State v. Fernandez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
08-JUN-2026
08:05 AM
Dkt. 75 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LANDON KALANIKOA FERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Landon Kalanikoa Fernandez
(Fernandez) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence
(Judgment) entered on November 26, 2024, in the Family Court of
the First Circuit (Family Court).1/ Following a jury trial,
Fernandez was convicted of Violation of an Order for Protection,
pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 586-11(a)(1)(A).2/
On appeal, Fernandez contends that the Judgment must be
vacated or reversed because: (1) Plaintiff-Appellee State of
Hawai#i (State) "did not provide notice of an element of the
offense"; (2) "[t]he prosecution's line of questioning and method
of leading the [complaining] witness [(CW)] during the direct
examination" constituted prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the

1/
The Honorable Brian A. Costa presided.
2/
At the time of the alleged offense, HRS § 586-11(a) (Supp. 2023)
stated, in relevant part:
Violation of an order for protection. (a) Whenever an
order for protection is granted pursuant to this chapter, a
respondent or person to be restrained who knowingly or
intentionally violates the order for protection shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Fernandez's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Fernandez contends that the September 9, 2024
Complaint and the oral charges failed to allege an essential
element of the offense – specifically, that Fernandez had notice
of the Order for Protection under HRS § 586-6.3/
Because this argument is made for the first time on
appeal, we apply the Motta/Wells liberal construction rule.4/
Under this rule, we will not reverse a conviction based on a
defective complaint unless the defendant shows prejudice, or the
complaint "cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime."
State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 400, 219 P.3d 1170, 1187
(2009) (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai#i 198, 212, 915 P.2d
672, 686 (1996)); see State v. Tran, 154 Hawai#i 211, 226, 549
P.3d 296, 311 (2024) (holding that the Motta/Wells standard
applies "where . . . a charge challenge is raised after a guilty
verdict has been returned (or after a court has adjudicated a
defendant guilty in a bench trial)").
As to the merits of Fernandez's contention, we
addressed a nearly identical argument in State v. Cichy, No.
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2025 WL 1025233, at *1-*2 (Haw. App. April 7,
2025) (SDO). There, we held that the defendant could not show
prejudice where he stipulated to having been served with the
relevant order for protection and was found by the family court
to have waived his right to confront the State's witnesses
regarding this issue. Id. at *1. We further held that the
defendant had not shown that the relevant complaint "cannot

3/
HRS § 586-6 (2018) states, in relevant part:
Notice of Order. (a) Any order issued under this
chapter shall either be personally served upon the
respondent, or served by certified mail, unless the
respondent was present at the hearing in which case the
respondent shall be deemed to have notice of the order.
4/
See State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 91, 657 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1983);
State v. Wells, 78 Hawai #i 373, 381, 894 P.2d 70, 78 (1995).

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within reason be construed to charge a crime[,]" where the
complaint "was drawn in the language of the statute." Id. at *2
(citing Merino, 81 Hawai#i at 214, 915 P.2d at 688).
Similarly, here, Fernandez stipulated to the admission
of the Order for Protection and the Proof of Service, which
showed that he was present at the November 27, 2023 hearing on
the petition for the order and was personally served with the
order. He has not shown prejudice in these circumstances. See
Tran, 154 Hawai#i at 226, 549 P.3d at 311 ("Tran has not
established that he was prejudiced by the indictment. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that he was misled or would have
defended the case differently if the indictment contained the
additional detail he proposes.").
Furthermore, the Complaint in this case, like its
counterpart in Cichy, was drawn in the language of HRS § 586-
11(a), which sets forth the essential elements of the offense
with reasonable clarity and defines it in comprehensible terms.
See Merino, 81 Hawai#i at 214, 915 P.2d at 688. Specifically,
the relevant statutory language provided: "Whenever an order for
protection is granted pursuant to this chapter, a respondent or
person to be restrained who knowingly or intentionally violates
the order for protection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." HRS
§ 586-11(a). In turn, the Complaint alleged:

On or about August 30, 2024, in the City and County of
Honolulu, State of Hawai #i, . . . FERNANDEZ did
intentionally or knowingly violate the Order for Protection
issued in FC-DA No. lFDA-23-2228 on November 27, 2023 by the
Honorable Jessi L.K. Hall, Judge of the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawai #i, pursuant to Chapter 586 of
the [HRS], thereby committing the offense of Violation of an
Order for Protection in violation of Section 586-5.5 and
Section 586-11(a) of the [HRS]. . . .

