In re the Marriage of Owen and Brinker

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0830
Filed March 5, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JASON C. OWEN
AND ALISON A. BRINKER

Upon the Petition of
JASON C. OWEN,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
ALISON A. BRINKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Craig M.

Dreismeier, Judge.

A woman appeals the property division and spousal-support provisions of

the district court’s order dissolving her marriage with her former spouse.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

Jessica A. Zupp of Zupp and Zupp Law Firm, P.C., Denison, and Julie G.

Mayhall, Carroll, for appellee.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
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SANDY, Judge.

Alison Brinker appeals the district court decree dissolving her marriage with

Jason Owen. She argues the district court’s property division and denial of spousal

support was inequitable. Specifically, Alison contends the district court

(1) undervalued the Owen family acreage, (2) failed to value certain farm

equipment separately from the Accu-Steel valuation, (3) undervalued the Klocke

and Klein farms, and (4) wrongly denied her spousal support. We affirm the district

court’s valuation of Accu-Steel. We modify the district court’s denial of spousal

support and award Alison spousal support consistent with this opinion. We affirm

the district court decree in all other respects and remand for purposes of

calculating child support.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Jason and Alison have been married since 2003. Jason has some college

education but left college to start a business. Alison has a bachelor’s degree in

accounting from the University of Northern Iowa. Her certified public accountant

certification lapsed during the marriage and would require renewal if she were to

work in that field again. During the marriage, the parties had two children, born in

2007 and 2009.

Jason petitioned to dissolve his marriage with Alison in September 2022.

At that time, the parties had been married for over nineteen years. Jason and

Alison stipulated to most childcare issues but left the court to calculate child

support. All other issues were decided by the district court, including property

division, spousal support, and attorney fees.
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In 2001 Jason founded and is currently the president of a company called

Accu-Steel, Inc., which employed eighteen people full-time at the time of trial. The

value of Accu-Steel—and Jason’s income from Accu-Steel—were points of dispute

during trial. The district court described Accu-Steel as a company that “designs

and manufactures steel frame structures and the polyethylene fabric sheeting that

goes over the steel frames.”

A. Accu-Steel’s Value

Jason and Alison each provided expert appraisers to value the company.

Jason’s expert valued Accu-Steel at $4,391,000, and Alison’s expert valued the

company at $5,699,600. The analysis for Jason’s expert started with 2019’s

financials while Alison’s expert started with 2018’s financials. The district court

believed both experts to be experienced but found the valuations to be “flawed”

due to the values only being “as good as the information provided to [the

appraisers]”—recognizing that both Jason and Alison may not have provided their

respective experts with the most complete picture of the company’s financials.

Accordingly, the district court estimated Accu-Steel’s value to be $5,045,300—the

average of the two experts’ valuations.

One point of contention when valuing the companies was to what extent the

farming equipment owned by Accu-Steel was included in the respective valuations.

Accu-Steel, despite not being involved in any farming, owns a large amount of

“nonessential farming equipment” used by JA Ranch.1 JA Ranch is another one

1 At trial Jason testified he believed the legal name of this company is “JA Ranch

Co. LLC,” but the company is referred to by several different legal names within
the parties’ various filings. For consistency, we refer to the company as “JA
Ranch.”.
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of Jason’s business entities that farms using the farming equipment owned by

Accu-Steel and pays Accu-Steel rent for that equipment’s use.

Jason’s expert testified that he “[did]n’t know exactly” what farm equipment

was or was not used to generate income for Accu-Steel. He suggested that these

assets may have been included in the depreciation schedules but testified that he

“typically [does]n’t go through and look through every single asset to see what [the

business] included” as an operating asset or nonoperating asset. He did testify

that those assets were not separately appraised. Alison’s expert stated that he did

not include the farming equipment in his valuation:

Q. Now, Accu-Steel also owns farm equipment; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And did you consider that farming equipment in any manner
when you did this valuation? A. No. Accu-Steel is not in the business
of farming. And so the farm equipment is not necessary assets to run
this business and so the farm equipment is not included in our
valuation.
Q. So would that have to be valued separately? A. Yes, it
would.
Q. And all the equipment, all the farm equipment, owned by
Accu-Steel would need to have a separate value placed upon it?
A. Right. If we had a value, we would have added it to this schedule;
but we don’t have a value.

