could not have been
raised or discovered during previous PCR actions. See Lindaman v. State,
No. 22-1032, 2023 WL 2908647, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023)
(“Schmidt does not apply to overcome the statute of limitations where the
evidence put forward to support a claim of actual innocence was available to
the applicant or could have been discovered with due diligence within the
limitations period” (emphasis added) (citation omitted))).

7
For evidence introduced in a criminal case to qualify as violative of an
applicant’s due process rights, “the evidence must have been so inherently
unreliable that even allowing the jury to consider the evidence rendered the
trial fundamentally unfair.” More, 880 N.W.2d at 511–12. Merely unreliable
evidence which is not fundamentally unfair does not violate an applicant’s
due process rights. Id.

Here, Keyes argues that recent scientific developments regarding fire
investigations based on the National Fire Protection Association
Guidelines 921 (NFPA) qualify as newly discovered evidence to overcome
the time bar under section 822.3. Iowa adopted NFPA 921 as the standard for
fire investigations in 2011. In Keyes’s initial PCR action, he also relied on the
NFPA, which our court found was not newly discovered evidence. See Keyes,
2017 WL 1086781, at *2, *5. Keyes now asserts that the current version of
the NFPA 921, which is generally updated every three years, describes new
science that shows:
(1) the use of toxicology in fire investigations is newly discovered and
disproves the State’s fire origin and cause, instead demonstrating that this
fire was an accident; (2) children are not reliable witnesses; (3) canine
accelerant detection canines are not reliable evidence of arson and modern
day standards do not permit Hiles’s testimony; and (4) the State presented
false testimony regarding cause and origin of the fire.

We agree with the district court’s determination that this alleged new
evidence concerning the evolving standards of NFPA 921 was raised in
Keyes’s previous PCR action. As we stated in the previous PCR appeal
decision, “[w]hile each marginal advance in science cannot form the basis of
a new trial, watershed developments are a different story.” Id. at *8 (quoting
More, 880 N.W.2d at 509). The facts which uphold Keyes’s fire-science-
related assertions were available during the prior PCR action, where Keyes
asserted similar claims to the ones raised here. See Iowa Code § 822.8.

8
Although NFPA 921 is updated regularly with advancing scientific opinions,
these advancements do not qualify as newly discovered evidence or
“watershed developments.” See Keyes, 2017 WL 1086781, at *8. Moreover,
the expert report based on NFPA 921 methods, which Keyes heavily relies
upon, determined the fire was accidental based on lack of human involvement
and cites to studies which either were published during 2014 or earlier,
indicating the information was available in the prior PCR action. As stated in
Keyes’s previous PCR appeal, “[w]e conclude this evidence is cumulative or
impeaching—not newly discovered evidence.” Id. Accordingly, we find that
this evidence does not overcome the statute of limitation exception under
section 822.3.

Although we need not reach the merits of whether Keyes’s alleged new
ground of fact based on newly discovered evidence would have changed the
outcome of trial, we choose to do so.5 See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521.
Even if we were to conclude the NFPA 921 developments qualify as newly
discovered evidence that would overcome the statute of limitations under
section 822.3, which we do not, we are not convinced the verdict would have
been different if this new scientific evidence had been available. See Keyes,
2017 WL 1086781, at *9. We still find that:
Other evidence—both direct and circumstantial—contradicted
Keyes’s story. This evidence included Keyes’s own inconsistent
statements, observations of the fire and of Keyes by eyewitnesses, medical
evidence indicating minimal smoke inhalation, location of smoke detectors
found in the home, and Keyes’s postfire behavior and demeanor. Other

5
Because we find that the “newly discovered evidence,” which Keyes’s asserts
qualifies as a “new ground of fact” was available previously, the evidence, which might
have a nexus to the original trial, was time-barred, and so we are not required to analyze
whether the evidence would probably have changed the outcome of the underlying case.
See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003); see also Iowa Code § 822.3.

