In re Marriage of Backer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1771
Filed June 18, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRIANA R. BACKER
AND TIM F. BACKER

Upon the Petition of
BRIANA R. BACKER,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
TIM F. BACKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, Colleen Weiland,

Judge.

A former spouse appeals financial and custodial provisions in a dissolution

decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Tyler J. Johnston of Cordell Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Shanna Chevalier of Laird & Luhring, Waverly, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Tim Backer appeals a holiday physical-care schedule and assorted

economic provisions of a decree dissolving his marriage to Briana Backer. We

modify the spousal-support award and affirm the rest of the decree.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Tim and Briana married in 2000. They have three children together, only

one of which (born 2008) is still a minor. When they married, Briana was in college

for her bachelor’s degree. Tim had completed an associate’s degree and was

working at John Deere.

During the first years of the marriage, Briana completed her bachelor’s and

a master’s degree. At the time of trial, she worked as a speech pathologist for the

local area education agency. By agreement of the parties, Briana worked part-time

as the children grew up and increased her hours as the children aged; she was

working four days a week (0.8 full-time equivalent) during the school year at the

time of the dissolution trial, which still allowed flexibility to attend appointments and

school events with the children. She testified she would have to obtain health

insurance at an additional cost as a result of the dissolution and did not currently

have the option to increase to full-time in the region, but there had been openings

in the past. She worked a part-time job over the summer months.

As of trial, Tim was working in John Deere’s machine shop with health

insurance that covered the children, himself, and Briana. He started working in

this role in summer 2022 after working for several different employers over the

course of the marriage. His employment at John Deere included an increase in

his pay, but a recent switch to first shift lowered his hourly rate a bit and there was
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less overtime available. Starting in 2020, Tim spent thousands of dollars

purchasing parts for ghost guns, assembled the guns, and sold several of them.

He testified the sales were close to the cost of the parts, not for profit.

At trial, the parties spent a significant amount of time disputing the value of

various personal property, including furniture, tools, firearms, and vehicles. Each

party tended to value property they wanted to keep at its “used” value and the

property going to the other as “new.” The parties stipulated to joint custody and

shared physical care of the minor child. But they could not agree on a regular

schedule or holidays.

The court dissolved the parties’ marriage. After a two-day trial, the court

ordered Tim and Briana share physical care and have joint legal custody of the

minor child and set a regular care and holiday schedule. The court valued and

divided the parties’ disputed personal property and financial accounts. Using

income based on the most recent tax documents, the court ordered Tim to pay

Briana traditional spousal support and no child support. Finally, the court ordered

Tim to “contribute $5000 to Briana’s fees.”

Tim appeals, and Briana seeks appellate attorney fees.1

1 Briana’s brief reflects a common issue that frustrates us: instead of a digitally

exported copy of a word processing document (such as a Microsoft Word
document saved as a .PDF file), Briana’s brief was printed out, scanned back into
the computer, and then filed as a scanned image. These scanned documents are
unnecessarily difficult to read, frequently skew text or cut off words, and often pose
problems for digital search functions. We ask parties to please stop filing scanned
briefs.
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II. Standard of Review

A dissolution-of-marriage proceeding is heard in equity, and we generally

review the resulting dissolution de novo. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402,

406 (Iowa 2015). “We give weight to the factual determinations made by the district

court; however, their findings are not binding upon us.” Id. “We will disturb the

trial court’s order only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (cleaned

up).

III. Discussion

Tim appeals the spousal support order; the court’s valuation of his tools,

firearms and firearm parts, and two old vehicles; the order to contribute to Briana’s

attorney fees; and the Christmas-holiday part of the physical-care schedule.

Briana urges the district court’s order was correct and requests appellate attorney

fees. We address the physical care issue first, then the assorted financial claims.

A. Holiday Schedule

Tim requested to have visitation with the minor child on Christmas Day after

noon. The decree covers only one more Christmas—for 2025. Under the decree,

“in odd-numbered years” (like 2025) Tim has care of the minor child starting at

10:00 a.m. on Christmas day and lasting until December 28. Because we cannot

change what happened on the Christmas before the appeal was submitted to us,

and no action is needed for Tim to have his desired result this Christmas, we do

not disturb the holiday-visitation provision of the decree and do not engage with

this issue further.
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B. Spousal Support

Tim requests we eliminate or reduce the spousal support he was ordered

to pay Briana. He observes Briana’s asset distribution was significantly more liquid

than his and Briana has “almost no debt” coming out of the marriage. According

to Tim, “Briana has a significant earning capacity and potential,” has out-earned

Tim at times during the marriage, and moving from 0.8 full-time equivalent to

full-time would make “her potential earnings . . . equal to or greater than those of

Tim.”

