Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1402
Filed January 9, 2025

DEN HARTOG INDUSTRIES and WEST BEND MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Petitioners-Appellants,

vs.

TYLER DUNGAN,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

An employer appeals from a judicial-review proceeding following an

adverse decision by the workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.

Lee P. Hook, Morgan R. Todd Borron, and Jordan R. Reed (until

withdrawal) of Peddicord Wharton, LLP, West Des Moines, for appellants.

Michael Roling and Christopher Spencer of Peddicord Wharton, LLP, West

Des Moines, for appellant West Bend Mutual Insurance Company.

Janece Valentine, Fort Dodge, for appellee.

Heard by Buller, P.J., Langholz, J. and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
2

BULLER, Judge.

Den Hartog Industries and its insurer appeal from a judicial-review

proceeding arising out of a contested workers’ compensation case involving former

employee Tyler Dungan. Den Hartog alleges a legal error in the district court and

workers’ compensation commissioner’s interpretations of a 2017 amendment to

Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v) (2019), which could potentially affect the amount of

benefits owed Dungan. Finding the district court correctly affirmed the

commissioner’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Most of the material facts in this case are not disputed. Dungan injured his

back in July 2019 while working for Den Hartog. He promptly reported the injury

to Den Hartog and saw medical providers for treatment. He missed some work

while receiving medical care but continued to work for Den Hartog for the next

eleven months with some restrictions.

Dungan voluntarily left his job at Den Hartog the next June to take a different

job and move closer to his family. He worked a few different positions before he

started at his current employer as a welder, earning more than he had while

working for Den Hartog.

Dungan petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits in March 2021.

Following arbitration, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner determined

Dungan sustained an eight percent functional impairment and awarded him

industrial disability benefits based on a fifteen percent reduction in his earning

capacity as well as costs and continued medical care. Den Hartog appealed to the

commissioner, who affirmed the deputy’s award in its entirety.
3

By way of background, before 2017, permanent partial disability to an

unscheduled body part was compensated exclusively by an industrial disability

calculation, which focuses on the loss of earning capacity.1 As part of the 2017

legislative changes, the General Assembly amended Iowa Code

section 85.34(2)(v), which in pertinent part reads:

In all cases of permanent partial disability other than those
hereinabove described[,] . . . the compensation shall be paid during
the number of weeks in relation to five hundred weeks as the
reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the disability
bears in relation to the earning capacity that the employee
possessed when the injury occurred. . . . If an employee who is
eligible for compensation under this paragraph returns to work or is
offered work for which the employee receives or would receive the
same or greater salary, wages, or earnings than the employee
received at the time of the injury, the employee shall be compensated
based only upon the employee’s functional impairment resulting from
the injury, and not in relation to the employee’s earning capacity.
Notwithstanding section 85.26, subsection 2, if an employee who is
eligible for compensation under this paragraph returns to work with
the same employer and is compensated based only upon the
employee’s functional impairment resulting from the injury as
provided in this paragraph and is terminated from employment by
that employer, the award or agreement for settlement for benefits
under this chapter shall be reviewed upon commencement of
reopening proceedings by the employee for a determination of any
reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the
employee’s permanent partial disability.

The workers’ compensation commissioner interpreted the bifurcation process to

only apply when a worker returns to work for the employer and is later terminated

by the same employer. Under that reasoning, the commissioner determined the

1 Earning capacity is focused “on the ability of the worker to be gainfully employed.”

Keystone Nursing Care Ctr. v. Craddock, 705 N.W.2d 299, 306 (Iowa 2005)
(citation omitted). In this opinion, when we refer to industrial disability, we mean
the reduction in earning capacity. See Loew v. Menard, Inc., 2 N.W.3d 880, 884
(Iowa 2024) (“Determining an injured employee’s compensation based on the
employee’s reduction in earning capacity is known as the industrial method.”).
4

functional impairment provision did not apply to Dungan because he voluntarily

separated from Den Hartog. As a result, the commissioner determined the

bifurcated process established by section 85.34(2)(v) linking benefits to functional

impairment did not apply to Dungan, and the commissioner instead calculated his

industrial disability.

