In the Interest of X.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0152
Filed May 7, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF X.M.,
Minor Child,

H.M., Mother,
Appellant,

T.M., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brent Pattison, Judge.

A mother and father each appeal the termination of their parental rights to

their daughter. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Teresa M. Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Leah Patton of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Jami J. Hagemeier of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and

Langholz, JJ.
2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A daughter was removed from her mother’s custody in 2023 based on

concerns that she was using illegal substances while caring for the daughter.1 The

daughter was placed with her paternal grandmother. At the time, the daughter’s

father was incarcerated—as he has been for almost all of the daughter’s life.

Eighteen months after removal, the father was still incarcerated and the mother

had not addressed her substance-use issues. So the juvenile court found that the

daughter could not be returned to either parent’s custody and terminated both

parents’ parental rights. Each now separately appeals.

On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. Termination of the

mother’s parental rights is in the daughter’s best interest given the mother’s failure

to address the safety concerns she poses to the daughter, and a guardianship is

not appropriate here based on the daughter’s age and the family interactions. As

for the father’s appeal, we also agree that it is in the daughter’s best interest for

the father’s rights to be terminated rather than establishing a guardianship as she

deserves permanency now. Any parent-child bond does not warrant declining to

terminate the father’s parental rights, and the relative-custody exception does not

apply because the daughter is not in the legal custody of a relative.

We thus affirm on both appeals.

1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—

unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2)
(2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110.
3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In February 2023, a then-one-month-old daughter came to the attention of

the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) after it was

discovered that the mother was using illegal substances, possibly even while

caring for the daughter. A few months later, the mother was caught driving over

100 miles per hour on a gravel road with the daughter in the car. The mother was

swerving and appeared to be under the influence. HHS offered substance-use

and mental-health-related services to the mother. But she kept using illegal

substances. The mother is married to the daughter’s father, who was incarcerated

in April 2023 for one count of conspiracy to commit a forcible felony. He is

scheduled to be released in July 2027 but is eligible for parole in June 2025.

The county attorney petitioned to adjudicate the daughter in need of

assistance in May 2023. At first, the daughter was voluntarily placed with her

paternal grandmother under a safety plan. But in June, the daughter was

adjudicated a child in need of assistance and put in HHS’s legal custody for

continued placement with her grandmother. In July, the mother reported to HHS

that she had been recently discharged from outpatient treatment for failing to

engage consistently.

During the November review hearing, the mother reported being

successfully discharged from a residential treatment program and enrolling in

outpatient treatment. She had also been accepted into and begun participating in

an intensive, weekly recovery court. As a result, the court ordered visits between

the mother and daughter be switched from fully supervised to semi-supervised.
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But shortly after the review hearing, the mother resumed using illegal

substances. She was discharged from outpatient treatment for misusing her

suboxone. She reported to HHS in December that she had been using

methamphetamine and fentanyl, and she tested positive for cocaine and THC that

month as well. In March 2024, the mother was admitted to another inpatient

treatment facility and tested positive for cocaine and THC upon intake. A few

months later, she was discharged from inpatient treatment due to an “outburst” and

started outpatient treatment once again. At a June permanency hearing, the court

granted a six-month extension to work towards reunification.

Despite the extra time, the mother continued to struggle with substance use.

In August, an HHS worker attended a visit with the mother and the daughter. The

mother told the HHS worker that she was not sober during this visit, and the worker

noted that the mother was “not being attentive” to the daughter but was laying on

the ground or distracted on her phone. A week later, the mother reported to HHS

that she had relapsed on cocaine and methamphetamine.

An inpatient treatment facility had a bed available for the mother towards

the end of September, but the mother refused it. The mother then spent some

time at a residential facility for trauma survivors, where she had some treatment

services for substance use. But in late November 2024, the mother reported to

HHS that she was “in active use,” using several different substances. After the

mother left the residential facility, HHS struggled to contact her and set up visits.

And she stopped participating in weekly recovery court. At the time of the

termination hearing, HHS believed that the mother was not engaged in any

substance-use or mental-health treatment.
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Meanwhile, the father remained incarcerated. There, he took classes to get

his GED and attended support group meetings for substance use. He called the

grandmother to talk to the daughter multiple times a week.2 He had up to two video

visits with the daughter each month. And the father had one in-person visit with

the daughter. HHS described the father’s engagement in the case as “minimal.”

As for the daughter, she was doing well in the grandmother’s care and she

continued to be “a happy child.” “She smiles, plays and is very affectionate.” At

first, there were concerns about the grandmother’s stability because of the

conditions of her home and financial struggles. But these concerns were resolved,

leading HHS to believe that the grandmother was “a safe and stable home.”