These allegations mirror those found sufficient in Cichy. See
2025 WL 1025233, at *2. Likewise, Fernandez has not shown that
the Complaint "cannot within reason be construed to charge a
crime."5/ Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 400, 219 P.3d at 1187; see

5/
Fernandez's reliance on State v. Medina, 72 Haw. 493, 824 P.2d 106
(1992), is misplaced. As we explained in Cichy:

Medina was charged under HRS § 586-11 with violating a
family court restraining order. The family court dismissed
(continued...)

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Tran, 154 Hawai#i at 227, 549 P.3d at 312 ("[T]he charge here can
be construed as alleging the offense charged 'within reason.'"
(quoting Motta, 66 Haw. at 91, 657 P.2d at 1020)).
(2) Fernandez contends that the deputy prosecuting
attorney (DPA) committed misconduct by using "inappropriate
leading questions" to bring out information regarding a "domestic
violence charge" against Fernandez.
Prior to trial, Fernandez had filed a motion in limine
to exclude certain evidence from use at trial. At the hearing of
the motion, the parties stipulated to the exclusion of the
following, "subject to opening the door": "Any history of
documented and/or undocumented allegations [o]f abuse or violence
by [Fernandez] against [CW], including, but not limited to, the
underlying facts included in the underlying Order for
Protection." The Family Court's subsequent order reflected this
stipulation.
During trial, CW testified about the November 27, 2023
hearing regarding a "restraining order," at which she, Fernandez
and their respective attorneys were present. The following
exchange then occurred:

Q [by DPA] Okay. And so just to be clear, this is for
a restraining order --

A [by CW] Correct.

Q -- or was it for something else?
A It was a restraining order and also a domestic
violence charge.
Q So at the --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can the witness repeat that
answer? Sorry, I couldn't hear that.
[CW]: That hearing specifically was for the
restraining order hearing and also for the domestic violence
charge that I had against him.

5/
(...continued)
the charge after finding that Medina had not been personally
served with the order. The State appealed. The supreme
court affirmed. Medina recognized a service requirement for
enforcing a restraining order; it did not create an element
of a violation under HRS § 586-11. "Notice" is not an
element of HRS § 586-11(a).
2025 WL 1025233, at *2.

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I'd ask to strike that
answer. It's in violation of the motions in limine.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to strike the
witness's answer the first time and also the second time.
I'm instructing the jury, you're not allowed to consider
that answer for any purpose whatsoever. It is not to be
considered evidence.

Fernandez contends that the DPA's questioning
constituted prosecutorial misconduct because she "asked multiple
times what the purpose of the hearing . . . was" and "made
attempts to lead the witness to speak up regarding the domestic
violence charge." The State counters that the challenged
question that ended – "or was it for something else?" – was not
leading; the DPA was in fact trying to avoid asking a leading
question by adding "or was it for something else" to the
question; the DPA had a legitimate reason for asking the
question, so as to establish Fernandez's presence at the hearing
in which the Order for Protection was granted, which involved
establishing the hearing's purpose; in doing so, the DPA
unintentionally elicited testimony that violated the court's in
limine order; and defense counsel (not the DPA) then asked the
witness to repeat her answer because defense counsel did not hear
it the first time.
"Whenever a defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct,
this court must first decide: (1) whether the conduct was
improper; and (2) if the conduct was improper, whether the
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Willis, 156 Hawai#i 195, 204, 572 P.3d 668, 677 (2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Udo, 145 Hawai#i 519,
534-35, 454 P.3d 460, 475-76 (2019)). In determining whether
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we look at
"the nature of the alleged misconduct, the promptness or lack of
a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness of the
evidence against the defendant." Udo, 145 Hawai#i at 538, 454
P.3d at 479 (quoting State v. Iuli, 101 Hawai#i 196, 208, 65 P.3d
143, 155 (2003)).
The DPA's question that ended "or was it for something
else?" was not leading. The question was improper, though, as
the DPA should have known that it could elicit testimony that

