Charles Jonas Hasselmann v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1616
Filed April 9, 2025

CHARLES JONAS HASSELMANN,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Nelmark, Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

Leah Patton of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

In September 2017, after a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, the

district court convicted Charles Hasselmann of three counts of first-degree theft

and four counts of forgery. The convictions stemmed from what Hasselmann

contends was his innocent role in a secret shopper internet scam targeting car

dealerships. Hasselmann dismissed his direct appeal and first application for

postconviction relief. He filed a second application in September 2020, raising the

same ineffective-assistance claims that were at issue in his first application. The

district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. We reversed the

court’s ruling and remanded for a hearing on his postconviction-relief application.

See Hasselmann v. State, No. 21-0483, 2022 WL 951084, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Mar. 30, 2022).

On remand, Hasselmann asserted defense counsel was ineffective by

(1) failing to object to amendments of the trial information, (2) permitting him to

consent to a trial on the minutes, (3) leading Hasselmann to believe there was a

plea offer for probation, (4) failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for

his theft convictions, and (5) arguing for prison when Hasselmann had not

authorized that recommendation. He also raised an actual innocence claim. The

district court rejected all these claims and denied Hasselmann’s application for

postconviction relief. Hasselmann appeals, asserting the same claims he raised

in district court, plus a new ineffective-assistance claim about a sentencing issue.

I. Standard of Review

Postconviction-relief proceedings are normally reviewed for correction of

errors at law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293,
3

306 (Iowa 2018). But when the application raises a constitutional claim, such as

ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the proceedings de novo. Sothman

v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). Claims of actual innocence are also

reviewed de novo. Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019).

II. Analysis

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

To establish his claims of ineffective assistance, Hasselmann was required

to prove (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice

resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Lopez,

907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). We “may consider either the prejudice prong

or breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will preclude relief.” 1 State v.

McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).

1. Trial Information Amendments. Hasselmann was charged by trial

information with three counts of first-degree theft under both the “theft by taking”

and “theft by deception” alternatives. See Iowa Code § 714.1(1), (3) (2016). He

was also charged with four counts of forgery. Three of the forgery counts

concerned Hasselmann’s use of fraudulent checks, while the fourth was for his use

of a fraudulent driver’s license.

1 Because we resolve all Hasselmann’s claims on the duty prong, we need not

consider his argument that “trial counsel’s cumulative errors prejudiced him.” See
McPeek v. State, No. 22-1870, 2024 WL 2042115, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8,
2024) (“We only engage in a cumulative-error inquiry when we ‘analyze[] the
prejudice prong of Strickland without considering trial counsel’s failure to perform
an essential duty.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488,
501–02 (Iowa 2012)).
4

As Hasselmann’s case progressed, the trial information was amended three

times to correct mistakes in the dates of the crimes and the numbering of the

counts. One of the amendments also removed the theft-by-taking alternative after

the supreme court’s decision in State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 524 (Iowa 2017),

which held that to “‘[take] possession or control’” under section 714.1(1), “a person

must acquire property without the consent or authority of another.” Hasselmann

claims that defense counsel “was ineffective in failing to inform [him] of the

amendments to the trial information and object to them.” The postconviction court

rejected this claim, as do we.

Defense counsel testified that he did not recall discussing the amendments

with Hasselmann. But each of the amendments was made prior to or during

scheduled plea hearings that did not result in a change of plea. The amendments

were discussed at those hearings, which Hasselmann attended. So the first part

of Hasselmann’s claim is belied by the record. As for the second part, we find that

any objection would not have succeeded because the amendments did not

prejudice the “substantial rights of the defendant” or charge a “wholly new and

different offense.” See Iowa R. Civ. P. 2.4(8) (2017); State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d

1, 6 (Iowa 1997) (“An amendment prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant

if it creates such surprise that the defendant would have to change trial strategy to

meet the charge in the amended [trial] information.”); State v. Vandermark, 965

N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 2021) (“An offense is not wholly new and different where

the amendment charges the same base prohibition but alleges ‘different means’ of

committing the same base prohibition.”). As a result, counsel did not breach a duty

for failing to raise meritless objections to the amendments. See State v. Brothern,
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832 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 2013) (“We will not find counsel incompetent for failing

to pursue a meritless issue.” (citation omitted)).

2. Trial on the Minutes. Hasselmann next claims defense counsel

“breached an essential duty in permitting him to consent to a trial on the minutes

of testimony without first making sure he knew what was happening.” The

postconviction court found that Hasselmann “made the decision to waive a jury

trial intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.” We agree.