Given the lack of progress with both parents, the State petitioned to

terminate parental rights in October 2024, and a hearing was held in December.

At the time of the hearing, the father was twenty-one years old and the mother was

twenty-two. The father remotely participated from prison. The mother also

appeared remotely—she had an active warrant for her arrest pending that she was

not yet ready to resolve. And the grandmother and HHS worker testified as well.

The daughter’s guardian ad litem recommended termination. And the juvenile

court ultimately agreed, terminating the parental rights of both parents.

In a thorough and well-reasoned decision, the court found that the State

proved termination was warranted for both parents under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h) (2024). The court reasoned that the daughter was under

two years old, had been adjudicated in need of assistance, had been removed

2 The father testified that he called three to four times a week; the grandmother

said it was only once or twice a week.
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from her parents’ care for around eighteen months, and neither parent was in the

position to care for the daughter at the time of the hearing. And the court found

that the State proved termination was warranted for the mother under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(l) as well because she “has a severe, substance abuse related

disorder” that causes her not to be able to safely care for the daughter.

The court also found that it was in the daughter’s best interest for both

parents’ rights to be terminated. The court explained that the daughter “should not

have to wait any longer for her parents to learn to be safe caregivers” and “[t]he

bottom line is that these are young parents with significant substance abuse

disorders and related criminal justice problems.” And the court had “no doubt that

neither parent can adequately meet [the daughter’s] needs.”

The court declined the father’s request to apply two discretionary

exceptions. First, the court found that the relative-custody exception did not apply

because the daughter was in the legal custody of HHS. And second, the court

found that the parent-child-bond exception did not apply because the father had

not proved that termination would be detrimental to the daughter because of the

bond she shared with the father. The court also rejected a guardianship as an

appropriate permanency alternative for both parents, finding that because of the

daughter’s “young age and the family dynamics in this case, termination and

adoption are in [the daughter’s] best interests—not a guardianship.”

Both parents now appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their

respective parental rights to the daughter.
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II. The Mother’s Appeal

Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-

step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must

prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show that

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And finally, the parent bears the

burden to show whether a discretionary exception applies that should preclude

termination. Id. We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful

consideration” to the juvenile court’s fact findings, especially when based on

credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). On

appeal, the mother raises two challenges to the juvenile court’s ruling: (1) whether

termination is in the best interest of the daughter and (2) whether a guardianship

should have been established as an alternative permanency outcome.

Best Interest of the Child. The mother argues termination of her parental

rights is not in the daughter’s best interest. In support of her argument, the mother

points to her engagement in services. She acknowledges that she “will continue

to need to address trauma, substance abuse and her mental health,” but contends

those needs do not warrant termination. The mother also claims that the

grandmother’s “ability to provide long term, without additional oversight and

assistance, is questionable” based on past struggles.

The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination

proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the daughter’s long-

range and immediate best interests. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172

(Iowa 1997). And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and
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to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa

Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016).

We agree that it is in the daughter’s best interest to terminate the mother’s

parental rights. As the juvenile court found, “the original safety concerns continue

to exist today.” The mother continues to struggle with substance use. While she

has periods where she attends substance-use treatment, many times she has

come out of treatment and then resumes using substances. The HHS worker

testified that some interactions she has witnessed between the mother and the

daughter “are concerning,” as the daughter is the one comforting the mother when

she is emotionally struggling or her emotions are heightened. Although it is

commendable that the mother has participated in services at different times during

this case and has tried to deal with past traumas that she has suffered, that does

not mitigate the still-present safety issues that she poses to her daughter.

Guardianship. The mother also argues that the juvenile court should have

instead established a guardianship for the daughter because it “would provide

permanency for the child and would provide additional protections for the child

through ongoing court oversight.” “[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable

alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned

up). This is because over the life of the guardianship—potentially until the child

turns eighteen—the court could terminate the guardianship or change the guardian

at either parent’s request or on its own motion. See id. at 477–78. It sets up

potential conflict between the guardian and the parent. So it often does not

“achieve permanency” and stability. Id. at 478 (cleaned up). While Iowa Code

section 232.104 allows for guardianship as a permanency option, it requires “a
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judicial determination that [such a] planned permanent living arrangement is the

best permanency plan for the child.” Iowa Code § 232.104(3)(a).

