In re Marriage of Nimrick

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1227
Filed July 2, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF STEPHANIE NIMRICK
AND VICTOR NIMRICK

Upon the Petition of
STEPHANIE NIMRICK, n/k/a STEPHANIE TROUTWINE,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
VICTOR NIMRICK,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Linda M. Fangman, Judge.

A former spouse appeals from a dissolution decree, challenging various

provisions including a restriction on social-media usage. AFFIRMED AS

MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

Austin J. McMahon of Lange & McMahon, P.L.C., Independence, for

appellant.

Melissa M. Lien of Ament & Lien Law Firm, P.C., Waterloo, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Victor Nimrick appeals from a decree dissolving his marriage to Stephanie

Nimrick n/k/a Stephanie Troutwine. He contests the decree’s protective order

restricting his contact with Stephanie, a social-media restriction, the determination

placing sole legal custody of three minor children with Stephanie, the physical-care

and visitation provisions, the child-support calculation, and the award of attorney

fees and related enforcement mechanism. We modify the decree by narrowing

the scope of the social-media restriction and affirm all other challenged provisions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Stephanie and Victor married in 2011 after dating for two years. They

moved to Iowa in 2020 or 2021 and separated in late 2022 or early 2023. They

share three children: twins born in 2014 and another child born in 2019.

Stephanie petitioned for dissolution in March 2023. Victor evaded and

refused service of the petition, and Stephanie had to resort to service by

publication. The district court entered a default judgment when Victor failed to

appear. Then Victor hired counsel and moved to vacate the default decree about

a month later. In an order setting aside the default, the court found that Victor

knew Stephanie was seeking a divorce, knew a deputy sheriff had attempted to

serve him at his brother’s residence, refused to accept formal service at an

attorney’s office, left Iowa for Illinois, and had not paid any child support while

Stephanie was seeking to commence the dissolution proceedings. The court

found service by publication “was sufficient” but, because the court was focused

on “the best interest of the child,” it chose to “err in an abundance of caution and

set aside the default decree.” The court made an express finding that Victor did
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not have “clean hands” and “question[ed] whether this motion to set aside the

default decree [was] simply a tool to either harass [Stephanie] or to escape paying

child support.” And the court ordered Victor to pay Stephanie’s attorney fees

incurred while she was trying to serve him through the time of the hearing on

vacating the default.

A temporary-matters order placed physical care with Stephanie, granted

Victor visitation every other weekend and holidays, and granted Stephanie sole

legal custody. The order also required Victor to pay child support, which he

never did.

Both parties alleged at trial that the other perpetrated violence inside the

home. Stephanie detailed multiple instances of domestic violence and sexual

abuse. After a sexual assault, Stephanie sought medical care and reported the

matter to police. But—according to her—Victor left the area, and police were never

able to locate him. Stephanie had also previously obtained a protective order in

Illinois as a consequence of domestic violence. Stephanie described one recent

occasion in which she and Victor were exchanging the children when Victor

grabbed her phone from her hands and threw it “about fifty feet into a field.” And

she described other occasions in which he was “yelling, screaming,” or “jump[ing]”

into her vehicle despite her repeatedly telling him he did not have permission to

do so.

Victor made various allegations against Stephanie and her family members,

none of which the district court appears to have credited. Victor has claimed (on

Facebook and otherwise) that Stephanie was violent with him, which Stephanie

denies. Victor filed papers with both Illinois and Iowa courts claiming Stephanie
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had abused him: he voluntarily dismissed the Illinois action and failed to attend the

Iowa hearing, resulting again in dismissal. He also once arranged for Stephanie’s

arrest in front of the children on allegations that Stephanie maintains were false.

When it comes to the children, Victor often did not provide adequate care

during his parenting time under the temporary-matters order, and he frequently left

Stephanie in the dark as to the children’s whereabouts and activities. As the district

court found,

[T]here’s often problems during Victor’s visit. Victor does not provide
information to Stephanie concerning where the kids are staying,
where they’re sleeping, or where they’re spending their weekends.
Up until the trial Stephanie did not know an actual address where
Victor was living. She did not know where the children were
sleeping. The children have come back after visits starving, saying
they have not eaten. In fact, Victor himself had told her at the
exchange that the children had not eaten. Stephanie testified the
children often have hygiene issues when they return, wearing the
same clothes they were sent in on Friday, and they do not appear to
have been bathed nor brushed their teeth.

Victor also caused problems with transporting and exchanging the children. In

addition to the violence and yelling, Victor’s move to Illinois led to extended travel

for the children, made more difficult by Victor’s lack of cooperation with Stephanie.

