State of Iowa v. Victor Cole Swai

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0283
Filed September 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

VICTOR COLE SWAI,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,

Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.

Victor Swai appeals his sentence for assault causing bodily injury.

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Victor Swai appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to assault causing

bodily injury. He alleges the district court (1) considered improper sentencing

factors and (2) did not explain its reasons for the sentence imposed. Because we

find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On July 2, 2024, Swai followed two individuals in his car to a park in Mason

City. Once the individuals stopped, Swai exited his car and yelled a threat at one

of the young men in the other car. A fight ensued between Swai and one of the

men. Swai punched the man in the face. The man went to the hospital as his

teeth were broken and falling out, he was throwing up blood, and he had a

concussion. The State filed a trial information charging Swai with assault causing

bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2) and 708.2(2) (2024).

Swai pleaded guilty as charged in the trial information. In his guilty plea, he

admitted:

On or about July 2nd, 2024, in this county, I did the following: I did
an act, without justification, which was intended to result in physical
contact which would be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with
the apparent ability to execute the act; or an act which was intended
to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which would
be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive coupled with the apparent
ability to execute the act. My act caused bodily injury.

As part of the written guilty plea, Swai agreed the district court could consider the

minutes of testimony to support the factual basis for the guilty plea. At sentencing,

Swai requested a deferred judgment, and the State asked the court to impose one

year in the Cerro Gordo County Jail with all but seven days suspended and one
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year of probation. The district court declined Swai’s request for a deferred

judgment by stating:

I’m not sure what brought this situation about, okay? But your
decision or momentary thing, or, you know, however it was termed
here has lasting implications for other people, not just, you know,
recovering from the pain of it, but things that could last forever, like
not having teeth. I’ve heard absolutely no justification for this
whatsoever, and, to be honest, anything that I could hear would not
justify it. You cannot interact with people this way. I know that you’re
young; I know that from an adult criminal history you don’t have
anything previously, but this goes beyond a lapse of judgment. You
know, you jumped a kid in the wherever you were, the park, and
inflicted some pretty significant injuries here. That is unacceptable,
and I understand all the reasons that you want to ask for a deferred
judgment, but I’m not granting it. It’s not appropriate.

The district court imposed the one-year jail term with all but seven days suspended

but allowed Swai to serve his term on weekends. The court also imposed a two-

year term of probation. Swai filed a timely appeal.1

II. Discussion

a. Improper Sentencing Factors

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse

of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). The district

court’s decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is

cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720,

724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision

1 As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached

pursuant to a plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). However, the
parties agree, and we find there is good cause for appeal from discretionary
sentence rather than the guilty plea. See State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 69
(Iowa 2021).
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made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

A court cannot consider unproven facts or unprosecuted offenses in

fashioning a defendant’s sentence. State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616

(Iowa 2024). This includes the information in the minutes of testimony unless the

facts “are admitted to or otherwise established as true.” State v. Lovell, 857

N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014). “Where portions of the minutes [of testimony] are

not necessary to establish a factual basis for a plea, they are deemed denied by

the defendant and are otherwise unproved and a sentencing court cannot consider

or rely on them.” State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998). Swai has

the burden to “show that the sentencing court relied on improper evidence.” State

v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018).

Swai argues the district court considered improper sentencing factors

because it considered the minutes of testimony’s description of the victim’s injuries

and described them as “significant.” He contends the district court could not

consider the exact nature of the injuries and, after its review of the minutes of

testimony, implied they were serious injuries. But “‘[s]erious injury’ is a term of art

in Iowa criminal law.” State v. Carter, No. 13-0484, 2014 WL 69755, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014). Iowa Code section 702.18 defines it as either a “disabling

mental illness” or “bodily injury which does any of the following: (1) Creates a

substantial risk of death[;] (2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement[; or]

(3) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or

organ.” Significant injury is not similarly defined.
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Swai advances this argument relying on two of our unpublished cases. See

State v. Cubbage, No. 23-1156, 2024 WL 2043156, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 8, 2024); Carter, 2014 WL 69755, at *3. In both cases the defendant was

charged with willful injury causing serious injury and entered a guilty plea to willful

injury causing bodily injury. The district court referred to “serious injury” several

times during the sentencing hearings. In those circumstances, we reversed

because a district court cannot rely on unproven and unprosecuted charges

“unless the defendant admits them or facts are presented to prove them.” State v.

Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021). We find Swai has not made a sufficient

showing here.

First, Swai argues the district court should not have considered the nature

of the injuries in the minutes of testimony. But in his guilty plea, Swai consented

to the district court’s use of the minutes of testimony to determine if a factual basis

existed. The description of the victim’s injuries in the minutes of testimony was

necessary to establish a factual basis for the bodily injury element of the assault

charge. As a result, the court could consider those injuries in sentencing Swai.

See Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d at 517.

Second, we find Swai has not established the district court considered

improper factors. The district court told Swai he “inflicted some pretty significant

injuries here.” Swai has not carried his burden to show “significant” is being used

as a facsimile for “serious.” The district court’s comment can be reasonably

interpreted to describe the bodily injury Swai inflicted. We find the district court did

not rely on improper sentencing factors.
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b. Explanation of Sentence

Next, Swai alleges the district court failed to adequately explain its

sentencing decision. This argument also fails as “a sentencing court need only

explain its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed and need not explain its

reasons for rejecting a particular sentencing option.” State v. Crooks, 911

N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). The district court’s reasons for a

particular sentence may be “terse and succinct” if “the reasons for the exercise of

discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record before the court.”

State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015).

At the sentencing hearing, the district court made the following statement

prior to announcing its sentence:

Mr. Swai, at the time of sentencing I’m required to impose a
sentence that I feel is appropriate to meet your needs for
rehabilitation and also to do what’s necessary to protect the
community and your specific victim from further offenses by you or
by others. A number of things factor into that: Your age; any prior
criminal history; your employment, family, and personal
circumstances I’ve been made aware of; the nature of the offense;
the recommendation of the parties; and anything else I’ve learned
about you throughout the proceedings.

The district court provided sufficient explanation of the reasons selecting Swai’s

sentence to show it properly exercised its discretion. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d

at 724–25.

III. Conclusion

Because we find the district court did not consider an improper sentencing

factor and gave adequate explanation for its sentence, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.