Den Hartog petitioned for judicial review in the district court, urging that

section 85.34(2)(v)’s bifurcated process applied regardless of whether the

employee was terminated or voluntarily separated from the employer. The court

affirmed the commissioner, criticizing Den Hartog’s position as asking the court to

ignore part of the statutory text and finding that the statute read as a whole only

imposed the bifurcated process when the employee returned to work and was then

terminated by the employer. Den Hartog appealed, and the supreme court

transferred this matter to our court for resolution.

II. Standards of Review

We review the interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute for

correction of errors at law, without deference to the agency’s legal interpretation.

Chavez v. MS Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). If the commissioner’s

factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by

them. Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 2012).

III. Discussion

There are essentially two parts to this appeal—statutory interpretation and

application of the statute to the facts to determine Dungan’s industrial disability

rating. We address each separately.
5

A. Statutory Interpretation

On the legal question, we must determine for the first time how Iowa Code

section 85.34(2)(v) applies in the circumstance of a voluntary quit. “Our first step

in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the language is ambiguous.”

State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017).

The supreme court recently looked at compensation under this section,

explaining:

Section 85.34(2)(v) provides two methods for calculating
compensation for a nonscheduled permanent partial disability.
Compensation shall be paid using the industrial method based on
“the reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the
disability.” However, when an employee returns to work at the “same
or greater salary, wages, or earnings than the employee received at
the time of the injury,” then “the employee shall be compensated
based only upon the employee’s functional impairment resulting from
the injury, and not in relation to the employee’s earning capacity.”
Here, Loew suffered a nonscheduled injury to his lower back, and he
returned to work at the same or greater compensation. Because
Loew returned to work at the same or greater compensation, he was
entitled to compensation “based only upon [his] functional
impairment resulting from the injury.”

Loew, 2 N.W.3d at 886–87 (internal citations omitted). Although this language

brushes up against the issue in this case, it does not squarely resolve it.

In our view, we find the statutory language recognizes two categories under

section 85.34(2)(v) with different bases for calculation compensation: (1) if the

employee returns to work at the same or greater pay, then they are compensated

for their functional impairment; and (2) if the employee does not return to work at

the same or greater pay, then the industrial disability calculation applies.

Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. Anderson, 4 N.W.3d 676, 682 (Iowa 2024). The statute

provides for those involuntarily moved from the first category to the second with a
6

bifurcated compensation process to seek additional industrial disability

compensation. See Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). But the statute does not address

those who voluntarily do not return to work or those who return to work but leave

voluntarily. As a result, we find the statute ambiguous—a conclusion supported

by the vigorous briefing seen from both parties in this case, as they attempt to

interpret opaque statutory language. See Richardson, 890 N.W.2d at 616 (“A

statute is ambiguous if reasonable minds differ or are uncertain as to the meaning

of the statute.” (citation omitted)). And we think this lack of clarity in the statutory

language has created uncertainty between employees and employers as to when

and how the different compensation rates apply to employees whose injuries are

governed by paragraph (v).

Under controlling precedent, we are required to “apply the workers’

compensation statute broadly and liberally in keeping with its humanitarian

objective: the benefit of the worker and the worker’s dependents.” Xenia Rural

Water Dist. v. Vegors, 786 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Iowa 2010). This prescribed

approach supports affirming the interpretation of the commissioner and the district

court, as both interpreted ambiguous language to benefit the worker, and it weighs

against reversing in favor of the employer for the same reason. As a result, we

hold the district court did not err at law when it affirmed the commissioner’s

conclusion that the functional-impairment analysis did not apply to Dungan,

because Dungan was not terminated from employment. Instead, this case falls

within the first sentence of paragraph (v)—and the longstanding practice for

compensation of unscheduled injuries—“the compensation shall be paid . . . as the

reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the disability bears in
7

relation to the earning capacity that the employee possessed when the injury

occurred.” Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v).

