State v. MANZANO-HILL

NO"I` I'*`()l'{ .PUIKI,,ICA'{`]ON IN WEST'S HA.\‘¢IAI‘I REI"OR'I`S AN'I) P./'XCII*`I(,`, RE [’OR'!`ER

N0. 29063
in THE :NTERMED1ATE c0uRT 0F APPEALs
oF THE sTATE 09 HAwAr:

sTATE 0F HAwAr:, P1aintiff~Appe11anc, v., n.
ROBERT M. MANZANO-HILL, Defendant~Appelleepju

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRlCT COURT 0F THE THlRD CIRCU:T FF
NORTH AND SOUTH HlLO DIVlSION (€F‘ 6
(CASE NO. 3P2~O6-1632; POLICE REPORT NO. CO6037U%7) “J

amc

MEMORANDUM OPlNION

(By: Nakamura, C.J., Fujise and Leonard, JJ.)

Defendant~Appellee R0bert M. Manzano-Hill (Manzano-Hill
or Defendant) was charged with promoting a detrimental drug in
the third degree after a search by airport security uncovered
marijuana in his luggage. Manzano-Hill moved to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of the search of his luggage and
his subsequent arrest. On Februray l3, 2008, the District Court
of the Third Circuit (district court)F issued an order granting
Manzano-Hill's motion to suppress evidence (Suppression Order).

Plaintiff-Appellant State of HawaiU.(State) appeals
from the Suppression Order. As explained in greater detail
below, we conclude that regardless of whether the findings of
fact and conclusions of law issued by the district court in
support of the Suppression Order are correct, an issue we do not
address, they do not provide a valid basis for suppressing
evidence. Accordingly, we vacate the Suppression Order and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our
Memorandum 0pinion. In doing so, we express no view on the
merits of the parties' conflicting interpretation of the medical~
use~of~marijuana law, codified in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
Chapter 329, Part IX.

I.
To provide a background context for this case, it is

helpful to review certain provisions of the medical-use-of-

F The Honorable Barbara T. Takase presided.

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marijuana law, which was enacted in 2000. 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws
Act 228 at 595~600. HRS § 329~l25 (Supp. 2009} provides an
affirmative defense to marijuana-related crimes. Under HRS

§ 329~125, "[a] qualifying patient or the primary caregiver may
assert the medical use of marijuana as an affirmative defense to
any prosecution involving marijuana under this [part] or chapter
7l2; provided that the qualifying patient or the primary
caregiver strictly complied with the requirements of this part."
(Braokets in original).

As used in the medical-use-of~marijuana law, the term
"qualifying patient," is defined as "a person who has been
diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical
condition[,]" and the term "primary caregiver" is defined as "a
person, other than the qualifying patient and the qualifying
patient's physician, who is eighteen years of age or older who
has agreed to undertake responsibility for managing the well~
being of the qualifying patient with respect to the medical use
of marijuana." HRS § 329-121 (Supp. 2009). The term "medical
use" is defined to mean

the acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, distribution,
or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to
the administration of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms or
effects of a qualifying patient's debilitating medical
condition. For the purposes of "medical use", the term
distribution is limited to the transfer of marijuana and
paraphernalia from the primary caregiver to the qualifying
patient. '

ld4 (emphasis added).

HRS § 329-122 (Supp. 2009) contains a number of
conditions for the permitted medical use of marijuana. The
condition disputed by the parties in this case is set forth in
HRS § 329-l22(c)(2)(E). HRS § 329-122 provides, in relevant
part:

Medical use of marijuana; conditions of use. (a)

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the medical use of
marijuana by a qualifying patient shall be permitted only

if:

(1) The qualifying patient has been diagnosed by a
physician as having a debilitating medical
condition;

(2) The qualifying patient's physician has certified

in writing that, in the physician's professional

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opinion, the potential benefits of the medical
use of marijuana would likely outweigh the
health risks for the particular qualifying
patient; and

(3) The amount of marijuana does not exceed an
adequate supply.

(c) The authorization for the medical use of
marijuana in this section shall not apply to:

(l) The medical use of marijuana that endangers the
health or well-being of another person;

(2) The medical use of marijuana:
(A) In a school bus, public bus, or any
moving vehicle;
(B) In the workplace of one's
employment;
(C) On any school grounds;
(D) At any public park, public beach,

public recreation center, recreation
or youth center; or

(E) Other place open to the public; and

(3) The use of marijuana by a qualifying patient,
parent, or primary caregiver for purposes other
than medical use permitted by this part.

(Emphases added.)

