State of Iowa v. Daniel Welchs Doyen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0802
Filed May 21, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DANIEL WELCHS DOYEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Casey D. Jones (plea)

and Nicholas Scott (sentencing), Judges.

The defendant appeals from his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.

Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Sandy, J., and Mullins,

S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Characterizing his claim as an issue of first impression, Daniel Doyen

appeals from his plea of guilty to assault causing bodily injury,1 a serious

misdemeanor, and the resulting sentence. He argues there was a defect in

accepting the written guilty plea because he never signed it and asserts it cannot

be used to show he voluntarily and intelligently agreed to its terms and waived his

right to file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge it. Doyen advocates that

we should treat his plea as if not entered because the written form was unsigned,

making the plea and the sentence “null and void.” The State contends that Doyen

does not have good cause to appeal from his guilty plea under Iowa Code

section 814.6(1)(a)(3).2 Alternatively, if we reach the merits of Doyen’s challenge,

the State argues the guilty plea substantially complied with Iowa Rule of Criminal

Procedure 2.8(4). And the State directs us to Iowa Code section 814.29, asserting

we cannot vacate the plea under this record in any event.

Because we construe the language of the rule 2.8(4) strictly, we agree with

Doyen that there was a defect by the court’s acceptance of the written plea

1 Doyen was charged under Iowa Code sections 708.1(2) and 708.2(2) (2024) after

he allegedly assaulted a person without provocation. His written guilty plea
addressed this matter and two other unrelated charges for similar behavior. Doyen
asks that we take judicial notice of the other two proceedings “to fully understand
the procedural failure in the instant case,” but those matters are not part of the
record in this appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.801.
2 This section provides that:

1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:
a. A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:
....
(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This
subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class “A” felony or
in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.
Iowa Code § 814.6 (emphasis added).
3

agreement. But, on the record made below, we are unable to determine that the

defect prevented the guilty plea from being entered voluntarily and intelligently or

that Doyen would have chosen to go to trial absent the defect, thus, his challenge

fails.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

According to Doyen’s plea counsel, while he was in custody Doyen asked

if he could plead guilty to resolve three misdemeanor charges, including the

serious misdemeanor assault that is at issue in this case. On April 10, 2024,

Doyen’s attorney signed the plea agreement on behalf of Doyen under the

“DEFENDANT CERTIFICATION” paragraph at the end of the written plea, which

appears as follows:

Along with signing on behalf of Doyen, plea counsel also signed, certifying as an

officer of the court that certain obligations had been met:
4

The written plea agreement confirmed the parties would make a joint

recommendation for a sentence of thirty days with credit for time served, “release

forthwith.” So, presumably, Doyen would not stay in jail on this charge after

sentencing if the court accepted the terms of the agreement.3 Instead of imposing

the agreed-upon recommendation of the parties the court imposed a harsher

sentence.

On the date the written guilty plea was filed, the court accepted the plea by

written order, noted “defendant appears by Attorney,” and stated:

The defendant states that defendant is ready to plead and
enters a plea of guilty. The written plea of guilty shows that the
defendant’s plea is voluntary, being freely and intelligently made,
with an understanding of the charge, with knowledge of the penal
consequences of the plea, with full knowledge of the defendant’s
constitutional rights, and that said rights are waived by a plea of
guilty, without any threats, improper inducements or persuasion, and
the Court finds there is a factual basis for the defendant’s plea of
guilty.
The written plea indicates the defendant’s informed
understanding of defendant’s rights contemplated in the cases of
State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 [(Iowa 1969)]; Brainard v. State, 222
N.W.2d 711 [(Iowa 1974)]; and State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488
[(Iowa 1977)], all as shown in the defendant’s written plea of guilty,
which plea is made a part hereof by this reference.