In so holding, we recognize the statutory language is subject to multiple

interpretations. Forced to choose between competing interpretations, case law

compels we err on the side of the employee and historical practice. See Xenia,

786 N.W.2d at 257.

B. Industrial Disability Rating

Den Hartog also contests the amount of industrial disability awarded,

contending fifteen percent was too high. In calculating industrial disability, the

commissioner is permitted to consider a variety of factors, not all of which apply to

every case:

the employee’s medical condition prior to the injury, immediately
after the injury, and presently; the situs of the injury, its severity and
the length of the healing period; the work experience of the employee
prior to the injury and after the injury and the potential for
rehabilitation; the employee’s qualifications intellectually,
emotionally, and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the
injury; age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a result
of the injury; inability, because of the injury, to engage in employment
for which the employee is fitted; loss of earnings caused by a job
transfer for reasons related to the injury; and the employer’s refusal
to give any sort of work to an impaired employee.

IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 632–33 (Iowa 2000) (identifying relevant

factors from McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1980)).

“The . . . commissioner is not required to fix disability with precise accuracy.”

Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999). And we are

mindful the assessment must concern the employee’s general earning capacity in

the competitive labor market, not just a comparison of wages between specific

roles or specific employers. See id. at 356.
8

Without dwelling unnecessarily on the details, we find the commissioner’s

decision supported by substantial evidence. Dungan had decades left in the

workforce, some ongoing lift restrictions while working in a manual-labor industry,

was motivated to work, and had to obtain subsequent employment at a “quite

accommodating” employer compared to his previous work-seeking without

restriction. Dungan also continued to have lower-back pain and required some

degree of continuing treatment. Den Hartog’s most targeted argument on this point

suggests Dungan’s disability is not permanent. But every expert report in the

record concludes otherwise. We find substantial evidence plainly supports the

commissioner’s determination on the amount of industrial disability and the judicial-

review court’s affirmance of the same.

IV. Disposition

We affirm the district court’s judicial-review ruling, which in turn affirmed the

agency action of the workers’ compensation commissioner.

AFFIRMED.

Doyle, S.J., concurs; Langholz, J., dissents.
9

LANGHOLZ, Judge (dissenting).

The governing workers’ compensation statute provides that an employee

with an unscheduled injury “shall be compensated based only upon the employee’s

functional impairment resulting from the injury, and not in relation to the employee’s

earning capacity” if the employee “returns to work or is offered work for which the

employee receives or would receive the same or greater salary, wages, or

earnings than the employee received at the time of the injury.” Iowa Code

§ 85.34(2)(v) (2019). All agree that Tyler Dungan returned to work and received

the same or greater earnings. Yet Dungan argues this provision cannot apply to

him because the next sentence in the statute—granting a special review-reopening

right to a subset of returning employees who are then terminated by their original

employer—does not apply to him. The workers’ compensation commissioner

agreed, awarding industrial disability benefits based on his earning capacity. And

the majority affirms, though based mainly on its conclusion that the statute is

ambiguous. But since the statute’s plain and unambiguous text requires Dungan

to “be compensated based only upon [his] functional impairment resulting from the

injury, and not in relation to [his] earning capacity,” I respectfully dissent.

I.

To answer this question of statutory interpretation, I would have “started

(and ended) . . . with the language of the relevant statute.” Second Inj. Fund v.

Strable, __ N.W.3d __, __, 2024 WL 5100098, at *5 (Iowa 2024). Paragraph “v”

of Iowa Code section 85.34(2) governs compensation for unscheduled injuries

causing permanent partial disabilities. See Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v); Loew v.

Menard, Inc., 2 N.W.3d 880, 886–87 (Iowa 2024). Its first two sentences provide
10

a default rule for compensating such injuries based on a loss of earning capacity,

often referred to in practice and precedent as “the industrial method.” Loew, 2

N.W.3d at 884. But its third sentence creates an exception to the default rule:

If an employee who is eligible for compensation under this paragraph
returns to work or is offered work for which the employee receives or
would receive the same or greater salary, wages, or earnings than
the employee received at the time of the injury, the employee shall
be compensated based only upon the employee’s functional
impairment resulting from the injury, and not in relation to the
employee’s earning capacity.

Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). A plain reading of this text tells us that a set of

employees with unscheduled injuries must be compensated based on their

“functional impairment” from their injuries rather than the default industrial method.

Id. And it tells us the condition needed for this exception to apply—when an

employee “returns to work or is offered work” at the same or greater pay as before

the injury. Id.; see also Loew, 2 N.W.3d at 887.

Dungan returned to work after suffering an unscheduled injury. At first, he

worked for the same employer as before the injury at the same hourly wage. But

he later resigned to take a position with a different employer where he earned

greater wages than at the time of the injury. He was still working at this higher pay

at the time of the hearing before the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner.

So applying the plain meaning of paragraph “v,” Dungan satisfies the

condition for the exception to apply because he is an employee who returned to

work at the same or greater pay as he had before the injury. And thus, the statute

requires that he be compensated based on his functional impairment from his

injury rather than the default industrial method.
11

Despite this straightforward statutory interpretation and application, Dungan

argues that the functional-impairment exception does not apply to him. He reasons

that to properly interpret the functional-impairment exception in the third sentence

of paragraph “v,” we must also consider the fourth sentence:

Notwithstanding section 85.26, subsection 2, if an employee who is
eligible for compensation under this paragraph returns to work with
the same employer and is compensated based only upon the
employee’s functional impairment resulting from the injury as
provided in this paragraph and is terminated from employment by
that employer, the award or agreement for settlement for benefits
under this chapter shall be reviewed upon commencement of
reopening proceedings by the employee for a determination of any
reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the
employee’s permanent partial disability.

Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). And Dungan contends—adopting the reasoning of the

commissioner in this and other cases2—that reading the two sentences together

shows that “the legislature set up a bifurcated litigation process” that “only applies

when the defendant-employer discharges the claimant after the agency issues an

award or approves the parties’ agreement for settlement on the question of

permanent disability based on functional impairment.” (Cleaned up.) In essence—

according to this reasoning—because the two sentences are linked, the third

sentence’s functional-impairment exception should only apply when the fourth

sentence’s reviewing-reopening right applies. So because Dungan voluntarily left

his original employment rather than being terminated, the entire bifurcated process

would not apply and he would be compensated under the default industrial method

based on earning capacity rather than under the functional-impairment exception.

2 See Martinez v. Pavlich, Inc., No. 5063900, 2020 WL 5412838, *3–6 (Iowa
Workers’ Comp. Comm’r July 30, 2020) (detailing the commissioner’s statutory-
interpretation reasoning, which was followed as binding agency precent here).
12

I agree with Dungan that we should look to the fourth sentence to inform

our interpretation of the third. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) [hereinafter Reading Law] (“The text

must be construed as a whole . . . which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider

the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its

many parts.”). That’s especially so where, as here, the two sentences were added

to the statute in the same enactment. See State v. Hall, 969 N.W.2d 299, 309

(Iowa 2022) (“The contrast between the statutes is particularly revealing because

both statutes were passed at the same time in the same piece of legislation.”); see

also 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 23, § 8. But when examining the text of the related

sentences, I see two distinctions that show the third sentence’s exception requiring

compensation based on functional impairment must apply to a broader universe of

employees than the fourth sentence’s review-reopening right.

First, the fourth sentence applies only to an employee who “returns to work

with the same employer.” Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). The third sentence contains

no such requirement that the work be “with the same employer.” Id. This use of

materially different terms shows us that the scopes of the two sentences are not

coextensive—“different meanings are intended” for each. Teig v. Chavez, 8

N.W.3d 484, 493 (Iowa 2024). “If the drafters intended the two concepts to be

coextensive, different words would not have been used.” Id. (cleaned up); see

also Reading Law at 170 (“[W]here the document has used one term in one place,

and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term

denotes a different idea.”). Dungan’s interpretation—that the third sentence’s

functional-impairment exception would only apply when the fourth sentence’s
13

narrower condition of returning to the same employer is satisfied—fails to give

meaning to these differences and thus flouts the statutory text.

