State of Iowa v. Alexis May Haupert

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1496
Filed July 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ALEXIS MAY HAUPERT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Robert J. Richter,

Judge.

Alexis May Haupert appeals the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to

assault with intent to inflict serious injury. AFFIRMED.

Debra S. De Jong of De Jong Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J. and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Alexis May Haupert appeals the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to

assault with intent to inflict serious injury.1 Upon our review, we affirm her

sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

After she stabbed another woman multiple times with a knife, the State

charged Haupert with willful injury, a class “D” felony. See Iowa Code § 708.4(2).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Haupert pled guilty to the lesser-included offense

of assault with the intent to inflict a serious injury. See id. § 708.2(1). As part of

the agreement, Haupert requested a suspended two-year term of incarceration

and twenty-four months of informal probation. But on appeal, Haupert and the

State disagree about whether the plea was conditioned upon the court’s

acceptance. In one portion of the written plea agreement, it states, “I understand

that the Court is not bound by the plea agreement and may sentence me up to the

maximum sentence provided by law.” But later on in the same plea agreement, it

reads, “My entry of this guilty plea IS contingent upon the Court accepting the plea

bargain.” Haupert initialed and signed both portions.

Because Haupert waived her right to a plea hearing, the plea acceptance

occurred at the sentencing hearing in September 2024. But before accepting her

1 Generally, defendants do not have a right to appeal after pleading guilty unless

they establish good cause. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2024). But because
Haupert “makes at least one challenge to [her] underlying discretionary sentence,”
she has established good cause to pursue an appeal. State v. Grafton,
No. 23-1746, 2025 WL 401746, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025). We therefore
proceed to the merits of her arguments.
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plea, the court clarified the discrepancies within the written plea agreement,

stating:

THE COURT: But I do want to have a conversation with you
about the effect of [the plea agreement]. That is that you have a plea
deal with the State, but the plea deal is a nonbinding plea deal on the
Court. That means I don’t necessarily have to follow it. . . . I need
you to know and understand that I could go up to the maximum
penalty allowed by law.
....
Now that you know that, do you still want to go forward with
your sentencing today and your guilty plea?

After conferring with counsel, Haupert agreed to proceed with pleading guilty and

sentencing. Sentencing continued, after which the court imposed a 360-day term

of incarceration, suspended all but ninety days, which the court permitted to be

served through house arrest, and imposed twenty-four months of formal probation.

Haupert appeals.

II. Compliance with Rule 2.10.

Haupert first contends that the sentencing court failed to comply with

applicable rules when rejecting her plea agreement. Under rule 2.10(3), plea

agreements which are “conditioned upon the court’s approval of a sentencing

agreement between the parties” may either be accepted or rejected by the court.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3). If rejected, the court must “inform the parties of [its intent

to reject the sentencing agreement] and afford the defendant an opportunity to

withdraw the plea.” Id. r. 2.10(3)(b)(1). The court must further warn the defendant

that its sentencing decision “may be less favorable to the defendant than that

contemplated by the plea agreement.” Id. r. 2.10(3)(b)(2). But the defendant may

choose to be sentenced, anyway, although he or she loses the right to withdraw

the plea agreement if the sentence is not as expected. Id. Haupert specifically
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argues that the court failed to warn her of its intent to depart from the plea

agreement and allow her the opportunity to withdraw her plea.

But the State contends that this issue is not properly before us, challenging

Haupert’s failure to move in arrest of judgment to preserve this issue for appeal.

“As a general rule, a defendant who wishes to challenge a guilty plea on appeal

must first raise the challenge in the district court by filing a timely motion in arrest

of judgment.” State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 535 (Iowa 2024). Failure to file

such a motion “usually precludes appellate review of alleged plea defects.” Id. But

we have previously held that such rule 2.10 challenges are considered a

“procedural defect[]” and therefore absolved from complying with standard

error-preservation requirements. Grafton, 2025 WL 401746, at *4; accord State v.

Barnes, No. 21-1939, 2023 WL 3860153, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023)

(proceeding to the merits of a 2.10 challenge because it was considered “a defect

in the sentencing procedure”). Accordingly, we still reach the merits of Haupert’s

argument.

