State of Iowa v. Tre Evans Worden

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0839
Filed July 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TRE EVANS WORDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, James N. Daane,

Judge.

The defendant challenges the suppression ruling and sufficiency of the

evidence for his conviction for interference with official acts. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden (until withdrawal) and

Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Considered by Badding, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Blane, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.

Tre Worden appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress by

asserting an unlawful seizure and the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction

for interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury. Finding he was lawfully

seized and the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Around 2:00 a.m. on March 11, 2022, police officer Tyler Hemingson was

driving a marked squad car in search of a white, 2014 Nissan Maxima. He was

acting as the “stop car” during a drug investigation, and an occupant1 of that vehicle

reportedly possessed or sold drugs. A vehicle matching that description passed

him on the road, and Hemingson noted the windows were so darkly tinted, he

couldn’t see into them. He determined the window tinting violated Iowa law and

began following the vehicle, which stopped in a parking lot. He pulled his squad

car behind the Maxima.

While still in his own vehicle, he saw two individuals get out of the Maxima

but could not tell if one was the driver. He “[i]nitiated a traffic stop on the vehicle”

by turning on his flashing lights. The encounter was recorded on Hemingson’s

body camera and the squad car’s dashboard camera. On the video, flashing lights

are visible on the scene.

The two individuals began walking away. Hemingson got out of his car and

told them, “Stop right there, guys. Come here.” At the time, Hemingson was

wearing street clothes with a police vest and a badge. One of the individuals

1 Hemingson testified he was not informed of the exact number of people that

would be in that car nor anything about their physical appearance or identity.
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responded, “What?” and kept walking away. Hemingson said, “Go back to the car

please.” When they kept walking, Hemingson repeated, “Hey, come here.”

Hemingson was simultaneously calling the stop into dispatch. When the two men

refused to stop, Hemingson told the dispatcher “people are not stopping for me,”

exited the squad car, and started after them. At the same moment, the dashboard

camera shows a woman emerging from the driver’s seat of the Maxima. Outside

the car, Hemingson again said, “Stop right there, come back here.” The individual

later identified as Worden took off down the alley. Hemingson pursued him, calling

“police” and “stop” again.

Worden approached a seven-foot-tall fence with a gate. Hemingson saw

him use his keys to unlock the gate, open it, and then close the gate behind him.

Hemingson testified he thought the gate was locked, so he began scaling the

fence, but the gate was not secured and “popped open” again, allowing Hemingson

to pass through.

A short distance away from the gate, Worden stopped and turned around

to face the officer. Worden had his hands in his pockets, and Hemingson told him

to get down on the ground. Hemingson then “[took Worden] to the ground” and

told him to get his hands out of his pockets. Hemingson “force[d] [Worden’s] arms

behind his back to place him in handcuffs.”

A search incident to Worden’s arrest revealed a bag of cocaine. The State

charged him with possession of a controlled substance, third violation, in violation

of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2022), and interference with official acts resulting

in bodily injury to a peace officer, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(c).

The district court denied Worden’s pretrial motion to suppress asserting an illegal
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seizure. Worden waived jury trial and stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of

testimony. The court found Worden guilty as charged. Worden appeals.

II. Analysis

Worden first challenges the constitutionality of his seizure under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa

Constitution. Second, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury.

A. Unlawful Seizure

“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our

standard of review is de novo.” State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa 2022).

That review means we consider the entire record to independently evaluate the

totality of the circumstances. Id. In doing so, we defer to the district court’s fact

determinations, such as credibility findings, but are not bound by them. Id. “In our

review of the suppression ruling, we consider not only the evidence at the

suppression hearing but also the evidence at trial.” State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d

31, 36 (Iowa 2005).

Worden contends Hemingson lacked sufficient cause to seize him as he

walked away from the parked car. He asserts Hemingson should have known

neither of the men walking away from the car were the driver because a woman

eventually got out of the driver’s seat. He contends that because the alleged
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probable cause for the stop was the tinted window violation, an offense committed

by a driver,2 there was no justification to stop anyone who was not the driver.

The dashboard camera shows a third person coming out of the driver’s door

right around the time when Hemingson began chasing after Worden. Hemingson

testified he thought one of the two earlier individuals was the driver and did not see

the woman coming out because he was more “oriented toward the two males that

were walking away from the traffic stop.” He didn’t find out who the driver was until

later when he watched the dash cam footage.

Worden insists it was unreasonable for the officer to believe he was the

driver of the car. He points out that the video shows the brake lights were still

illuminated on the Maxima, so a reasonable officer should have observed there

was another person in the driver’s seat. Thus, there was no cause to stop the two

passengers who were walking away.