Second, the third sentence applies to some employees who never return to

work at all—those who are merely “offered work.” Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v).

Dungan’s interpretation would strike these words out of the statute. An employee

who is offered but does not return to work with the same employer could never be

terminated by that employer. So the review-reopening right of the fourth sentence

could never apply. And under Dungan’s interpretation, the third sentence’s

functional-impairment exception could thus never apply to those “offered work.” Id.

That can’t be. “[W]e must giving meaning to every word in a statute. None should

be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to

have no consequence.” Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Anderson, 4 N.W.3d 676,

686 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up); see also Reading Law at 174 (“It is no more the

court’s function to revise by subtraction than by addition.”).

And so, both these distinctions between the two sentences defeat Dungan’s

argument that the third sentence’s functional-impairment exception applies only

when the fourth sentence’s review-reopening right applies. To faithfully give

meaning to the sentences’ distinctions, we must read the third sentence to require

compensation based on functional impairment for one set of employees with

unscheduled injuries: those who return to work or are offered employment at the

same or greater pay as before the injury. And the fourth sentence then moderates

the consequences of this exception for a smaller subset: those who returned to

work for the same employer, had their original award or settlement based on the

functional-impairment method required by the third sentence, and then were
14

terminated by that same employer. This subset of employees is granted the right

to bring a review-reopening proceeding in which they can seek a redetermination

of their compensation using the industrial method based on their loss of earning

capacity. Interpreting the two sentences in this way harmonizes them. See

Reading Law at 180 (“[T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering

provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously.”). And it gives the

most natural reading to all the words in the statute.

Dungan’s contrary interpretation seems to flow in large part from an

underlying assumption that the legislature intended to require compensation by the

functional-impairment method only as part of a “bifurcated process” in which the

employee could eventually have a chance for compensation by the industrial

method. And given the longstanding use of the industrial method for compensating

unscheduled injuries, it’s understandable that those involved in the workers’

compensation system might assume that it should always remain available. But

that assumption has no basis in the current text of the statute. The statute never

uses the term “bifurcated process.” And as already discussed, it defines the scope

of the functional-impairment exception more broadly than the scope of the review-

reopening right. If the legislature meant for the functional-impairment exception to

apply only when the review-reopening right also applied, there are many ways the

legislature could have written that meaning into the statute. But the words enacted

into law are not one of them. See State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 539 (Iowa

2024) (explaining that “[t]o find the meaning of [a statute], we must focus on its

text, the words chosen by the legislature” and rejecting attempt to add an additional

requirement for the applicability of a statute when those words “offer no support”).
15

II.

The majority affirms the commissioner’s interpretation—or at least its top-

line conclusion that paragraph “v”’s default industrial method of compensation

applies to Dungan—reasoning that the statute is ambiguous and thus must be

interpreted “broadly and liberally” to “the benefit of the worker.” Xenia Rural Water

Dist. v. Vegors, 786 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Iowa 2010). To find the statute ambiguous,

the majority agrees with Dungan and the commissioner that the statute “does not

address those who voluntarily do not return to work or those who return to work

but leave voluntarily.” But that’s not so.

True, the fourth sentence does not grant the review-reopening right to either

category the majority identifies. But it’s the third sentence that covers the issue

here—whether the functional-impairment exception applies. And that text plainly

addresses Dungan’s situation and the other categories that the majority finds

ambiguous. “[T]hose who voluntarily do not return to work”? If the employee was

“offered work for which the employee . . . would receive the same or greater salary,

wages, or earnings than the employee received at the time of the injury,” then the

functional-impairment exception applies. Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). And “those

who return to work but leave voluntarily”? Again, if they “receive[] . . . the same or

greater salary, wages, or earnings than the employee received at the time of the

injury” upon their return to work, the exception applies. Id. I’m not sure what more

we would expect the legislature to say to be clear that it intends the functional-

impairment exception to apply to the employees it has already expressly specified.