For example, Stephanie requested to exchange the children at a police department

halfway between their homes, but Victor frequently text-messaged her different

locations for the exchange at the last minute and would not utilize the police

department as neutral ground or exchange the children on time. On one occasion,

Victor did not return the children per the terms of the temporary-matters order,

which resulted in the children missing school. On another occasion, shortly after

exchanging the children, Victor “veer[ed]” his vehicle toward the car containing
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Stephanie and the children; the kids “were crying and scared” and “thought [they]

were going to go off the road.”

Before trial, Victor told Stephanie that he didn’t want to work because he

“doesn’t want to get raped in child support.” He was gainfully employed in 2022

(earning approximately $27,000 annually) and 2021 (approximately $25,000).

And, in interrogatories, he swore that he “d[id] not claim to be unable to work due

to a physical injury or disability.” As of trial, Victor claimed to be disabled and

unable to work. And he was receiving $1,216 per month as a social security

benefit. On cross-examination, he agreed that his alleged disability was the same

since approximately 2016 and admitted he could still be working: “I can work, yes,

if I try.” He also admitted to receiving a lump-sum back payment from the

government for more than $16,000 but spent none of it on child support, medical

support for the children, or attorney fees the court ordered him to reimburse

Stephanie following the default judgment. In a Facebook post, Victor wrote: “I

rather give all my money away then [sic] let you even see a penny of it or that bum

ass dude you’re with.” The post included a kissing emoji and a middle-finger emoji.

Before, during, and after the dissolution litigation, Victor harassed

Stephanie. According to Stephanie, Victor used “probably 40, 50 different

numbers” to send her “threatening or harassing messages” “multiple times a day.”

Stephanie testified that Victor also harassed her mother (on her personal phone

and at her place of work), her brother, and her grandmother. Stephanie submitted

text messages and Facebook posts corroborating her account of the harassment.

As the district court put it, “The text messages and Facebook posts are

harassing in nature. They are vulgar. They are full of name calling. They clearly
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show Victor is unable or unwilling to communicate respectfully with Stephanie.”

Just by way of illustration, some of the names Victor called Stephanie by text-

message include: “druggie azz bitch,” “racist white bitch,” “rude ass bitch,” “hoe

ass bitch,” “slutt,” “whore,” “piece of shit,” and “dumbass.”1 On one occasion in

which both Victor and Stephanie appear to have video-recorded the drop-off, Victor

called Stephanie a “stupid ass whore,” “fucking delusional,” a “bitch,” an “asshole,”

a “ho,” a “stupid ass bitch,” and a “stupid ass ho” in front of the children, all within

thirty seconds. In that video, Stephanie tells Victor to “roll [his] window up” rather

than trading insults. She testified this was typical of her interactions with Victor

when exchanging the children.

After trial, Victor (seemingly using a fake or falsified number) text-messaged

Stephanie:

• “You should feel guilty you stupid fucking whore shits definitely going to get
worse for you now”;

• “You should stop doing drugs and being a bad Mother piece of shit”;

• “Your karma is coming really soon now too you stupid whore”; and

• “You piece of shit you’re going to hell for all that you’ve done”

Victor did not resist Stephanie’s motion to reopen the record to include these text

messages or otherwise dispute that he sent them. In other messages known to

be from Victor’s phone number, he called her a “bitch,” a “piece of shit,” and a

1 We quote Victor’s language verbatim in this opinion because he challenges the

necessity of the protective order’s restriction on his speech. A paraphrase of
Victor’s derogatory comments would sanitize or minimize the language and its
potential impact on Stephanie and the children.
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“dumbass,” and referred to her “slut ass attorney” and the “bias ass judge that took

your side.”

Victor’s Facebook posts similarly attacked Stephanie and her attorney and

accused the district court of being biased. With regard to Stephanie, Victor’s posts

refer to her as a “narcissist/cheater,” a “liar,” a “bitch,” “grimy,” a “manipulator,” a

“bad mother,” and other similar terms. He attempted to enlist his Facebook friends

into messaging Stephanie to persuade her to modify her approach to exchanging

the children for visitation. He posted: “I don’t respect her even as the Mother of

my children.” And he made posts questioning paternity of two of the children,

featuring their photos. Victor admitted on cross-examination that his Facebook

page was “public” and “anyone can see it”—potentially including the children. And

he admitted that it would be harmful for the children to read at least some of what

he posted online.

In addition to the comments targeted at Stephanie, Victor posted on

Facebook: “fuck you [middle-finger emoji] and fuck your lawyer.” And he called

Stephanie’s attorney a “stalker” and a “crybaby bitch.” Beyond the public

Facebook posts, Victor also sent an email directly to Stephanie’s attorney, telling

her she “should feel ashamed” and calling Stephanie many of the derogatory

names he called her in the public communications.

