State of Iowa v. Savion Devonte Wilson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1647
Filed March 5, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SAVION DEVONTE WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Linda M. Fangman, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder.

AFFIRMED.

Jessica Donels of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

It’s undisputed Savion Wilson pointed a gun at Cortavius Benford’s head,

pulled the trigger, and killed him. The fight in this case was about whether the

shooting was an accident or intentional. A jury did not believe Wilson’s claim it

was an accident and found him guilty of first-degree murder. Wilson appeals,

claiming errors in jury selection, that there was not enough evidence supporting

the verdict, and that the court erred in evidentiary rulings during trial. We find no

reversible error and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Witnesses agreed that Wilson and Benford had known each other a long

time, their families were close, and they were friends. It was also largely

undisputed that, about four months before the shooting, Wilson and Benford had

a disagreement reflected in part by a social-media livestream in which Wilson

recorded himself making statements about Benford. During the livestream, Wilson

said he would “pop pop on ya niggas . . . one two three ding dong”; made

statements like “come get him off the ground”; and referred to Benford’s “life” as

the marijuana blunt he was about to light. Benford’s girlfriend understood all of

these statements to be explicit or implicit threats of violence directed at Benford.

And she explained at trial that Wilson and Benford had a bit of a falling out after

this livestream and had only seen each a few times in the months between the

stream and the shooting. Wilson’s mother, who overheard Wilson recording the

livestream, described Wilson and Benford as “arguing like two bitches.” But she

also thought they patched things up in the weeks that followed.
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On the day of the shooting, Wilson, Benford, Benford’s girlfriend, and a

friend of Wilson were all hanging out at Benford’s apartment. The group, other

than Benford, was smoking marijuana. There were no overt signs of

disagreement, and everyone but Benford went to get drinks and snacks at a nearby

store. They went back to Benford’s apartment after, and the group resumed

hanging out—again seemingly without issue. But witness accounts diverge slightly

about what happened in the moments leading up to Wilson shooting Benford less

than an hour later.

According to Benford’s girlfriend, Wilson left the apartment for a few

minutes, then returned wearing a camouflaged mask he had on his head earlier in

the day. In her words: “[Wilson] came in the front door. By the time I looked up

from my phone, I had seen the gun pointed, and the gun went off within like three

seconds after I had looked up.” When asked about the specific sequence of

events, she clarified that Wilson walked toward Benford, lifted the gun up, pointed

it at Benford’s head, and pulled the trigger—all in a matter of seconds. She also

explained that she had chastised Wilson on other occasions for playing around

with guns—like pointing one at her cat—because it was dangerous.

Wilson’s friend agreed that Wilson left the apartment and added that Wilson

pulled the gun out from under Benford’s couch. He described Wilson “playing

around with” the gun before eventually pointing it directly at Benford’s head, pulling

the trigger, and shooting him. Wilson’s friend agreed that Wilson had a mask that

day, but he wasn’t sure if Wilson was wearing it when he shot Benford.

Wilson eventually turned himself in to police but claimed he didn’t know

where the gun was. He initially told detectives that both he and Benford were
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playing with the gun that day and he didn’t know which of them pulled the trigger.

Wilson’s story shifted at trial. He admitted that Benford never touched the gun that

day. And he admitted that he pointed the gun at Benford’s head and pulled the

trigger. But he claimed the shooting was accidental, as he “was playing around

with the gun,” “pointed it everywhere,” and didn’t know it would fire when he pulled

the trigger. Wilson also admitted to having a camouflaged mask the day of the

shooting but said he wasn’t wearing it when he fired the gun and killed Benford.

Witness accounts generally reconverged on what happened after the

shooting. Wilson said something like, “what the fuck.” Benford’s girlfriend called

911, while Wilson and his friend fled the scene separately on foot. According to

Wilson, he ran away with Benford’s blood literally on his hands, and he ditched the

mask somewhere outside while running.

When police performed a forensic extraction of Wilson’s cell phone, they

found videos of Wilson wearing the same clothing seen in surveillance footage

from the store and a gun that appeared consistent with descriptions of the one he

used to shoot Benford. Based on comparison of the gun in the videos to different

manufacturers, police identified the model of the weapon and discovered it had

two safeties—both a slide and a trigger. The phone extraction also revealed that

Wilson had performed internet searches for “manslaughter sentence Iowa” and

searched for news articles related to the shooting after he shot Benford.

