In the Interest of R.G., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0881
Filed August 20, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF R.G.,
Minor Child,

M.P., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Michelle Jungers, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

Luke C. Jenson of Jenson Law Firm, PLC, Waterloo, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Tammy L. Banning of Waterloo Juvenile Public Defender Office, Waterloo,

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both the mother and

father of a child born in 2023. Only the mother appeals. She only challenges the

juvenile court’s refusal to give her additional time to work toward reunification

instead of terminating her rights. Our review is de novo. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d

27, 32 (Iowa 2022).

The juvenile court has discretion to grant a parent additional time to work

toward reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (2024) (permitting the court to

deny termination and enter a permanency order under section 232.104); see also

id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving a parent an additional

six months to work toward reunification). However, to exercise this option, we must

be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral

changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal

of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional

six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b). After our de novo review of the record, we

agree with the juvenile court’s decision to deny the mother’s request for additional

time.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services became involved with

this family due to reports that the mother was smoking marijuana in the presence

of her child, who was just over one month old at the time. The mother was on

pretrial release for felony charges at the time, and her conduct violated the

conditions of release, so she was incarcerated. She was subsequently sentenced

to twenty-five years in prison following convictions for second-degree burglary,

conspiracy to commit a forcible felony, felony eluding, and possession of a
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controlled substance with intent to deliver. Despite her lengthy prison sentence,

at the first permanency hearing held about a year before the eventual termination

hearing, the mother was granted a six-month extension in the hope she would be

paroled soon. She was not, and she remained incarcerated through the time of

the termination hearing.

Although the mother maintained contact through regular visitation and

demonstrated a bond with the child, her ability to participate in rehabilitative

services—such as parenting classes and substance abuse treatment—was limited

by her incarceration. She testified that she expected to be paroled two months

after the termination hearing, but there was no other evidence to support her

claim.1 If released, she planned to reside with her father, who is currently on

probation for drug-related charges and has not been approved as a placement

option for the child. The mother could not explain persuasively how she intended

to overcome this placement obstacle. Cf. In re D.M., No. 18-0086, 2018 WL

1433104, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018) (collecting cases finding a child

cannot be returned to a parent when the parent does not have stable housing or

employment).

We understand the mother’s desire to reunify with the child. But the record

does not support a finding that reunification could safely occur within six months

1 We ignore the alleged facts the mother’s attorney included in her petition on

appeal—in violation of our rules of appellate procedure—that are not part of the
record, including the mother’s alleged release from prison. Because this
information was not part of the record before the juvenile court, we may not
consider it on appeal. See In re D.A.W., 552 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996) (“[W]e only consider those parts of the record we find were properly
considered by the trial court.”).
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of the termination hearing. There was no guarantee that she would be paroled any

time soon, and even if she were, a substantial amount of time would still be

required for her to demonstrate sobriety, comply with her case plan, and establish

a safe and stable living environment for herself and the child. Transitioning from

fully supervised visits to becoming a child’s sole caregiver is a significant step—

one that necessitates a meaningful amount of time to transition. In re J.H., 952

N.W.2d 157, 170 (Iowa 2020) (“[T]here is a substantial difference between meeting

a child’s needs under the supervision and guidance of other people and being able

to independently care for a child . . . .”).

At the time of the termination hearing, the child was nineteen months old

and had spent eighteen of those months outside of the mother’s custody. Further

delay in providing the child with permanency and stability serves only the mother’s

interest—not the child’s.2 As we have previously emphasized:

We must reasonably limit the time for parents to be in a
position to assume care of their children because patience with
parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for the children.
A child should not be forced to endlessly suffer the parentless limbo
of foster care. The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended
while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.
Children simply cannot wait for responsible parents.

2 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the mother’s request that we hold
“permanency must be deferred when the parent has been in custody for a non-
child endangerment conviction; that parent will soon be released on parole back
into the community at the time of the permanency or termination hearing; and the
parent and child have demonstrated a current bond.” The mother cites no authority
to support such a holding. And neither the legislature nor our appellate courts
have adopted such a policy automatically giving non-incarcerated parents who
have not fulfilled their parenting responsibilities additional time. No good reason
exists to give a parent who has not fulfilled her parenting responsibilities due to
incarceration an automatic extension when non-incarcerated parents are not given
such time.
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In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted)

(affirming the termination of an imprisoned father’s parental rights).

Since removal, the child has been placed with the maternal aunt and her

family, who provide a safe and stable environment where the child is reportedly

thriving. It would be against the child’s best interest to prolong uncertainty in the

hope that the mother might someday be ready to parent. See In re L.L., 459

N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Children simply cannot wait for responsible

parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant,

responsible, and reliable.”).

Given the record before us, we are not persuaded that an additional six

months would remove the barriers to reunification. Accordingly, we affirm the

juvenile court’s order denying the mother’s request for additional time and

terminating her parental rights.

AFFIRMED.