In trial testimony, Stephanie emphasized her view that it was important

Victor continue to receive significant parenting time with the children, but she

wanted to make time with him less disruptive for the children and involve fewer

weekends where the children spent as many as ten hours in the car. In her words,

“my goal was to never take the kids away from their dad or take his time away from
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the kids.” But she did not believe they could share legal custody given Victor’s

“explosive behavior” and inability to communicate. Victor testified that he thought

he and Stephanie were able to positively communicate regarding the children,

despite what his attorney characterized as “inappropriate” language, and he said

they could function as coparents. Near the end of trial, when the court expressed

concern about the burden of travel on the children for visitation, Victor had an

outburst in the courtroom that required the court to ask Victor if the court needed

to summon security.

The court ordered Stephanie would have sole legal custody of the children,

based in part on the court finding Stephanie’s reports of domestic abuse were

credible and that the abuse happened in the presence of the children. The court

also emphasized that “Victor is disrespectful, threatening, vulgar, calls Stephanie

names, and cannot participate in making joint decisions due to his behavior.” And

the court expressly found that “Stephanie’s safety w[ould] be jeopardized by . . .

joint custody of the children.” The court placed physical care with Stephanie for

largely the same reasons. And the court ordered that exchanges of children for

scheduled visitation with Victor would take place at the Waterloo and Davenport

Police Departments and be facilitated by third parties (extended-family members).

In response to an unresisted post-trial motion from Stephanie, the court also

incorporated a protective order into the decree, prohibiting Victor from

communicating with or being in the physical presence of Stephanie, except during

facilitated exchanges. The same provision of the decree imposed a speech

restriction: “Victor shall also not post any social media or derogatory comments

about Stephanie on any medium.” And another provision assessed Victor
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approximately $2300 in attorney fees for litigation related to the default and

indicated that failure to pay the fees “may result in Victor being held in contempt.”

Victor filed a post-ruling motion challenging the visitation schedule, the

protective order as unconstitutional, and the attorney-fee provision as unlawfully

contemplating contempt as a potential remedy for a future violation.2 As to the

protective order, the court explained its rationale as follows:

Victor further argues the protective order is unconstitutional
because it prohibits communication and contact with [Stephanie] and
restricts his ability to post derogatory statements about the victim on
social media or any medium. The purpose of a protective order is by
nature to restrict a person’s ability to contact another person. The
protective order prohibiting Victor from contacting Stephanie is not
unconstitutional as it was entered after the Court made a finding of
domestic abuse and was entered for the protection of Stephanie. As
to whether Victor has a constitutional right to post harassing, vulgar,
threatening communications, the Court finds he does not have a
constitutional right to post threats of violence. Victor does not have
a right to harass, insult, or threaten Stephanie. The fact Victor so
vehemently argues he has the right to post derogatory, threatening,
vulgar messages about Stephanie supports the Court’s finding the
protective order is necessary.

As for the attorney-fees provision, the court expanded or clarified its earlier ruling,

explaining its basis for ordering Victor to pay attorney fees: Stephanie incurred

those fees while she was trying to diligently serve Victor and before the court set

aside a default at Victor’s request so that the court could resolve the issues on the

merits rather than close the courthouse doors to Victor. The court also reiterated

that Victor had received a lump-sum payment in government benefits and had not

2 Between the decree and the post-trial ruling, Victor repeatedly posted on
Facebook that he intended to defy the court order. For example: “I WILL continue
to exercise my first 1st amendment e.v.e.r.y s.i.n.g.l.e t.i.m.e. So.. in MY OPINION
I think my [babymama], and her attorney are little cry baby bitches.” He also tried
to pressure Stephanie into ignoring the court’s limitations on his visitation.
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paid any child support, medical support, or attorney fees from that lump sum—

which strongly suggested he had funds available to pay the attorney-fee award to

Stephanie.

Victor appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Our review in dissolution cases is generally de novo. In re Marriage of

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). We give weight to the district court’s

factual findings, particularly regarding the credibility of witnesses, but we are not

bound by them. Id. To the extent separate constitutional issues are raised, we

also review those de novo. In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1997).

Questions that turn on the court’s statutory authority are reviewed for correction of

errors at law. Id. And an award of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006).

III. Discussion

We understand Victor to challenge five aspects of the decree: the protective

order (including its restrictions on communicating with Stephanie and making

derogatory comments about her); legal custody; visitation; child support; and the

award of attorney fees and associated enforcement mechanism. We consider

each.

A. The Protective Order3

Victor challenges the protective-order provision in multiple ways, claiming

procedural defects; insufficient evidence he perpetrated domestic abuse; a

3 In raising this challenge, Victor’s opening brief and reply brief repeatedly refer to

district court filings that post-date his notice of appeal. These are outside the
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violation of his free-speech rights; and a violation of his rights as a parent. We

consider each in turn.

