State of Iowa v. Cedric Lee Taylor

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1317
Filed May 7, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CEDRIC LEE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence for sexual abuse in the third degree.

AFFIRMED.

Grant A. Woodard and Reuben A. Neff of Wandro, Kanne, & Lalor, P.C.,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Cedric Taylor raises two issues in this appeal of his indeterminate ten-year

sentence for sexual abuse in the third degree. First, he contends that the

prosecutor breached the plea agreement by expressing concerns about his ability

to comply with probation and mentioning factors that supported a prison sentence.

Second, Taylor faults the sentencing court for calling the victim a “child”—invoking

an element of sexual abuse in the second degree.

On the first contention, because the plea agreement allowed the State to

advocate for any sentence provided by law, the prosecutor’s comments did not

breach that agreement. On the second claim, the sentencing court’s colloquial

references to the victim as a child did not betray an intent to sentence Taylor for

an uncharged offense. We thus affirm the judgment and sentence.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Fifteen-year-old N.T. ran away from home in December 2022. Clive police

found her at Taylor’s apartment. Taylor, who was thirty-eight, admitted committing

sex acts with the teenager. Taylor told the officers that he had been

communicating with her on social media sites and knew that she was a runaway.

The State charged Taylor in a two-count trial information with sexual abuse

in the third degree, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1

and 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d) (2022), and harboring a runaway, an aggravated

misdemeanor, in violation of section 710.8.
3

The parties reached a plea deal, documented in this November 2023 order:

Before the sentencing hearing, the department of correctional services

prepared a presentence investigation (PSI) report, recommending a suspended

sentence and term of probation with the condition that Taylor complete a sex-

offender-treatment program. At the sentencing hearing, both the prosecutor and

defense counsel urged the district court to follow that PSI recommendation.

But the court declined. Citing the “terrible impact” that this crime had on “a

vulnerable girl,” the sentencing court imposed a term of incarceration not to exceed

ten years. Taylor appeals that sentence.1

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review Taylor’s sentence for the correction of errors at law. See State

v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Iowa 2022). To merit resentencing, he must show

that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a prison term or there was

a defect in the proceeding. See id. A prosecutor’s breach of a plea agreement

counts as a defect, Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 130, as does a sentencing court’s

consideration of an unproven offense, State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616

(Iowa 2024). We examine these sentencing proceedings to see if they suffer from

either defect alleged by Taylor.

1 Because Taylor challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea, he has good

cause to appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3). State v. Patten, 981
N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 2022).
4

III. Analysis

A. Did the Prosecution Breach the Plea Agreement?

A plea bargain works as a contract but carries constitutional significance for

the accused who is giving up rights by agreeing to plead guilty. Patten, 981 N.W.2d

at 131. That constitutional significance is why we expect prosecutors to strictly

comply with the terms of the plea agreement. Id.

Here, according to Taylor, the State did not meet that strict compliance

standard because the prosecutor discussed facts from the PSI that weighed

against imposing a suspended sentence. For instance, the prosecutor noted that

Taylor had a daughter the same age as the victim, suggesting that he should have

had greater awareness of the harmful nature of his actions.2 The prosecutor also

expressed concern about the stability of Taylor’s housing. On the other hand, the

prosecutor emphasized that Taylor cooperated with the investigation and was

“amenable to treatment.” The prosecutor also highlighted Taylor’s educational

achievements and employment. In the end, the prosecutor recommended

probation over incarceration.

Yet Taylor contends that the prosecutor “severely obfuscated [the State’s]

recommendation for a suspended sentence” by “implicitly suggest[ing] a harsher

alternative.” He compares his situation to State v. Davis, in which the prosecutor

made a “perfunctory endorsement of the PSI report’s recommendation for

2 In his allocution, Taylor apologized to the court for his “lack of attendance” at the

“last session.” In response, the prosecutor opened with this comment: “I would
have rather that Mr. Taylor apologize to the victim and her family.” On appeal,
Taylor contends that the prosecutor was stressing his lack of remorse.
5

suspended sentences immediately after she read the four victim-impact

statements calling for prison time.” 971 N.W.2d at 557.

But Taylor’s case is unlike Davis, where the plea agreement obligated the

State to follow the recommendation in the PSI report. See id. at 555. Here, the

plea agreement left the parties “free to argue all resolutions.” Granted, defense

counsel said at sentencing that she “believe[d] the plea agreement was that [the

prosecutor] said she [would] stand by what the PSI was recommending.”3 But that

belief was not reflected in the November 2023 district court order accepting

Taylor’s guilty plea. And that is the only official record we have of the plea

agreement.4

But even if the plea agreement had bound the State to echo the

recommendation of the PSI report, it did so here. The prosecutor did not express

“a material reservation regarding the plea agreement or recommended sentence”

either explicitly or implicitly. See State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 71−72

(Iowa 2021) (“The prosecutor complied with the letter and spirit of the plea

agreement.”). The prosecutor offered this full-throated endorsement: “I do think

that the PSI shows that he has some promise and ability to comply with corrections,

and that’s why I am recommending that he get a suspended sentence and

probation and not a prison term.” On this record, we find no breach.

