Nakamura v. Nakamura

CourtListener 9505388HawappMay 20, 2024

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-MAY-2024
07:49 AM
Dkt. 103 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

CURT LANCE NAKAMURA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHARLENE KEIKO NAKAMURA, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1DV191000133)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Charlene Keiko Nakamura (wife)

appeals from the Order Denying Defendant's Motion and

Declaration for Post Decree Relief Filed on March 3, 2020,

entered by the Family Court of the First Circuit (family court)

on June 15, 2020.1

1 The Honorable Jessi L.K. Hall presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Wife raises seven points of error on appeal. Upon

careful review of the record and relevant legal authorities, and

having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the

issues raised by the parties, we resolve wife's points of error

as follows:

(1) With respect to wife's first five points of error,

wife contends that she was entitled to relief: (1) from the

divorce decree pursuant to Hawaiʻi Family Court Rules (HFCR)

Rule 60(b); and on the grounds that (2) the divorce decree was

unconscionable; (3) Curt Lance Nakamura (husband) "engaged in

misconduct by not fully disclosing his financial status prior to

wife entering into said divorce decree"; (4) husband

"accelerated" the divorce process while she was "mentally weak";

and (5) she was not properly informed of husband's assets.

"The standard of review for the grant or denial of

a[n] HFCR Rule 60(b) motion is whether there has been an abuse

of discretion." LaPeter v. LaPeter, 144 Hawaiʻi 295, 304,

439 P.3d 247, 256 (App. 2019) (citation omitted).

With regard to unconscionability,

Unconscionability encompasses two principles: one-sidedness
and unfair surprise. Lewis [v. Lewis, 69 Haw. 497, 502,
748 P.2d 1362, 1366 (1988)]. One-sidedness (i.e.,
substantive unconscionability) means that the agreement
"leaves a post-divorce economic situation that is unjustly
disproportionate." Id. Unfair surprise (i.e., procedural
unconscionability) means that "one party did not have full
and adequate knowledge of the other party's financial
condition when the [marital] agreement was executed."

Balogh v. Balogh, 134 Hawaiʻi 29, 41, 332 P.3d 631, 643 (2014).

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As the record reflects, husband filed a complaint for

divorce in February 2019. Husband was represented by counsel;

wife appeared self-represented, and filed an Appearance and

Waiver on February 22, 2019. Each party filed their respective

Income and Expense Statements and Asset and Debt Statements. In

March 2019, the family court issued a Divorce Decree that, inter

alia, awarded no alimony to either party, and divided the

parties' assets and debts. There is no reservation of alimony

in the divorce decree. Both parties approved the divorce decree

as to form and content.2

2 The divorce decree, as signed by wife, included the following
acknowledgement,

PARTIES' STATEMENT RE: ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION/VOLUNTARY
EXECUTION. The parties acknowledge and understand that [husband]
has been represented in this matter by COATES FREY TANIMOTO &
GIBSON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLLC. [Wife] was given the time and
opportunity to obtain her own attorney. [Wife] further
understands and acknowledges that [Wife] has been informed
throughout these proceedings that said law firm represents only
[husband] and not [wife], and [wife] is aware that such is the
case although she may have had voluntary contact(s) with various
personnel associated with said law firm during the processing of
this agreement. Instead, [wife] acknowledges that she has been
advised from the beginning that she has the right to consult with
and/or retain independent counsel to review this Divorce Decree
and all other documents or agreements made in this case with
regard to their propriety and fairness and/or to represent [wife]
in this matter. [Wife] acknowledges that her decision regarding
consultation of lack of same with her own attorney and to proceed
with the signing of any documents or agreements without also
having an attorney review and/or sign same on her behalf has been
reached knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Both [husband]
and [wife] recognize, acknowledge and agree that in the event
that any of [wife's] contacts or interactions with the Coates
Frey Tanimoto & Gibson law firm could possibly be viewed in any
way to constitute a conflict of interest or representation of any
sort, then both [husband] and [wife] have hereby voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waived any such conflict(s). Both
[husband] and [wife] acknowledge that they have carefully read
the Divorce Decree to be entered in this case and all the other
supporting financial and other documentation pertinent to this
(continued . . .)
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This appeal arises out of wife's second Motion and

Declaration for Post-Decree Relief (Second Motion for Relief),

filed in March 2020.3 In the Second Motion for Relief, wife, who

was represented by counsel, requested alimony and a

recalculation of the parties' assets and debts. After a hearing

on May 21, 2020, the family court determined that wife had not

presented any evidence or arguments justifying relief under

HFCR Rule 60(b), and denied the Second Motion for Relief.