Before the stipulated bench trial on the minutes, Hasselmann twice tried to

plead guilty to four of the charges under a plea agreement with the State.2 The

first plea proceeding ended when Hasselmann could not provide a factual basis

for his guilty pleas. After that hearing, the parties revised their agreement to allow

Hasselmann to enter Alford pleas3 to the same four charges. But at the second

plea proceeding, Hasselmann changed his mind and decided that he wanted to

proceed to trial.

Just over a week before the scheduled jury trial, Hasselmann reversed

course and asked the trial court to set another plea hearing. At the start of that

hearing, the court stated, “This matter was originally scheduled for a guilty plea

this morning. It’s my understanding now that things have changed and the parties

wish to proceed with a trial on the minutes and additional evidence in this matter.”

2 The agreement was that Hasselmann would plead guilty to two counts of first-

degree theft and two counts of forgery. In exchange, the State would dismiss the
other three counts and follow the recommendation of the presentence investigation
report as to Hasselmann’s sentence.
3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting a criminal

defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong
evidence of guilt and voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly agreeing to allow
the court to consider such strong evidence of guilt in accepting the plea).
6

The record does not explain the reason for the change. Defense counsel testified

there were some “ongoing discussions with the judge,” but he did not recall

whether the judge “said she didn’t want to do an Alford.” In any event, Hasselmann

signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial and, in a detailed colloquy with the

court on the record, acknowledged that he was voluntarily, intelligently, and

knowingly waiving that right. See State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 811–12 (Iowa

2003). Counsel testified that he reviewed the written waiver with Hasselmann and

“answered any questions that he had.” He believed that Hasselmann “fully knew

what was going on,” noting he was “a smart kid.”

Hasselmann, however, contends that although he “waived his right to a jury

trial, he did not waive his right to a bench trial in the written waiver or during the

colloquy with the judge.” But Hasselman received a bench trial—it was just on a

stipulated factual record. As required at the time, the court (1) verified

Hasselmann’s jury trial waiver on the record; (2) confirmed “the extent of the factual

record to which the parties are stipulating”; and (3) found the “facts specially and

on the record,” separately stated its conclusions of law, and rendered a verdict.4

State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997). The postconviction court was

not persuaded by Hasselmann’s testimony at the postconviction-relief hearing

“that he did not know what he was doing” considering the record made at the trial

on the minutes. We defer to that credibility finding, see Ledezma v. State, 626

4 Updated Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(2), which became effective on

July 1, 2023, added other requirements for trials on the minutes. But Hasselmann
did not mention this rule in the postconviction-relief proceedings or on appeal, and
we apply the rule in effect at the time of Hasselmann’s trial on the minutes. See,
e.g., State v. Berg, 12 N.W.3d 583, 584 & n.1 (Iowa 2024) (applying the rules in
effect before the July 1, 2023 revisions).
7

N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001), and find that defense counsel did not breach any

duty as it relates to Hasselmann’s decision to proceed with a trial on the minutes.

3. Plea Offer for Probation. In a somewhat related argument,

Hasselmann contends that defense counsel led him “to believe there was a plea

offer for probation at the bench trial on the minutes of testimony.” When asked

whether the State made any concessions in exchange for Hasselmann agreeing

to a trial on the minutes, counsel testified that he thought “the State was going to

agree to a joint recommendation of probation.” And Hasselmann testified that

when he waived the jury trial, he “thought everything was, like, a prerequisite to

getting that Alford plea with the probation.” There are three problems with this

claim.

First, Hasselmann had already been through two partial guilty plea

proceedings before agreeing to a trial on the minutes. So, as the State argues,

“he would have recognized the bench trial as something different.” Second, the

transcript from the trial on the minutes does not mention an Alford plea or any joint

recommendation for probation. Instead, in its order finding Hasselmann guilty as

charged and setting a sentencing hearing, the trial court noted: “State to argue for

no more than 40 years. Defense to argue for whatever they want.”5 Third,

Hasselmann filed nothing between the trial on the minutes and his sentencing

hearing challenging that recitation of the parties’ agreement. Nor did he object at

the sentencing hearing when the State followed through with that recommendation

and urged the court to sentence Hasselmann to forty years in prison. And

5 The maximum prison sentence that Hasselmann was facing on all seven charges

was an indeterminate term of fifty years.
8

Hasselmann does not claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move

to enforce this alleged agreement for a joint probation recommendation. Given

this record, Hasselmann has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

counsel induced his jury waiver by misrepresenting the State’s sentencing position.