II.
A.
Prior to trial, Manzano-Hill filed two motions: l) a
Motion to Dismiss the case and 2) a Motion to Suppress Evidence
(Suppression Motion). According to the declaration of counsel
submitted by Manzano-Hill in both motions, the relevant facts
were as follows:

l. On November 27, 2006 the Defendant was traveling
within the State of Hawaii. At the Hilo Airport his baggage
was selected for a "secondary" search. Within his enclosed
baggage a can of macadamia nuts was located. The searching
officer felt the can was too light, and while shaking it it
did not rattle like a can of nuts would. The can was
opened, and a leafy green substance was located.

2. The green substance was field tested, and was
found to be Marijuana.

3. The Defendant is a licensed caregiver for the
use of medicinal marijuana, and is also a licensed medical

N()'l` F()R 'PI.FL’»LIC¢~\'}`I()N IN WES'I"S I/IA.WZ~'-\I‘I RI£POIZTS ANI) PACIP`IC Rfll’()li'l`lill'~{

marijuana user. As such, he lied a legal right to t.he
zrxarijuana, and the marijuana was not contraband.

In the memorandum of law in support of the Motion to
Dismiss, Manzano~Hill asserted that "[t}he State acknowledges
that [Manzano-Hill] had a legal right to the marijuana in his
possession, both as a licensed medical marijuana cardholder, as
well as being a licensed caregiver." Manzano»Hill argued that
HRS § 329~122(c)(2)(E) only applies to prohibit a licenced
medical marijuana user from actually using, in other words
smoking, marijuana in a public place. He claimed that because he
was not smoking the marijuana at the airport, his possession of
the marijuana was lawful and the prosecution should be dismissed.

In his memorandum of law in support of the Suppression
Motion, Manzano-Hill argued that warrantless search of the
macadamia nut can containing the marijuana was illegal and that
there was no probable cause for his arrest. He therefore claimed
that any evidence seized and the post~arrest statements he made
should be suppressed. Defendant's Suppression Motion does not
identify the substance of the post~arrest statement that he
purportedly made.

The State opposed both motions. In opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss, the State argued that HRS § 329-l22(c)(2)(E)
and the definition of "medical use" set forth in HRS § 329-121
clearly prohibit a person who possesses a valid medical marijuana
license from possessing or transporting marijuana in places open
to the public. The State therefore asserted that Manzano-Hill's
medical marijuana license did not provide a defense to the
charged marijuana-possession offense. In opposition to
Defendant’s Suppression Motion, the State contended that under
State v. Hanson, 97 Hawafi 7l, 34 P.3d 1 (2001), the search by
airport security which led to the discovery of the marijuana was
a valid search, and thus the marijuana was not subject to
suppression.

B.

The district court held a hearing, apparently on both

motions. No evidence was presented by either party at the

hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the district court

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asked Manzano~Hill‘s counsel if he had “[a]ny other arguments."
Manzano~Hill's counsel responded, "No, Your Honor, I think what's
in the motion, that he has a medical marijuana permits card and
he was traveling as he's lawfully entitled to, 1 don’t think we
need to add anything more to that." The State responded that
although Defendant "does have" a medical marijuana permit, the
law does not allow marijuana to be in an airport because it is an
area open to the public.

The parties then engaged in argument over the proper
interpretation of HRS § 329-l22(c)(2)(E). Manzano~Hill‘s counsel
argued that notwithstanding the statutory definition of "medical
use," which includes the acquisition, possession, cultivation,
use, distribution, or transportation of marijuana, the term
"medical use" for purposes of HRS § 329~l22(c)(2) should be
limited to the actual use (i.e., smoking) of marijuana. Manzano-
Hill's counsel argued that reading "medical use" for purposes of
HRS § 329-l22(c)(2) according to its broad statutory definition
would nullify the medical-use-of-marijuana law and lead to absurd
results. Such an interpretation would make it extremely
difficult for a medical marijuana qualifying patient to acquire
and use marijuana because HRS § 329-122(c)(2)(E) would then
prohibit the transportation or possession of marijuana in a place
open to the public.

The State contended that HRS § 329-122(c)(2) should be
construed as incorporating the statutory definition of the term
"medical use." When HRS § 329~122(c)(2) is construed in this
fashion, HRS § 329~122(c)(2)(E) plainly prohibits the
transportation or possession of marijuana in a place open to the
public, such as an airport, The State acknowledged that its
interpretation of HRS § 329~122(c)(2)(E) would restrict
qualifying patients‘ access to marijuana, but claimed its
interpretation would not eliminate such access.