1. Procedures

The self-described “threshold contention” of Victor’s procedural challenge

is his assertion that protective orders cannot be entered in dissolution cases. But

this is not accurate. The General Assembly expressly conferred on the district

court authority to issue protective orders in chapter-598 cases like this one. Iowa

Code § 664A.1(2) (2023) (defining a “protective order” to include “a temporary or

permanent protective order . . . under chapter 598”); id. § 664A.2(2) (“A protective

order issued in a civil proceeding shall be issued pursuant to chapter . . . 598. . . .”);

id. § 664A.7(1) (setting penalties for the violation of “a protective order issued

pursuant to chapter . . . 598”); see also id. § 598.42 (requiring the clerk to “provide

notice and copies of temporary or permanent protective orders . . . entered

pursuant to this chapter to the applicable law enforcement agencies”). And we

have expressly upheld such orders before. See White v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,

No. 11-1831, 2012 WL 1864596, at *4, *7–8 (Iowa Ct. App. May 23, 2012)

(affirming a “domestic abuse protective order accompanying dissolution decree”).

record for purposes of this appeal. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Iowa 2005) (“[T]he appellate courts cannot consider materials that were not before
the district court when that court entered its judgment.”); Iowa R. App. P. 6.801
(providing an exclusive list of items comprising the record on appeal). We also
note Victor’s reply brief attempts to interject counsel’s personal recollection of
certain events and seeks to vacate an order that post-dates the notice of appeal.
We admonish counsel to stop circumventing the rules of appellate procedure. And
we note as a general matter that, if we were to consider filings that post-date the
notice of appeal in this case, it would not at all benefit Victor.
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We reject Victor’s claim about the district court’s lack of authority as contrary to the

plain text of the statute.

Next, Victor argues that the court in this chapter-598 case was required to

import the exact procedures of chapter 236. We see no support for this position in

the statutory text or our case law. And, in any event, we find that Victor received

adequate procedural protections in this case because he had notice and

opportunity to be heard. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994)

(analyzing procedural due process in the context of domestic-abuse protective

orders); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (discussing the federal

procedural-due-process framework). Stephanie’s pretrial exhibit list included one

marked “Sexual Assault Form and Records.” And Victor sent Stephanie a text

before trial saying “[i]t looks really retarded” for Stephanie to make what he called

“false rape allegations.” Had the allegations of domestic abuse and sexual

violence issue truly been the ambush he now claims, Victor could have asked for

a continuance—and he didn’t, because he wasn’t surprised. In fact, Victor

attempted to offer evidence addressing the issue at trial.4 Consistent with Victor

having notice and adequate time to prepare, he text-messaged Stephanie before

trial that, if she was trying to prove he raped her, she should “go for it” because he

had “all the evidence” he “need[ed] to prove [his] innocence from that serious shit.”

4 As Stephanie notes, Victor’s appellate brief quotes from an exhibit he proposed

on this subject at trial, but the district court excluded that proposed exhibit. The
proposed exhibit is not part of our record on appeal. Victor’s references to it are
improper, and we do not consider them. See Hill v. State, No. 22-0653, 2023
WL 2397369, at *3 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023). We again admonish counsel
not to inject outside-the-record materials into the briefing.
13

To the extent Victor advances the narrow claim that, while he may have

known about the evidence Stephanie intended to offer, he did not know she would

be seeking a protective order, we are similarly unpersuaded. Stephanie did not

request the protective order until Victor continued to harass her after trial, and he

did not resist her motion to reopen the record and offer into evidence those

harassing communications. He never sought a continuance or evidentiary hearing.

And he only challenged the protective order by a motion to reconsider. Setting

aside for a moment concerns about whether this challenge was timely or preserved

error, it certainly reflects that Victor had sufficient notice and opportunity to be

heard. See Knight, 525 N.W.2d at 843. That Victor did not take advantage of the

opportunity to be heard does not mean he received inadequate due process. If

anything, the court deciding his motion to reconsider gave him an extra opportunity

to ensure his claims were heard. We discern no error or legal deficiency.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Victor next contends there was insufficient evidence he perpetrated

domestic abuse against Stephanie. We disagree. Stephanie testified to multiple

instances of domestic (and at least one instance of sexual) abuse, and the district

court generally credited her testimony. This was sufficient to support a protective

order.