Of course, if one overlooks the clear distinctions between the two sentences

or accepts the atextual bifurcated-process assumption, the proper interpretation
16

can become murkier. All the more so when we have appropriately zealous

advocacy making thoughtful arguments on both sides. “But a statute is not

ambiguous merely because two litigants”—or “skilled lawyers,” administrative

judicial officers, or judges—“disagree about its meaning.” Est of Butterfield v.

Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).

Nor do the “legislative purposes,” such as “the purpose of helping workers” give us

“leave to ignore the plain language of the statute.” Bridgestone, 4 N.W.3d at 683

(cleaned up). And so, when properly focusing on the plain meaning of the text of

the statute, I see no ambiguity that would permit me to default to Dungan’s

interpretation just because it benefits workers.3

III.

Dungan also urges us—regardless of the result we reach—to give guidance

to the workers’ compensation bar and commissioner about the application of

paragraph “v” beyond the facts here. While I can understand that desire, there is

wisdom in fleshing out the meaning of statutes with our normal case-by-case

approach—deciding only what must be decided to resolve a particular case with

the benefit of adversarial briefing by parties with a direct stake in the issues

decided and a full factual record on which to apply the terms we interpret. So as

the commissioner has thoughtfully explained, the agency will still need to “act[] as

3 In any event, Dungan’s preferred interpretation does not always benefit workers.

See Loew, 2 N.W.3d at 889 (“A claimant may suffer a functional disability but have
no industrial disability if the functional disability does not impede his ability to
perform the duties of his employment.” (cleaned up)). Indeed, the first case in
which the commissioner interpreted paragraph “v” was one in which the
employer—not the employee—argued for the application of the industrial-method
because it thought the employee’s loss of earning capacity would be less than the
functional impairment. See Martinez, 2020 WL 5412838, *6.
17

the front-line authority in interpreting statutory workers’ compensation provisions,”

especially on these relatively recent amendments. Martinez, 2020 WL 5412838,

at *4.

That said, I believe that the interpretative approach that I use above—based

on a plain reading of all the text without additions or subtractions—would provide

greater clarity to those seeking to apply the statute to other factual circumstances

than either Dungan’s or the majority’s. To be sure, some of those circumstances

will present closer questions than this case. For example, it is not necessary to

decide here whether the statute’s use of the present tense—“returns to work”—

means that the return must continue up to the date of the hearing because Dungan

was still working at that time here. Nor do we need to wrestle with the related

question of what happens if the employee returns to the original employer and is

terminated by that employer before being compensated under the functional-

impairment method. In such a situation, the review-reopening right clearly couldn’t

apply—but absent an interpretation of “returns” that continues to the time of

compensation, the functional-impairment exception would seem to still apply. And

since Dungan returned to work, we do not face deciding what requirements, if any,

beyond offering the same or greater pay may be implied—perhaps based on other

parts of chapter 85—for an offer of work to meet the condition for the functional-

impairment exception. But I would wait to resolve these questions until we have

the benefit of adversarial briefing and the commissioner’s adjudication of them

before us. See Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 372–73 (1955)

(counseling that close questions’ “difficulty admonishes us to observe the wise
18

limitations on our function and to confine ourselves to deciding only what is

necessary to the disposition of the immediate case”).

For now, we need only correct the commissioner’s erroneous interpretation

of the statute here. Because Dungan returned to work and received the same or

greater earnings as he did at the time of his unscheduled injury, the plain and

unambiguous text of paragraph “v” requires Dungan to “be compensated based

only upon [his] functional impairment resulting from the injury, and not in relation

to [his] earning capacity.” Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). I would thus reverse the

district court’s and workers’ compensation commissioner’s contrary interpretation

of the statute and remand for the commissioner to decide an award based only on

Dungan’s functional impairment.