9
evidence pointed to motive, including Keyes’s poor treatment of his wife,
his relationship with another woman, his financial woes, and his recent
purchase of renter’s insurance. There was also testimony by a jailhouse
informant who said Keyes told him how he set the fire.

Keyes had the motive and means; he was at the right place at the
right time, and his behavior generally points in the direction of guilt. We
recognize that the fire investigation may have been flawed and that any
singular piece of evidence in isolation may not have been convincing, but
it was the combination of facts and circumstances that strongly point
toward Keyes’s guilt.

Id.

We are not convinced these NFPA 921 developments would have
probably changed the outcome of trial. More, 880 N.W.2d at 499. The district
court did not err in granting summary judgment to the State on this issue
based on the relevant evidence not qualifying as newly discovered.

B. Evidentiary Support for the State’s Summary Judgment
Motion

Keyes asserts the State produced no evidence in its motion for
summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. Keyes argues
the State failed to refer to any evidence or the record in its motion and relied
on “mere denials.” So, Keyes claims that due to lack of citation in the motion,
the district court should have considered his assertions as true and without
factual opposition and granted summary judgment for Keyes. See Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.981(5).

We disagree with Keyes’s assertions. The State’s motion for summary
judgment cites to the record, several pieces of evidence, and case law. The
State relies on evidence that, although circumstantial, rebuts the claims made
by Keyes’s experts. The State’s motion likewise used the record, case law,

10
and statutes to argue Keyes’s claims were barred and cumulative. We find the
State adequately referred to evidence and the record in its motion for
summary judgment.

C. Application of Brady v. Maryland Regarding the Strobel
Letter

Keyes asserts that the Iowa Attorney General’s office, which
represented the State on his direct appeal, was in possession of a letter
delivered by an Alcohol Tobacco and Fire (ATF) Agent Strobel. This letter
was delivered in 1993 to Assistant Attorney General Thomas Tauber, about
three years before the death of Keyes’s wife and child. The letter stated, in
Strobel’s opinion:
A positive result from an accelerant detection canine is insufficient
evidence that an accelerant is present. The dog, for instance, may be
alerting to material which could be used as an accelerant but in a particular
case is present at the fire scene for legitimate reasons (e.g. kerosene and a
kerosene heater). Because of this we assert that the use of a canine’s
indication to the presence of an accelerant is only one of the many factors
used in a fire investigator’s origin and cause determination and can never
be a sole basis for that determination.

Additionally, any alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis must
be considered a false alert (false positive) for the purposes of origin and
cause determination. The accelerant detection canine is a tool used to
assist the fire investigator in the collection of suitable samples for forensic
laboratory analysis. If the forensic laboratory examination of the sample is
negative, any positive indication by the canine at the fire scene is irrelevant.

The above statements do not contradict the fact that a properly
trained canine is a reliable detector of accelerants.

Keyes asserts that because this letter was in possession of the Iowa
Attorney General’s office at the time of indictment, it should have been

11
provided to the defense and thus constituted a Brady violation. See 373 U.S.
at 87.

Keyes argues that the contents of the Strobel letter show that Agent
Hiles’s testimony concerning the canine Sax’s “hitting” on remains of liquid
accelerants within the garage, which did not test positive in the laboratory,
was false and misleading. And because the State knew of this letter, they also
knew the testimony was false, and the result of the trial was affected. Keyes
argues that the Iowa Attorney General’s office was a part of the State’s
general prosecution team and was bound to turn over the letter to the defense
as exculpatory evidence under Brady but suppressed the letter. See generally
id.

“A defendant’s due process rights are violated when the prosecution
fails to produce upon request evidence favorable to the accused ‘where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.’” State v. Romeo, 542
N.W.2d 543, 551 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Whether or not
the prosecution acted in good or bad faith in failing to produce evidence is
“unimportant in deciding whether a defendant’s due process rights have
been infringed.” Id.

For Keyes to prove a Brady violation, he must show: (1) the
prosecution suppressed the Strobel letter; (2) the letter was favorable to the
defense; and (3) the letter was material to the issue of guilt. Id. “Whether the
evidence was material depends on whether ‘there is a reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). To show a reasonable probability of
a different result, the suppression of the evidence must undermine the
“confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. (citation omitted). We review
this issue de novo. Id.