In his brief, Victor describes the district court’s ruling as “perfunctory.” But

it is not. This ruling actually includes quite a bit more detail than the typical

form-order issued in a chapter-236 case, which we recognize are often set for short

summary hearings and typically include few if any traditional written fact-findings

beyond the finding of domestic abuse (and certainly no element-by-element
14

analysis that Victor suggests must be required). Victor also writes that it’s

“inexplicable” how Stephanie could be telling the truth about the abuse when she

did not take action to hold him accountable earlier. But the dynamics of domestic

abuse are complicated, and that a victim did not report right away does not mean

he or she is lying about the abuse. Cf. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa

2004) (discussing the dynamics of domestic abuse and holding that “the

defendant’s prior conduct directed to the victim of a crime, whether loving or

violent, reveals the emotional relationship between the defendant and the victim

and is highly probative of the defendant’s probable motivation and intent in

subsequent situations”).

Other scattered complaints appear in Victor’s brief on this issue, some of

which border on frivolous if not offensive. For example, he claims that living in

Illinois “precludes” him being a “credible and imminent threat” to Stephanie. This

is silly. Moving across a geographic border does not instantly negate the threat

posed by a domestic abuser—particularly one who must necessarily remain

connected to the victim through their shared children for more than a decade to

come. And our common sense tells us that a few hours’ drive is not much of a

barrier to the commission of domestic violence, particularly for an offender with the

history of anger, threatening statements, and misogyny consistently demonstrated

by Victor—to say nothing of his criminal history, which includes convictions within

the last decade for “domestic battery,”5 harassment, disorderly conduct, and

violating a different order of protection. Victor also complains that Stephanie is not

5 We quote Victor’s description of the offense, rather than refer to it with the Iowa

term “domestic abuse assault,” because it may have been an Illinois conviction.
15

credible because she did not request “that security be provided at the trial.” See

Iowa Code § 598.8(1). We think most Iowans reasonably believe the courthouse

to be a safe place, and there is no legal authority to suggest they must request

additional security to pursue a protective order under chapter 598 or seek other

relief. In short, none of these complaints persuade us.

Last, Victor attempts to shame Stephanie for allegedly sending him explicit

photos. Stephanie maintains Victor “hacked” her phone—a claim at least partially

corroborated by multiple messages in which someone, likely Victor using a fake

number, admits to doing exactly that. We find this sex-shaming argument from

Victor irrelevant, immaterial, and improper.

3. Free Speech

Victor also levies a challenge under the state and federal constitutions’

free-speech provisions. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Iowa Const. art. I, § 7. But it

is not entirely clear to us how much of Victor’s challenge remains after we have

upheld the district court’s finding that he domestically abused Stephanie. On a

human level, we recognize the district court’s speech restriction does not ask much

of Victor—just that he treat Stephanie like we expect all citizens to treat one

another in civilized society. But, human decency aside, there are constitutional

questions in the mix. As a student law review comment puts it, “A seemingly simple

clause that asks divorcing parties to act like adults is surprisingly the center of

great controversy.” Jacob Eisenman, Comment, The Use of Non-Disparagement

Clauses in Family Law Cases, 33 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 593, 593 (2021).

Prior restraints on speech are “one of the most extraordinary remedies

known to our jurisprudence” and warrant scrutiny. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart,
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427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).6 Yet prior restraint can be proper based on “(a) the

nature and extent of [the speech being restrained]; (b) whether other measures

would be likely to mitigate the effects of [the speech]; and (c) how effectively a

[prior restraint] would operate to prevent the threatened danger.” Id.

The relevant portion of the decree ordered: “Victor shall also not post any

social media or derogatory comments about Stephanie on any medium.” In our

review, we discern only one problematic aspect of the order—the decree’s

reference to “derogatory comments.” In its post-ruling order, the court clarified that

the protective order was intended to establish that Victor could not post “threats of

violence” or “harass, insult, or threaten Stephanie.” We have little trouble

concluding the order’s prohibition on threats and criminal harassment withstands

constitutional scrutiny, as those restrictions touch only on unprotected speech.

See Wedding v. Harmon, 492 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding

restriction on a parent’s ability to harass the other parent). But some of Victor’s

past and probable future comments may fall outside the categories of utterly

unprotected speech and instead in the broader bucket of “derogatory comments.”

For example, his past social media posts ranged from calling Stephanie a

“narcissist/cheater” to “grimy” to a “manipulator” and many other disparaging

6 Because Victor does not advance any argument that the analysis under the Iowa

Constitution would differ from its federal counterpart, we find any independent
state-constitution claims waived and analyze the issue under federal law. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) cmt.; cf. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291–92
(Iowa 2013) (“Because Tyler has not proposed a standard for interpreting our
search and seizure provisions under the Iowa Constitution differently from its
federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general standards as outlined
by the United States Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge
under the Iowa Constitution.”).
17

terms. These comments are certainly “derogatory” under a common definition.

