Latoyia Towns v. Silver Oaks Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0310
Filed December 17, 2025

LATOYIA TOWNS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

SILVER OAKS NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,

Judge.

Latoyia Towns appeals from a district court order that determined the court

lacked jurisdiction to review the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s

decision following remand. AFFIRMED.

Dennis Currell of Currell Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Tyler C. Block of Kuper Block & Paumer, PC, LLO, Omaha, Nebraska, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and

Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

This appeal centers on the jurisdiction of the district court following a

remand after hearing on a petition for judicial review. Latoyia Towns sustained a

work-related injury to her right shoulder during her employment at Silver Oaks

Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC. Dissatisfied with her employer’s stance on

recommendations from her primary care physician, Towns filed a petition for

alternate medical care. Following the denial of her request for alternate medical

care by the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner, Towns filed a petition

for judicial review in the Polk County District Court challenging the decision. There

is no dispute that Towns’s initial timely petition for judicial review was procedurally

correct.

Following hearing on Towns’s petition for judicial review, the district court

determined that “given the record before the Court, it cannot determine whether

the Commissioner’s decision was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” The

district court remanded the case to the agency for “more specific findings” and

“further analysis” “as to the issues of Towns’[s] notice [of dissatisfaction] to Silver

Oaks, Silver Oaks’[s] notice to Towns, and whether [Towns’s primary care provider

(PCP)] was deemed an authorized provider by Silver Oaks.”

After entry of the order, both parties filed motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of

Civil Procedure 1.904. The court denied Silver Oaks’s motion and denied Towns’s

motion in part and granted such in part, determining: “This Court feels that the

previously entered order implicitly required the agency to undertake the requested

actions, but this ruling will make that request explicit. Additional hearing and

supporting documents are necessary for a decision by the agency.”
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Following remand and hearing, the deputy entered a decision denying

Towns’s petition for alternate medical care. The deputy’s order further stated it

was “delegat[ed] authority” “to issue final agency decisions on applications for

alternate care”; “[c]onsequently, this decision constitutes final agency action, and

there is no appeal to the commissioner. Judicial review in a district court pursuant

to Iowa Code chapter 17A is the avenue for an appeal.”

It is at this point where the jurisdictional dispute arises. Towns did not file

a petition for judicial review following the commissioner’s decision but instead filed

a document captioned “presentment of agency response to remand order for

additional factual findings and request for order for hearing transcript and

scheduling orders.” Towns challenged the deputy’s decision and requested, in

part, that the district court “direct the agency to enter an award of alternate medical

care entitling Ms. Towns to proceed with the care recommendations from her

PCP.”

The district court scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, Silver Oaks disputed

the court’s jurisdiction. Silver Oaks maintained that Towns was required to file a

petition for judicial review to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the remand

decision. But Towns argued the district court retained jurisdiction because it had

ordered remand for the limited purpose of receiving additional factual findings on

the specific issues requested by the court. The district court agreed with Silver

Oaks and ordered: “[T]he court does not have jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner’s Remand Decision. The court takes no further action, and the

Remand Decision stands as the final decision.”
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Towns appeals, claiming the district court erred in finding it was without

jurisdiction as the court previously ordered a “limited remand,” which did not result

in final agency action reviewable only by a petition for judicial review.1

We begin our analysis with the following. A limited remand contemplated

by the section of the administrative procedure act which allows a court to order the

taking of additional evidence is unlike the remand envisioned in the section

providing for a remand for further proceedings. The limited remand is meant to

expand the record available to the district court for judicial review and to permit the

agency to modify its decision on the basis of additional evidence, while a complete

remand contemplates review on the merits and is appropriate where an erroneous

rule of law is applied by the agency or where the record is inadequate for the court

to determine effectively the merits of appeal. Iowa Code § 17A.19(7), (10) (2023);

Reiter v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 763, 766–67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).

In a limited remand, the reviewing court retains its jurisdiction; while in a

remand for further proceedings, the reviewing court loses jurisdiction. See Reiter,

327 N.W.2d at 766–67 (distinguishing between a limited remand and remand for

further proceedings).

There may be instances where the district court is authorized to make an

interlocutory order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings. See

Iowa Code § 17A.19(7); see also W. Side Transp., Inc. v. Fishel, No. 02-0092,

2003 WL 21542498, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003). If this is done, “it is

1 Towns also maintains the deputy’s “remand decision is null and void” because

the “agency exceeded the limits of the remand order.” But because this issue was
not decided by the district court, it is not preserved for review. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
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incumbent upon the court to note that the remand is of a limited nature and that

the court is retaining jurisdiction.” Cont’l Tel. Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625

(Iowa 1984). Here, the district court did not indicate the remand was limited, nor

did the court indicate it was retaining jurisdiction.

Towns highlights Iowa Code section 17A.19(7), referenced above, which

provides in part:

Before the date set for hearing a petition for judicial review of agency
action in a contested case, application may be made to the court for
leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of
the case. If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the
additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for
failure to present it in the contested case proceeding before the
agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken
before the agency upon conditions determined by the court.

Our courts have held remanding for further proceedings is sound and in

accordance with the underlying reasons for the exhaustion requirement. Bugely

v. State, 464 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1991). These reasons include “aiding judicial

review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert

forum,” conserving the court’s time due to “the possibility that the relief applied for

may be granted at the administrative level,” and allowing the agency below a

chance to correct errors which occurred during administrative proceedings. Id.

at 881 (cleaned up).

We find Towns’s argument that the district court’s prior order was for a

limited remand to be unpersuasive. Neither party made application to the court to

present additional evidence to the district court before the remand as contemplated

in section 17A.19(7). We concur with the district court that its ruling on judicial

review in this case “is missing the essential elements of a limited remand.” See,
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e.g., Reiter, 327 N.W.2d at 766. The district court explained the remand order as

follows:

The court held a review on the merits, but found the record was
inadequate to effectively determine the merits without further fact
finding and analysis by the Commissioner. The court remanded the
case to the Commissioner for further findings and analysis, but did
not expressly state or otherwise make clear the remand was limited,
nor that the court was retaining jurisdiction pending the
Commissioner’s taking of additional evidence.
. . . . The court found remand was necessary not just because
more evidence was needed, but because the Commissioner on one
issue applied the law incorrectly, and also failed to properly analyze
the evidence already in the record. Importantly, there was nothing in
the court’s Judicial Review Ruling indicating it was a limited remand
under section 17A.19(7) or that the court was retaining jurisdiction.

On remand, the deputy entered a remand decision that, as here, specified

it was the agency’s final agency action. “A timely petition for judicial review from

an administrative decision is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Askvig v. Snap-On

Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Iowa 2021); Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll.,

782 N.W.2d 160, 164 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (stating “a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction cannot be waived”). And here, there was a lack of a judicial-review

petition from the agency’s final action. Accordingly, we agree that the district court

was without jurisdiction to consider Towns’s claims.

AFFIRMED.