12
Keyes asserts that because the Iowa Attorney General’s office has a
duty to supervise county attorneys, the principles of agency law dictate that
knowledge of the Attorney General is imputed to the trial prosecution team.
And, because that knowledge is imputed, by withholding the Strobel letter,
the county prosecutor suppressed the letter.

Iowa Code section 13.2 governs the duties of the Attorney General in
relation to county attorneys:
1. It shall be the duty of the attorney general, except as otherwise provided
by law to:

a. Prosecute and defend all causes in the appellate courts in which
the state is a party or interested.

b. Prosecute and defend in any other court or tribunal, all actions
and proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or
interested, when, in the attorney general’s judgment, the interest of the state
requires such action, or when requested to do so by the governor, executive council,
or general assembly. The attorney general may prosecute a criminal
proceeding on behalf of the state even if a county attorney does not request
the attorney general to act as a county attorney in a proceeding under
section 331.754, subsection 7.

....

g. Supervise county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties
of their offices, and from time to time to require of them reports as to the
condition of public business entrusted to their charge.

(Emphasis added.)

The Iowa Supreme Court has stated, regarding this statute, in dicta,
“[o]rdinarily, a criminal case is under the control of the county attorney until
the supreme court acquires jurisdiction, after which it is under the sole
control of the attorney general.” State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 841
(Iowa 1983) (citation omitted). But, if the Attorney General “feels the best

13
interests of the state require” the office to “prosecute and defend in all
actions or proceedings, civil or criminal, before any court or tribunal,” then
it may intervene in a district court proceeding. Id. (emphasis omitted). And,
as stated in section 13.2, the Attorney General may be requested to intervene
in such a proceeding by “the governor, executive council, or general
assembly,” and does not need a specific request from a county attorney to do
so.

In other words, it appears the duties of a county attorney and the
Attorney General are separate until the Attorney General’s office, in its
discretion, chooses to become involved in a district court case, or the
“governor, executive counsel, or general assembly” requests it intervene. See
Iowa Code § 13.2(1)(b); Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d at 341–42. So, although the
Attorney General indeed has supervisory authority over county attorneys,
that authority extends only to ensuring the county attorney is performing
their duties unless the Attorney General chooses to or is called upon to
become directly involved in a case.

Keyes argues that the “prosecution team” necessarily includes both
the county attorney and the Attorney General’s office. See Hamann v. State,
324 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1982) (“The focus is . . . the ‘prosecution team,’
which includes investigative units under the prosecutor’s control, or
agencies allied with the prosecutor in connection with the subject case.”).
But the court in Hamann examined whether testimony from two doctors
employed at the Iowa Security Medical Facility was imputed to the
prosecution and found it was not, even though the agency regularly worked
closely with prosecutors. See id. at 915. (“The prosecution is not charged
with knowledge of the information allegedly undisclosed by Dr. Loeffelholz.”
(emphasis added)). Here, if principles of agency law do not apply between

14
the Attorney General and county attorneys, so that the Attorney General is
not a part of the “prosecution team,” then nondisclosure of the Strobel letter
to the local prosecution would not qualify as a Brady violation. See id.

We now turn to whether principles of agency law apply to the
relationship between the Attorney General and county attorneys. Keyes cites
to the Restatement (Second) of the Law–Agency to assert that the Attorney
General is “master” of county attorneys, which thus imputes information
held by the Attorney General to trial prosecution:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.

(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:

(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or

(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or

(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or

(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (A.L.I. 1958). Agency relationship
principles as cited above do not apply to the Attorney General and county
attorneys. Agency law generally requires that a fiduciary relationship exists
between the agent and the principal, and that the agent agrees to act on behalf
of the principal, under the principal’s control. See id. §§ 1, 13, 14.

