In re the Marriage of Howard

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0278
Filed June 18, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KENNETH M. HOWARD
AND ANNA V. HOWARD

Upon the Petition of
KENNETH M. HOWARD,
Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
ANNA V. HOWARD,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

Judge.

A petitioner appeals the child-support, spousal-support, and property-

division provisions of the decree dissolving the parties’ marriage. AFFIRMED AS

MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

Steve Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Clive, for appellant.

Donna R. Miller of Miller, Zimmerman & Evans PLC, Des Moines, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Kenneth “Mike” Howard appeals the decree dissolving his twenty-three-

year marriage with Anna Howard. Mike argues that the district court erred when

calculating child support by not adjusting both parties’ incomes to account for the

spousal-support award, and Anna agrees. He also requests a reduction in the

spousal-support award. And he contends that the district court erred by including

vehicles in the property division that he claims were his premarital property.

We agree that the parties’ incomes should have been adjusted for spousal

support in the court’s child-support calculations and remand to the district court to

recalculate the child-support award. But on the remaining issues, we affirm the

district court’s decree. We find that the short-term rehabilitative spousal support

award is equitable given Anna’s need for training to become self-supporting. And

Mike failed to preserve error on his claim that his vehicles were premarital assets.

We also decline Anna’s request for appellate attorney fees.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings

In 2001, Mike met Anna in Russia; they soon married. Anna was twenty-

one years old, had a fashion design degree, and was employed with “sewing work.”

Mike—who was forty-five years old—worked as a railroad employee early in the

marriage. They moved to Iowa in 2002, living on Mike’s property outside Madrid.

Anna gave birth to the first of their five children the next year and stayed home to

care for the children. Three of their children are now adults.1 The two minor

children were born in 2012 and 2014.

1 One of the three became an adult after the dissolution decree was filed.
3

Anna began working outside the home in 2018, first in a nursing home

kitchen. A couple of years later, the oldest child taught her how to drive. She took

classes to become a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”) and moved into that

position in 2021. At the time of the dissolution trial, Anna—who was now forty-four

years old—was working part-time as a CNA with an annual income of just over

$28,000 while also studying to become a surgical technician. She estimated it

would take her two years to finish the program.

During the marriage, Mike worked for the railroad and a demolition business

and eventually began driving a truck. He was often away from home for weeks at

a time. At the time of trial, Mike—then sixty-eight years old—was an over-the-road

trucker making over $122,000 per year.

The court held the dissolution trial in January 2024. Mike—who was then

representing himself after consenting to his attorney’s withdrawal—did not appear.

So the court received exhibits and testimony from only Anna. In its decree, the

court placed the two youngest children in Anna’s physical care and the oldest

then-minor child in Mike’s care. It also divided the parties’ assets and ordered

Mike to pay Anna $2000 per month of rehabilitative spousal support for thirty

months. And following Anna’s proposed child-support calculation—which did not

factor in any spousal-support award—the court ordered Mike to pay Anna child

support.

Mike unsuccessfully asked the court to reconsider the physical-care

placement for the youngest two children. And he now appeals, challenging only

the decree’s child-support, spousal-support, and property-division provisions.
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II. Error Preservation

Before reaching the merits of Mike’s claims on appeal, we must consider

whether Mike has preserved error even though he failed to appear at trial. “It is a

fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised

and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v.

Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). This gives the district court a chance

to correct the error itself “at a time when corrective action can be taken.” In re

Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up). It

ensures that we are reviewing a decision already made rather than addressing it

for the first time on appeal. See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537. And it “preserve[s]

judicial resources by avoiding proceedings that would have been rendered

unnecessary had an earlier ruling on the issue been made.” Top of Iowa Coop. v.

Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000). Given all these interests

protected by the requirement, we address whether error is preserved even when

not raised by the opposing party. See id.

A party still must preserve error in a dissolution appeal because we only

conduct “review de novo, not trial de novo or trial anew.” In re Marriage of Huston,

263 N.W.2d 697, 699–700 (Iowa 1978). Yet even a defaulting party to a dissolution

decree may seek review of the “basic fairness of the decree’s provisions in light of

the total record made at trial.” Id. at 700.

Following this precedent, we conclude that we may consider Mike’s claims

that the child- and spousal-support awards are inequitable. See id. But Mike’s

third challenge—to the property division—is not properly preserved. He argues

only that four vehicles that the district court included in the division should have
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been excluded as premarital assets. But aside from a summary assertion in his

financial affidavit that Anna submitted into evidence, Mike submitted no evidence

that he owned any of the vehicles before his marriage.2 Raising this factual

question now after “his trial court dereliction” is too late. Id. We thus confine our

review to Mike’s child- and spousal-support challenges.