3 However, Doyen was required to serve jail time on the other cases that had not

yet been completed.
5

The plea agreement terms included a waiver of Doyen’s right to move in arrest of

judgment and, in fact, Doyen never filed such motion. The sentencing hearing was

held on April 25 with a different judge. The court first stated, “This is the date and

time set for sentencing on the guilty plea which was filed on April 10, 2024, by

[Doyen’s counsel] and signed by the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) And other

than exchanges between the attorneys involved and the court, the only words

spoken by Doyen were, “Can I go for a mental health evaluation?” and then, when

the court asked what he said, another request of, “Can I go for a mental health

evaluation, like to Abbe Center or anything like that?”4 Ignoring the attorneys’

sentencing recommendation, the court sentenced Doyen to 365 days in jail plus

the maximum fine and surcharges. The court later indicated it was amenable to

ordering mental health treatment. Doyen appeals.

Standard of Review.

“We ordinarily review challenges to guilty pleas for correction of errors at

law.” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016). But here, we must start

with whether Doyen can even appeal from his guilty plea.

Discussion.

A. Good Cause Determination.

In this guilty plea challenge, Doyen argues the court failed to follow the guilty

plea procedures set out in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) and (4), which

4 Doyen was asked no questions about his written plea agreement. The court
acknowledged that there “is probably some mental health issues going on that are
creating this issue [of committing multiple assaults] for you.” After imposing the
sentence, the court did order a mental-health evaluation.
6

provides the steps the court is required to take before accepting a plea and

establishes the procedure to waive rights under a written plea. Doyen recognizes

that under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), he must establish good cause to

appeal. To that effect, he asserts there was a defect in the plea proceeding that

impacted his ability to preserve error on his challenge. Specifically, he contends

he was not properly informed of his right to raise any defect in a motion in arrest

of judgment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d)(1)–(3) (requiring the court to inform

the defendant that challenges to the plea must be made through a timely motion

in arrest of judgment). Doyen argues this failure makes his guilty plea null and

void, along with the sentencing judgment, because the waiver of his right to file a

motion in arrest of judgment within the document cannot be considered as affecting

his right of appeal under section 814.6(1)(a)(3).

We start with this first hurdle. As he recognizes, Doyen “bears the burden

of establishing good cause to pursue an appeal of [his] conviction based on a guilty

plea.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020); see also Iowa Code

§ 814.6(1)(a)(3). “Good cause” means “a legally sufficient reason.” Damme, 944

N.W.2d at 104 (cleaned up). There is no possibility for relief on appeal when a

defendant pleads guilty and waives the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment

unless an exception applies to this bar. See State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109

(Iowa 2021). One exception allows “a defendant [to] challenge his guilty plea on

appeal despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment where the district court

failed to adequately advise the defendant of the consequences of not filing a

motion in arrest of judgment.” Id. This is the exception Doyen raises.
7

We know the court did not advise Doyen on the impact of waiving his right

to file a motion in arrest of judgment—it was not discussed at sentencing, and

Doyen’s guilty plea was entered and accepted without a hearing. But given the

written waiver before us, whether Doyen has good cause to appeal turns on

whether his attorney’s signature on the written guilty plea that contained the

necessary advice on filing a motion of arrest in judgment is sufficient to show

Doyen was properly appraised of his right to file a motion for arrest in judgment

before appeal.

Rule 2.8(4) governs plea agreements for serious misdemeanors. In

relevant part, the rule states:

With the court’s approval, the defendant may waive personal
colloquy in open court in a guilty plea to a serious or aggravated
misdemeanor or a nonforcible class “D” felony. In such event, the
defendant must sign a written document substantially complying with
rule 2.37—Form 12[5] . . . that:
a. Demonstrates the defendant has been informed of and
understands the matters set forth in rule 2.8(2)(b)(1)–(9).
....
c. Informs the defendant that any challenges to the guilty plea
based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in
a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to raise such
challenges precludes the right to assert them on appeal.

(Emphasis added.) “Iowa court rules have the force and effect of laws, and

therefore ‘we interpret rules in the same manner we interpret statutes.’” State v.

Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 221 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). When interpreting our

Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he first step in our statutory interpretation

analysis is to determine whether the [rule] is ambiguous.” State v. Coleman, 907

5 Form 12 is a court form entitled: “Waiver of Rights & Written Guilty Plea for

Serious or Aggravated Misdemeanors or Nonforcible Class ‘D’ Felonies.”
8

N.W.2d 124, 135 (Iowa 2018). “Ambiguity exists if reasonable minds may differ or

may be uncertain as to the meaning” of the rule. State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15,

18 (Iowa 1991). “Our inquiry ends with the plain language if the [rule] is

unambiguous.” State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021).

The operative word of the rule at issue here is “sign.” According to Black’s

Law Dictionary, “sign” means “[t]o identify (a record) by means of a signature,

mark, or other symbol with the intent to authenticate it as an act or agreement of

the person identifying it.” Sign, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). We find

this definition comports with the meaning of rule 2.8(4); a defendant is to mark,

with a signature, their plea agreement to indicate his or her agreement. The plain

language of rule 2.8(4), limited to “defendant must sign a written document,” is not

ambiguous.

To determine whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) were met, “[w]e

employ a substantial compliance standard.” Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 681 (citation

omitted). In Fisher, the court noted that even though counsel had certified in the

plea form “he had explained the procedure for filing a motion in arrest of judgment

to the defendant . . . , this guarantee would be insufficient to satisfy the second

requirement of rule 2.8(2)(d).” Id. at 682 (cleaned up); see also State v. Meron,

675 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2004) (“Even considering the assurances that counsel

[for the defendant] explained the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, this

guarantee would be insufficient to satisfy the second requirement of

rule 2.8(2)(d).”). So, we look to see if there was substantial compliance with our

rules here.
9

The State argues that when reviewing rule 2.8(4) for substantial

compliance, we should allow the defendant’s attorney to sign the guilty plea on

behalf of the defendant if that attorney confirms, as here, that the defendant “read

[the] entire document” and “underst[oo]d the contents and consequences of this

written guilty plea.” The State asserts this is substantial compliance with the rule

requiring that the defendant be properly informed of the motion in arrest of

judgment. But we read the placement of the terms “substantial compliance” to

qualify that the terms “written document” and that the document must “substantially

comply” with the form referenced in the rule. Form 12, as set out in the rules,

specifically provides for the defendant’s certification involving the rights and

consequences related to the plea with a line for the defendant to confirm and sign.

Even under the substantial compliance test, we find the defendant must sign their

plea agreement if there is to be no personal colloquy as would be required without

a written plea.

Because Doyen did not personally sign the plea agreement, and there was

no personal court colloquy where he waived his right to file a motion in arrest of

judgment, the record does not adequately demonstrate that he was advised of the

consequences of failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. Consequently, he is

not precluded from appellate review of his challenge to his guilty plea. See State

v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 535–36 (Iowa 2024).

B. “Defective Plea.”

So, we turn to Doyen’s substantive argument that his guilty plea was

defective and is null and void, along with the sentencing judgment. Given our

analysis above, without Doyen’s signature, we cannot conclude Doyen was fully
10

informed of his rights as set out in that agreement, including if he voluntarily agreed

to or understood the terms based upon the written plea agreement alone. While

the discussions at the sentencing hearing gave some indication Doyen was aware

of the details of the plea agreement’s terms and the substance of the plea

negotiations, there is no evidence in the record that indicates Doyen “voluntarily

and intelligently” entered into a plea agreement and understood the ramifications

of choosing to enter a plea—either at the time of sentencing or when the guilty plea

was entered about two weeks earlier. See State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 402

(Iowa 2017); see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). At sentencing, counsel for both parties

recited the substance of the plea agreement and stated their reasons for setting

forth the recommendation in the plea agreement. After the recitation of the plea

negotiation, the court asked Doyen, “Mr. Doyen, you have a right to allocution. You

can tell me anything you want me to know before I pass judgment and sentencing

here today. Is there any statement that you wish to make?” Doyen asked only if

the court could order a mental-health evaluation.