B. Did the Sentencing Court Consider an Unproven Offense?

Taylor next condemns the district court’s repeated use of the word “child” to

describe N.T. The court referred to the sexual abuse victim as a child at least four

3 The prosecutor neither confirmed nor denied that rendition of the plea agreement.
4 Taylor’s appellate counsel did not order a transcript of the guilty-plea hearing.
6

times during the sentencing hearing. From these references, Taylor charges that

the court considered the unproven and unprosecuted offense of sexual abuse in

the second degree. Compare Iowa Code § 709.3(1)(b) (a person commits second-

degree sexual abuse if the other person is a child), and § 702.5 (defining child as

“any person under the age of fourteen years”), with Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d)

(a person commits third-degree sexual abuse if the other person is fourteen or

fifteen and the defendant is four or more years older). Resentencing is required

when the district court considers unproven or unprosecuted offenses when

fashioning its sentence unless they are admitted or proven. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d

at 616.

We start our analysis with some necessary context. In his allocution, Taylor

told the court that he understood this was “a very serious matter” and that he hoped

“to never be in this situation ever again.” The court was unhappy with the passivity

revealed by Taylor’s last statement, saying, “This is a terrible thing you did, and it

disturbs me greatly when I hear you make statements like, ‘I hope to never be in

this situation again.’ The reason you’re in this situation is not because something

randomly happened. It’s because you sexually assaulted a child. A girl.” The

court then caught itself and clarified: “When I said ‘a child’—I guess she was

fourteen at the time.”5 But the court continued to rebuke Taylor for not accepting

responsibility: “You hope it doesn’t happen? You’re the one who controls whether

it happens again or not. You sexually assaulted this girl.”

5 Our record shows that N.T. was fifteen at the time of the offense.
7

Later, in addressing the nature of the offense, the court again referred to

N.T. as a child: “You committed a terrible crime that will have a lasting impact for

a long, long time on a vulnerable girl. A child that’s run away, obviously, is

vulnerable, and you took extreme advantage of that.”6

In rejecting a suspended sentence, the court reasoned that Taylor’s

reluctance to take personal accountability for the crime did not “bode well” for his

rehabilitation in the community: “I’m not hearing anything to indicate that he thinks

anything needs to change. It just kind of happened to him. He’s not a threat. He

sure was a threat to this child—this girl. When I say ‘this child,’ I mean this girl.”

Then defense counsel spoke up: “Your Honor, it was most certainly a lapse of

judgment.” And the court again pounced:

No. No. This was not a lapse of judgment. This was a sexual assault
on a vulnerable child. That is not a lapse of judgment. A lapse of
judgment is speeding down the highway. He had . . . many
opportunities to not let this happen, yet he sexually assaulted a girl,
a vulnerable girl. He brought her into his home and sexually
assaulted her. This is not just, “Whoops.” It’s not a lapse in
judgment. This is beyond a lapse in judgment. This is a heinous
offense.

Viewing the court’s references to the victim as a “child” through the give-and-take

of the entire sentencing hearing, we see no reason for resentencing. The

sentencing court was not under the misimpression that N.T. fit the definition of child

for purposes of second-degree sexual assault. See Iowa Code §§ 702.5,

709.3(1)(b). The court knew that her age and Taylor’s age fit the elements of third-

6 As context, Iowa Code section 710.8 defines a runaway child as “a person under

eighteen years of age who is voluntarily absent from the person’s home without
the consent of the person’s parent, guardian, or custodian” (emphasis added).
N.T. met that legal definition.
8

degree sexual assault. See Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d). “We will not draw an

inference of improper sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the

record.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). The sentencing

court did not consider an unproven offense. Rather, it was motivated to reject the

parties’ request for probation because Taylor failed to show contrition—an

acceptable consideration. See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005)

(“[A] defendant’s lack of remorse is highly pertinent to evaluating his need for

rehabilitation and his likelihood of reoffending.”). The court was also within its

discretion to give weight to the crime’s impact on the young victim. See State v.

Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 763 (Iowa 1998).

True, it may have been better for the district court to choose more precise

language when describing the victim, especially given the definition of “child” in the

criminal code as someone under the age of fourteen. See Doe v. Cherwitz, 518

N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1994) (citing Iowa Code § 702.5). But we agree with the

State’s suggestion that the court was using the word “child” in the “general sense,

as you would someone that is not a fully grown adult.” This court’s colloquial use

of the term “child” is not cause for vacating the sentence. When analyzing this

kind of challenge, we give district courts considerable leeway to explain their

reasons for choosing a particular sentence because of the discretionary nature of

their job and the respect required by the appellate process. See State v.

McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024). Taylor has not shown that the

sentencing court relied on impermissible factors or unproven conduct.

AFFIRMED.