Further, the Accu-Steel valuation report provided by Alison’s expert states that the

farm equipment was not included in the company valuation, including any rental

revenue derived from that equipment: “A hypothetical rental income, estimated at

$80,000 annually, was not included in this [normalizing income] adjustment as it is

our understanding that the farm equipment owned by Accu-Steel is to be

considered separately or to be sold and the proceeds split between the parties.”
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But Jason testified on direct examination that Accu-Steel reported rental

income from JA Ranch—income that the district court found both experts used in

their Accu-Steel valuations:

Q. And you were also paid rental income from JA Ranch at
times; correct? A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. For that equipment? A.: Right. JA Ranch wrote a big
check to Accu-Steel for it, yes.

Unfortunately, there was not testimony about the amount of the “big check.”.

Unfortunately, the date of the “big check” was never testified to. Unfortunately,

whether Alison’s expert excised the “big check” from his valuation was never

testified to. The disputed farm equipment’s asset-based value was itemized in trial

exhibit OO. Such value was $1,027,784.91. Jason admitted that figure’s accuracy

and argued for the same in his post-trial brief.2

The district court found that both experts included the value of the farming

equipment in their Accu-Steel valuation and that separately valuing it for the

property division would amount to “double-counting” the farm equipment’s value.

B. The Owen Acreage

While the parties were married, they lived on the property referred to by

both as the Owen acreage. The acreage is roughly twenty-five acres in size,

contained within three tax parcels. The acreage contains the family residence and

the family business. Accu-Steel operates out of the property. At trial, Jason and

Alison disputed the total value of the acreage. That dispute largely arose from

2 Jason argued this is the book value of all equipment that had not been sold or

fully depreciated. According to Jason, Alison did not account for full depreciation
or items that were sold when she estimated the value of farm equipment to be
$1.45 million.
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their disagreement as to the value of a manufacturing building located on the

acreage. Jason estimated the building is worth $75,516 (a figure provided by a

certified appraiser). Alison estimated the building is worth $544,000, which she

claimed is the assessed value of the building. Jason’s appraiser estimated the

acreage to be worth $915,000, while “Alison [took Jason’s] value of $915,000 and

add[ed] to it the difference between his determination of the value of the

manufacturing building . . . to the assessed value.”

The district court arrived at Jason’s certified appraiser’s estimated value,

finding his testimony “credible” because he “personally viewed the [acreage]” and

“provided a comprehensive comparison of other properties to that of the Owen

[a]creage.”

C. The Klocke and Klein Farms

During the marriage Alison and Jason purchased a couple of farms, which

they refer to as the Klocke farm and the Klein farm. The Klocke farm, purchased

in 2010 for approximately $1,000,000, consists of 140 crop acres and is located

about a quarter mile from the Owen acreage. The farm is used to support a cattle-

feeding operation. Jason calculated the value of the property to be $2,080,000,

which was based on his analysis of comparable farm sales. Alison’s expert, who

was not a certified appraiser, also arrived at a value for the Klocke farm using

comparable sales data. Her expert estimated the total value of the farm to be

$2,718,312.

Jason’s loan officer reviewed the analysis for purposes of determining

whether his bank would finance a cash equalization payment to Alison based on
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the value Jason provided. The loan officer testified that he believed his bank would

finance the equalization payment using Jason’s estimated value.

The disparate nature of the value estimates was based in large part on

Jason and Alison’s disagreement relating to the value of a cattle building and hay

building located on the farm. Finding that “[n]either party has presented any

credible evidence to support their values for these structures,” the district court

adopted Jason’s $2,080,000 land value and then added the difference of the

parties’ structure values ($153,801.50) for a total valuation of $2,233,801.50. The

district court used Jason’s estimated land value because Jason provided his land

valuation methodology while Alison’s expert did not do the same.

Jason and Alison purchased the Klein farm about three years before trial,

which consists of 110 total acres and ninety crop acres. This property was

purchased for around $950,400 and remains highly leveraged, with about

$557,000 left on the mortgage. Jason valued this property at $1,100,000 and

Alison valued it at $1,541,549. The district court valued the Klein farm at

$1,100,000, providing the same reasoning as for the Klocke farm (minus the

dispute over building valuations).

