State v. Reyes

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
28-MAR-2024
08:29 AM
Dkt. 60 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDDIESON REYES, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Eddieson Reyes (Reyes) appeals
from the November 16, 2022 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence
(Judgment), entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
(Circuit Court).1 Following a jury-waived trial on the charges
of second-degree murder, first-degree terroristic threatening,
and firearm-related offenses, Reyes was found guilty as charged,

1 The Honorable Fa‘auuga L. To‘oto‘o presided.
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and was sentenced to a life term of imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.2
On appeal, Reyes contends that the Circuit Court erred
by: (1) denying Reyes's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, where
the Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai‘i (State) "failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and
intentionally omitted clearly exculpatory evidence by
withholding the results of the gunshot residue [(GSR)] test from
the grand jury"; (2) denying Reyes's Motion to Suppress, where
it "failed to consider and evaluate the required Kaneaiakala
factors in holding that [an eyewitness]'s identification of
[Reyes] was 'reliable enough' to be admitted at trial"; and (3)
denying Reyes's Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (MJOA),
where "the State failed to exclude every reasonable inference of
[Reyes]'s innocence, and thus failed as a matter of law to
discharge its burden of presenting substantial evidence to
support [Reyes]'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."3
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Reyes's
points of error as follows, and affirm.
The Circuit Court did not err by denying the Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment.

Reyes argues that the State "failed to establish
probable cause" because his arrest was based on two things: (1)
eyewitness Leon Pacatan's (Pacatan) identification, which did
not provide probable cause because it was "corrupted and
unreliable"; and (2) the fact that Reyes was the "registered

2 The underlying case involved a road rage incident, where Triston
Billimon (Decedent) was shot and killed by another driver on the Likelike
Highway off-ramp in Kalihi.
3 Reyes's points of error have been reordered for clarity.
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owner of the Acura" also did not provide probable cause because
Reyes had reported "his vehicle was stolen ten minutes prior to
the shooting" and "it was highly likely [Reyes] did not
discharge a firearm." The State argues that probable cause was
established, where Pacatan positively identified Reyes as the
suspect shooter.
"[I]n cases involving sufficiency of the evidence to
support an indictment, this court . . . appl[ies] a de novo
standard." State v. Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i 205, 214, 269 P.3d 740,

749 (2011) (citations omitted).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
probable cause before the grand jury, every legitimate
inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn
in favor of the indictment and neither the trial court nor
the appellate court on review may substitute its judgment
as to the weight of the evidence for that of the Grand
Jury. The evidence to support an indictment need not be
sufficient to support a conviction.

Id. at 215, 269 P.3d at 750 (quoting State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai‘i
358, 367, 917 P.2d 370, 379 (1996)). "A grand jury indictment
must be based on probable cause. 'Probable cause' has been
defined as a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary
caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a
strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." Id. at 218, 269
P.3d at 753 (cleaned up). To support an indictment, "the
prosecution must provide evidence of each essential element of
the charged offense to the grand jury." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the evidence presented to the grand jury
sufficiently established probable cause for the charges in the
Indictment. Pacatan gave eyewitness testimony about seeing an
Acura and a BMW speeding on the freeway on June 18, 2021, at
11:00 p.m.; and he testified that when the vehicles were
stopped, the driver of the Acura got out, went to the driver's
side window of the BMW, and shot through the window. Pacatan

