State of Iowa v. Raul Louis Liendo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0511
Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RAUL LOUIS LIENDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Meghan Corbin,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for introduction of

contraband onto the grounds of a jail. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE

VACATED, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

An intoxicated Raul Liendo showed up at the Muscatine County Jail to serve

a five-day jail sentence with a bottle of Fireball whiskey in his pocket. He was

convicted of introducing contraband onto the grounds of a jail in violation of Iowa

Code section 719.7(3)(a) (2023). Following the jury trial on that charge, Liendo

stipulated that he was a habitual offender. The district court imposed a suspended

indeterminate sentence of fifteen years in prison, placed Liendo on probation, and

ordered him to pay a fine of $1025.

On appeal, Liendo challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction, the district court’s failure to engage in an adequate habitual-offender

colloquy, and its imposition of a fine. The State concedes error on the last two

claims but contests the first. So we start there.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review Liendo’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for correction of

errors at law. State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). In performing this

review, “we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,” which is binding on this

court “if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Jones, 967

N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to

convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. While we consider all evidence in the record—not just evidence supporting

guilt—we view that evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” and draw all

“legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be

deduced.” Cook, 996 N.W.2d at 708 (citation omitted).
3

With that standard of review in mind, we turn to the marshaling instruction

given to the jury:1

The State must prove all of the following elements of
Possession of Contraband in a Jail Facility:
1. Raul Liendo was confined in the Muscatine County Jail.
2. Muscatine County jail is a county jail.
3. On or about April 7, 2023 . . . Raul Liendo knowingly
introduced an intoxicating beverage into or onto the grounds of the
Muscatine County Jail.
4. The beverage introduced was an intoxicating beverage.

Liendo challenges the first, third, and fourth elements of the offense as marshaled.

A. Confined

On the first element, Liendo argues that he was not “confined” to the jail

because he was not yet “committed,” or “accepted for mittimus,” when he arrived

at the jail with the bottle of Fireball whiskey. We agree with the State that because

neither the legislature nor the jury instructions defined the word “confined,” we can

“look to other sources, including dictionaries and common usage.” State v.

Borchers, No. 22-1454, 2024 WL 467375, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024); see

also State v. Ellison, 985 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Iowa 2023) (“[W]ords used in a jury

1 Iowa Code section 719.7(3) provides three ways to commit the offense of
“possessing contraband.” The marshaling instruction combined two of those
alternatives—section 719.7(3)(a), which prohibits a person from “[k]nowingly
introduc[ing] contraband into, or onto, the grounds of a . . . jail,” and
section 719.7(3)(c), which prohibits a person from “[k]nowingly . . . possess[ing]
contraband while confined in a . . . jail.” (Emphasis added.) The trial information,
however, only charged that Liendo “knowingly introduce[d] contraband” into the
Muscatine County Jail. Even though the instruction added a confinement element
to the charged offense, no one objected, and so it’s now the law of the case. See
State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). But we repeat our warning
in State v. Coleman—which discussed a similarly inaccurate jury instruction for a
charge under section 719.7(3)—that practitioners should not “read this opinion as
approving of the quoted instruction as the most accurate statement of the statutory
elements for this offense.” No. 23-0918, 2024 WL 4965860, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2024).
4

instruction ‘need not be defined if they are of ordinary usage and are generally

understood.’” (citation omitted)); State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Iowa

2019) (“When the legislature does not define [a] term, we look to the context in

which the term appears and give it its ordinary and common meaning.”). The State

argues that online dictionaries define “confined” to mean “limited to a particular

location,”2 or “to keep someone closed in a place.”3 Giving the word that common

meaning, we find there was substantial evidence that Liendo was confined in the

Muscatine County Jail.

Liendo appeared in court at noon on April 7, 2023, and was ordered to report

to the jail at 6:00 p.m. that day to begin serving a sentence on a prior charge.

Liendo spent that window of time drinking with a friend. He showed up at the jail

around 4:00 p.m. and buzzed the secure door at the south lobby entrance to be

admitted. Although correctional officers cannot book an inmate more than one

hour before their scheduled mittimus time, because the officers could see that

Liendo was intoxicated and they were concerned for his safety, they admitted him

into the south lobby of the jail.