D. Spousal Support

Alison requested $13,500 in monthly spousal support until she remarried or

the date of either party’s death. Jason argued that her request for spousal support

should be denied.

Alison worked for Accu-Steel in accounting and marketing from 2006 until

February 2023, earning an annual salary of $60,000. She has a few retirement

accounts from accounting positions she held in the late 1990s through early 2000s.
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Jason also reported a $60,000 annual salary in his role as the president of Accu-

Steel. The district court found it was difficult to ascertain his true income due to

the opaque recordkeeping and creative categorization of certain expenses as

business expenses. Both Jason and Alison used the income figures in Jason’s

income calculation exhibit as the basis for estimates relating to Jason’s income.

But Alison used Jason’s taxed “gross income” and Jason used his taxed “net

income”. Alison also added back various personal expenses she claims were

deducted as business expenses. Alison proposed taking the average of Jason’s

2020–2022 incomes while Jason proposed using 2017–2021, arguing that 2022’s

high figure was too “anomalous.” While the district court agreed that net income

was the best method for calculating Jason’s income, it used the 2017–2022 period,

disagreeing that 2022 should be excluded simply because Jason believed the

income to be too high. This resulted in the court’s determination that Jason should

be imputed an annual income of $420,854.

Alison argued no income should be attributed to her, but Jason contended

that she should be attributed an earning capacity of $75,000 based on her ability

to find work as an accountant. Since Alison worked in accounting during the

marriage and has the ability to further increase her income by renewing her CPA

certification if she so chooses, the court found her earning capacity to be $69,000.

The district court found the parties’ joint marital net value is $8,915,822.70.

After allocating assets and liabilities, Jason had a net value of $7,490,319.10 while

Alison had a net value of $1,425,503.60, resulting in a $6,064,815.50 differential.

The district court then ordered a $3,032,407.70 equalization payment from Jason

to Alison. As a result of the equalization payment, the district court found that
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Alison would “likely” earn a seven percent rate of return, which would generate

$212,269 income annually. That amount in addition to her accounting income

would give her an annual earning capacity of $281,269.

Despite the $140,000 gap in earning capacity between Jason and Alison

and the almost twenty-year marriage, the district court declined to award Alison

any spousal support. The district court noted that Alison claimed many expenses

($25,000 per month) it had difficulty confirming, such as $6640 in farm mortgage

expenses she would not be incurring.

The district court observed that Alison reported a monthly entertainment

expense of $2790. The court further stated “[t]here was very little [evidence], if

any, to show what this actually consists of per month on average. She notes $6400

per month representing car payments, property taxes, vehicle maintenance and

professional fees. As mentioned, the vehicles in her possession are paid for . . . .”

The district court also noted that Jason would need to take out a loan to

make the equalization payment to Alison. In its view “when the interest payments

Jason will need to make on an annual basis are factored into the equation, any

[income] discrepancy quickly disappears.”

Alison now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review decrees dissolving marriage de novo, In re Marriage of Sullins,

715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006), including determinations of spousal support, In

re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). See Iowa R. App.

P. 6.907. “Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight

to the trial court’s factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the
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witnesses.” Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 247 (citation omitted). We afford the district

court considerable latitude in determining spousal support, In re Marriage of

Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Iowa 2022), and “should disturb the district court’s

determination . . . ‘only when there has been a failure to do equity,’” Sokol, 985

N.W.2d at 182 (citation omitted).

III. Discussion

Alison argues the district court (1) undervalued the Owen family acreage,

(2) failed to value certain farm equipment separately from the Accu-Steel valuation,

(3) undervalued the Klocke and Klein farms, and (4) wrongly denied her spousal

support. We address each argument in turn.

Under Iowa Code section 598.21(5) (2023), the court shall divide all

property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party,

equitably between the parties after considering the statutory factors. Although not

required, In re Marriage of Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 1985), trial courts

generally strive to make the division of property approximately equal, In re

Marriage of Conley, 284 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Iowa 1979). Property division and

spousal support are contemplated in conjunction to “evaluat[e] their individual

sufficiency.” In re Marriage of Dahl, 418 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).