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gave a description to the police of the suspect shooter, the
license plate of the shooter's vehicle, and later identified
Reyes to the police as the shooter. A second witness testified
to hearing a gunshot after he passed by two stopped vehicles at
the scene, and provided "a partial of the license plate number"
of the vehicle that sped away. Decedent's wife and BMW
passenger, Jannine Billimon (Jannine) testified to a
confrontation between the vehicles on June 18, 2021 at 11:00
p.m. while Decedent was attempting to pass; she saw the Acura
driver point a gun at her; the Acura driver moved his vehicle in
a manner to force their BMW to take the off-ramp and end up
hitting the Acura; Jannine hid under the BMW dashboard and heard
a gunshot; Jannine then saw a hole in the BMW, and Decedent was
bleeding. The medical examiner testified that Decedent died of
a gunshot wound to the chest. Police officer witnesses
testified to their pursuit of a suspect matching the description
in the area of the scene; that Reyes reported his vehicle stolen
at 11:16 p.m.; that the vehicle Reyes reported as stolen matched
the description and license plate of the suspect shooter's
vehicle; that Reyes looked like he had "just gotten out of the
shower" when he went to the Kalihi Police Station to report the
stolen vehicle; and that Pacatan identified Reyes at the Kalihi
Police Station as the suspect but with a different shirt on.
The evidence above established "probable cause," as it
"would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe
and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt
of" Reyes for the offenses he was charged with. See Taylor, 126
Hawai‘i at 218, 269 P.3d at 753 (cleaned up). Reyes's arguments

on appeal go to the weight of the evidence, which may be at
issue at trial, but are inappropriate for review of evidentiary
sufficiency for a probable cause determination. See id. at 215,
269 P.3d at 750 ("[E]very legitimate inference that may be drawn
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from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the indictment and
neither the trial court nor the appellate court on review may
substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for
that of the Grand Jury." (emphases added) (citation omitted)).
The Circuit Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss
the Indictment based on insufficient evidence. See id. at 214-
15, 269 P.3d at 749-50.
Reyes's second argument for dismissal of the
Indictment is that the State "intentionally omitted the results
of the [GSR] test before the grand jury—clearly exculpatory
evidence which the prosecution was obligated to present." This
argument lacks merit.
"Where evidence of a clearly exculpatory nature is
known to the prosecution, such evidence must be presented to the
grand jury." State v. Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i 120, 138, 456 P.3d 484,
502 (2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Bell, 60 Haw.
241, 245, 589 P.2d 517, 520 (1978)). "In cases involving
allegations of prosecutorial abuse or misconduct, this court has
applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a motion
to dismiss an indictment." Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i at 214, 269 P.3d
at 749 (citation omitted). "Dismissal of an indictment is
required only in flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been
overreached or deceived in some significant way." State v.
Borge, 152 Hawai‘i 458, 464, 526 P.3d 435, 441 (2023) (cleaned

up).
Here, the State presented evidence at the hearing on
the Motion to Dismiss that the lack of GSR was not "clearly
exculpatory" evidence that the State was required to present to
the grand jury. See Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i at 138, 456 P.3d at 502
(citation omitted). Expert Kenton Wong testified that the lack
of GSR could have been caused by a person washing their hands or
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GSR falling off. Expert Kaleo Kaluhiokalani also testified that
the lack of GSR can be from wearing gloves, a person washing
their hands, or that GSR was not collected or detected due to
too little GSR being deposited or other foreign materials
covering the GSR. Thus, the fact that there was no GSR on
Reyes's hands did not conclusively establish that Reyes was not
the suspect shooter, and the negative GSR test result was not
"clearly exculpatory[.]" See id. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when
it found and concluded that the GSR result did not "constitute
[] clearly exculpatory evidence and therefore it was within
[the] prosecution['s] discretion whether to bring it in at the
grand jury." See Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i at 214, 269 P.3d at 749;

Borge, 152 Hawai‘i at 464, 526 P.3d at 441. Thus, the Circuit

Court did not err when it denied the Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment on this basis.
The Circuit Court did not err when it denied the
Motion to Suppress.

Reyes argues that the Circuit Court erred in admitting
Pactan's identification of Reyes because the field show-up was
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification." Reyes argues that the Circuit Court abused its
discretion when it found that Pacatan's identification "was
'reliable enough' under the totality of the circumstances
without even considering all of the relevant factors it was
obligated to consider under Kaneaiakala." Reyes does not
specifically challenge any of the Circuit Court's findings in
its suppression order, and appears to challenge the Circuit
Court's oral ruling at the suppression hearing. Thus, the
Circuit Court's FOFs are binding, and support its conclusion
that Pacatan's identification was reliable. See State v.