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the
parties to present new evidence and/or arguments that could
not have been presented during the earlier adjudicated
motion. Reconsideration is not a device to relitigate old
matters or to raise arguments or evidence that could and
should have been brought during the earlier proceeding.

Tagupa v. Tagupa, 108 Hawai‘i 459, 465, 121 P.3d 924, 930 (App.

2005) (cleaned up).

On this record, we conclude that wife has not shown

that she presented any evidence or arguments that could not have

2(. . .continued)
matter. They both confirm that all said documents are current
and accurate, and that they are completely aware of, and in
agreement with, the contents of same. This document is the
complete and final expression of all agreements made by the
parties to this divorce. There are no other express or implied
promises, or agreements, which are not set forth herein. Both
parties acknowledge that they have voluntarily executed the
Divorce Decree and any other documents or agreements pertaining
to this case with sufficient knowledge of the facts, both
parties' respective finances, and the applicable law; and that
this Divorce Decree is fair and reasonable, and as such they both
agree to be bound by this Decree and by their representations as
contained herein.

(Emphasis added.)

3 Wife, represented by counsel, filed a first Motion and
Declaration for Post-Decree Relief in June 2019. Wife withdrew this first
motion on June 27, 2019.
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been presented prior to entry of the divorce decree that the

decree was unconscionable, that husband did not disclose his

financial records prior to entering the divorce decree, that

husband improperly "accelerated" the divorce process while wife

was "mentally weak," or that she was not properly informed of

husband's assets.

The family court did not abuse its discretion in

denying wife's Second Motion for Relief.

(2) Wife contends that the family court erred in

refusing to set a trial on her Second Motion for Relief.

"Decisions relating to the conduct of a trial or hearing and the

adequacy of process usually involve the exercise of discretion,

and thus warrant review under the abuse of discretion standard

on appeal." TSA Int'l Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92 Hawaiʻi 243,

252, 990 P.2 713, 722 (1999). In its discretion, a family court

"may deny relief under Rule 60(b) without holding a hearing and

may decide the issue on the basis of papers submitted."

Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 125 Hawaiʻi 128, 149, 254 P.3d 439,

460 (2011) (citations omitted).

At the hearing on wife's Second Motion for Relief, the

family court determined that wife, who was present and

represented by counsel, did not present any evidence or

arguments that would support the motion. The family court noted

that "[i]t is clear from the record that [wife] prepared and

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signed her financial statements," and that "[s]he had the

opportunity to request [husband's] financial statements prior to

signing the Divorce Decree or even obtaining counsel prior to

signing the Divorce Decree." Moreover, "[wife] [had] the

opportunity to file her initial motion [for relief from the

Divorce Decree]," and, with the advice of counsel, "she chose to

withdraw it." The Second Motion for Relief thus lacked merit,

and the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion without a trial or evidentiary hearing.

(3) Wife contends that the family court mislabeled its

Findings of Fact (FOF) nos. 19, 20, and 21; i.e., that FOF no.

19 is actually a mixed FOF and conclusion of law (COL), and FOF

nos. 20 and 21 are actually COLs.4 The family court's FOF no. 23

provides that, "[t]o the extent that any Finding of Fact herein

is a Conclusion of Law, it shall be so construed." The family

court's COL no. 4 provides that, "[t]o the extent any Conclusion

of Law herein is a Finding of Fact, it shall be so construed."

"[T]he trial court's label is not determinative of the standard

of review. A determination that embraces an ultimate fact is a

factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of

review even though classified as a COL." Crosby v. State Dep't

of Budget & Fin., 76 Hawaiʻi 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1994)

4 The family court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, with regard to its Order Denying wife's Second Motion for Relief, on
August 7, 2020.
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(citation omitted). We conclude that FOF no. 19 is not clearly

erroneous, and, to the extent FOF nos. 20 and 21 could be

construed as mislabeled COLs, they are not wrong.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family

court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion and Declaration for

Post Decree Relief Filed on March 3, 2020, entered on June 15,

2020.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, May 20, 2024.

On the briefs: /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Presiding Judge
Stephen T. Hioki,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Associate Judge
Kai Lawrence,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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