An associate state medical examiner performed an autopsy. The cause of

Benford’s death was a single gunshot wound to the head and the manner of death

was ruled homicide. The medical examiner ruled out suicide because the fatal

gunshot was fired from at least three or four feet away and the position of the
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gunshot entering Benford’s head from above made it essentially impossible for

Benford to have fired the shot.

In his trial testimony, Wilson disputed whether the statements in the

livestream were threats. But he admitted the references to shooting someone—

“pop pop”—were about Benford and another individual. In some tension with that

admission, he also testified he did not “ever” think about killing Benford.

The jury found Wilson guilty of murder in the first degree, a class “A” felony

in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2(1)(a) (2022). And the district

court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. He appeals.

II. Discussion

Wilson’s different claims—jury selection, sufficiency, evidentiary errors—

carry different standards of review and some have embedded problems with

preservation of error. We consider each separately.

A. Jury Selection

Wilson claims the district court erred when it denied his challenge to the

State’s use of peremptory strikes pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

96–97 (1986). We review this claim de novo, but with “great deference” to the

credibility findings of the district court. State v. Knox, 464 N.W.2d 445, 448

(Iowa 1990).

But first, we assess whether error was preserved, as we are a “court for the

correction of errors at law”—not a court that typically decides issues in the first

instance. Iowa Code § 602.5103(1). On appeal, Wilson contests the peremptory

strikes used against prospective jurors 95 and 266. But he did not challenge the

strike of prospective juror 95 below; in fact, in a subsequent argument regarding
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prospective juror 266, he appears to have conceded striking 95 was appropriate

or justified. After the State pointed out this preservation issue in its brief, Wilson

filed a reply brief—but did not address the error-preservation deficiency in any way.

We conclude any challenge to the State’s strike of prospective juror 95 was not

preserved,1 and we review only the challenge to prospective juror 266.

“Batson holds that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of racial

discrimination by showing that the prosecutor has exercised one or more

peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of a racial minority and

that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of

discrimination.” State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 332 (Iowa 2019) (discussing

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98). “Such a showing shifts the burden to the prosecution

to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for exercising the challenges.” Id.

As framed by the parties on appeal, the dispute is over whether the State offered

a race-neutral reason for the strike and whether that reason was true or a pretext.

Prospective juror 266, like Wilson, was described as African American or

black. In voir dire, 266 described himself as an “advocate of the Second

Amendment,” said he would look for “just anything in the case that could leave

reasonable doubt,” disagreed with the premises of some questions by prosecutors,

and expressed that he would only convict in a hypothetical question if the evidence

gave him “no choice” and he was “forced to believe it.”

1 Even if this challenge had been preserved, we would affirm.Prospective juror 95
twice said she did not believe she could be “fair.” The district court correctly
observed that it was “clear that there were race neutral reasons” for striking her,
and Wilson’s counsel made a similar observation.
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Below, Wilson’s attorney contended there was no race-neutral reason for

the State exercising a peremptory strike on prospective juror 266. The assistant

county attorney argued that 266 “appeared skeptical of essentially testimony,”

“seemed to want to make what I could character as excuses for individual[s’]

conduct,” and was “contrarian” in his repeated disagreement with prosecutors

during voir dire. The district court credited the State’s “position that [the

prosecutors] felt that 266 was contrary to them” as “a race neutral reason” and

denied the Batson challenge. And the court left the door open to revisit the issue

if the State struck additional African American jurors. Neither party asked the court

to revisit the issue.

We agree with the district court that striking a prospective juror due to the

prospective juror’s skepticism of testimony as evidence, tendency to offer excuses

for culpable conduct, and disagreeable nature are race-neutral reasons under

Batson. The transcribed record of prospective juror 266’s statements is generally

consistent with the assistant county attorney’s recollection (and we recognize he

had no transcript available to review at the time). We also defer to the district

court’s advantaged position to read the room rather than our review of the cold

record. See Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 327 (emphasizing we give “a great deal of

deference” to a trial court’s determination of “the true motives of the attorney when

making strikes” (citation omitted)). In our de novo review, informed by the court’s

credibility findings, we conclude the proffered reasons for striking prospective

juror 266 were not a pretext for racial animus, and we affirm denial of the Batson

challenge.
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B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Wilson next contends there was insufficient evidence to support a

first-degree murder conviction. We review for correction of errors at law. State v.

Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury’s

verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

Wilson specifically contests the elements of malice aforethought,

premeditation, and specific intent to kill. But the core of his complaint is simpler:

he wishes the jury had believed his claim the shooting was an accident rather than

the State’s circumstantial case that he intended to kill Benford with malice. Yet, as

we have held before, “A criminal defendant is not entitled to acquittal merely

because he wishes the jury had believed him[.]” State v. Hernandez, No. 23-0630,

2025 WL 52424, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2025) (en banc). Instead, like in most

cases, the jury’s determination of intent here “turned on resolution of competing

inferences and implicit credibility findings”—and we are not empowered to

substitute our view of the evidence for that of the jury. State v. Howard, 14 N.W.3d

763, 767 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).

To the extent analysis on the individual elements is required beyond

recognition of the jury’s role deciding facts and credibility, we find the evidence

sufficient to support the first-degree-murder conviction. The jury was entitled to

reject Wilson’s explanations and protestations regarding the livestream and

instead believe he was angry with Benford and had threatened to “pop pop” or
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shoot him. And the jury was similarly free to reject evidence that tensions between

Wilson and Benford had cooled in the weeks leading up to the shooting. It is

well-established that “prior threats” are probative on the intent accompanying

future violence. E.g., State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Iowa 2001). And

the same goes for “bad feelings or quarrels between the defendant and the victim”

as proof of malice aforethought or the motive accompanying premeditation. E.g.,

State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 49 (Iowa 2003).

The jury was also permitted to infer both malice aforethought and specific

intent to kill from Wilson’s use of a dangerous weapon coupled with the opportunity

to deliberate. See State v. Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 779–82 (Iowa 2017)

(surveying history and re-affirming use of this permissive inference). Pointing the

gun at Benford’s head and pulling the trigger—a version of events admitted by

Wilson at trial—was sufficient to permit that inference, particularly in light of the

gun’s multiple safeties. And this evidence was reinforced by Wilson’s shifting

explanation for what happened, his internet searches following the shooting, and

him fleeing the scene, all of which were substantive evidence of guilt. See, e.g.,

State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Iowa 2001) (“[C]onflicting statements about

who did own the gun were another indication of guilt.”); State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d

557, 562 (Iowa 1995) (“Admissions may be implied by the conduct of the defendant

subsequent to a crime when such conduct indicates a consciousness of guilt.”);

State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993) (“A false story told by a defendant to

explain or deny a material fact against him is by itself an indication of guilt . . . .”);

see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2) (permitting otherwise improper character

evidence to prove “lack of accident”).
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In the end, while it is possible a different jury could have believed Wilson’s

testimony and rejected the State’s circumstantial mens rea evidence, this jury did

not. Instead, the jury rejected Wilson’s claim of accident and credited the

prosecution’s theory of murder. Substantial evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the State and pursuant to longstanding case law, supports the verdict.

C. Impeachment

Wilson next challenges the district court’s evidentiary ruling prohibiting what

he contends were two instances in which he sought to admit inconsistent

statements made by Benford’s girlfriend at trial. We analyze these statements

separately. But we first consider the standard of review in the context of the

precise challenge levied on appeal. Neither party’s appellate brief relies on the

hearsay rules—like Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(1)(A) regulating prior

inconsistent sworn statements—for admission of any of the statements at issue.

Instead, the parties solely rely on Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.613, which regulates

impeachment with unsworn statements. We follow the parties’ briefing and solely

review this issue under Rule 5.613 for an abuse of discretion. See Bauer v. Cole,

467 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Iowa 1991); State v. Berry, 549 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1996).

1. The Deposition

The first piece of alleged impeachment evidence concerns a prior sworn

statement by Benford’s girlfriend in deposition. At trial, Wilson’s attorney asked

her: “[H]ad Cortavius [Benford] ever played around with guns?” Benford’s girlfriend

answered: “Not that I seen, no.” Wilson’s attorney then attempted to impeach her

with reference to her deposition, but the State objected. Outside the presence of
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the jury, Wilson’s attorney then paraphrased the witness’s statement in deposition

that Benford “would mess around with guns but not after he got out,” with Benford’s

attorney understanding “got out” as a reference to Benford leaving a correctional

facility and beginning probation. The court ruled that this was not proper

impeachment, given counsel’s recitation that “she said the whole time she was

with him she never saw [him playing with a gun], but before they were together

maybe.” The court added that, even if the statement was admissible for

impeachment, the only way this witness would know what Benford did before they

got together was hearsay, so it was inadmissible for a second independent reason.

Wilson’s attorney said he wasn’t sure the witness only knew from hearsay but

admitted that is what everyone inferred from the statement.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.613 allows for impeachment of witnesses by

extrinsic evidence of a “prior inconsistent statement” on a material issue. See 7

Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.613:1 (Dec. 2024 update).

