State of Iowa v. John Eddie Hanes III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0405
Filed October 1, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOHN EDDIE HANES III,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John Telleen, Judge.

John Eddie Hanes III appeals his convictions and sentences after a jury

found him guilty of first-degree murder and intimidation with a dangerous weapon.

AFFIRMED.

Jessica A. Millage of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Sandy, J., and

Potterfield, S.J.* Telleen, S.J., takes no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

John Eddie Hanes III appeals his convictions and sentences after a jury

found him guilty of first-degree murder and intimidation with a dangerous weapon.

Hanes contends that he was denied his right to counsel and the trial court abused

its discretion by denying his motion for new trial. We cannot consider these claims

on direct appeal, either because Hanes failed to preserve error or we are prohibited

by statute. Hanes also challenges the requirement that he serve a minimum term

of incarceration before he is eligible for parole, but he fails to show the sentencing

court abused its discretion. We therefore affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Fourteen-year-old Jamon Winfrey was shot and killed in February 2021

during a gang-related shooting in Davenport. Winfrey was a passenger in the front

seat of a car associated with a gang when an SUV carrying members of a rival

gang approached. Although both Winfrey and the car’s driver were unarmed, the

SUV’s passengers shot at them. Winfrey exited the car, ran, and was shot once

in the back with a 9mm bullet fired from a Glock. The bullet pierced Winfrey’s lung

and an artery, and he died a short time later. After investigating and interviewing

witnesses, police identified Hanes as one of two SUV passengers who shot at

Winfrey’s vehicle. Hanes used a Glock while the other passenger used a .40

caliber pistol.

In April 2022, the State charged Hanes with murder in the first degree and

intimidation with a dangerous weapon. About two weeks before trial was

scheduled to begin in February 2023, the Iowa Supreme Court suspended Hanes’s

attorney from the practice of law for thirty days. Hanes’s attorney moved to
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continue the trial, citing “potential scheduling conflict, availability of witnesses, and

availability of Defense counsel.” The court granted the motion, and trial began in

May 2023. At its conclusion, the jury found Hanes guilty as charged.

The court initially scheduled the sentencing hearing to take place in

July 2023. But after Hanes’s counsel requested three continuances and the State

requested one, the court sentenced Hanes in February 2024. Because Hanes was

seventeen years old at the time he committed the crimes, the court imposed a

sentence on the murder conviction of life in prison with the possibility of parole after

serving a minimum term of twenty years. It sentenced Hanes to serve ten years

for intimidation with a dangerous weapon and ordered the sentences to run

concurrently.

II. Sixth Amendment Claims.

Hanes first contends he was denied his right to counsel and a fair trial under

the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He cites three instances in which

he alleges his trial counsel’s performance was so defective that it amounted to

structural error. These claims are related to his trial counsel’s (1) thirty-day

suspension in February 2023, (2) failure to timely file a motion for new trial, and

(3) request for a sentence that the court could not legally impose.

On the first claim, Hanes argues that he was denied counsel because the

suspension of his court-appointed attorney’s license for thirty days prevented him

from communicating with his attorney during a key period of trial preparation. Cf.

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We have

held that a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is impaired when

he cannot cooperate in an active manner with his lawyer.”). The State responds
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that Hanes never raised this claim below and thus it is not preserved for review.

See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental

doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided

by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). Hanes, in turn, claims

that the issue could not have been presented below, citing State v. Williams, 895

N.W.2d 856, 859 n.2 (Iowa 2017), for the proposition that error preservation

requirements do not apply when a question is presented that only the supreme

court can answer. But the supreme court has since clarified that Williams did not

change the duty of the party who lost in district court to preserve error for appeal.

Ruiz v. State, 18 N.W.3d 453, 457 (Iowa 2025) (distinguishing a postconviction-

relief applicant’s request for adoption of an equitable tolling doctrine, which he

raised for the first time on appeal following dismissal, from the facts of Williams, in

which the State as the prevailing party in district court sought for the first time on

appeal to overturn a line of cases addressing the speedy indictment rule).

Because Hanes failed to raise this issue to the district court, we do not consider it

on appeal.

As to the second and third arguments, Hanes is arguing ineffective

assistance of counsel. State v. Williams, No. 24-0797, 2025 WL 1704308, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding a defendant’s structural-error claim alleging

“effectively a complete denial” of counsel was ineffective assistance by another

name). But we cannot decide such claims on direct appeal. See Iowa Code

§ 814.7 (2024) (stating that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “shall not

be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings”); State v. Treptow, 960

N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021) (“Because we have just upheld the constitutionality of
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section 814.7, this court is without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claims on direct appeal.”). We do not consider them further.

III. New Trial.

Hanes next contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion for new trial because the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the

evidence. But both the motion and ruling were based on alleged deficiencies in

the court’s instructions to the jury, not on the weight of the evidence. Because

Hanes never challenged the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions,

error is not preserved for our review. See State v. Kramer, No. 16-2048, 2018 WL

346454, at *6 n.7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (concluding that a weight-of-the-

evidence claim was not preserved for review on appeal because the defendant’s

motions for new trial never “specifically challenged the weight of the evidence”).