See Derogatory, Merriam-Webster, https://perma.cc/T4WC-YZPX (defining the

term as “expressive of a low opinion : disparaging” or “detracting from the character

or standing of something”). But the comments are not threats and likely not

harassment (at least when considered in isolation).

So, can a court prohibit one parent in a dissolution from making “derogatory”

comments about the other? Massachusetts courts have recognized “the State has

a compelling interest in protecting children from being exposed to disparagement

between their parents,” and that a disparagement restriction may be permissible

when linked to communication that would impact the children. Shak v. Shak, 144

N.E.3d 274, 279 (Mass. 2020) (citation omitted). We agree with this proposition.

Following that same rationale, the South Carolina Court of Appeals recently upheld

the following provision in a contentious dissolution:

All parties are restrained against the use of profanity or making any
derogatory comments about or toward the other party or allowing
anyone to do so in front of the child/children, or in any manner
whereby the child might learn of the same, except where there
exists a reasonable expectation of privacy whereby the child
reasonably would not, could not, or should not learn of the
same.

Clark v. Clark, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 2025 WL 699278, at *7 (S.C. Ct. App. 2025).

In upholding the provision, the South Carolina court emphasized first that the

provision left the parents free to derogate each other in forums where they had a

reasonable expectation of privacy and second that sophisticated children are apt

to access public internet posts made by their parents. Id. at *7–8. We find both of

these considerations persuasive.
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With this backdrop in mind, we think the protective order entered by the

district court here generally withstands constitutional scrutiny but could be more

narrowly tailored to ensure Victor retains a forum in which he can express

derogatory comments about Stephanie if there is no reasonable probability the

children will be exposed to or otherwise affected by the comments. To effectuate

that holding, we affirm the social-media restriction in the decree as modified, and

we direct the district court on remand to substitute the existing one-sentence

speech restriction prohibiting derogatory comments on “any social media” or “any

medium” with a separate order containing the following provisions or the

substantial equivalent:

Victor shall not post on social media or any other forum any
messages that constitute harassment or threats toward Stephanie.
And Victor shall not make derogatory comments about Stephanie in
front of the minor children or in any medium in which the minor
children are reasonably likely to become aware of Victor’s derogatory
statements.

We believe this re-tooling of the decree’s speech restriction addresses the

Facebook posts, text messages, and in-person comments that prompted the court

to issue the order while appropriately balancing Stephanie and the children’s

interests as well as Victor’s free-speech rights. Cf. id. at *7; see also In re Marriage

of Hartmann, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 245 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[C]ourts routinely order

the parties not to make disparaging comments about the other parent to their

children or in their children’s presence.”). However, nothing about our opinion

affirming the provision as modified or the accompanying remand is intended to

prohibit the district court from, in its discretion, hearing additional evidence and

further refining the protective order (in compliance with the state and federal
19

constitutions, case law, and other applicable legal authority) to address any

additional post-decree conduct or statements by Victor that we were unable to

address in this opinion given the scope of the existing record.

4. Vagueness

Victor also alleges the speech restriction is impermissibly vague under the

state and federal constitutions. We are not persuaded. As we identified above,

“derogatory” has a commonly understood definition, and there are easily

identifiable examples of Victor’s speech in this record that fall in the scope of that

definition. As modified above, the speech restriction set forth is not void for

vagueness. Victor has not proven the restriction fails to provide people of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits, nor

do we discern a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (explaining the

void-for-vagueness doctrine). And we are not concerned the provision sweeps up

protected speech given our narrowing of its application. See id.

5. Parental Rights

Victor next contends the protective order’s communication restriction

“unduly and substantially burdens [his] constitutional rights as a parent and his

fundamental interests in familial integrity and association under both the Iowa and

United States Constitutions.” But Victor cites no legal authority—and we are aware

of none—holding that a father has a constitutional right to communicate with (or

insult and disparage) a mother after domestically abusing her. In our review, we

discern no constitutional basis for such a holding and reject the argument. To the

extent Victor claims the restriction on communicating with Stephanie may impact
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his ability to exchange the children, we think the district court’s involvement of third

parties is neither particularly unusual nor improper. And it certainly is not

unconstitutional on these facts. If the involvement of third parties proves

unworkable, Victor can seek relief from the district court and develop a factual

record with specifics on why it is unworkable. Until then, we discern no basis for

disturbing the decree beyond the modification set forth above.

B. Legal Custody

Victor also challenges whether the district court should have awarded

Stephanie sole legal custody of the children. He did not seek below, nor does he

seek on appeal, physical care of the children.

