In the Interest of R.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0924
Filed August 7, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF R.M.-V.,
Minor Child,

S.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Britt Gagne of Gagne Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Nicole Garbis Nolan of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) and (l) (2024). She argues the State failed to prove grounds

for termination, termination is not in the best interests of the child, and a permissive

exception should be applied to preclude termination because of the closeness of

the parent-child relationship.1

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

R.M.-V. was born in 2010. His family has been involved with the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) sporadically over several years

because of the mother’s ongoing and unresolved methamphetamine use.2

HHS initially ended its involvement with the family in March 2022, but the

birth of a new child in April of the same year, who tested positive for

methamphetamine and amphetamines, prompted reinvolvement. R.M.-V. was

removed from his mother’s custody in June and adjudicated a child in need of

assistance (CINA) in August. A subsequent hair-stat test of R.M.-V. was positive

for methamphetamine. R.M.-V. was placed with his father after removal, but he

was eventually moved to another relative placement.3

The mother engaged in outpatient substance-use treatment after R.M.-V.

was adjudicated to be a CINA. But the mother minimized her history of use and

1 The mother makes a passing reference to an extension of time and a
guardianship, but because she does not develop these arguments, we do not
address them. See Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646
N.W.2d 417, 431 n.2 (Iowa 2002).
2 The mother’s parental rights were terminated to a younger child. Her appeal of

this termination was recently affirmed by this court. In re L.M., No. 24-0612, 2024
WL 3292689, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2024).
3 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
3

remained involved in an unhealthy and abusive relationship with a boyfriend. The

mother eventually completed treatment, and R.M.-V. was returned to his mother’s

custody following a May 2023 permanency hearing. But just months later, the

mother relapsed, and there was domestic violence in the home. The State moved

to modify in August, and R.M.-V. was again removed from his mother’s custody in

September.

The mother’s continued substance use and involvement in an unhealthy

relationship with her boyfriend prompted the State to file a termination petition in

February 2024. A termination hearing was held the following month. The mother

admitted she used methamphetamine less than one month prior to the hearing and

had used the drug off and on over the last three or four years. She had not

participated in outpatient treatment since February 2023, and she agreed she was

not able to safely parent while using methamphetamine. Finding the mother had

failed to address her substance use and pattern of unhealthy and abusive

relationships, the court terminated her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) and (l). She appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“In termination-of-parental-rights cases, we review the proceedings de

novo.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the

juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing

the credibility of witnesses.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).
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III. Analysis

The mother argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing

grounds for termination, termination is not in the best interests of the child, and the

close relationship between the mother and child should preclude termination.

To review the termination of parental rights, we follow a three-step analysis.

In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021). First, we determine whether a

ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) has been established.

Id. Second, we consider whether the best interests of the child support

termination, as laid out in section 232.116(2). Id. And finally, we look to see if any

exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3) should be applied. Id. Ultimately,

“[t]he State must prove termination was proper by clear and convincing evidence.”

Id. at 312.

A. Grounds for Termination

The court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to

section 232.116(1)(f) and (l). “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s

termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing

evidence.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. Because we determine grounds for

termination existed under section 232.116(1)(f), we limit our discussion to that

ground.

A ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(f) exists if:

The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
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for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.

The mother does not contest the first and second element. Rather, she

focuses on the third and fourth elements. The third element of

section 232.116(1)(f) requires a finding that the child has been removed from the

physical custody of the child’s parents for a minimum period of time. The mother

asserts that the child was only removed “from the physical custody of the child’s

parents” for ten of the last eighteen months. She argues that because R.M.-V.

was initially placed with his father after removal, he was not removed from the

physical custody of his parents until a later date.4

We look at the specific timeline in our record in conjunction with the mother’s

argument. R.M.-V. was initially removed from his mother’s custody and placed

with his father from September 2, 2022 to January 17, 2023. He was placed with

another relative from January 17 to May 9. He was returned to his mother’s

custody from May 9 to September 21. He was removed from his mother’s custody

4 Other Iowa cases have addressed similar, but slightly different timeframe
arguments related to section 232.116. See generally In re Z.P., 948
N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 2020) (finding where one parent never had custody and
was not subject to a removal order, removal from the other parent begins the clock
as to both); In re C.F.-H., 889 N.W.2d 201, 206–08 (Iowa 2016) (finding where a
parent has never had custody, there must still be a removal); In re J.E., 907
N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“Physical removal from the mother is
sufficient to start the statutory timelines counting toward termination as to either
parent.”); In re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (finding when
one parent is unaware they were even a parent, removal from the other parent still
begins the accrual of time); In re J.O., 675 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that mere contact between the parent and child is not a return of physical
custody, there must be a judicial determination and order returning the child to the
parent).
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again on September 21 and remained out of his mother’s custody through the

termination hearing in March 2024. Having only been in his mother’s custody for

just over four of the last eighteen months, the mother’s argument related to the

calculation of the twelve-month removal requirement under section

232.116(1)(f)(3) relies on the time R.M.-V. was in his father’s custody.