County attorneys have their own statutory duties which they must
perform, separate from the duties of the Attorney General. See generally Iowa
Code §§ 331.751, 331.756. Importantly, there is no fiduciary relationship

15
between the two State entities. Although the Attorney General is required to
“supervise county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
offices,” indicating a principal-agent relationship, no authority indicates this
relationship implicates a Brady violation unless the Attorney General is
directly involved in trial prosecution. See Iowa Code § 13.2(1)(g); Hamann,
324 N.W.2d at 909–10.

There is a circumstance recognized by our courts where knowledge of
an agency separate from a county attorney’s office is directly imputed to the
county attorney. See generally Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522–23. The
knowledge of one prosecutor “may be imputed from one government
attorney to another within the prosecutor’s office,” and that the police, as a
member of a different government agency, are considered a part of the “law-
enforcement ‘team’” within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction. Hamann, 324
N.W.2d at 909–10 (emphasis added).

But the relationship between the police and county attorneys is
distinguishable from the relationship between county attorneys and the
Attorney General. See generally Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522–23. Law
enforcement agencies “within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction” are considered a
part of the prosecutorial “team” presumptively, as law enforcement works
with the county prosecutor throughout the pendency and trying of a case.
Hamann, 324 N.W.2d at 910; see generally Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522–23.

So, law enforcement is presumed to be “acting on the government’s
behalf in the case.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). As stated above,
this is not the same as the Attorney General, who only acts on the
government’s behalf in a criminal case at its discretion or by order of relevant
government entities. See Iowa Code § 13.2. This imputative relationship
between law enforcement and county attorneys is dissimilar to the alleged

16
agent-principal relationship between the Attorney General and county
attorneys. Here, while the Attorney General had a statutory duty to supervise
the county attorney, it did not choose to become involved in the proceedings,
and thus its knowledge of the Strobel letter was not imputed to the
prosecution team, especially because common law agency principles do not
apply. See id.; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219.

Even if we find that the Strobel letter, which states that alerts by fire
investigation canines should be disregarded absent a positive laboratory test
for an accelerant, was imputed to the prosecution, the letter was not
suppressed as the facts were publicly available. “Publicly available
information, by definition, is not suppressed.” Richter v. State, No. 15-1800,
2017 WL 935064, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017) (collecting cases). Trial
counsel was in possession of an article from the International Association of
Arson Investigators (IAAI) which stated in the relevant part, “Testimony
regarding unconfirmed [canine] indications should be restricted . . . and
should not play a part in the actual trial.” This IAAI article was also included
as a reference in Keyes’s motion for summary judgment in this current
action. At the trial in 1997, Keyes’s counsel provided that same article to
Agent Hiles during cross-examination, to which Hiles provided his own
contrary professional opinion. The IAAI article also mentions Strobel by
name, acknowledging “his substantial contributions to the development of
the position of this paper.” Also, in the first PCR proceeding, one of Keyes’s
experts, Lentini, testified that the ATF had a task force focusing on canine
alert evidence, proposed its findings to the IAAI, which used those findings
in the article.

Because the IAAI article confirms that Strobel’s opinions were already
reflected in arson-investigation trade publication, we find the facts contained

17
in the letter were publicly available and not suppressed. See id. Counsel could
have utilized Strobel at the original trial, as his opinions concerning the
unreliability of fire investigation canines were discoverable, and counsel
appears to have presented these opinions.

And even if we determine the Strobel letter was suppressed, we are not
convinced its admission at trial or the prior PCR proceeding would have
created “a reasonable probability of a different result” as the facts contained
in the letter do not show Hiles’s opinion testimony was false and are
cumulative to similar evidence already presented. See Romeo, 542 N.W.2d at
551.

We find the district court did not err in holding that no Brady violation
occurred, and Keyes’s due process rights were not violated.