The circuit court orally ruled as follows:

Well, 1 think there is ambiguity in the . . . statute
itself in the definition of "medical use", that appears to
be incongruous with the section that the State is citing,

[HRS §] 329-122(C)(2), 1 guess . . . [be]cause on the one
hand medical use includes transportation of marijuana .
and . . . on the other hand . . . it does appear as if

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{HRS §] 329~l22{C)(2) is or should he when they are actually
using it and not necessarily transporting it. Those are
places where use of marijuana would he prohihited. And
based on that I‘m going to grant the defendant's motion to
suppress. This is a motion to suppress, so ~~

At that point, Manzano~Hill's counsel advised the district court
that both the Suppression Motion and Motion to Dismiss were
pending before the court. The district court made clear,
however, that it was only granting the Suppression Motion,
stating, "l am granting [Manzano-Hill's] motion to suppress, not
to dismiss but to suppress at this time.“
C.

On February l3, 2008, the district court issued its

written Suppression Order. The Suppression Order states, in

relevant part:

FINDINGS OF FACT

l. Gn November 27, 2006, Defendant, ROBERT MANZANO~
HILL, possessed marijuana within his luggage and
attempted to transport it through the Hilo
International Airport.

2. Defendant also possessed a valid medical
marijuana card at the time of his arrest.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That there is ambiguity in the statute regarding
the definition of "medical use."

2. That Hawaii Revised Statutes § 329~l22(C)(2)
should not apply when someone is transporting
marijuana but only when someone is actually
using 1t.
The district court did not enter a written order regarding
Manzano-Hill's Motion to Dismiss.
III.

On appeal, the State argues that the district court
erred in concluding that: l) there is ambiguity in the definition
of "medical use“ in the medical-use-of-marijuana law; and 2) the
limitations set forth in HRS § 329-l22(c)(2) should only apply
when someone is actually using marijuana. The State asserts that
HRS § 329-122(c)(2) should be construed as incorporating the

statutory definition of the term "medical use," which includes

NO'F FOR PU'BLICA'.I`I()N IN \W'PlS'I"S H'AW’¢XI‘I REP()R'I`S ANI) PAC.IF`]C RPIPORTER

"the acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, distribution, or
transportation of marijuana." HRS § 329-12l.

Manzano-Hill's main argument in his answering brief is
that "[t]his case must be remanded for a redetermination of the
[Suppression Motion] because the lower court failed to place its
’essential' findings on the record and because the [Suppression]
[O]rder was based on a misinterpretation of the legal bases for
suppressing the evidence." Alternatively, Manzano-Hill asserts
that assuming arguendo that this court declines to remand the
case, we should affirm the Suppression Order based on the
existing record. Manzano-Hill also separately argues that the
district court "correctly interpreted HRS § 329»l22 as allowing
the transportation of marijuana in public areas." He concedes,
however, that the district court's conclusions of law
interpreting HRS § 329-l22(c)(2) are "not the proper basis for
the granting of a motion to suppress the evidence" and that the
district court's "interpretation of the 'ambiguity’ in the term
medical use has no relevance to the instant appeal."

We agree with the main argument in Manzano-Hill's
answering brief that this case must be remanded for
redetermination of his Suppression Motion, The district court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law do not provide a valid
basis for the Suppression Order. lt appears that the district
court relied on the grounds asserted in Manzano-Hill's Motion to
Dismiss to grant Manzano-Hill's Suppression Motion. In doing so,
the district court explicitly stated that it was only granting
Manzano-Hill's Suppression Motion and not his Motion to Dismiss.
The district court's interpretation of HRS § 329-l22(c)(2) is
relevant to determining the scope of the affirmative defense to
marijuana-related prosecutions provided by the medical~use-of-
marijuana law. But, the district court's interpretation of HRS §
329-l22(c)(2) does not provide a basis for suppressing evidence.

In support of his Suppression Motion, Manzano-Hill
contended that the opening of his macadamia nut can by an airport
security officer without a valid search warrant was an illegal
search. The State countered that the search of the can was valid

pursuant to the Hawafi Supreme Court‘s decision in Hanson, 97

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Hawafi 71, 34 P.3d l. No evidence was presented at the hearing
regarding the circumstances surrounding the search of the
macadamia nut can. Nor did the district court's findings of fact
or conclusions of law address any of the arguments raised by the
parties concerning the Suppression Motion.

we vacate the Suppression Order. On remand, the
district court may permit the parties to introduce evidence on
Manzano-Hill's Suppression Motion before entering a ruling on the
Suppression Motion. The district court may also receive evidence
on Manzano~Hill's Motion to Dismiss and enter findings and
conclusions with respect to that motion. we reject Manzano-
Hill's alternative argument that this court should affirm the
Suppression Order based on the existing record.

IV.
We vacate the Suppression Order and remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

DATED= Honolulu, Hawai‘i, January 27, 2010.

Kevin S. Hashizaki,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

County of Hawaij_ éj;Z£ jai §ZZ@éQ@7¢L¢¢b4_d

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Chief Judge

Theresa Marshall,
Deputy Public Defender
(Jon N. Ikenaga,

Deputy Public Defender,
with her on the briefs)
for Defendant-Appellee.