In dissolving a marriage with minor children, the district court must assign

sole or joint legal custody. In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2009). “Legal custody” grants the parent (or parents) certain rights and

responsibilities, including but not limited to “decision making affecting the child’s

legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious

instruction.” Iowa Code § 598.1(5); see also Gensley, 777 N.W.2d at 714. The

child’s best interests are the primary consideration. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n).

And the district court should, if reasonable and in those best interests, ensure the

children have maximum physical and emotional contact with both parents. Iowa

Code § 598.41(1)(a). The Iowa Code and our case law set forth a lengthy list of

non-exclusive factors to guide custody decisions. Id. § 598.41(3); In re Marriage

of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974) (listing often-overlapping

considerations for evaluating legal custody and physical care).
21

Among the statutory factors, the district court must consider “[w]hether a

history of domestic abuse . . . exists.” Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j). The court must

weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances, including whether a petition for

relief was filed, whether a protective order was entered, the response of peace

officers to the scene of any alleged abuse, and whether an arrest or conviction

resulted. Id. “[I]f the court finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a

rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists.” Id.

§ 598.41(1)(b).

Here, the district court explicitly found a history of domestic abuse, and that

finding was grounded in credibility findings we give weight to on appeal. See Iowa

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Victor thus faces the uphill climb of not only disturbing

credibility findings but also rebutting the presumption against joint legal custody.

See Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(b). As we understand his challenge, he essentially

argues that he never physically harmed the children, that the communication

problems between him and Stephanie weren’t that bad, and that Stephanie “would

be glad to share” medical and education records with Victor. While it is true the

record does not prove Victor ever physically harmed the children, his disparaging

and harassing conduct toward Stephanie certainly was not in the children’s best

interests, especially when committed in their presence. The record is replete with

evidence that the acrimony between these parties goes well beyond the normal

discord attendant to separating couples, as evidenced by the many issues that

arose while the parties operated under the temporary-matters order. We find

Victor’s behavior during that time demonstrates he cannot co-parent. And we find

much of his appellate argument on this point belied by the record: for example, he
22

argues the parties “were able to agree on exchange points” to hand off the children,

yet the district court actually found that instances of domestic violence occurred

during the exchanges and that Victor had “made the exchanges difficult” in part by

refusing to agree on a neutral site like the police station. We agree with the district

court on our de novo review, particularly given the vitriol Victor spewed during the

recorded exchange in which he called Stephanie the many names and epithets we

set forth in the facts section of this opinion, all with the children in earshot.

We also, like the district court, recognize Stephanie’s past and professed

future intent to support Victor’s relationship with the children despite his abusive

conduct toward her. And we agree with the district court Victor has shown he

“cannot support Stephanie’s relationship with the children.” This too supports

placing sole legal custody with Stephanie. And we broadly agree with the district

court’s observation that the approximately six-hour drivetime between the parents

also weighs against joint legal custody, given the parents’ inability to communicate

(and in light of Victor’s inability to co-parent, abide by court orders, or respectfully

communicate with Stephanie). In sum, the factual record in this case supports the

district court’s conclusion that joint legal custody was unworkable and not in the

children’s best interests. See id. § 598.41(2)(b).

At one point, Victor seems to argue in his appellate brief that the district

court must have credited his allegations that Stephanie domestically abused him

because the court noted in its ruling he made such allegations. We do not agree.

The district court specifically found “Stephanie’s safety will be jeopardized by

awarded joint custody of the children.” This necessarily credits her version of

events. As does entering the protective order, which the court noted was after it
23

“made a finding of domestic abuse” and done “for the protection of Stephanie.” We

discern no error in the court’s application of the rebuttable presumption against

joint custody after a finding of domestic violence. See id. § 598.41(1)(b). The

district court correctly granted Stephanie sole legal custody.

C. Visitation

Victor levels a somewhat ambiguous challenge to the visitation provisions,

contending they are “unconstitutional and/or otherwise not in the best interests of

the children.” Although we are not sure the exact contours of this claim, we do our

best to address the arguments as we understand them.

Victor first mischaracterizes the district court order, claiming on appeal that

the district court restricted his visitation as punishment for his failure to pay child

support. That is not true. The district court instead reasonably noted that requiring

Stephanie to bear the financial costs of transporting the children to Victor was

unreasonable when she was getting “no support” from Victor. In other words, the

court found failure to pay child support was relevant to transportation for visitation,

rather than the exercise of visitation. We agree with the district court and discern

no error in that analysis.

