In the Interest of H.S., Minor child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1441
Filed December 3, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF H.S.,
Minor Child,

B.C., MOTHER,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Patrick J. McAvan,

Judge.

A mother appeals the district court’s entry of a bridge modification order and

its order finding reasonable efforts for reunification were made. AFFIRMED.

Rebecca L. Petig of Bierman & Petig, P.C., Grinnell, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, New Sharon, attorney and guardian

ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and

Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

A mother appeals a bridge modification order entered in a child-in-need-of-

assistance (CINA) proceeding and an order finding reasonable efforts for

reunification were made. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

H.S. was born in 2017. The parents, who were never married, separated

the following year. In 2022, the district court entered a decree awarding the parties

joint legal custody of H.S, with physical care to the mother. The father was

awarded visitation every other weekend.

The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services in March 2023, upon concerns of physical discipline by the

mother resulting in injuries to H.S. Voluntary services were initiated, but additional

injuries to the child by the mother were reported. For example, the child had a

burn on his arm, a split lip, and bruises on his body. Further investigation into the

matter resulted in a founded child abuse assessment. In August, H.S. was

removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the father subject to

department supervision. The mother was ordered to have supervised visits. After

a hearing in December, the court adjudicated H.S. a CINA. A dispositional order

was entered in January 2024, which placed custody of H.S. with the father.

Meanwhile, the father filed a petition for modification of physical care. He

then filed a motion for concurrent jurisdiction in the juvenile case, which the mother

resisted. Following a review hearing in June, the court granted the father’s motion

for concurrent jurisdiction.
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The court entered a permanency order in September. The court observed

the mother was “participating in [parent-child interactive therapy (PCIT)] and has

made considerable progress,” but “[u]nfortunately, her progress outside of PCIT is

lagging.” The court noted the mother “would like more frequent visitation with less

supervision,” and stated, “The department, with input from the [guardian ad litem

(GAL)], is encouraged to continue to evaluate the safety of [H.S.] at visits with his

mother and to modify visitation if and when it is safe and appropriate to do so.”

In December, the father filed a motion for bridge order to “modif[y] and

transfer[] physical care of the child to [the father]” and close “this juvenile case.” A

permanency review hearing took place in February 2025. Following the hearing,

the court entered an order finding in part:

[The mother] was provided up to six months to participate in services
to achieve the goal of reunification. As that time ends, she remains
at fully supervised visits. [The mother] has not progressed past
supervised visitation, and, by extension, cannot resume care of the
child. Therefore, a different permanency order must be issued.

The court scheduled a permanency review hearing, “including consideration of a

bridge modification order as an appropriate permanency option,” to “be held

concurrently with hearing on petition for termination of parental rights, if filed.”1

The mother filed a motion for reasonable efforts, stating in part, “Despite

consistently engaging in therapy and visitation, mother’s visitation has not

progressed.” The motion also alleged “[t]ransportation issues have prevented [the]

mother from being able to engage with PCIT.” The court ordered the motion to be

considered at the permanency review hearing.

1 No termination petition was filed.
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Following a hearing in August, the court entered a bridge order, granting the

father sole legal custody and physical care of H.S. The court granted the mother

visitation, fully supervised, every other Friday from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and

“[o]ther visitation times as agreed to in writing by the parties.” The court also

entered a permanency review order, which denied the mother’s motion for

reasonable efforts. The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review CINA proceedings de novo. In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 192

(Iowa 2021). We give weight to the district court’s fact findings, but we are not

bound by them. Id. Our primary concern is the child’s best interests. Id.

III. Reasonable Efforts

We turn first to the mother’s challenge to the court’s reasonable-efforts

ruling. In this CINA proceeding, reasonable efforts are “the efforts made to . . .

eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely

return to the [mother]’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a) (2023). The

reasonable-efforts mandate requires the department to make every reasonable

effort to return children to their home as soon as possible consistent with the

children’s best interests. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “The focus

is on services to improve parenting,” which includes visitation. Id. We review the

department’s compliance with the reasonable-efforts mandate based on the

individual circumstances of each case. See In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2000). We look at the services provided and the parent’s response, not

necessarily the services a parent claims the department failed to provide. C.B.,

611 N.W.2d at 494.
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The mother maintains she “consistently engaged in services throughout the

pendency of this case,” but “she was denied the opportunity to progress in

visitation beyond the fully supervised visits.” True, the mother requested increased

visitation with H.S. And the mother was participating in therapy. However, H.S.’s

therapist testified the child was “still fearful with [the mother], and . . . he doesn’t

understand the structure and boundaries in her care.” H.S. reported that the

mother “freaks out” at him if he doesn’t “tell her what she wants.” The therapist

noted that the child’s “issues in school” and concerning behaviors “seemed to

coincide with either anticipating visits with his mother or following visits with his

mother that he would become more disregulated.” The therapist opined the child’s

behavior had vastly improved since he had been “getting safety, structure, and

security” and she didn’t recommend “anything beyond supervised visitation at this

point in time.”

