In the Interest of R.S., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2085
Filed March 19, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF R.S.,
Minor Child,

A.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Michelle Jungers, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Falls, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio of Juvenile Public Defenders Office

Waterloo, Waterloo, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, R.S.,

contending that a six-month extension should have been granted.1 Upon our

review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This family has a long history with the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (“the department”). Even before this case, the mother had five

founded child-abuse assessments. Her parental rights to two of her five children

had been previously terminated, and two of her other children had been placed in

guardianships with paternal relatives. This appeal concerns the mother’s fifth

child, R.S., born in 2023.

In late 2023, when R.S. was just over one month old, the mother was

arrested after driving drunk with R.S. not properly secured in the backseat. The

State charged the mother with operating while intoxicated and child endangerment,

and a no contact order was entered listing R.S. as the protected party. When the

department spoke to the mother in jail, she refused to cooperate with them or

disclose the location of the child. R.S. was eventually discovered at a family

friend’s home. When the mother was released from jail, she contacted the family

friend, falsely claiming the no contact order had been dropped and requesting R.S.

be returned to her care. After the mother “threatened to run away with the child,”

the juvenile court removed R.S. and placed him with the family friend as a

1 The juvenile court also terminated the putative father’s parental rights to R.S.

Because he does not appeal, we do not address him further.
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fictive-kin placement. The mother eventually pled guilty, and the no contact order

was modified to allow the department to facilitate visitation.

Throughout these proceedings and the mother’s previous involvement with

the department, the mother was “verbally abusive and aggressive.” She called the

department staff “bitches” and threatened violence against them. Every attempt

by providers to redirect the mother’s unsafe parenting was met with hostility. The

department had to provide two people to supervise the mother during visits due to

her behaviors. And these visits were not always consistent, with the mother

attending only twenty-eight out of forty-four visits offered. When she did attend

visits, the mother often arrived late, left early, or was otherwise disengaged from

the child, sometimes refusing to feed R.S. or take him out of his car seat while she

scrolled on her phone. The mother told the department’s caseworker that “the

placement holds him too much” and R.S. is “too heavy” to explain why she did not

hold him. The caseworker testified that the providers resorted to hiding R.S.’s car

seat during visits to force the mother to engage with him. And even when the visits

were transferred to the mother’s apartment, she did not provide age-appropriate

toys or activities. Instead, she watched television while R.S. “tr[ied] to play with

the outlet” until providers intervened.

Another conflict between the mother, the department, and R.S.’s placement

concerned the child’s medical care. The mother interfered with the placement’s

access to R.S.’s medical care, canceling or rescheduling appointments without

informing her. The mother also refused routine vaccinations for R.S. The

department caseworker testified that the doctor later wrote her a letter, concluding

the mother’s decision to refuse “vaccinations was vindictive and not based in
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religion and/or safety concerns.” At one of R.S.’s medical appointments, the

mother “became aggressive” and “got in [the placement’s] face.” The mother was

then only permitted to attend these appointments by phone.

The mother also failed to address the department’s primary concern, which

was the substance use that initially led to her criminal charges. While she

completed both substance-use and mental-health evaluations, she was not honest

with the evaluators about her drinking or trauma. As a result, neither

recommended any treatment based on the mother’s self-reports. And when the

mother agreed to see a therapist, she only attended a couple appointments before

she no-showed again. As for her substance use, despite the juvenile court

excusing a number of her drug tests,2 the mother continued to either test positive

for alcohol or refuse to test at all. She similarly declined to participate in any

substance-use treatment.

A termination hearing occurred in October 2024, after which the juvenile

court terminated the mother’s parental rights to R.S. The mother appeals.

II. Review.

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re

W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021). “We are not bound by the factual findings

of the juvenile court, but we give them weight, particularly regarding credibility

determinations.” Id.

2 The juvenile court found the drug tests conducted on Sundays should be excused

because the mother was unable to find public transportation to the drug-testing
facility on Sundays.
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III. Discussion.

The mother does not challenge the grounds for termination of her parental

rights to her child; we therefore “limit our review to the specific claim[] presented.”3

In re K.W., No. 23-1884, 2024 WL 1757377, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2024).

The mother only contends that a six-month extension should have been granted

in lieu of termination. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (permitting the juvenile court

to delay permanency if “the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will

no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period”). But we do not grant

such extensions without justification. See id. (requiring the court to “enumerate

the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” to justify

additional time); accord In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (“We do not

gamble with the child[’s] future by asking them to continuously wait for a stable

biological parent.” (cleaned up)). To be granted additional time, the mother must

3 But the mother does loosely argue that termination was not in the best interests

of the child and that the department failed to conduct adequate visitation. We find
the first argument is waived for lack of argument and decline to proceed to its
merits. See In re K.C.-P., No. 23-1730, 2024 WL 260829, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 24, 2024) (finding a parent’s “bare-bones best-interests argument” “is not
enough to facilitate our review”). As to the mother’s concerns about visitation, we
interpret this as a reasonable-efforts challenge. See Iowa Code § 232.102(4)(b)
(2024) (requiring that the department “make every reasonable effort to return the
child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests
of the child”); In re R.D., No. 22-1966, 2023 WL 2672051, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 29, 2023) (including “visitation designed to facilitate reunification” as part of
its reasonable-efforts finding (citation omitted)). But this argument was raised for
the first time at the termination hearing, which is too late for our review. See In re
C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]f a parent fails to request other services
at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at
the termination proceeding.”). We therefore need not reach the merits of the
mother’s reasonable-efforts claim. See id.
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“show the impediments to placing [the child] with [her] will not exist in six months.”

W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 323.

Upon our de novo review, we do not find that the mother met this burden.

The mother has made almost no progress during the course of these proceedings,

which does not convince us that she would be able to care for R.S. after the six

additional months have elapsed. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000)

(considering “the parent’s past performance” to indicate “the quality of the future

care that parent is capable of providing”). “Time is a critical element” in termination

proceedings, especially after the statutory grounds for termination have been

established. Id. (“A parent cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the

statutory time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest

in parenting.”). The mother has not demonstrated an ability to maintain sobriety

and care for R.S. She also has not historically taken advantage of the litany of

services offered to her by the department nor addressed any of its concerns. We

therefore have limited confidence that this will change in the short timeframe

afforded to us under section 232.104(2)(b). Meanwhile, R.S. has become “very

bonded” to his placement and has thrived in their care. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d

at 708 (finding the child’s bond and integration with placement family favors

terminating the mother’s parental rights). We decline to “deprive [R.S.] of

permanency . . . by hoping someday [his] parent will learn to be a parent and be

able to provide a stable home.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014).

Instead, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to R.S.
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IV. Disposition.

Because we find that a six-month extension is not warranted, we affirm

termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.