The State argues that Hemingson had initiated a traffic stop and had the

ability to “freeze the scene” to investigate further and to protect his own safety.

See State v. Finch, No. 02-1148, 2003 WL 22828750, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.

26, 2003) (holding that “when a passenger immediately exits a lawfully stopped

vehicle an officer may instruct the passenger to return to the vehicle” in the interest

of officer safety).

Worden insists there was no traffic stop because the officer did not make a

show of authority until the two men were walking away. The supreme court has

said, “Generally, police officers have probable cause to stop a motorist if they

2 The statute prohibits “[a] person” from “operat[ing]” a car with excessively tinted

windows. Iowa Code § 321.438(2).
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witness the motorist commit a traffic violation.” State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848,

860 (Iowa 2021). Police officers may stop the driver of a vehicle for a traffic

violation even after the driver has parked and exited the vehicle. See id. at 859–

61; see also id. at 860 (declining to distinguish between parking and traffic

violations when law enforcement seizes a motorist). When Hemingson turned on

his flashing lights to investigate the window tint, the vehicle was seized and the

passengers walking away were subject to the officer’s control under the reasoning

cited in Finch. See 2003 WL 22828750, at *3–5. For the same reasons, we agree

that Hemingson had probable cause to stop the vehicle and authority to instruct

the passengers to stop fleeing the scene. Hemingson testified, apparently

credibly, that he thought one of the two men was the driver and that he did not

know the driver was still in the vehicle. He tried to detain them to find out who was

the driver. Thus, the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the

evidence resulting from the seizure.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Worden next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury.

We evaluate sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for substantial
evidence, upholding a verdict if substantial evidence supports it.
“Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational trier of fact the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” We view “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, including all
legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record.”

Warren, 955 N.W.2d at 856 (citations omitted). “[F]indings of fact in jury-waived

cases shall have the effect of a special verdict.” Id. at 857 (quoting Iowa R. App.

P. 6.907). “The district court’s finding of guilt is binding upon us unless we find
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there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding.” Id.

(quoting State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993) (en banc)).

A person is guilty of interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury if

the person knowingly resists or obstructs anyone known by the person to be a

peace officer in the performance of a lawful act and the interference results in

bodily injury other than serious injury. See Iowa Code § 719.1(1)(c).

Worden challenges the resistance-or-obstruction and the bodily injury

elements. On the bodily injury element, Worden argues the State didn’t prove the

cuts on Hemingson’s hand resulted from Worden’s interference. The district court

found “in the performance of his lawful duty, Hemingson sustained minor cuts to

the palm of his right hand.” Worden asserts the statute requires that the injury be

causally related to the interference, not just something that happened during or

after it. Hemingson provided no testimony about his injury but did describe how

he had to “take [Worden] to the ground and . . . force his arms behind his back to

place him in handcuffs.” The criminal complaint notes that “[d]uring the foot pursuit

officers sustained minor injuries.” On an offense report, a different officer noted,

“Officer Hemingson had to conduct a takedown on the arrested party, getting a

minor cut on the palm of his right hand.” It is reasonable to infer that because

Hemingson reported he received the injury during the active pursuit and arrest of

Worden, that Worden’s failure to comply with Hemingson’s commands caused the

injury. Taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find a rational trier of

fact could reach that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the court’s

finding is supported by substantial evidence.
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On the resistance-or-obstruction element, Worden argues that interference

requires more than passive resistance. “It is sufficient if the person charged

engaged in actual opposition to the officer through the use of actual or constructive

force making it reasonably necessary for the officer to use force to carry out his

duty.” State v. Donner, 243 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Iowa 1976). “‘[O]bstruct’ is more

broad than ‘resist,’ and includes putting obstacles in the path of officers completing

their duties.” State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

The district court found Worden committed interference by refusing to

remove his hands from his pockets when directed to by Hemingson. Substantial

evidence supports that conclusion. Hemingson testified Worden did not listen to

his instruction to remove his hands from his pockets and that Worden continued to

try to access his pocket after he had been arrested. See generally State v.

Anderson, No. 07-0415, 2007 WL 4322204 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007) (finding

resistance by refusing to take hand out of pocket). We also find that Worden

placed a physical “obstacle in the path of [Hemingson] completing” his duty by

closing the locking fence gate as Hemingson chased him. Hemingson was

obstructed when he believed he had to climb the seven-foot fence in pursuit of

Worden. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings on this charge. Thus,

the verdict binds us on appeal, and we must affirm.

Finding no meritorious grounds in this appeal, we affirm the convictions.

AFFIRMED.