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violated the in limine order. See State v. Williams, 146 Hawai#i
62, 73, 456 P.3d 135, 146 (2020) ("Especially when it chose to
call [the witnesses], the State should have been careful not to
elicit evidence regarding the involvement of Child Welfare
Services, which violated the motion in limine"). That said, it
does not appear that the DPA's question was purposely designed to
elicit such testimony. Rather, in context, the question comes
across as an inartful attempt to establish that the November 27,
2023 hearing at which Fernandez was present concerned the Order
of Protection that Fernandez was accused of violating – not just
a non-specific "restraining order." And the DPA did not cause
CW's response to the challenged question to be repeated; defense
counsel did. Further, Fernandez has not shown that the resulting
testimony prejudiced him in these circumstances, where a copy of
the Order for Protection, which was admitted into evidence as
State's Exhibit 1, included a finding that "[a] protective order
is necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse,"
and restrained Fernandez "from committing further acts of abuse
or threats of abuse."
In any event, after defense counsel's objection, the
Family Court promptly struck CW's repeated answer and gave the
jury a strongly worded curative instruction that "you're not
allowed to consider that answer for any purpose whatsoever. It
is not to be considered evidence." The jury is presumed to have
followed this instruction. See State v. Acker, 133 Hawai#i 253,
278, 327 P.3d 931, 956 (2014).
Moreover, the evidence supporting the conviction was
strong. The primary issue at trial was whether Fernandez came
within 100 yards of CW's residence, in violation of the Order for
Protection. CW testified that on August 30, 2024, she saw
Fernandez's car6/ parked in front of a neighbor's house across the
intersection from CW's house. A photograph admitted into
evidence as State's Exhibit 3 showed the location of CW's house
in relation to where Fernandez's car had been parked. A

6/
CW clarified that the car was "[her] old vehicle," which Fernandez
had been using "since he took it from the residence when he left back in . . .
September of that year, '23."

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responding police officer, Corporal John Zeuzheim (Cpl.
Zeuzheim), testified that on the day of the incident, he met with
CW, and while investigating, he saw Fernandez walk out of the
house that the vehicle was parked in front of. CW testified that
she had lived at her house since January 2022, had walked the
area before, and knew that the distance to the neighbor's house
was not 100 yards, which would have been the length of a football
field. This testimony was uncontradicted. Additionally, the
Proof of Service (see supra) showed that Fernandez was personally
served with the Order for Protection, which, on its face,
prohibited him from coming within 100 yards of CW's residence.
In sum, the evidence that Fernandez had violated the Order for
Protection was strong.
On this record, we conclude there is no reasonable
possibility that the DPA's improper question might have affected
the trial's outcome. See State v. Hirata, 152 Hawai#i 27, 33,
520 P.3d 225, 231 (2022) (quoting State v. Riveira, 149 Hawai#i
427, 431, 494 P.3d 1160, 1164 (2021)). The question was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(3) Fernandez contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction. In particular, he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to show that he "knowingly or
intentionally" violated the Order for Protection.
We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as
follows:

Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the
case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v. Yuen, 154 Hawai#i 434, 444, 555 P.3d 121, 131 (2024)
(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Richie, 88 Hawai#i 19, 33,
960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998)).
In order to convict Fernandez under HRS § 586-11(a),
the State was required to prove that he knowingly or
intentionally violated the Order for Protection. We have
summarized the evidence supporting his conviction above.

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On appeal, Fernandez tries to infer from certain trial
testimony by CW and Cpl. Zeuzheim that on the day of the
incident, he was "in the area to visit his friend" and "not . . .
with the intention to violate the [Order for Protection] . . . ."
However, based on the Order for Protection and the Proof of
Service, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Fernandez
knew he was not to come within 100 yards of CW's residence. And
based on CW's testimony that Fernandez had previously lived with
her at the residence, and State's Exhibit 3 showing the location
of the residence in relation to where Fernandez's car had been
parked, the jury could reasonably have inferred that on the day
of the incident, Fernandez knew where he was in relation to, and
that he was within 100 yards of, CW's residence.
Based on all of the evidence presented at trial,
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution, we
conclude there was substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably have inferred that Fernandez acted knowingly or
intentionally in violating the Protective Order. See State v.
Calaycay, 145 Hawai#i 186, 200, 449 P.3d 1184, 1198 (2019)
("[T]he mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts,
conduct, and inferences fairly drawn from all of the
circumstances." (quoting State v. Kiese, 126 Hawai#i 494, 502-03,
273 P.3d 1180, 1188-89 (2012))). On this record, the evidence
was sufficient to support the conviction for violation of
§ 586-11(a)(1)(A).
For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment is
affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 8, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
David S.H. Cho, Presiding Judge
Deputy Public Defender,
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Robert T. Nakatsuji, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
08-JUN-2026
08:05 AM
Dkt. 75 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LANDON KALANIKOA FERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Landon Kalanikoa Fernandez
(Fernandez) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence
(Judgment) entered on November 26, 2024, in the Family Court of
the First Circuit (Family Court).1/ Following a jury trial,
Fernandez was convicted of Violation of an Order for Protection,
pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 586-11(a)(1)(A).2/
On appeal, Fernandez contends that the Judgment must be
vacated or reversed because: (1) Plaintiff-Appellee State of
Hawai#i (State) "did not provide notice of an element of the
offense"; (2) "[t]he prosecution's line of questioning and method
of leading the [complaining] witness [(CW)] during the direct
examination" constituted prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the