We agree with the juvenile court that a guardianship is not in the daughter’s

best interest. At the hearing, the daughter was about to turn two years old—so a

guardianship would continue for sixteen years. And we are skeptical, like the

juvenile court, that the parents and the grandmother will continue to “work well

together” over those sixteen years. The grandmother testified that she feels like

the parents “don’t listen” to her and she was adamant that a guardianship would

not benefit the daughter or her needs. And she testified, which the juvenile court

found credible, that she would “encourage a relationship between [the daughter]

and both the parents” even after termination of their parental rights.

Further, the HHS worker testified that a guardianship is not in the best

interest of the daughter based on the mother being “inconsistent” and “disruptive.”

As far as the mother’s concerns about the grandmother’s ability to parent the

daughter, and while HHS at one point had concerns about the grandmother’s

stability, those concerns have been alleviated. The daughter deserves

permanency now, and a guardianship would not give that to her. Therefore, we

affirm the juvenile court’s guardianship-finding and in turn affirm the juvenile court’s

termination of the mother’s parental rights.

III. The Father’s Appeal

In his appeal, the father raises four issues. First, he argues that termination

of his parental rights is not in the daughter’s best interest. Second, he argues that

the court should have declined to terminate his rights because of the closeness of

his relationship with the daughter. Third, he argues that the court should have
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declined to terminate his rights because the daughter is placed with a relative. And

fourth, he argues that the court should have established a guardianship as an

alternative permanency outcome. We will take each issue in turn.

Best Interest of the Child. The father argues that termination of his parental

rights is not in the best interest of the daughter because she “needs a father figure

in her life, and he wants to fulfill that role when he is released.” He also points to

his participation in services while in prison and his contact with the daughter

through phone calls, video chats, and an in-person visit.

But we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the daughter’s

long-term and immediate best interest. The father has been incarcerated for

almost all the daughter’s life. He was still incarcerated at the time of the hearing

and is not scheduled for release until July 2027. While he could be paroled sooner,

he has had disciplinary issues while in prison that could negatively affect his

release. And he acknowledged that the daughter could not be returned to his care

upon his release because he would need to “get [himself] together” and get “back

on [his] feet.” We agree with HHS that it is not “appropriate to delay permanency

for [the daughter]” until the father is released. The daughter is doing well in her

grandmother’s care, and she is attached to the grandmother. And so, we affirm

the juvenile court’s best-interest finding.

Parent-Child Bond Exception. The father next contends that the court

should have declined to terminate his rights because he and the daughter “have a

close relationship and bond.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). This statutory

exception is permissive, so even if the father and daughter have a close

relationship, a court may still order termination when doing so would serve the
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child’s best interest. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475. And we agree with the juvenile

court that the father has not proved by “clear and convincing evidence that

termination would be detrimental to [the daughter] due to the closeness of her bond

with [the father].”

The father has been incarcerated for almost all of the daughter’s life. And

while they do have weekly phone calls and video visits, there has only been one

in-person visit. And the father seemed to acknowledge that their bond has been

impacted by his incarceration—when asked about their bond, he responded, “I

mean, I love her. But I only have so much contact with her. She’s young. She

doesn’t understand.” Because the mere existence of “some bond between” the

father and daughter is not enough to preclude termination, see M.W., 876 N.W.2d

at 225, we affirm the juvenile court’s rejection of this exception.

Relative-Custody Exception. The father also argues that the court should

have declined to terminate his rights because the grandmother has custody of the

daughter. See Iowa Code 232.116(3)(a). Section 232.116(3)(a) applies only when

the child is in the legal custody of a relative. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113

(Iowa 2014). Here, the daughter is in the legal custody of HHS—not the

grandmother. Because the exception does not apply, we affirm the juvenile court’s

rejection of it.

Guardianship. Finally, the father argues that the juvenile court should have

granted a guardianship as an alternative permanency option because the “child’s

stability and long-term interests would not be affected” by creating a guardianship.

He claims that a “guardianship would allow [him] and the child to continue to have

a relationship and would allow contact and visitation between” them. And he
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suggests that a “guardianship would not jeopardize the child’s permanency and

placement.” We agree with the juvenile court that a guardianship is not in the

daughter’s best interest in regard to the father’s parental rights for the reasons we

explained on the mother’s appeal. The daughter deserves permanency now. We

thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.

* * *

We do not doubt that both parents love the daughter. But we agree with the

juvenile court that “these are young parents with significant substance abuse

disorders and related criminal justice problems” and “they are each still learning

how to take care of themselves and cannot meet the needs of a young child.” The

daughter has been involved with HHS since she was one month old and was nearly

two years old at the termination hearing. The daughter is doing well in her

grandmother’s care and the time has come for stability and permanency. We

therefore affirm the termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights to the

daughter.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.