Section 232.116(1)(f)(3) states that the child must have “been removed from

the physical custody of the child’s parents.” In the mother’s view, because R.M.-V.

was placed in his father’s custody after removal from her custody, he was not

removed from the physical custody of his parents. We reject this argument. First,

in interpreting statutory language, “the singular includes the plural, and the plural

includes the singular.” Iowa Code § 4.1(17). As a result, the significance the

mother puts on the plural “parents” language in section 232.116(1)(f)(3) is

misplaced.

The mother’s argument that the child must be removed from the custody of

both parents to terminate the parental rights of either parent is based on an

erroneous reading of the statute, as “parents” as used in section 232.116(1)(f)(3),

includes “parent.” In other words, if the child’s parents are separated and the

juvenile court removes the child from the custody of one parent and places the

child in the custody of the other parent, the placement does not toll the removal

period under section 232.116(1)(f)(3). In re A.U., No. 13-0599, 2013 WL 2646971,

at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 12, 2013). And we have previously determined that

removal of a child from one parent is sufficient to support termination of the other

parent’s parental rights.” In re Z.G., No. 16-2187, 2017 WL 1086227, at *3 (Iowa

Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017).
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The child was removed from the custody of his mother on September 2,

2022, and the twelve months necessary under section 232.116(1)(f)(3) began

accruing as to the mother on that date. The child was removed from his mother’s

physical custody for at least twelve of the last eighteen months.

As to the fourth element, the mother argues R.M.-V. could have been

returned to her at the present time, asserting that the requirement of

section 232.116(1)(f)(4) was not met. Section 232.116(1)(f)(4) requires there be

“clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be

returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.” “At

the present time” means “at the time of the termination hearing.” See In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018).

The mother has a long history of unresolved drug use. And “unresolved,

severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children.” In

re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012). At the termination hearing, the mother

reported that she had not used methamphetamine in the last twenty-two or twenty-

three days, highlighting the mother’s history of relapse after periods of sobriety.

The short period of sobriety preceding the termination hearing does not

demonstrate the mother’s ability to immediately resume custody of her child. See

In re K.A., No. 02-1925, 2003 WL 183994, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003)

(“The juvenile court found [the mother’s] history of short-term sobriety and then

relapse . . . mitigated against believing her statements about her substance use,

especially in light of her long history of substance abuse. We fully concur in these

findings.”).
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B. Best Interests

The mother further argues termination is not in R.M.-V.’s best interests. She

asserts the differential treatment between R.M.-V. and another sibling, whose

permanency goal is different, is detrimental, and termination should be a last

resort.

“Even after we have determined that statutory grounds for termination exist,

we must still determine whether termination is in the [child’s] best interests.” A.B.,

815 N.W.2d at 776. “In evaluating this issue, we ‘give primary consideration to the

child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and

growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs

of the child.’” Id. (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010)).

The best interests of a child are impacted heavily by the need for

permanency: “we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved

a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778

N.W.2d at 41. The mother has been unable to provide R.M.-V. with permanency.

R.M.-V. has been moved from placement to placement, returned to the mother’s

custody, and removed again because of the mother’s relapse. This is not

permanency. See id. The mother used methamphetamine less than one month

before the termination hearing. She has failed to demonstrate that she is on a path

to sobriety. This has rendered her unable to provide R.M.-V. with a stable home.

See W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 314 (“[W]e cannot deprive these children of a stable

home on the hope that Mom will someday be able to succeed in her efforts to

remain sober.”). Termination is in the best interests of R.M.-V.
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C. Permissive Exception

The mother also argues a permissive exception should be applied to

preclude termination because of the close parent-child relationship. She

specifically highlights the exception in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c): “The court

need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if . . . [t]here is

clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the

child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” But the

court is not required to apply an exception: “The court has discretion, based on the

unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to

apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.” In re

D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). Once a ground for termination

has been established, it is up to the parent to show the court should apply an

exception. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. And “our consideration must center on

whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the

disadvantage overcomes [the parent’s] inability to provide for [the child’s]

developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709.

There is no question that the mother loves R.M.-V. And R.M.-V. has

expressed a desire to be returned to the mother’s home. But the child also

reported that if a return to the mother’s custody is not possible, the child wishes to

be adopted by the current placement, who is willing to do so. Where a child has

achieved stability in a home willing to adopt them, we must consider that before

applying an exception which will cast them back into chaos. See M.W., 876

N.W.2d at 225.
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The mother acknowledged she cannot care for her child when she is using

methamphetamine, and she has failed over several years to address her

methamphetamine use. The mother’s continued inability to place herself in a

position to parent R.M.-V. weighs against the application of an exception. See In

re B.B., No. 22-1816, 2023 WL 3335868, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023).

We conclude that the mother has not shown clear and convincing evidence

that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to R.M.-V. because of

the closeness of their relationship. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169

(Iowa 2021).

IV. Conclusion

Clear and convincing evidence supports termination under

section 232.116(1)(f), termination is in the best interests of the child, and the

application of a permissive exception is unwarranted. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.