The district court ordered Tim to pay Briana $1500 a month for three years

in spousal support, then $1000 per month until either party’s death, Briana’s

remarriage, or a court modification after a substantial change in circumstances. 2

The court specified the spousal support was “traditional”: support based on the

parties’ twenty-three year marriage and their assumption of “traditional roles” with

Tim’s career a priority while Briana’s depended on parenting needs. In 2023, Tim’s

wages were more than double Briana’s, though the court averaged his 2023 wages

and what Tim expected to earn in 2024 to set his salary at $110,000. The court

used Briana’s 2023 wages of $59,630 in its calculations, though she expected to

make a bit more in 2024, and noted Briana would incur monthly insurance costs

when she had previously been covered without extra expense by Tim. Briana

explained that Tim controlled most of the financial and practical decisions during

the marriage, so she had been learning how to handle her finances and what her

regular costs would be.

2 The court observed this spousal support resulted in equalized incomes bringing

any child support obligation under $10 per month for shared physical care.
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“The institutional deference afforded the district court in determining

spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with spousal support awards.

An appellate court should disturb the district court’s determination of spousal

support ‘only when there has been a failure to do equity.’” In re Marriage of Sokol,

985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). “Traditional spousal support

is often used in long-term marriages where life patterns have been largely set and

‘the earning potential of both spouses can be predicted with some reliability.’” In

re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

“[P]articularly in a traditional marriage, when the parties agree a spouse should

stay home to raise children, the economic consequences of absence from the

workplace can be substantial.” Id. “The award and duration of a traditional alimony

award ‘is primarily predicated on need and ability.’” In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971

N.W.2d 530, 543 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). We also consider other factors,

including the length of the marriage. See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 410–11.

Here, the parties’ twenty-three-year marriage falls squarely within the length

of marriage that “merit[s] serious consideration for traditional spousal support.” Id.

at 411. And Briana, though she has consistently worked in her professional field,

does not appear to have ever worked full-time because the parties decided to

prioritize her time at home with the children from the time she finished school. We

find an award of traditional spousal support is appropriate, so we turn to

determining an appropriate amount and duration.

Tim underestimates the difference between his income and that of Briana.

Tim argues Briana could choose to work full-time instead of the 0.8 time she is

currently contracted for, and she could work “all year long instead of just nine
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months out of the year,” to bring her earnings “equal to or greater than those of

Tim.” But this assumes without record support that Briana could increase to

full-time during the school year—despite her credible testimony it was not

available—and find full-time employment for just the summer at a similar rate of

pay. And Briana noted the uncertainty surrounding continued employment with

the area education agency—presumably given the recent legislative changes to

the agency’s structure and funding. We also recognize Tim is now reaping the

rewards of consistent full-time work in his own field, with a higher salary and bonus

potentials—made possible by Briana taking on the lion’s share of work raising their

children and not prioritizing her own career during the marriage the way Tim did.

Spousal support for the first three years at $1500 per month is reasonable

given the difference between 0.8 and full-time work, Briana’s lack of opportunity to

move to full-time work with the employer she has had for the entire marriage, and

the limited other employment opportunities in her field in the area. But we find she

does have the earning capacity to become self-sufficient given her consistent

employment history and education. So we limit the duration of the $1000 award

to seven years after the first three years, for a total of ten years of spousal support.

Consistent with the limitations originally imposed by the district court, if either party

dies or Briana remarries before the ten-year period expires, Tim’s spousal-support

obligation will end.

C. Property Valuation

Tim contests the district court’s valuation of firearms, parts, tools, and two

vehicles awarded to him. He also urges the court should have offset Briana’s

remaining student loans in the division of assets.
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Briana estimated Tim had spent more than $21,000 on gun parts between

2020 and 2022, and there were still parts in the house when she moved out in

2023. She estimated Tim’s guns and gun parts to be worth at least $8000. But,

according to Tim, the gun parts were gone later that year, because he was buying

them for other people and sold them for cost. Tim only claimed ownership of one

ghost gun and six other guns and valued them at $2700. And he identified an

additional thirteen guns in his possession as belonging to the children, worth more

than $3600. Yet Briana produced copies of checks to Tim for guns for more than

$500 and $900. The court determined $6000 was a fair value to assign all Tim’s

firearms and firearm parts.