The south lobby is a small waiting area at the jail with two doors—one to

the outside of the building and another to the interior jail. Those doors are locked

and can be opened only by the jail’s master control officer. Once Liendo was inside

the south lobby, correctional officers testified that he was not free to leave, both

because jail staff had contacted deputy sheriffs to investigate his intoxication and

because he had reported to the jail on a mittimus order. The supervising lieutenant

2 See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/Y6C4-UEG8.
3 See Cambridge Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4BAA-DM9R.
5

at the jail explained that typically, once someone reports for mittimus, “we don’t

want them to leave.” Indeed, Liendo unsuccessfully tried to leave several times—

pulling at both locked doors in the lobby. This evidence is sufficient to convince a

rational trier of fact that Liendo was confined in the jail.

We would reach the same conclusion even with Liendo’s more technical

definition of “confined” as meaning “committed.” The supervising lieutenant

testified that “someone is formally in custody” at the jail “when we have . . . a lawful

reason to hold them, such as we have charges. We have the mittimus. . . . And

they were . . . ordered to be there by a judge.” This testimony tracks with case law

stating that “mittimus is synonymous with the word ‘commitment.’” State v.

Robinson, 262 N.W.2d 270, 271 (Iowa 1978); accord State v. Huston, 209 N.W.2d

42, 47 (Iowa 1973). So, even though Liendo had not been booked while he was

waiting in the south lobby, he was “committed” to the jail by the court’s order issuing

mittimus.

B. Knowingly Introduce

Liendo next argues that he “did not knowingly introduce an intoxicating

beverage into the jail” because he testified at trial that he had forgotten the bottle

of Fireball was in his pocket. Video from the south lobby shows that Liendo’s claim

is not true. Within four minutes after he was admitted into the south lobby, Liendo

pulled the bottle out of his pocket and took a drink. He briefly placed the bottle on

a chair next to him before putting it back into his pocket. Over the next forty or so

minutes, Liendo moved the bottle around several times—pulling it out and looking

at it, shifting it between pockets, and taking another drink. Liendo thus had

“knowledge of the existence of the fact he was in possession of [Fireball whiskey]
6

when he entered into, or onto, the grounds of the jail.” State v. Monson,

No. 18- 0482, 2019 WL 320213, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019) (interpreting

section 719.7(3)(a) to “mean merely a knowledge of the existence of the facts

constituting the crime” (citation omitted)).

Relying on a specific intent instruction given to the jury, Liendo contends

the State had to prove a higher level of knowledge: that “not only was Liendo aware

he possessed an intoxicating beverage and did so voluntarily, but he did so with

the specific purpose of introducing it into the jail.” While we question the impact

(and applicability) of the specific intent instruction,4 which was not referenced in

the marshaling instruction or closing arguments, we conclude the evidence was

sufficient to establish that specific intent despite Liendo’s intoxication.5 See State

v. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Iowa 2015) (requiring a “high level of

intoxication to support a finding of no specific intent”), overruled on other grounds

by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2016). Liendo interacted

4 As our supreme court explained in State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa

1999), the “term ‘specific intent’ describes a special mental element above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” The
court in Canas concluded “the offense criminalizing the introduction of controlled
substances into a detention facility” in section 719.8 was a general intent crime
because it “does not require an intent to do any further act or achieve some
additional consequence other than the prohibited conduct of introducing a
controlled substance into a detention facility.” 597 N.W.2d at 495–96; see also
Iowa Code § 719.8 (“A person not authorized by law who furnishes or knowingly
makes available a controlled substance or intoxicating beverage to an inmate at a
detention facility, or who introduces a controlled substance or intoxicating
beverage into the premises of such a facility, commits a class “D” felony.”).
Section 719.7(3)(a) is similarly limited to the knowing introduction of contraband,
with no intent to do any further act.
5 Although intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime, see State v.

Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986), the jury received an instruction on
that defense.
7

with multiple officers and never disclosed that he had the bottle of Fireball, which

he was careful to keep in his pocket when they were in the room with him. One of

the correctional officers pointed out a segment from the video that appeared to

show Liendo trying to hide the bottle as he drank from it. The bottle was discovered

only when the officers were patting Liendo down before taking him into the jail’s

interior. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Liendo intended to

introduce the whiskey into, or onto the grounds of, the jail. See State v. Schminkey,

597 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999) (noting that we may rely on “the facts and

circumstances surrounding the act, as well as any reasonable inferences to be

drawn from those facts and circumstances” to assess intent).