1/
The Honorable Brian A. Costa presided.
2/
At the time of the alleged offense, HRS § 586-11(a) (Supp. 2023)
stated, in relevant part:
Violation of an order for protection. (a) Whenever an
order for protection is granted pursuant to this chapter, a
respondent or person to be restrained who knowingly or
intentionally violates the order for protection shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Fernandez's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Fernandez contends that the September 9, 2024
Complaint and the oral charges failed to allege an essential
element of the offense – specifically, that Fernandez had notice
of the Order for Protection under HRS § 586-6.3/
Because this argument is made for the first time on
appeal, we apply the Motta/Wells liberal construction rule.4/
Under this rule, we will not reverse a conviction based on a
defective complaint unless the defendant shows prejudice, or the
complaint "cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime."
State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 400, 219 P.3d 1170, 1187
(2009) (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai#i 198, 212, 915 P.2d
672, 686 (1996)); see State v. Tran, 154 Hawai#i 211, 226, 549
P.3d 296, 311 (2024) (holding that the Motta/Wells standard
applies "where . . . a charge challenge is raised after a guilty
verdict has been returned (or after a court has adjudicated a
defendant guilty in a bench trial)").
As to the merits of Fernandez's contention, we
addressed a nearly identical argument in State v. Cichy, No.
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2025 WL 1025233, at *1-*2 (Haw. App. April 7,
2025) (SDO). There, we held that the defendant could not show
prejudice where he stipulated to having been served with the
relevant order for protection and was found by the family court
to have waived his right to confront the State's witnesses
regarding this issue. Id. at *1. We further held that the
defendant had not shown that the relevant complaint "cannot

3/
HRS § 586-6 (2018) states, in relevant part:
Notice of Order. (a) Any order issued under this
chapter shall either be personally served upon the
respondent, or served by certified mail, unless the
respondent was present at the hearing in which case the
respondent shall be deemed to have notice of the order.
4/
See State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 91, 657 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1983);
State v. Wells, 78 Hawai#i 373, 381, 894 P.2d 70, 78 (1995).

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within reason be construed to charge a crime[,]" where the
complaint "was drawn in the language of the statute." Id. at *2
(citing Merino, 81 Hawai#i at 214, 915 P.2d at 688).
Similarly, here, Fernandez stipulated to the admission
of the Order for Protection and the Proof of Service, which
showed that he was present at the November 27, 2023 hearing on
the petition for the order and was personally served with the
order. He has not shown prejudice in these circumstances. See
Tran, 154 Hawai#i at 226, 549 P.3d at 311 ("Tran has not
established that he was prejudiced by the indictment. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that he was misled or would have
defended the case differently if the indictment contained the
additional detail he proposes.").
Furthermore, the Complaint in this case, like its
counterpart in Cichy, was drawn in the language of HRS § 586-
11(a), which sets forth the essential elements of the offense
with reasonable clarity and defines it in comprehensible terms.
See Merino, 81 Hawai#i at 214, 915 P.2d at 688. Specifically,
the relevant statutory language provided: "Whenever an order for
protection is granted pursuant to this chapter, a respondent or
person to be restrained who knowingly or intentionally violates
the order for protection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." HRS
§ 586-11(a). In turn, the Complaint alleged:

On or about August 30, 2024, in the City and County of
Honolulu, State of Hawai#i, . . . FERNANDEZ did
intentionally or knowingly violate the Order for Protection
issued in FC-DA No. lFDA-23-2228 on November 27, 2023 by the
Honorable Jessi L.K. Hall, Judge of the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawai#i, pursuant to Chapter 586 of
the [HRS], thereby committing the offense of Violation of an
Order for Protection in violation of Section 586-5.5 and
Section 586-11(a) of the [HRS]. . . .