Therefore, we find no breach of duty. See State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 391

(Iowa 2020) (noting under the breach-of-duty prong, “our presumption is that

counsel performed competently unless the claimant proves otherwise by a

preponderance of the evidence”).

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Hasselmann’s fourth claim asserts that

defense counsel “breached an essential duty by failing to challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence” for the theft convictions. The postconviction court rejected that

claim, finding that while “Hasselmann denies he had fraudulent intent, . . . there

was sufficient evidence in the minutes to support all elements of ‘theft by

deception.’” We agree.

The stipulated factual record established that law enforcement began

investigating Hasselmann in November 2016 for using fraudulent cashier’s checks

to buy cars from three Des Moines dealerships. The dealerships did not learn the

checks were forgeries until after Hasselmann left with the vehicles. Hasselmann

used these checks—which appeared to be from a credit union—to buy a 2007

BMW on November 8, a 2003 Lincoln Aviator on November 18, and a 2015

Volkswagen Jetta on November 26 from the dealerships. The checks were made

out for more than the price of the cars, and Hasselmann received the difference in

cash. Hasselmann was arrested on November 29, and all three cars were

recovered at his residence in Norwalk.
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Under this record, Hasselmann argues “there was insufficient evidence that

he had the intent to permanen[tly] deprive the car dealerships of the vehicles.” See

State v. Fielder, No. 18-0096, 2019 WL 1303965, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 20,

2019) (per curiam) (concluding the element of permanent deprivation is

incorporated in the structure of section 714.1(3)). Proof of such intent “is seldom

capable of being established with direct evidence.” State v. Schminkey, 597

N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999). Thus, the “facts and circumstances surrounding

the act, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts and

circumstances, may be relied upon to ascertain the defendant’s intent.” Id. We

find the facts and circumstances in this case support an inference that Hasselmann

intended to take more than temporary possession of the vehicles. Id.

Multiple witnesses saw Hasselmann driving the vehicles in the days and

weeks after he obtained possession of them. He was arrested while driving the

2007 BMW twice—once in Des Moines on November 14 and again in East Moline,

Illinois, on November 17. Hasselmann’s bail bondsman saw him driving “a new

SUV with paper tags” on November 15 and a Volkswagen Jetta sometime after

that. See State v. McCarty, No. 03-1151, 2004 WL 894553, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.

Apr. 28, 2004) (finding sufficient evidence of permanent deprivation when the

defendant “took the truck to a different town a significant distance from where it

was stolen and it was not recovered for several days”). When the cars were

recovered at Hasselmann’s residence, police found more counterfeit checks in the

BMW and Jetta. They also discovered a medical note for Hasselmann in the BMW,

along with a motel receipt and a speeding ticket. See Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at
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791–92 (observing intent to permanently deprive can be shown by defendant’s use

of vehicle as his own).

We have also considered Hasselmann’s shifting stories when he was

interviewed by the police. At first, Hasselmann said that he bought the vehicles

with cash. But when confronted with the fraudulent cashier’s checks, Hasselmann

claimed that he “got the checks from a guy named ‘John’ on Craigslist,” and he

was “a victim of a scam.” If Hasselmann thought that he was the victim of a scam

and only in temporary possession of the vehicles as part of a secret shopper job,

“his statements and actions certainly spoke otherwise.” State v. Hawkins, No. 12-

0617, 2013 WL 535738, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013) (noting the

defendant’s initial denial of knowledge about a stolen car was a fact that supported

an inference of permanent deprivation).

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see State v.

Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023), a reasonable fact finder could find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Hasselman intended to permanently deprive the

dealerships of the vehicles. Thus, counsel did not breach any duty in failing to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the theft convictions. See Ruiz v.

State, ____ N.W.3d ____, ____, 2025 WL 806962, at *5 (Iowa 2025) (“Where a

claimant alleges counsel’s failure to pursue a particular course breached an

essential duty, there is no such duty when the suggested course would have been

meritless.” (cleaned up)).

5. Defense Counsel’s Sentencing Recommendation. For his fifth and

final ineffective-assistance claim, Hasselmann asserts that defense counsel

“breached an essential duty in arguing for prison when [Hasselmann] had not
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authorized that recommendation.” We agree with the postconviction court that the

record from the sentence hearing does not support this claim.