C. Intoxicating Beverage

Finally, Liendo contends the State failed to prove that he introduced an

intoxicating beverage into the jail because the liquid inside the Fireball bottle was

not tested. In making this argument, Liendo relies on his testimony that before he

went to the jail, he drank all the whiskey in the bottle and poured an energy drink

into it. The jury was free to reject that explanation and instead accept testimony

from the officers who handled the bottle and said that it contained an intoxicating

beverage. State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (“It is not our place

‘to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to

determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters

are for the jury.’” (citation omitted)).

Those officers testified that the bottle they removed from Liendo’s pocket

was labeled “Fireball” and had a distinctive red cap. The transparent bottle, with

its label and red cap, can be seen on the video from the south lobby. The liquid
8

inside the bottle was amber, which officers testified resembled whiskey. The

officer who disposed of the liquid confirmed that it “looked and smelled like Fireball

whiskey” when he dumped it out. Liendo admitted that he bought a bottle of

Fireball earlier in the day and that the liquid inside was whiskey-colored. And when

Liendo was given a preliminary breath test just after taking a drink from the bottle,

the reading came back as “HI,” which an officer testified happens if the person

consumed alcohol in the last fifteen minutes before the test. Jurors using their

common knowledge and experience could reasonably conclude from this evidence

that the liquid in the Fireball bottle was whiskey, an intoxicating beverage. See

State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974). We accordingly find that the

jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, despite the inaccurate but

unchallenged jury instructions that increased the State’s burden and were a boon

to Liendo.

II. Sentencing Issues

For his sentencing challenges, Liendo argues that the district court failed to

conduct an adequate habitual offender colloquy and incorrectly imposed a fine of

$1025 that was not authorized by the sentencing statutes for habitual offenders or

the underlying offense. The State agrees, as do we.

Because admission to prior offenses under the habitual offender

enhancement is akin to a guilty plea, the district court “must ensure that the

admission is ‘voluntary and intelligent,’ and that the defendant understands ‘the

ramifications of an habitual offender adjudication.’” State v. Harrington, 893

N.W.2d 36, 45 (Iowa 2017). To meet that standard, the court must inform the

defendant of the following: (1) the nature of the habitual offender enhancement,
9

including that the prior felony convictions are valid only if the defendant was either

represented by or waived counsel; (2) the maximum punishment, including any

mandatory minimums; (3) the trial rights in Iowa Rule of Criminal

Procedure 2.8(2)(b) and that no trial will take place by admitting the prior

convictions; and (4) that any challenges to an admission based on defects in the

habitual offender proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment to

preserve a right to appeal. Id. at 45–46; State v. Smith, 924 N.W.2d 846, 852–53

(Iowa 2019).

While the district court confirmed that Liendo was represented by counsel

in his prior convictions, the court failed to advise him about the maximum and

mandatory minimum punishments for the habitual offender enhancement; the trial

rights in rule 2.8(2)(b) and that no trial would take place by admitting the prior

convictions; and the right to challenge the admission through a motion in arrest of

judgment.6 Because the colloquy here “leaves us ‘unable to conclude [the]

admission was knowingly and voluntarily made,’” we affirm Liendo’s conviction but

reverse the habitual offender judgment and vacate the sentence. Smith, 924

N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Harrington, 893 N.W.2d at 47). We remand for further

proceedings consistent with the requirements of Harrington or, if Liendo denies the

prior convictions or their validity, for trial on whether he qualifies as a habitual

6 Liendo is not precluded from challenging his habitual offender admission on
appeal because the court failed to inform him about this last right. See Smith, 924
N.W.2d at 851 (“[N]o offender in a habitual offender stipulation proceeding should
suffer Harrington’s error preservation sanction unless the court has complied with
its duty under Harrington to inform the offender that challenges to the stipulation
proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and the failure to do
so precludes raising those challenges on appeal.”).
10

offender. Id. Our reversal of Liendo’s judgment and vacation of his sentence also

vacates the unauthorized fine imposed as part of that sentence.7

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

7 The habitual offender provisions apply to persons convicted of class “C” or class

“D” felonies. See Iowa Code § 902.8. Liendo’s conviction was a class “D” felony.
See id. § 719.7(4). Neither section 902.9(1)(c), the sentencing statute for habitual
offenders, nor section 719.7(4) authorized the court to impose a fine. See State v.
Halterman, 630 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Iowa 2001) (vacating fine imposed on a habitual
offender where no separate statute imposed a fine against the defendant).