A. Accu-Steel’s Farm Equipment

Alison argues that Accu-Steel’s farm equipment was not accounted for in

the district court’s valuation of the company because neither party’s expert

included the equipment in their valuation. We disagree and find that the parties’

experts included the income derived from the farm equipment in their respective
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reports. The district court found that “both experts have considered this same

equipment in valuing the business.”

We agree that Jason’s expert included this equipment explicitly in his

valuation because that expert testified that he “[does]n’t go through and look

through every single asset to see what [the business] included” as an operating

asset or nonoperating asset. And although Alison’s expert testified that “the farm

equipment is not included in our valuation,” it is unclear to what extent his report

expressly carved out the actual revenue produced by the equipment—the “big

check.” And, because such carve out would have been necessary so as to not

include the farm equipment in the Accu-Steel business valuation, whether Alison’s

expert indeed “double dipped” is unclear on the record before us. He never

testified that any of Accu-Steel’s reported rental income was excised from his

report. Alison’s expert agreed he “d[id]n’t have any knowledge about the breakout

of equipment that is actually used in the Accu-Steel business versus farming

equipment.” While Alison’s expert understood that the farm equipment was going

to be valuated separately, sold, and divided equitably, such did not obviously

occur.

From our seats, we cannot serve as expert appraisers, nor can the district

court. We look to the information provided by the retained experts. Without clear

information over how the agricultural equipment impacts the company value, we

cannot remove it and add it to the property list. As it stands now, the agricultural

equipment is owned by AccuSteel and if sold would follow the company. Thus, we

follow the district court’s careful analysis based upon what it had available to

consider.
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The value of the farm equipment is baked into each expert’s valuation—

both explicitly and implicitly. It would be impossible to value the farm equipment

separately without having both experts revalue the company accordingly. The

extent to which the district court’s valuation of Accu-Steel was imperfect was due

to no error on its part. Rather, it was due to the lack of precise record relative to

the “big check.” The company’s financial reporting as it relates to the revenue-

generating aspects of the farm equipment is opaque and not well-established by

the record. Remanding for the purpose of revaluing the company and separating

the farm equipment value from Accu-Steel’s value would not correct any inequity

done by the district court and would give Alison an opportunity at a second bite at

the apple. We affirm the district court’s Accu-Steel valuation and decline to

separately value the company’s farm equipment.

B. Owen Acreage

Alison argues the district court erred in valuing the Owen acreage at

$915,000 and failing to increase the value by $544,140 to account for the

manufacturing building on site. We disagree.

Property values “within the range of permissible evidence” are generally left

undisturbed. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Iowa 2013); see

In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007).

As the district court observed, Jason’s certified appraiser actually viewed

the property in person, which is not necessarily the case in a tax assessment.

Alison did not have an appraiser view the premises. The district court’s

assessment that the manufacturing building appeared “dilapidated” is consistent

with the appraiser’s assessment to the same:
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The building is highly depreciated in value overall. The fabric cover
is nearing the end of its useful economic life and has multiple
tears. . . . Given the building’s current state, the appraiser has
determined that it is not financially feasible to replace the building’s
fabric cover and therefore, the building’s vertical frame has no
contributory value.

He concluded that

There have been very few real estate sales transactions that include
fabric-covered hoop buildings. Per the appraiser’s research and
discussions with market participants, the appraiser determined that
fabric-covered hoop structures have an approximate economic life of
15-25 years and there is not a strong market demand for fabric-
covered hoop buildings that are in the middle of their economic life
due to rapid depreciation.

From the appraisal, it is clear that the expert gave thoughtful consideration to the

building’s value. Additionally, Alison’s contention that the 2023 tax assessment

supports her proposed valuation is not persuasive. That assessment relates to the

entire parcel—not solely the specific manufacturing building at issue here. The

assessment provides no itemization of individual building values. Using Alison’s

recommended valuation method would “effectively double-count[] the acres, the

other building, and the improvements.”

Alison provides no evidence that Jason’s valuation is unreliable beyond

countering with her own imperfect valuation. We agree with the district court on

this issue and will not disturb its Owen acreage valuation.