These allegations mirror those found sufficient in Cichy. See
2025 WL 1025233, at *2. Likewise, Fernandez has not shown that
the Complaint "cannot within reason be construed to charge a
crime."5/ Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 400, 219 P.3d at 1187; see

5/
Fernandez's reliance on State v. Medina, 72 Haw. 493, 824 P.2d 106
(1992), is misplaced. As we explained in Cichy:

Medina was charged under HRS § 586-11 with violating a
family court restraining order. The family court dismissed
(continued...)

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Tran, 154 Hawai#i at 227, 549 P.3d at 312 ("[T]he charge here can
be construed as alleging the offense charged 'within reason.'"
(quoting Motta, 66 Haw. at 91, 657 P.2d at 1020)).
(2) Fernandez contends that the deputy prosecuting
attorney (DPA) committed misconduct by using "inappropriate
leading questions" to bring out information regarding a "domestic
violence charge" against Fernandez.
Prior to trial, Fernandez had filed a motion in limine
to exclude certain evidence from use at trial. At the hearing of
the motion, the parties stipulated to the exclusion of the
following, "subject to opening the door": "Any history of
documented and/or undocumented allegations [o]f abuse or violence
by [Fernandez] against [CW], including, but not limited to, the
underlying facts included in the underlying Order for
Protection." The Family Court's subsequent order reflected this
stipulation.
During trial, CW testified about the November 27, 2023
hearing regarding a "restraining order," at which she, Fernandez
and their respective attorneys were present. The following
exchange then occurred:

Q [by DPA] Okay. And so just to be clear, this is for
a restraining order --

A [by CW] Correct.

Q -- or was it for something else?
A It was a restraining order and also a domestic
violence charge.

Q So at the --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can the witness repeat that
answer? Sorry, I couldn't hear that.
[CW]: That hearing specifically was for the
restraining order hearing and also for the domestic violence
charge that I had against him.

5/
(...continued)
the charge after finding that Medina had not been personally
served with the order. The State appealed. The supreme
court affirmed. Medina recognized a service requirement for
enforcing a restraining order; it did not create an element
of a violation under HRS § 586-11. "Notice" is not an
element of HRS § 586-11(a).
2025 WL 1025233, at *2.

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I'd ask to strike that
answer. It's in violation of the motions in limine.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to strike the
witness's answer the first time and also the second time.
I'm instructing the jury, you're not allowed to consider
that answer for any purpose whatsoever. It is not to be
considered evidence.

Fernandez contends that the DPA's questioning
constituted prosecutorial misconduct because she "asked multiple
times what the purpose of the hearing . . . was" and "made
attempts to lead the witness to speak up regarding the domestic
violence charge." The State counters that the challenged
question that ended – "or was it for something else?" – was not
leading; the DPA was in fact trying to avoid asking a leading
question by adding "or was it for something else" to the
question; the DPA had a legitimate reason for asking the
question, so as to establish Fernandez's presence at the hearing
in which the Order for Protection was granted, which involved
establishing the hearing's purpose; in doing so, the DPA
unintentionally elicited testimony that violated the court's in
limine order; and defense counsel (not the DPA) then asked the
witness to repeat her answer because defense counsel did not hear
it the first time.
"Whenever a defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct,
this court must first decide: (1) whether the conduct was
improper; and (2) if the conduct was improper, whether the
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Willis, 156 Hawai#i 195, 204, 572 P.3d 668, 677 (2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Udo, 145 Hawai#i 519,
534-35, 454 P.3d 460, 475-76 (2019)). In determining whether
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we look at
"the nature of the alleged misconduct, the promptness or lack of
a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness of the
evidence against the defendant." Udo, 145 Hawai#i at 538, 454
P.3d at 479 (quoting State v. Iuli, 101 Hawai#i 196, 208, 65 P.3d
143, 155 (2003)).
The DPA's question that ended "or was it for something
else?" was not leading. The question was improper, though, as
the DPA should have known that it could elicit testimony that