D. Other Claims of Alleged False Evidence

Keyes argues the district court used an incorrect analysis on his Napue
v. Illinois claims, citing the court’s holding it was “not convinced that any of
the evidence on which these arguments are based constitutes newly
discovered evidence that would take the action outside the limitations period
of § 822.3.” See 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Keyes asserts the court failed to use a
“nexus analysis” of the evidence, specifically with respect to “(1) Hiles’
testimony regarding the alerts of his dog” and “(2) testimony Keyes was
outside the house without his children.” According to Keyes, these
allegations were false, and their nexus to the origin and cause of the fire
supports an exception to the three-year limitation.

A claim under Napue requires that the State knowingly used false
evidence to secure a conviction and that the false testimony was material,
which contradicts “any concept of ordered liberty.” 360 U.S. at 269. But to

18
successfully raise a Napue claim under these circumstances, Keyes must
show that the State knowingly provided false testimony based on newly
discovered evidence to overcome the statute of limitations under
section 822.3. Keyes argues the district court erred by not applying a “nexus
analysis” to determine whether the evidence has a nexus to the convictions
before dismissing the claim because it found the evidence was not newly
discovered. See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 520 (“[T]he applicant must also
show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged
conviction.”).

The district court did not reach the nexus analysis because it
determined the alleged facts showing the State presented false evidence were
not newly discovered. While an applicant attempting to overcome the statute
of limitations under section 822.3 with a ground-of-fact exception need not
show that it would have probably changed the outcome of trial, they still must
show the evidence is newly discovered. See id. at 521 (“Because Harrington
asserted a relevant ground of fact or law ‘that could not have been raised
within the applicable time period,’ this action is not time barred.”).

Keyes claims that the State presented false evidence in the form of
witness testimony implying that Keyes was alone in his van while the fire
burned and that he ran back inside to grab two of his children only when
people stopped to help. Keyes claims he did not learn of this false testimony
until 2022, when he received an affidavit from an expert analyzing the
incident’s 911 call history. The State used this testimony to indicate that
Keyes intended to kill his whole family but then attempted to save face by
returning inside the house in a rescue attempt.

Keyes now asserts new evidence shows that in his 911 call recording
his children can now be heard in the background, and the time of the call is

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now confirmed to be the first 911 call. This evidence supposedly refutes the
testimony of several witnesses who stated they did not see children in the van
with Keyes initially. And Keyes argues that Agent Hiles’s testimony was false
because of new evidence disputing the reliability of fire investigation canines.

This alleged false evidence has been available since trial in 1997. Keyes
could have analyzed the 911 recording at his previous PCR proceeding or
earlier. Keyes does not explain why he could not have discovered these facts
previously. The facts that his expert analyzed and prepared in their affidavit
were available immediately after trial. Keyes has not fulfilled his burden to
prove this evidence is newly discovered to overcome the three-year statute of
limitations under section 822.3. The same analysis applies to Keyes’s
assertion that Hiles’s testimony was false, as facts supporting its alleged
falsity were discoverable during and after trial.

Nor has Keyes raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
prosecution was aware the evidence was false. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
Keyes simply asserts that the Strobel letter and the 911 recording were
contradictory to some testimony, not that the State possessed knowledge of
false evidence. See id. But in any event, we agree with the district court that
even if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the witnesses’
testimony was false, Keyes could have discovered these facts earlier. So, on
this issue, Keyes has not overcome the statute of limitations under
section 822.3, and his Napue claim fails.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Keyes next claims that his counsel was ineffective at both his criminal
trial and first PCR proceeding by failing to present evidence of developing
changes in fire investigations, some of which did not exist at the time of trial.

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Keyes already asserted ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his prior
PCR action. See Keyes, 2017 WL 1086781, at *4–5. We need not reach the
merits of this claim as it is time-barred by section 822.3: “[a]n allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior case under this chapter shall not
toll or extend the limitation periods in this section nor shall such claim relate
back to a prior filing to avoid the application of the limitation period.”
Procedendo in Keyes’s previous PCR action was issued in 2017, so this claim
is asserted outside the limitations period. See id.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling in favor of
the State’s motion for summary judgment. We agree there is no genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether Keyes has proven actual innocence or
whether there exists newly discovered evidence to overcome the applicable
statute of limitations.

AFFIRMED.

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