To determine whether the court complied with rule 2.10, we first look at the

written plea agreement. State v. Hoffman, No. 21-1134, 2022 WL 468739, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) (noting that the defendant’s “plea is clear and

consistent throughout, indicating that it was conditioned on the court’s acceptance

of the plea bargain”). But the plea agreement here contains language

inconsistencies, which require us to go outside the four corners of the document.

See Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 542 (considering the sentencing transcript to resolve

ambiguity); see also State v. Williams, No. 22-1463, 2023 WL 5093366, at *4 (Iowa

Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023) (considering the court’s accompanying sentencing order to
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analyze compliance with rule 2.10); Hoffman, 2022 WL 468739, at *1 (considering

whether the court “reference[d] the fact that [the defendant’s] guilty plea was

conditioned on the court’s agreement to be bound by the plea agreement in either

the sentencing hearing or its sentencing order” to determine rule 2.10 compliance).

But this is not a circumstance in which Haupert was unaware of her rights until

after the sentence was already imposed. See Barnes, 2023 WL 3860153, at *2

(finding noncompliance with rule 2.10 where the defendant was given the

opportunity to confer with counsel after plea acceptance and sentencing

pronouncement). Instead, the sentencing court here specifically paused before

pronouncement, clarified that the plea agreement was not conditioned upon its

acceptance, and asked Haupert whether she still wanted to plead guilty and be

sentenced immediately despite the potential consequences. The court then

permitted Haupert to confer with counsel. Only then did Haupert confirm her desire

to proceed with her guilty plea and sentencing, after which the court complied. We

find that based on the sentencing transcript, Haupert was aware that her plea

agreement was not covered under rule 2.10 and the court was not required to

engage in any colloquy. Despite this, the court on its own gave Haupert the

opportunity to reconsider her plea or make any objections before sentencing.

Haupert declined to do so. So even if the plea agreement was covered under

rule 2.10, we would find that Haupert waived her right to withdraw the guilty plea

when she elected to proceed with sentencing. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3)(b)(2).

Accordingly, we affirm.
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III. Sentencing Discretion.

Haupert further challenges the court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion,

contending that it failed to consider certain mitigating factors.2 There is a “strong

presumption” in the sentencing court’s favor if it imposes a sentence within the

statutory limits. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). Accordingly,

we will affirm unless there is “an abuse of discretion or some defect in the

sentencing procedure.” Id.

Haupert specifically argues that the court failed to consider her

mental-health and substance-use history and improperly weighed other factors,

such as the victim’s conduct, Haupert’s pregnancy and role as primary caregiver

to five children, and Haupert’s unemployment. While the court is not “required to

specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant,” see State

v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995), the court here expressly did. In

its explanation for the sentence, the court paid particular attention to Haupert’s

substance use, in which it stated its priority for rehabilitation and “getting a handle

on substances abuse issues.” The court also ordered Haupert to comply with a

substance use evaluation and any recommended treatment. As for other

2 Haupert also contends that “the court relied on an inaccurate fact” when
sentencing because the court was unsure of the maximum cap for the house arrest
program. But we disagree. At sentencing, when asked by Haupert how much
house arrest generally costs, the court stated that the maximum cap “used to
be $1,000” but advised Haupert to direct her questions to the jail because the
amounts may have changed. Besides a vague claim that the court was
unreasonable, Haupert does not offer, and we decline to search for her, any
authority in which the court commits sentencing error when it directs a defendant
elsewhere to answer her questions; accordingly, we find this argument waived.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (stating issues inadequately argued on
appeal may be deemed waived).
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mitigating factors, the court expressly referenced Haupert’s young age, “the impact

[the] sentence would have on [Haupert’s] family situation,” her employment, and

the victim’s conduct. In fact, the court attributed these mitigating factors to its

decision to grant house arrest rather than impose traditional incarceration. But the

court also considered Haupert’s criminal history, the severity of the offense,

including the serious harm to the victim who was stabbed multiple times, and the

need for deterrence. Due to the discretionary nature of sentencing, consideration

of the relevant factors “will not always lead to the same sentence.” Formaro,

638 N.W.2d at 725. But “this does not mean the choice of one particular

sentencing option over another constitutes error.” Id. Without evidence of a

procedural defect or an abuse of discretion, we must affirm Haupert’s sentence.

See id. at 724.

IV. Disposition.

Because the court did not err or abuse its discretion, we affirm Haupert’s

sentence.

AFFIRMED.