IV. Sentence.

Finally, Hanes challenges the requirement that he serve a minimum of

twenty-five years in prison before he is eligible for parole. We review sentencing

decisions for abuse of discretion. See State v. Moore, 16 N.W.3d 58, 64 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2024). The court abuses its discretion if it bases a sentence “on grounds or

for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). “In applying this standard, we

assess whether the district court weighed the societal goals of sentencing—

rehabilitation and impact on the community.” Id.

As a juvenile at the time of the offense, Hanes is entitled to an individualized

sentencing hearing. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400-04 (Iowa 2014).

During this hearing, the court must give “complete and careful consideration of the
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relevant mitigating factors of youth.” Moore, 16 N.W.3d at 64 (quoting State v.

Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017)). These include:

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such
as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”;
(2) the particular “family and home environment” that surround the
youth;
(3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances
relating to youth that may have played a role in the commission of
the crime;
(4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the
criminal process; and
(5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.

Id. (quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10). Hanes focuses on the third element,

the circumstances of the crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may

have played a role in its commission. In considering the circumstances of a

juvenile’s crime, “attention must be given to the juvenile offender’s actual role and

the role of various types of external pressure,” which “is particularly important in

cases of group participation in a crime.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146.

At the sentencing hearing, the court made findings on each of the mitigating

factors of youth. In addressing the circumstances of Hanes’s crime and the role

external pressure played in its commission, the court stated:

I don’t believe there was a peer pressure here. I don’t believe that
there was somebody putting you up to this. I believe, based on the
testimony that I heard, that you were right there in the thick of it, if
not an instigator, and if not one of the ones—I mean, there was not,
oh, somebody put you up to this. You willingly shot many, many
rounds . . . , launched a barrage of bullets at the other car and at the
party, Mr. Winfrey. I think the trial testimony I heard indicated that
this is not a peer pressure event. This is a willing shooting by you
against an opposition group. “There go the opps.” A rival gang.
I heard all kinds of testimony that I found credible about [your
gang] . . . , but you even denied being a member of the gang to one
of the experts. Well, I’m sorry, sir, but you pled guilty to criminal gang
participation previously . . . in your criminal history.
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Hanes argues that the evidence shows that peer pressure played a role in

the crime. That evidence shows that at the time of the shooting, Hanes was

seventeen, in a gang, and in the company of three adult members of that gang.

Someone shouted, “There go the opps,” meaning the opposition, a rival gang, and

an adult was first to open fire. The expert witness Hanes retained testified at the

sentencing hearing about the role that his “peer group”—meaning the gang—

played in his life at the time:

Hanes . . . had a strong attachment to this peer group. And part of
what appeared to be a challenge in this peer group was this
glorification of violence. And Mr. Hanes participated in this
glorification of violence as well. So doing things like displaying
pictures, holding guns.
We also think that . . . part of the conflicts that appeared to be
happening at the time with respect to these two different antisocial
peer groups, Mr. Hanes’s group had some desire to exact justice or
retribution towards another peer group as well, so this conflict
between the two peer groups also appeared to play a big role in his
decision-making.
So the culture of this antisocial peer group, Your Honor, in our
opinion, seemed to be one of this . . . glorification of violence,
needing to maintain status or dominance within their perceived
community, needing to exact justice or retribution towards perceived
wrongs.

He claims that this record “reflects peer pressure most certainly played a role.”

The district court drew a different conclusion from the evidence. Although

Hanes’s expert discussed the pressures of gang culture, the court looked for

evidence of specific external pressure exerted on Hanes in the moments leading

up to and during the shooting. It found none. There was no discussion before the

shooting began, and no one told Hanes to shoot.

The court had broad discretion in relying on information provided at trial and

sentencing to determine whether the circumstances of the crime, including the role
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of peer pressure, are mitigating factors of youth. See State v. Headley, 926

N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2019). The court “was free to accept or disregard evidence

according to its own evaluation of credibility.” State v. Farnum, 397 N.W.2d 744,

750 (Iowa 1986). While the court found both expert witnesses who testified at the

sentencing hearing credible, it was allowed to draw its own inferences from the

evidence and assign it the weight it saw fit. See State v. Guise, No. 17-0589, 2018

WL 2084846, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (en banc) (McDonald, J.,

dissenting) (“The sentencing court acts within its core competency in receiving the

evidence, determining the appropriate inferences, if any, to be drawn from the

evidence, and determining the weight of the evidence, all without cautionary

instructions.”), majority decision vacated, 921 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 2018). Hanes

disagrees with the conclusion the court drew from the evidence about the

circumstances of the crime and the sentence it imposed. But disagreement is not

enough. While a different judge might have drawn a different conclusion and

imposed a different sentence, it does not amount to an abuse of discretion. See,

e.g., Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725 (recognizing that while application of sentencing

goals and factors to individual cases will not always lead to the same sentence, it

is not error and instead reflects “discretionary nature of judging and the source of

the respect afforded by the appellate process”). Finding no abuse of discretion,

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.