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violated the in limine order. See State v. Williams, 146 Hawai#i
62, 73, 456 P.3d 135, 146 (2020) ("Especially when it chose to
call [the witnesses], the State should have been careful not to
elicit evidence regarding the involvement of Child Welfare
Services, which violated the motion in limine"). That said, it
does not appear that the DPA's question was purposely designed to
elicit such testimony. Rather, in context, the question comes
across as an inartful attempt to establish that the November 27,
2023 hearing at which Fernandez was present concerned the Order
of Protection that Fernandez was accused of violating – not just
a non-specific "restraining order." And the DPA did not cause
CW's response to the challenged question to be repeated; defense
counsel did. Further, Fernandez has not shown that the resulting
testimony prejudiced him in these circumstances, where a copy of
the Order for Protection, which was admitted into evidence as
State's Exhibit 1, included a finding that "[a] protective order
is necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse,"
and restrained Fernandez "from committing further acts of abuse
or threats of abuse."
In any event, after defense counsel's objection, the
Family Court promptly struck CW's repeated answer and gave the
jury a strongly worded curative instruction that "you're not
allowed to consider that answer for any purpose whatsoever. It
is not to be considered evidence." The jury is presumed to have
followed this instruction. See State v. Acker, 133 Hawai#i 253,
278, 327 P.3d 931, 956 (2014).
Moreover, the evidence supporting the conviction was
strong. The primary issue at trial was whether Fernandez came
within 100 yards of CW's residence, in violation of the Order for
Protection. CW testified that on August 30, 2024, she saw
Fernandez's car6/ parked in front of a neighbor's house across the
intersection from CW's house. A photograph admitted into
evidence as State's Exhibit 3 showed the location of CW's house
in relation to where Fernandez's car had been parked. A

6/
CW clarified that the car was "[her] old vehicle," which Fernandez
had been using "since he took it from the residence when he left back in . . .
September of that year, '23."

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

responding police officer, Corporal John Zeuzheim (Cpl.
Zeuzheim), testified that on the day of the incident, he met with
CW, and while investigating, he saw Fernandez walk out of the
house that the vehicle was parked in front of. CW testified that
she had lived at her house since January 2022, had walked the
area before, and knew that the distance to the neighbor's house
was not 100 yards, which would have been the length of a football
field. This testimony was uncontradicted. Additionally, the
Proof of Service (see supra) showed that Fernandez was personally
served with the Order for Protection, which, on its face,
prohibited him from coming within 100 yards of CW's residence.
In sum, the evidence that Fernandez had violated the Order for
Protection was strong.
On this record, we conclude there is no reasonable
possibility that the DPA's improper question might have affected
the trial's outcome. See State v. Hirata, 152 Hawai#i 27, 33,
520 P.3d 225, 231 (2022) (quoting State v. Riveira, 149 Hawai#i
427, 431, 494 P.3d 1160, 1164 (2021)). The question was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(3) Fernandez contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction. In particular, he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to show that he "knowingly or
intentionally" violated the Order for Protection.
We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as
follows:

Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the
case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v. Yuen, 154 Hawai#i 434, 444, 555 P.3d 121, 131 (2024)
(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Richie, 88 Hawai#i 19, 33,
960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998)).
In order to convict Fernandez under HRS § 586-11(a),
the State was required to prove that he knowingly or
intentionally violated the Order for Protection. We have
summarized the evidence supporting his conviction above.

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On appeal, Fernandez tries to infer from certain trial
testimony by CW and Cpl. Zeuzheim that on the day of the
incident, he was "in the area to visit his friend" and "not . . .
with the intention to violate the [Order for Protection] . . . ."
However, based on the Order for Protection and the Proof of
Service, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Fernandez
knew he was not to come within 100 yards of CW's residence. And
based on CW's testimony that Fernandez had previously lived with
her at the residence, and State's Exhibit 3 showing the location
of the residence in relation to where Fernandez's car had been
parked, the jury could reasonably have inferred that on the day
of the incident, Fernandez knew where he was in relation to, and
that he was within 100 yards of, CW's residence.
Based on all of the evidence presented at trial,
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution, we
conclude there was substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably have inferred that Fernandez acted knowingly or
intentionally in violating the Protective Order. See State v.
Calaycay, 145 Hawai#i 186, 200, 449 P.3d 1184, 1198 (2019)
("[T]he mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts,
conduct, and inferences fairly drawn from all of the
circumstances." (quoting State v. Kiese, 126 Hawai#i 494, 502-03,
273 P.3d 1180, 1188-89 (2012))). On this record, the evidence
was sufficient to support the conviction for violation of
§ 586-11(a)(1)(A).
For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment is
affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 8, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
David S.H. Cho, Presiding Judge
Deputy Public Defender,
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Robert T. Nakatsuji, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge

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