The mother also claims she “required additional assistance ensuring that

PCIT happened on a regular basis due to transportation concerns and the

Department failed to assist to ensure that those appointments occurred.” But

contrary to the mother’s claim, the record reflects that transportation was not a

significant impediment to her progress in PCIT. And, despite two years of

department involvement, the mother continued to maintain that she had not done

anything wrong to be in this situation and that she just wanted her son back. As

the family support specialist reported, despite the mother’s regular attendance in

therapy, “[she] feels the concerns are with [the father] and not with herself,” which

“puts [her] in the precontemplation stage of change.” The department caseworker

explained:
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[The mother]’s participation in Parent-Child Interaction Therapy
(PCIT) has not yielded any significant improvements. This therapy
may soon conclude due to [the mother] reaching maximum benefits,
primarily because she fails to implement the strategies discussed
both in sessions and in her daily interactions with [H.S.] Her PCIT
therapist has indicated that [the mother] consistently neglects to
complete the assignments as instructed. Furthermore, [the mother]
continues to assert that [the father] is abusive to [H.S.], labeling him
as [H.S.]’s “true abuser.”

In short, the family specialist opined that “[the mother] struggles taking

responsibility for her involvement with the case which makes it difficult for her to

move forward.”

Upon consideration of the circumstances in this case, we agree with the

court’s determination that the department made reasonable efforts toward

reunification.

IV. Bridge Modification Order

The mother also challenges the court’s entry of the bridge modification

order. A bridge modification order returns “jurisdiction over the child’s custody,

physical care, and visitation to the district court” and closes a CINA case. Iowa

Code § 232.103A(1). Before the court is permitted to enter such an order, the

following statutory conditions must be met:

a. The child has been adjudicated a [CINA] in an active
juvenile court case, and a permanency order is in place in that case.
b. Legal paternity has been established for the child.
c. The child is safely unified with a parent.
d. The district court has issued an order concerning custody,
physical care, and parenting time regarding the child and the order
is in place at the time of the filing of the [CINA] petition.
e. The juvenile court has determined that the [CINA] case can
safely close when the modified district court order for custody,
physical care, and parenting time is in place.
f. Either parent has qualified for a court-appointed attorney in
the juvenile case.
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Id. § 232.103B(1)(a)–(f). Here, the mother concedes four of the conditions have

been met, but she “disagrees that the child is safely unified with a parent and that

the juvenile court case can safely close with entry of the bridge modification order.”

See id. § 232.103B(1)(c), (e).

The mother’s claim is not supported by the record. By all accounts, H.S. is

“thriving” in his current home. Specifically, regarding the safety and stability of

H.S.’s relationship with the father, H.S.’s therapist opined:

I have had the opportunity to witness interactions between
[H.S.] and his father and stepmother. In those sessions, he has
sought and received nurturance, regulation support, and redirection
from them. He will seek out his father or stepmother and sit on their
lap to be cuddled. I have not observed fear, trepidation, or anxiety
as he interacts with either of them. He will smile, take their hand,
and encouragingly engage them in the tasks presented in the
session.
It is my opinion that [H.S.] has thrived in his current home. He
is much calmer, happier, and better in control of his feelings and
behaviors. He has stated repeatedly in sessions that he loves his
mother and wants to visit her, but he wants to live with his father.

In contrast, the caseworkers continued to report that the mother was fixated

on the father, and she maintained that the father abused H.S. whereas she had

done nothing wrong. The caseworkers further noted that because the mother

refused to take accountability for her involvement in the case, the safety concerns

relating to her parenting were not addressed, and she was unable to move forward

and “focus on the future.” At the time of the hearing, the child remained fearful of

the mother. Under these circumstances, we concur with the district court’s

conclusion that the statutory conditions for entry of a bridge order were met.

The mother also claims the terms of the bridge modification order, which

“granted [the] father primary legal custody and primary physical care subject to
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fully supervised visitation with [the] mother,” were not in H.S.’s best interests.

Indeed, our overriding consideration in determining custody and physical care

issues is the child’s best interests. See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97,

101 (Iowa 2007); Iowa Code § 598.41(3); see also In re Marriage of Winter, 223

N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974) (setting forth factors guiding the court in addition

to those identified in Iowa Code section 598.41(3)).

On this question, the GAL expressed that H.S. “cannot continue to be in flux

any longer waiting for his mother to come around and do what is best for him.”

Specifically, the GAL opined that “physical custody of [H.S.] should be placed with

his father,” noting the child’s issues “have improved over time while in his father’s

care.” The GAL continued:

The entire team has stressed to [the mother] from the
beginning the importance of addressing her mental health and
coparenting with [the father], for the best interests of [H.S.] This has
not happened, and [H.S.] is the one suffering. He, even more than
other children, needs security and permanency in his daily life. This
appears to not be possible at this point as [the mother] cannot
address her own issues for the betterment of [H.S.]
The relationship that exists between these parents sheds light
on the unlikelihood that . . . the parents will never be able to coparent
in any way. There is not a good solution here. However, the best
solution is to have a Bridge Order entered and end juvenile court
involvement. It appears that any additional time and services would
be fruitless and not likely to improve the situation in any way.

Here, “[t]he only impediment to closure of the CINA proceedings is the

mother’s instability. The negative impact of that instability was curbed by the terms

of the bridge modification order giving the father legal custody and physical care

of the child[].” See In re M.M., No. 24-1700, 2025 WL 273131, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 23, 2025); see also In re M.A., No. 25-0940, 2025 WL 2539023, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2025) (noting “the father has provided a stable and safe home for
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the child”). Following our de novo review, we concur with the court’s conclusion

that it is in H.S.’s best interests to grant the father sole legal custody and physical

care of the child.

V. Conclusion

We affirm the court’s entry of a bridge modification order granting the father

sole legal custody and physical care and the order finding reasonable efforts for

reunification were made.

AFFIRMED.