Such an inconsistent statement is not offered as substantive evidence but instead

merely as impeaching evidence to attack the credibility of the declarant. See id.

This procedure is distinct and apart from admission of prior inconsistent sworn

statements as substantive evidence under Rule 5.801(d)(1)(A). See id. & n.2

(collecting cases).

Contrary to what Wilson claims in his reply brief, the question of whether a

statement is “inconsistent” for purposes of this rule does not rest with the jury—it

instead rests with the district court. See id. § 5.613:2.

The guiding definitions [for what is “inconsistent”] are general,
requiring only that the prior statement be “inconsistent in material
respects,” “at material variance” with trial testimony, or that “[i]t is
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enough if the [document], taken as a whole, either by what it says or
what it omits to say, affords some presumption that the fact was
different from defendant’s testimony.”

Id. (footnotes omitted). And, even after a proponent establishes a statement is

inconsistent, the district court retains a gatekeeping function to decide whether to

admit the evidence subject to other evidentiary concerns, including but not limited

to the potential for unfair prejudice. See United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 268

(4th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases that unanimously come to this conclusion for the

comparable federal rule).

Here, Benford’s girlfriend’s statement that she had not “seen” Benford play

with guns was not inconsistent with her prior statement that, before they had gotten

together or before he had left the correctional facility, Benford played with guns.

As a result, this prior statement was not admissible under Rule 5.613. And, as the

State correctly notes in its brief, Wilson does not materially dispute this basis for

the ruling in his own appellate papers. We affirm.

2. The Text Messages

The second alleged-impeachment challenge is more difficult to piece

together from the record. At its core, Wilson wanted to admit a text message

Benford’s girlfriend sent Wilson, in which she said: “Bye, G, because you just lying

to me. You put that shit up to his head playing, not knowing it wasn’t on safety.”

The defense’s offer of proof explaining the rationale for admitting this evidence

became a bit disjointed, so we quote the argument rather than try to summarize it:

[WILSON’S ATTORNEY]: I believe that as [Benford’s
girlfriend] sat there and testified here for the offer of proof, she had
stated that at this point she does not believe that Mr. Wilson was
playing around with the gun. However, she does acknowledge and
admit that she had sent a text message to him indicating the
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essentially opposite of that, that she was stating to him that she saw
him playing around with the gun immediately after this happened. I
do believe that’s valid impeachment evidence. I believe during the
offer of proof she essentially admitted that, so I do believe that we
should be allowed and entitled to ask that question.

As pertinent to the issues on appeal, both the district court below and the

State on appeal ascribe a different meaning to “playing” in “[y]ou put that shit up to

his head playing” than Wilson and his attorneys—the district court and the State

understood the statement to be speculation as to Wilson’s mental state at the time

he fired the gun—that he didn’t mean to kill, but was just “playing.” Given this

(mis)understanding between the parties, the arguments were muddled below and

are still discordant on appeal. But we focus narrowly on the district court’s ruling

to resolve the confusion.

This exchange concluded the discussion at trial:

THE COURT: You’re going to have to explain to me how
what—what you read into the record as the text impeaches anything
that [Benford’s girlfriend] previously said. Because her previous
testimony is she saw the person come in, she saw the person raise
the gun not fully extended, half extended up to his head and shot.
So what part of that text impeaches anything she said?
[WILSON’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I believe the question
that I asked—and I don’t remember specifically, but I believe what I
asked that was objected to was “did you see [Wilson] playing around
with a gun that day” or that was the intent after our discussion . . . .
THE COURT: Okay. But you’re messing up the facts of what
happened and what she later presumed to be. What she testified
about was that she had not seen the gun before it was extended and
before [Benford] was shot. So if you’re asking her if she saw [Wilson]
playing with it that day, you can ask that.
[cross-talk omitted]
I think she’s already testified that she did not see the gun
before that. The text message, when you look at it, is her speculating
about what [Wilson] did or did not know. . . .
[WILSON’S ATTORNEY]: . . . . When she sends a text
message immediately after stating that she saw [Wilson] put that shit
up to his head playing, that is a clear statement that she saw him
playing with the gun on that date.
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THE COURT: No. That is her speculating that he was playing.
It is not coming in. It’s not.