III. Child Support

Mike argues the court failed to consider the spousal-support award’s effect

on each party’s income when calculating child support. Anna concedes the court

should have included the spousal-support award in its child-support calculation.

The parties are correct: “If spousal support is to be paid in the pending matter, . . .

it will be determined first and added to the payee’s income and deducted from the

payor’s income before child support is calculated.” Iowa Ct. R. 9.5(1)(a)(1). Yet

the court used Anna’s proposed calculations that did not include any adjustments

to income for spousal support. The resulting award is inequitable. So we remand

for the district court to recalculate the child support Mike owes after adjusting the

parties’ respective incomes for duration of the spousal-support award.

IV. Spousal Support

Mike next urges the court awarded “an excessive amount” for spousal

support. The district court determined Anna needed rehabilitative spousal support

in the amount of $2000 per month for thirty months to allow her to complete job

2 As he acknowledges on appeal, at least one of those assertions was clearly

erroneous since he could not have owned a 2010 vehicle before the parties’ 2001
marriage.
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training and find suitable work in her field. Mike contends the monthly support

amount should be lowered to $750 because “[h]e is saddled with debt.”

“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined

based on the particular circumstances presented in each case.” In re Marriage of

Mills, 983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022). We consider many factors when assessing

spousal support, including the marriage’s length, the health and age of the parties,

the earning capacity of the party seeking support, the feasibility of and timeline for

the party seeking support becoming self-sufficient, and the results of any property

division. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a)–(j) (2023). “Rehabilitative spousal

support is a way of supporting an economically dependent spouse through a

limited period of re-education or retraining following divorce, thereby creating

incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become self-supporting.” In re

Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).

According to his own financial affidavit, Mike earns more than $10,000 per

month as compared to Anna’s $3000. And despite his appellate claim of being

“saddled with debt,” the only debt Mike included in the documents available on our

review was the mortgage on the house (which he was awarded in the property

division), specifically noting on his financial affidavit no other balance due for

installment payments or other debts. Anna, on the other hand, stayed home with

the couple’s children for nearly twenty years after moving to a new country and

seeks schooling to become self-sufficient as a surgical technician—a goal she was

already working toward at the time of trial. Considering the twenty-three-year

marriage, the respective roles of the parties in the marriage, the vast income

difference, and Anna’s need and desire for training for work that would allow her
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to become self-sufficient, we find that the awarded rehabilitative support is both

necessary and appropriate. Because it is equitable, we affirm the spousal-support

award.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees

Anna asks for an award of appellate attorney fees and helpfully submitted

an attorney-fee affidavit supporting her request. See In re Marriage of Samuels

da Fonseca Silva, 15 N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (expressing our

preference “that parties requesting appellate fees do so in their briefs and submit

an attorney-fee affidavit immediately after oral argument or after the case is

submitted without oral argument”). We have discretion whether to award appellate

attorney fees in an appeal of a dissolution decree. See id. In exercising that

discretion, “we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the

other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up).

Considering these factors, including Mike’s partial success on appeal and the

parties’ respective abilities to pay, we exercise our discretion to deny Anna’s

request for appellate fees. Appellate court costs shall be assessed equally to the

parties.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

Schumacher, P.J., concurs; Buller, J., specially concurs.
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BULLER, Judge (specially concurring).

I reluctantly concur. But if we were writing on a blank slate, I would find

Mike’s failure to attend trial precluded appellate review and summarily affirm.

As we have made clear: “We are a ‘court for the correction of errors at law,’

Iowa Code § 602.5103(1), and we cannot correct an ‘error’ the district court never

made.” State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 509 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (also citing

State v. Gomez Medina, 7 N.W.3d 350, 355 (Iowa 2024)). And as the supreme

court has observed, our error-preservation rule has “roots that extend to the basic

constitutional function of appellate courts.” State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 42

(Iowa 2017). In my view, the Iowa Constitution likely requires preservation of error.

See Iowa Const. art. V, § 4 (“The supreme court . . . shall constitute a court for the

correction of errors at law . . . .”).

Applying these principles of error preservation, I would find Mike cannot skip

trial below and claim error for the first time on appeal. This sandbagging is contrary

to the adversarial process, undermines judicial integrity and efficiency, and

blindsides the district court. And these concerns are just as present in dissolution

cases as any other. See In re Marriage of Jennings, No. 23-0850, 2024

WL 1551225, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024) (discussing these principles and

finding error not preserved).

As an intermediate appellate court, I recognize we are bound by the

supreme court’s decisions. E.g., State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2014). So I cannot fault the majority for its application of In re Marriage of

Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 699–700 (Iowa 1978). And I therefore concur in the

judgment under existing precedent.