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Rodrigues, 145 Hawai‘i 487, 497, 454 P.3d 428, 438 (2019)

("[U]nchallenged findings of fact are binding upon appellate
courts." (citations omitted)).
In reviewing whether an eyewitness identification
should be suppressed, "questions of suggestiveness and
reliability are questions of law that are freely reviewable on
appeal." State v. Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai‘i 231, 240, 450 P.3d

761, 770 (2019) (citation omitted). The supreme court in
Kaneaiakala recognized that show-up identifications are
inherently suggestive, and prospectively held that trial courts
must "consider any relevant factors" set forth in Hawai‘i

Standard Jury Instruction Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.19.4 145 Hawai‘i

at 242-43, 247, 450 P.3d at 772-73, 777. Trial courts must also
consider the "effect of suggestiveness on the reliability of the
identification . . . ." Id. at 248, 450 P.3d at 778. "The
identification must be suppressed only if the impermissibly
suggestive procedure used created a very substantial likelihood
of misidentification." Id. at 241, 450 P.3d at 771 (citation
omitted).

4 The thirteen HAWJIC 3.19 factors include: (1) the opportunity of
the witness to observe the person involved in the alleged criminal act, (2)
the stress, if any, to which the witness was subject at the time of the
observation, (3) the witness's ability, following the observation, to provide
a description of the person, (4) the extent to which the defendant fits or
does not fit the description of the person previously given by the witness,
(5) the cross-racial or ethnic nature of the identification, (6) the
witness's capacity to make an identification, (7) evidence relating to the
witness's ability to identify other participants in the alleged criminal act,
(8) whether the witness was able to identify the person in a photographic or
physical lineup, (9) the period of time between the alleged criminal act and
the witness's identification, (10) whether the witness had prior contacts
with the person, (11) the extent to which the witness is either certain or
uncertain of the identification and whether the witness's assertions
concerning certainty or uncertainty are well-founded, (12) whether the
witness's identification is in fact the product of his/her own recollection,
and (13) any other evidence relating to the witness's ability to make an
identification.

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Here, the Circuit Court considered the factors that it
deemed relevant from HAWJIC 3.19 and determined that Pacatan's
identification was reliable.5 While the Circuit Court found that
the field show-up was suggestive under "the totality of the
circumstances" of Pacatan's identification and the Kaneaiakala
factors, the Circuit Court concluded that Pacatan's
identification was nevertheless "reliable" and admissible. FOFs
42-43. The unchallenged FOFs reflect that the Circuit Court
found that the circumstances of the suggestive field show-up did
not influence Pacatan to make an identification of Reyes; that
Pacatan's identification remained consistent; and that the
identification was based on Pacatan's own recollection. The

5 The Circuit Court made the following unchallenged findings:

 Factor 1: Pacatan had "ample opportunity" to view Reyes with a "high
degree of attention" at a distance of "less than one and a half car
length[s]" for "at least 15 or 20 seconds" "under brightly lit street
lamps." Pacatan's view was "unobstructed." FOFs 10, 13-15 17-18, 20.
 Factor 2: Pacatan was "not under stress" when he observed Reyes, and
that "only after some seconds of keen observation" of Reyes's face and
appearance, did Pacatan realize someone got shot and his stress levels
rose. FOFs 21-23.
 Factor 3: Pacatan gave a "detailed and accurate description" of Reyes
"approximately 20 minutes after the shooting." FOFs 24-25.
 Factor 4: Reyes fit the "description of a person previously given by
Pacatan prior to the field show up." FOFs 26-27.
 Factor 5: Pacatan identified the suspect as a "Micronesian male," and
Reyes was described as a "Filipino male." FOFs 25, 27.
 Factor 6: Pacatan had the "capacity to make an identification," where
he "was not impaired in any way by alcohol or drugs[,]" "not affected
by any stress," "d[id] not have any visual or auditory disability," and
"wore glasses for reading." FOFs 29-30.
 Factor 8: Pacatan "was able to identify" Reyes from a field show-up.
FOF 31.
 Factor 9: Pacatan identified Reyes at 1:51am on June 19, 2021 from a
field show-up, "two hours and 36 minutes" after the time of the
criminal act. FOFs 33-36.
 Factor 10: Pacatan "did not have prior contacts" with Reyes. FOF 37.
 Factor 11: Pacatan was certain of his identification, where he
immediately identified Reyes as the suspect with different clothes on.
FOFs 32, 38-40.
 Factor 12: Pacatan's identification of Reyes was from his own
recollection, where he observed Reyes commit the criminal act in front
of him. FOFs 32, 39.
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record also reflects that Pacatan testified that he did not
overhear anything about the possible suspect and was not
prompted to identify Reyes. We conclude Reyes's challenge to
the denial of the Motion to Suppress is without merit. See
Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai‘i at 240, 450 P.3d at 770.

