State of Iowa v. Chad Michael LaGrange

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0980
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD MICHAEL LAGRANGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Tom Reidel,

Judge.

A defendant challenges the sentence imposed following his guilty plea.

AFFIRMED.

Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Chad LaGrange challenges the sentence imposed following his guilty plea

to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (methamphetamine),

in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2021), a class “C” felony.

LaGrange first asserts his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty

without first establishing a factual basis. Next, LaGrange claims the court failed to

consider mitigating circumstances when it sentenced him to a term of incarceration

not to exceed ten years. Because we have no authority to consider his ineffective-

assistance claim on direct appeal, we do not address the specifics of that

challenge. As for the sentencing decision, we conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion. We affirm LaGrange’s sentence.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On October 21, 2021, police initiated a traffic stop of a black Chevrolet S10

in Muscatine because of a broken taillight. The officer conducting the stop

informed the driver, LaGrange, the reason for the stop and requested his driver’s

license, insurance, and registration. LaGrange admitted to the officer that his

license was suspended and, because the vehicle belonged to his sister, he did not

know where the vehicle’s insurance information was located. The officer returned

to his patrol car to begin writing a traffic citation. An additional officer arrived to

assist; the second officer searched LaGrange’s person while the initiating officer

wrote LaGrange’s citation. With LaGrange’s consent, the second officer searched

LaGrange’s vehicle and uncovered a black digital scale and a clear glass

methamphetamine pipe in the center console. The officers issued LaGrange a

citation for driving while suspended. While LaGrange waited for a ride, officers
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noticed a clear plastic bag containing a white, crystal substance believed to be

methamphetamine under the initiating officer’s patrol car. When asked by officers

why he dropped the bag, LaGrange said he was scared to go to jail. A further

search of LaGrange uncovered $2197 in his possession. A test of the white

substance confirmed it to be 7.2 grams of methamphetamine.

As part of a binding plea agreement, LaGrange entered a written guilty plea

to the lesser-included offense possession of a controlled substance with intent to

deliver (methamphetamine) with an agreement that he would be sentenced to a

suspended term of incarceration not to exceed ten years and twenty-four months

of probation. A sentencing hearing was scheduled for April 13, 2022, at which time

the court would accept LaGrange’s guilty plea. The court’s concurrence was a

condition of the plea in accordance with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(3).

LaGrange failed to appear at his sentencing.

LaGrange was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant on May 7, 2024, and

his sentencing was rescheduled for May 31, 2024. At his resentencing, the court

rejected the sentencing agreement and offered LaGrange an opportunity to

withdraw his plea. After discussion with counsel, LaGrange decided to not

withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed with the sentencing. The court sentenced

him to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years. LaGrange appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review sentences imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors at

law.” State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 2022). “We afford sentencing

judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary nature of

judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’” State v.
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Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “Absent ‘an abuse of

discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure,’ we will not reverse a

sentence.” McCalley, 972 N.W.2d at 676 (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d

98, 103 (Iowa 2020)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court exercises its

discretion on grounds or for reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable.

We may find grounds untenable when based on an erroneous application of the

law.” State v. Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “[M]ere

disagreement with the sentence imposed, without more, is insufficient to establish

an abuse of discretion.” State v. Pena, No. 15-0988, 2016 WL 1133807, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016).

III. Discussion.

LaGrange raises two claims on appeal—his trial counseled was ineffective

and the sentencing court abused its discretion when imposing sentence. We

address each claim in turn.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

LaGrange first argues his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead

guilty without establishing an adequate factual basis of guilt. He claims that the

factual basis to which he pled guilty was a bare written recitation of the elements

of the crime that he signed and that such a written recitation is insufficient to

establish a factual basis for the plea. But, we have no authority to consider

LaGrange’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal.

Section 814.7 addresses this court’s authority to consider ineffective-

assistance claims. It states:
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An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case
shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief
pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct
appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim
for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided
on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.

Iowa Code § 814.7 (emphasis added). “Section 814.7 does not limit jurisdiction; it

limits the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to resolve ineffective-assistance

claims on direct appeal.” State v. Jordan, 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021).

Thus, pursuant to section 814.7, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must be brought through a separate claim for postconviction relief, not on direct

appeal. See State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 2022).

Because we have no authority to consider LaGrange’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, we do not reach the merits.

B. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing.

Next, LaGrange asserts the district court abused its discretion by

sentencing him to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years. Although

LaGrange pled guilty, he has good cause for appeal because he is challenging the

sentence imposed, which was neither mandatory nor agreed to. See Iowa Code

§ 814.6(1)(a)(3) (limiting the right of appeal from a guilty plea to a crime other than

a class “A” felony to instances “where the defendant establishes good cause”);

Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 100 (“We hold that the good-cause requirement is

satisfied . . . when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory

nor agreed to in the plea bargain.”).

LaGrange contends that the sentencing court abused its discretion by

imposing a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years instead of suspending the
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prison term sentencing him to probation and drug treatment. But “[a] sentencing

court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits

is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d

58, 65 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6)

categorizes conviction for possession of five grams or less of methamphetamine

with intent to deliver as a class “C” felony, which is punishable by a prison term of

“no more than ten years.” See Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(d) (setting maximum

sentence for class “C” felonies). Accordingly, “our task on appeal is not to second

guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d

720, 725 (Iowa 2002).

In the instant case, the district court considered a multitude of factors when

formulating an appropriate sentence for LaGrange. After considering the

presentence investigation report (PSI) details, the district court noted:

When I look at the PSI, first, we have the failure to appear for
sentencing [in April 2022]. We have a history of parole violations,
multiple assaults, multiple burglaries, a very lengthy criminal history.
Under the leisure section of the PSI, you actually indicated the only
thing you do for leisure is drugs, and your employment history has
been scant since 2010. When the Court reviews everything in total,
I can’t believe that probation is appropriate to maximize your
rehabilitation, protect the community and to deter this type of conduct
and others . . . . [T]he Court does reject the [sentencing agreement
in the] plea agreement.

After discussing these factors, the district court ultimately agreed with the

recommendations set forth in the PSI report and sentenced LaGrange to

incarceration.
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In his appeal, LaGrange asserts that the sentencing court failed to consider

mitigating factors that eliminated the need for incarceration. First, LaGrange

asserts that he was open and honest about his substance use history and his

reason for failing to appear at his initial sentencing date. Additionally, he argues

that he took responsibility and was remorseful for what he had done. It is true that

LaGrange was open and honest about his past shortcomings. During the

sentencing hearing, he spoke about his failure to appear at his original sentencing

hearing, stating, “It was ignorance on my behalf. There is really no excuse for it. I

really won’t make any excuse to make me look worse.” The sentencing court

recognized LaGrange’s admission of responsibility for failing to appear, stating,

“However, as we discussed, your failure to appear—something I truly appreciate

you taking ownership of—has played a significant role in my decision-making.”

The district court’s consideration of LaGrange’s behavior in failing to attend his

court hearing is not an improper factor. And “[t]he test for whether a sentencing

court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various

factors differently.” State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023). The

sentencing court considered LaGrange’s remorse, among other factors, but still

operated within its discretion to impose a term of incarceration.

LaGrange next argues the sentencing court denied him the maximum

opportunity for rehabilitation by failing to consider the support he would receive

from his family and the treatment options available through probation. Again, the

sentencing court directly weighed whether incarceration or probation gave

LaGrange the best chance of rehabilitation. During sentencing the court stated,

“[I]t comes down to whether I grant probation or . . . go with incarceration, and I
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think everything that we talked about, and to protect the community and maximize

your rehabilitation as well as deterrent to others, incarceration is necessary.” The

sentencing court noted the PSI author’s recommendation of incarceration,

LaGrange’s good relationship with his sister, and the fact that he was currently

living at her home. Yet, the court decided that incarceration was warranted. The

record belies LaGrange’s claim the district court failed to consider family support

and whether probation and treatment were the better sentencing option. Further,

“the district court need not list with specificity each factor the court considered in

sentencing.” State v. Gomez-Evans, No. 23-2048, 2024 WL 4039425, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2024); see also State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App.

1995) (“[A] failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not

necessarily mean it was not considered.”).

Therefore, we find that LaGrange has failed to demonstrate the sentencing

court relied on unreasonable or untenable grounds when reaching a sentencing

determination. Absent any showing of an abuse of discretion, we affirm the

sentence imposed.

IV. Conclusion.

We do not consider LaGrange’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; we

affirm his sentence.

AFFIRMED.