Victor goes on to contend that requiring school-year visitation take place in

Iowa violated his rights as a parent under the state and federal constitutions. Much

like his earlier parental-rights argument regarding the protective order, he cites no

case law or other legal authority that supports his position that requiring visitation

in the children’s state of residence is unconstitutional. And, contrary to Victor’s

protest that there is no reason to require visitation in Iowa, we find Victor’s own

conduct during visits—lying or obfuscating about the children’s whereabouts,
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frustrating or impeding exchanges, threatening Stephanie, causing the children to

miss school, and more—weighs heavily in favor of the geographic restriction. As

does the district court’s expressed concern that the children had been spending

more than ten hours per weekend in a car during the school year while Victor

engaged in various shenanigans while the temporary-matters order was in place.7

This geographic restriction furthers the children’s best interests and, to the extent

it touches on Victor’s constitutional rights as a parent, it does not infringe upon

them.

The remainder of Victor’s argument on this issue is even harder to decipher

in the briefing, but he seems to argue he should have received more visitation. We

are not inclined to tinker with the district court’s thoughtful assessment of the

visitation calendar given the geographic distance between the parties. Victor has

advanced little more than disagreement with the court on this point, and it suffices

to say for purposes of our review that the considerations we have identified

elsewhere in this opinion all support that the existing visitation schedule is lawful

and in the children’s best interests.

D. Child Support

Victor also challenges the district court’s child-support calculation, asserting

the court erred in imputing income to him based on his 2022 tax return. Victor

admits he responded to an interrogatory by writing that he was not disabled but

7 At trial, the district court expressed concern that it had been misled by Victor

about his whereabouts when entering the temporary-matters order. The court
emphasized it “would never have ordered every-other-weekend visitation for
children this young and expect them to spend ten hours every other weekend or
twenty hours a month to go to visits.”
25

now claims that he misunderstood the question as only concerning physical

disability, while his alleged inability to work is due to “mental or psychological

disabilities.” We are skeptical of this invented explanation, offered for the first time

on appeal. And we give it little weight, particularly in comparison to the district

court’s fact- and credibility-findings adverse to Victor, as well as the record

evidence that Victor (during the time period he claimed to be disabled) has held

multiple positions at a meatpacking plant and bottling companies. In his own

words, Victor “can work” if he “tr[ies].” The district court was authorized to impute

income to Victor under Iowa Court Rule 9.11(4) and made a written finding to that

effect. It was reasonable to rely on Victor’s 2022 tax return as a basis for that

finding.

Related or perhaps embedded within this challenge is Victor’s argument

that there was an error in distributing certain social-security payments to the

children due to paperwork problems and that this should have been accounted for

in assessing child support. See Iowa Code § 598.22C. The problem for Victor is

that he did not present any evidence on this subject at trial. The district court noted

this in a ruling on Victor’s post-trial motion, observing the court “cannot possibly”

have erred when Victor did not provide the court with any of this information. We

agree. And we find the record as currently developed insufficient to provide Victor

any relief on the child-support calculation. We reject his claim on appeal, though

without prejudice to any relief he may seek from the district court in the future,

given the recognition in the court’s post-trial ruling that information provided by

Victor in the future “may decrease [his] out-of-pocket payment because he will be

credited for any payments made by Social Security” and the court’s directions to
26

Victor to provide the court with that information “so an appropriate order may be

entered.” We decline to weigh in further on this potential future issue.

E. Attorney Fees and Contempt

Victor last contends the district court abused its discretion in ordering him

to pay attorney fees and informing him that failure to comply may result in contempt

proceedings. He claims in his brief that the fees “were not imposed pursuant to

any statute or rule.” But the district court specifically identified Iowa Code

section 598.10(1)(a) as the statutory authority it relied on and explained its

reasoning in detail. The record as a whole is replete with testimony and other

evidence about the parties’ needs and financial resources. And we discern no

abuse of discretion in the court considering relevant equities in assessing fees

pursuant to its statutory authority. See Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255.

Victor goes on to claim that informing him that failure to pay fees could serve

as the basis for contempt proceedings violates the Iowa Constitution’s prohibition

on incarceration for civil debts. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 19. It’s not clear to us

Victor preserved error on this claim below, as we discern no ruling on it.

Regardless, the claim is premature and not yet ripe for our review. Whether Victor

will be held in contempt for failing to pay his attorney fees is a hypothetical or

speculative future concern, and we are not empowered to weigh in on those. See,

e.g., State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) (“A case is ripe for

adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one

that is merely hypothetical or speculative.”). To the extent any issue related to the

court mentioning its enforcement mechanism is before us at this time, we discern

no error. See Iowa Code § 598.23(1) (authorizing contempt as the mechanism to
27

enforce domestic-relations decrees and establishing willful disobedience as

contemptuous conduct).

IV. Disposition

We affirm the speech limitation in the decree as modified, as discussed in

Division III.A.3 of this opinion. We remand with directions for the district court to

enter an order consistent with that holding. And we otherwise affirm the decree in

its entirety.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.