To counter Doyen’s challenge, the State relies on the attorney-signed guilty

plea to show Doyen was properly notified of his rights and obligations. Additionally,

the State also points out that Doyen is not contending in his appeal that his counsel

made fraudulent representations or that he was not advised of the plea’s

advisories—just that he did not sign the plea.6

As a background, “[t]here are two separate components of rule 2.8(2)(b),”

which govern all guilty pleas. Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 543. “The first concerns the

6 The State asserts the best way to tell the “whole story” would be through the

postconviction relief process, if that is an avenue Doyen chooses to take.
11

requirement of an in-court colloquy. The second concerns the requirement the

defendant is informed.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Those charged with a

serious or aggravated misdemeanor may “waive the in-court colloquy component,

[but] the rule still requires substantial compliance with the requirement that the

defendant be informed.” Id. “To enter a guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently

means the defendant has a full understanding of the consequences of a plea.”

State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001). “A guilty plea results in a waiver

of several constitutional rights. For the waiver to be valid, there must be an

intentional relinquishment of known rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

It is the court’s duty to ensure that the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b) are met

when accepting a guilty plea and proceeding to sentencing. See Hightower, 8

N.W.3d at 537 (“If that review [of the written plea] raises concerns in the mind of

the plea judge, the judge certainly has authority to require a personal colloquy

before accepting or rejecting a plea.”). Here, at the start of the sentencing hearing,

the court mistakenly stated that Doyen had signed the plea agreement. So, it

followed that no oral colloquy occurred to verify all of the requirements related to

that plea were met. The intent behind a written plea agreement is to explain

effectively the rights and consequences of a plea of guilt and confirm a defendant’s

understanding of those rights and consequences.7 We believe that our rules

governing written pleas generally provide both fairness and efficiency in the plea

process, hence the use of a written plea. But to assure compliance with rule 2.8(4),

7 We recognize that there are situations in the real-life practice of law where it is

difficult to meet face-to-face with a defendant, but requiring the defendant to
personally sign the guilty plea avoids the “he said, she said” situations that are part
of the postconviction relief cases we review.
12

we have confidence in a writing that sets out the terms where the defendant must

sign confirming it was actually read and that the defendant “knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily” enters into the written plea. This is even more important because

by signing the plea, often appellate review is foregone.

Applying the unambiguous language of the rule requiring the defendant to

personally sign the guilty plea avoids further proceedings because of

misunderstandings or failures in the process. Had the court noted that the plea

was not signed by Doyen, a plea colloquy could have confirmed that Doyen knew

what his rights were, including the waiver of his right to move in arrest of judgment.

And in this gatekeeping scenario, the prosecutor should also want to confirm the

plea requirements were met. So, we find that without a written guilty plea signed

by the defendant and in the absence of an oral colloquy, Doyen has established

deficiencies in the plea process that warrant additional explanation.

With this determination concerning the plea deficiencies, we follow the lead

of our supreme court in Hightower. There, after the defendant raised several

concerns over “irregularities” in the written guilty plea form, our supreme court

found that “[o]n the present record, though, we cannot conclude that these

irregularities show that the guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently.

We consider the issue preserved pending further development through a

postconviction-relief (PCR) action.” Id. We take the same path here and find that

Doyen’s challenges to his plea are preserved and can be addressed in a PCR

action under Iowa Code chapter 822. We are further convinced this is the right

path because Iowa Code section 814.29 prevents us from vacating Doyen’s guilty

plea “unless the defendant demonstrates that the defendant more likely than not
13

would not have pled guilty.” PCR proceedings would give Doyen a chance to

present evidence to establish whether he would have pled guilty absent the defect

in the plea proceedings. See id. at 542 (“[W]e conclude that section 814.29

prevents us from vacating Hightower’s plea. By way of conscious repetition,

however, nothing in this opinion precludes Hightower from pursuing claims related

to her guilty plea in a PCR action under Iowa Code chapter 822.”).

Due to the failure to adequately advise Doyen of the consequences

regarding failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment, he had good cause to

challenge his guilty plea. While we recognize there were defects in the plea

proceedings, on this record, we can neither conclude that those defects prevented

the guilty plea from being entered voluntarily and intelligently nor that Doyen would

have chosen to go to trial absent those defects. So, we affirm Doyen’s conviction

and sentence. He may seek relief through a PCR action if he chooses.

AFFIRMED.