C. The Klocke and Klein Farms

Alison argues the district court undervalued the Klocke and Klein farms. As

with her arguments relating to the Owen acreage valuation, we defer to the district

court’s credibility determinations on this issue. Alison takes issue with the district

court’s assertion that her expert’s “qualifications to value the farm ground are not
14

superior to Jason’s.” But the district court is correct; an “owner is a competent

witness to testify to [a property’s] market value,” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703, and

her expert is not a certified appraiser. Jason also provided a more detailed

analysis directly related to the farm ground’s productivity. Alison’s primary

argument for why her expert is more credible than Jason relates to the expert’s

testimony that he felt “fairly comfortable giving a range for the value of the

farmland.” We do not find that this is a compelling argument for departing from the

district court’s factual findings on the value of the Klocke and Klein farms.

D. Spousal Support

“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined

based on the particular circumstances presented in each case” and the statutory

factors in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1). Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. The district

court did not award Alison spousal support as she requested. Alison argues she

should be awarded traditional spousal support—one of the four forms of spousal

support recognized by our supreme court. See generally id. at 185–86. Traditional

spousal support is “equitable in marriages of long duration to allow the recipient

spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed.” Id.

at 185.

In deciding an equitable award of traditional spousal support, we give

particular attention to the earning capacity of each spouse, their current standards

of living, and the spouse’s ability to pay weighed against the relative needs of the

other spouse. See In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 436–37

(Iowa 1981). “The property division and the award of [spousal support] must be

considered together in evaluating their individual sufficiency; they are neither made
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nor subject to evaluation in isolation from one another.” In re Marriage of Grauer,

478 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).

The district court declined to award Alison any spousal support due to the

cash equalization payment and the income it may possibly create, her lack of debt,

her age and ability to support herself, and income earning potential. But we take

issue with the district court’s analysis in a couple of respects.

First, Alison’s income from the cash equalization payment will be subject

to the rising and falling tides of market performance—meaning there will be years

where it may not provide the estimated seven percent return the district court

assumed.3 Such a shortfall would heavily impact Alison’s ability to support her

expenses and standard of living. And it could require her to draw down from the

equalization payment principal to bridge the gap, which would reduce the income

she could earn in the future even further. Second, the large yearly gap in the

parties’ earning capacities—nearly $140,000—is difficult to reconcile without an

award of spousal support, especially when combined with potential years of poor

market return.

There is no dispute that Alison was an equal partner in the marriage. At the

time she and Jason married, she was a corporate accountant with a “greater net

worth than Jason.” She left that career path to support Jason’s business. And

although their marital assets are being evenly split, Jason’s stipulated award of

3 Alison is not disputing the district court’s determination that she could earn a

seven percent rate of return on her cash equalization payment after invested.
Thus, we will not weigh in on the propriety of the district court’s treatment of the
cash equalization payment as an income generating asset, how much income the
asset generates, or what investment vehicle is used to allow for such generation.
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Accu-Steel will provide him a much larger ceiling for income growth than will

Alison’s accounting career. That is due, in part, to her sacrifices.

A large portion of the district court’s reasoning for not awarding Alison

spousal support was based in its skepticism relating to her claimed monthly living

expenses, finding “her monthly living expenses are not even close to her $25,000

per month projection.” And while living expenses are certainly relevant to the

question of her relative needs, the district court did not give sufficient consideration

to permitting her to “maintain the lifestyle to which . . . she became accustomed.”

Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185.

Due to some of the ongoing expenses and interest Jason may take on in

order to make Alison’s equalization payment, we do not believe Alison’s argument

that she should be awarded $13,500 in monthly spousal support to be a

reasonable request. We find that Alison should be awarded $3500 per month in

traditional spousal support until she remarries or either party dies, whichever

occurs first. This award provides some buffer for poor market years, permits Alison

to continue the lifestyle to which she is accustomed, allows for her needs to be

met, and closes the gap between the parties’ incomes while also leaving Jason

sufficient income and access to funds to make the equalization payment.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s valuation of Accu-Steel. We modify the

spousal-support provision to award Alison $3500 in monthly traditional spousal

support consistent with this opinion. We affirm the district court in all other
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respects. We remand to the district court for purposes of calculating child support

given Alison’s award of spousal support.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.