The Circuit Court did not err by denying the Renewed
MJOA.
Reyes argues that although a single eyewitness
identification can support a conviction, "Pacatan's testimony
was directly contradicted by [Marie Botelho (Botelho)], the only
other eyewitness to the shooting." Reyes argues that Pacatan's
testimony was also conflicting with his previous testimony, and
that Pacatan's description of the suspect did not match Reyes.
According to Reyes, because Pacatan's testimony was unreliable,
"the remaining evidence at trial left wide open the reasonable
inference that [Reyes] was not the shooter."
We employ the same standard that a trial court applies
when reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, namely,
"whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of
the trier of fact, the evidence is sufficient to support a prima
facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Angei, 152 Hawai‘i 484,

492, 526 P.3d 461, 469 (2023) (quoting State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai‘i

472, 481, 927 P.2d 1355, 1364 (1996)).
Here, the main dispute was on identification. "The
testimony of one percipient witness can provide sufficient
evidence to support a conviction." State v. Pulse, 83 Hawai‘i

229, 244, 925 P.d 797, 812 (1996) (citing State v. Eastman, 81
Hawai‘i 131, 141, 913 P.2d 57, 67 (1996)). Appellate courts

"give 'full play to the right of the fact finder to determine

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credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences
of fact.'" Angei, 152 Hawai‘i at 492, 526 P.3d at 469 (quoting

State v. Yabusaki, 58 Haw. 404, 411, 570 P.2d 844, 848 (1977)).
Pacatan, the only eyewitness who saw the actual
shooting occur, identified Reyes as the suspect shooter at trial
and in a field show-up shortly after the incident occurred. The
Circuit Court found Pacatan credible, and held that he was
"forthcoming, detailed in his explanation."
Pacatan's testimony was corroborated by other
witnesses. Miguel Cadoy (Cadoy) testified that on June 18, 2021
at 11:14pm, while driving past the off-ramp, he observed a white
car and a darker-colored car parked on the left side of the off-
ramp, and heard a "gunshot" sound. He later observed the same
white car on Nalanieha Street. At 11:17pm, Cadoy reported to
police the white car's location and full license plate. He
observed two men outside of the car, one with a "white
undershirt."
HPD Sergeant Tyler Parson (Sergeant Parson) received
Cadoy's report and checked the area approximately ten minutes
after the report, observing two men about a "hundred feet" from
Nalanieha Street. At around 11:44pm, police dispatch called
Reyes back regarding his report and Reyes confirmed that he was
on the way to the Kalihi Police Station. At 11:50pm, upon
returning to the station, Sergeant Parson testified that he
observed the "same male" and identified Reyes.
Viewing the evidence in the "light most favorable to
the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the
trier of fact," there was sufficient evidence to support a prima
facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude that
Reyes was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the suspect
shooter in this case. See Angei, 152 Hawai‘i at 492, 526 P.3d at

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469. The Circuit Court's denial of Reyes's Renewed MJOA was not
erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of Conviction
and Sentence, filed on November 16, 2022 by the Circuit Court of
the First Circuit, is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 28, 2024.
On the briefs:
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Kevin A. Yolken,
Presiding Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Stephen K. Tsushima,
Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Associate Judge

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