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor urged the trial court to impose an

indeterminate sentence of forty years in prison. In response, defense counsel

discussed Hasselmann’s difficult childhood and his need for substance-use and

mental-health treatment. Counsel informed the court that an inpatient treatment

facility had been located and argued:

Our recommendation to the court for sentencing, taking those
into account, would be if the court only considers incarceration, we
think it should be no more than 15 years, so running a theft and a
forgery consecutive to each other, but then running everything else
consecutive.
However, Mr. Hasselmann is willing to and wants me to tell
the court that he would be willing to accept up to 20 or 25 years with
probation and treatment so that he knows that he has this additional
period of time should he fail probation.

Defense counsel did not, as Hasselmann suggests on appeal, argue

incarceration as “the preferred recommendation,” with probation “only suggested

as an afterthought.” Instead, counsel testified that his sentencing strategy was to

give the court a reasonable middle ground if the court was only going to consider

incarceration: “if we don’t have an agreed upon sentencing, then yes, I’ll ask for

probation and then give an alternative that we feel—because I always discuss it

with the client as to what we think would be an adequate incarceration time during

everything.” While Hasselmann didn’t get the probation that he hoped for, the court

did adopt counsel’s lower incarceration recommendation. Under these

circumstances, we find counsel’s sentencing recommendation was “a product of

tactics,” not deficient performance. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143.
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B. Actual Innocence

Hasselmann claims the postconviction court erred “in denying his

application for postconviction relief when he is actually innocent of the theft by

deception and forgery charges.” To succeed on this claim, Hasselmann must

prove “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt

supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant.”

Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5 (citation omitted). This requires “factual innocence,

not mere legal insufficiency.” Id. at 7 (citation omitted).

The postconviction court rejected Hasselmann’s claim, finding:

Hasselmann asserts that he thought he was purchasing
vehicles as a “secret shopper” and that the vehicles obtained were
going to be later returned to the dealerships. He also submitted an
exhibit that he claims supports the idea that he was unknowingly
caught up in a scam. Even if the newly submitted exhibit could be
deemed newly discovered (which is unlikely given that it is dated
prior to Mr. Hasselman’s arrest) it and his testimony fall short of the
clear and convincing evidence needed to support an actual
innocence claim.

(Internal citations and footnote omitted.) The court noted that the majority of

Hasselmann’s exhibit “does appear to be an attempt at recruiting for a ‘fake job’

scam” through an internet messaging app, with one page referencing auto

dealership auditing. But the exhibit does not show who created or sent the

messages or attached documents, which included a blank W-9 form and fraudulent

cashier’s checks. And, as the court found,

[e]ven if someone had attempted to recruit Mr. Hasselmann into a
scam, the wealth of evidence suggests he had to have known he was
engaging in fraudulent conduct . . . . His explanation at the
[postconviction-relief] trial as to how he thought the “auditing” would
be resolved was not credible.

We agree upon our de novo review of the record.
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction and Appellate Counsel

Last, in a new claim on appeal, Hasselmann argues that his first appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court’s consideration of an

improper sentencing factor on appeal. We generally only consider claims that

were first presented to the postconviction court. See Sandoval v. State, 975

N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 2022). Hasselmann asserts his failure to do so here was

due to the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Although ineffective-

assistance claims “are not bound by traditional rules of error preservation,” Nguyen

v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2016), “we only entertain such claims raised

for the first time on appeal if the record is adequate and no prejudice would result

to any party,” Porter v. State, No. 23-1330, 2025 WL 407184, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Feb. 5, 2025).

There is no record before us to explain why neither counsel raised this

issue. See Luke v. State, 465 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (noting

effective assistance does not require counsel “to raise every nonfrivolous issue

urged by the client”). Without an adequate record explaining counsel’s decision-

making process, we decline to reach the merits of Hasselmann’s claim. Porter,

2025 WL 407184, at *2; see also Goode, 920 N.W.2d at 526–27. We also decline

Hasselmann’s request to remand the claim for the district court to decide. See

Goode, 920 N.W.2d at 527 (declining to “remand claims of ineffective assistance

of postconviction counsel raised for the first time on appeal to the district court to

hear and decide” and directing such claims to “be filed as a separate application

in district court”).
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III. Conclusion

Having considered all claims raised on appeal, we affirm the decision of the

district court denying Hasselmann’s application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.