We observe four things from this exchange: (1) the court recognized the confusion

between the parties over the statement; (2) the court explained it did not find any

inconsistency in the testimony as elicited; (3) as it stood, the court thought

admitting the text message appeared to endorse speculation regarding Wilson’s

state of mind; and (4) the court gave directions for how Wilson’s attorney could

potentially open the door to admitting the text message if the court’s understanding

was incorrect. But Wilson’s attorney never took the court up on its invitation.

We discern no error or abuse of discretion in how the court handled this

confusing issue. We broadly share the district court’s understanding that the text

message did not appear to be inconsistent with any trial testimony elicited thus far.

This interpretation is reinforced by the supporting clause that followed the use of

“playing,” in which Benford’s girlfriend described Wilson as “not knowing it wasn’t

on safety.” We find the court’s suggestion that Wilson’s attorney could lay

foundation to potentially allow for admission of the text message was a reasonable

one given the state of the record, and this was a fair way of addressing any

lingering confusion. But we decline to hypothesize on how the issue might have

been resolved if Wilson’s attorney had laid the proper foundation. All this is a long

way of saying there is no reversible error in how the district court navigated this

issue by focusing on how Wilson had not yet elicited or identified testimony from

Benford’s girlfriend that contradicted the text message.

Last on this issue, we note a fleeting reference in Wilson’s reply brief that

appears to allege excluding this evidence may have violated his constitutional
15

rights. This claim was not preserved below. And it cannot be raised for the first

time in a reply brief, even if it had been preserved. See, e.g., Young v. Gregg, 480

N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1992) (“[W]e have long held that an issue cannot be asserted

for the first time in a reply brief.”). We do not consider it.

D. Images of Unknown People with Other Guns

Last, Wilson contends the district court erred in excluding four proposed

defense exhibits that were images extracted from Benford’s phone by police. The

proposed exhibits depict: an unknown individual licking part of a handgun; an

individual standing with a gun on the floor nearby; a closeup of a hand holding a

gun inside a building; and a closeup of a hand holding a gun with an extended

magazine inside a vehicle. Wilson did not affirmatively allege or prove any of the

persons depicted in the photos were Benford but instead that they reflected

Benford’s “interest in guns or firearms,” which Wilson argued supported his

position that Benford handled the gun before or during the shooting. The State

clarified that, to the best of its knowledge, the photos came from applications like

Snapchat or Pinterest—or at the very least there was no evidence Benford took

the photos himself—and the defense did not dispute this characterization. The

court ruled the images were not relevant, emphasizing there was no evidence the

images depicted Benford and did not appear to depict the gun at issue at trial. But

the court also left open the door that, if Wilson’s attorney could establish a link to

this case, the court would revisit the issue. Wilson’s attorney never linked the

images to Benford beyond them being in Benford’s cell-phone applications, at one

point explaining: “I don’t think the defense can hurdle over that additional burden
16

of connecting [the images] with depicting Mr. Benford, which is why we’re not

pursuing that line of questioning.”

On appeal, Wilson reframes his argument on this evidence, claiming

Benford’s “interest in guns” was relevant to whether Wilson acted with malice

aforethought and his mental state when he shot and killed Benford. He goes on

to contend that the images supported his theory that he planned to “sell the gun to

Mr. Benford and accidentally fired the fatal shot.” So, as we understand it, Wilson

is now arguing that, because Benford was interested in guns in the past, he was

more likely to be interested in guns the day of the shooting, thus more likely to

have handled the gun, and somehow it was then more likely that Wilson shot him

accidentally rather than intentionally. The State counters that this argument “relies

on wildly speculative propensity inferences” and the district court correctly

exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence.

We affirm the district court. The bar for relevance is low. State v. Thoren,

970 N.W.2d 611, 622 (Iowa 2022). But not so low that it compels a district court

to admit images found on a murder victim’s cell-phone depicting other people

handling other guns at unknown times and places. These images were not

probative on any fact of consequence, and they were properly excluded under

Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.401 and 5.402. To the extent Wilson’s chain of

propensity inferences was his true purpose in offering the evidence (rather than to

sully Benford’s character), it would also have been proper to exclude this evidence

under Rule 5.404 as improper character evidence or Rule 5.403 as substantially

more confusing and misleading to the jury than probative. For similar reasons, we

also hold that exclusion of these images was harmless, as it had no bearing on the
17

evidence supporting Wilson’s guilt and the inferences Wilson seeks to draw were

not permitted by the rules of evidence.

III. Disposition

Having disposed of all claims properly preserved and raised before us on

appeal, we affirm Wilson’s conviction for first-degree murder.

AFFIRMED.