Tim owns a significant amount of tools due to both his profession and his

preferred hobbies—filling two large standing toolchests as well as several table

saws and other power tools. Briana estimated the value of Tim’s tools at $15,000.

Tim testified he had many tools from before the marriage from gifts and for his

schooling; he estimated their worth at $2500. The court described it as “quite an

inventory” and noted “[n]either of the parties’ evidence regarding tools is

particularly convincing,” ultimately setting a value at $8000.

Finally, two vehicles were distributed to Tim, and he disputes their valuation.

The court assigned a 2005 minivan a value of $2240 and a 2009 SUV $4675.

These values generally track Briana’s valuations, which she supported with Kelley

Blue Book valuations of similarly aged vehicles in “Fair” condition. Tim estimated

their worth at $1500 and $500, respectively. A couple of weeks before trial when

driving the minivan, Tim had a “tire fl[y] off and kick[ him] sideways.” He opined

“[i]t should be with the junkyard. It should have been replaced ten years ago.” As
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to the SUV, he testified it had not run for “three or four years” and was not worth

more than scrap weight. Briana agreed it had not run for a few years and she was

willing to scrap and salvage the vehicles. But neither party testified to a specific

salvage value for either vehicle.

“Ordinarily, a trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the

range of permissible evidence.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703

(Iowa 2007). “Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the trial court

when valuations are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or

corroborating evidence.” Id. We find the court’s valuation of the guns and tools

easily falls within the range of permissible evidence. In doing so, we recognize

and decline to disturb the district court’s credibility findings on this issue, including

that no evidence regarding the tool valuation was “particularly convincing,” that the

court was “skeptical” of at least some of Tim’s testimony (even he admitted at trial

to being dishonest regarding the guns), and that the court believed “some [gun]

parts disappeared without explanation.” And although Tim testified the vehicles

were worth less than the two amounts offered into evidence by Briana, he did not

provide the court any competing evidence to support his estimate of their worth.

Under the circumstances, we defer to the court’s reliance on evidence in the

record.

As to Briana’s student loans, Tim argues “[p]art of Briana’s student loans

were incurred prior to the marriage” and “[t]here is no evidence before the court

that Briana’s student loans benefited Tim.” We disagree, as Briana’s education

played a major role in her ability to significantly contribute to the family’s support

even with part-time employment. Nor does Tim specify which of Briana’s student
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loans were obtained before the marriage to set aside. More, Tim paid off his own

premarital student loans during the marriage using marital funds. We affirm the

court’s decision not to offset Briana’s student loans.

D. Trial Attorney Fees

“The court has considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees” and “may

consider expert fees in an award of attorney fees.” In re Marriage of Schenkelberg,

824 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2012). We review the court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). “We

reverse the district court’s ruling only when it rests on grounds that are clearly

unreasonable or untenable.” In re Marriage of Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238

(Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court ordered Tim to “contribute

$5000 to Briana’s fees.”

According to Briana, she incurred extra trial attorney fees due to Tim not

returning the children from visitation on time, delayed discovery responses

resulting in a motion to compel, and Tim telling the children his utilities were being

turned off because of Briana. Briana requested Tim pay for all her attorney fees—

around $20,000. Tim argues the court provided no justification for the award, and

it was not fair or reasonable. Given the circumstances, we cannot say the district

court’s award of $5000 to Briana was an abuse of discretion, so we affirm.

E. Appellate Attorney Fees

Briana requests $7392 in appellate attorney fees. Our considerations for

discretionary appellate attorney fees include the requester’s need, the other party’s

financial ability, and the merits of the appeal. See Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255.
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Given lack of merit for most of Tim’s arguments on appeal, we take a similar

approach to the district court and award $1850 in appellate attorney fees to Briana.

IV. Disposition

We modify the district court’s decree to terminate Tim’s obligation to pay

traditional spousal support on July 31, 2034. We affirm all other aspects of the

district court’s dissolution decree. And we award Briana partial appellate attorney

fees in the amount of $1850. Costs on appeal are assessed to Tim.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.