State v. Wood

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
02-JUN-2026
07:54 AM
Dkt. 45 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
JASON KAPENA WOOD, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Guidry, JJ.)

On March 10, 2020, a Third Circuit grand jury indicted
Jason Kapena Wood on two counts of sexual assault in the first
degree and two counts of kidnapping. The indictment alleged two
incidents involving different complaining witnesses. The circuit
court granted Wood's motion to sever. Counts 3 and 4 involving
the second complaining witness (CW) were refiled under a new case
number.
On April 26, 2024, Wood moved to dismiss counts 3
and 4. He argued they "fail to state an offense and are
defective." The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 3-4 of the Indictment for
Failure to State an Offense was entered on July 2, 2024.1 The
State of Hawai#i appeals. We have jurisdiction under Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-13(1) (2016). We vacate and remand
for further proceedings.

1
The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

A charge is supposed "to safeguard an accused's
fundamental right to know what they must defend against to avoid
conviction." State v. Aquino, 154 Hawai#i 388, 393, 550 P.3d
1246, 1251 (2024). Its sufficiency is determined "by whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he or she must be
prepared to meet." State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai#i 96, 100, 508
P.3d 1182, 1186 (2022) (cleaned up).
We review the dismissal of an indictment de novo.
State v. Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i 302, 309, 574 P.3d 767, 774
(2025). In addition to the charge, we look at other information
provided to the defendant "to the point where the court passes
upon the contention that his right has been violated[,]" State v.
Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 120, 680 P.2d 250, 251 (1984), "to determine
whether the defendant had actual knowledge of what the defendant
alleges was missing from a charge." Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i at
313, 574 P.3d at 778.

Count 3

HRS § 707-730 (2014) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
first degree if:

(a) The person knowingly subjects another person to
an act of sexual penetration by strong
compulsion[.]

Count 3 alleged:

On or about the 5th day of April, 2014, in the County
and State of Hawai#i, JASON KAPENA WOOD knowingly subjected
[CW] to an act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion,
thereby committing the offense of Sexual Assault in the
First Degree, in violation of Section 707-730(1)(a), Hawai #i
Revised Statutes, as amended.
"Strong compulsion" means the use of or attempt to use one
or more of the following to overcome a person:
(1) A threat, express or implied, that places a
person in fear of bodily injury to the individual or another
person, or in fear that the person or another person will be
kidnapped;
(2) A dangerous instrument; or

(3) Physical force.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Wood argued the indictment was defective because
count 3 failed to allege the statutory definitions of "bodily
injury," "dangerous instrument," and "sexual penetration," and
did not specify the kind of "sexual penetration" he allegedly
perpetrated. HRS § 707-700 (2014) contains these definitions:

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.
. . . .

"Dangerous instrument" means any firearm, whether loaded or
not, and whether operable or not, or other weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or
inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to
be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury.
. . . .

"Sexual penetration" means:

(1) Vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio,
deviate sexual intercourse, or any intrusion of any
part of a person's body or of any object into the
genital or anal opening of another person's body; it
occurs upon any penetration, however slight, but
emission is not required. As used in this definition,
"genital opening" includes the anterior surface of the
vulva or labia majora; or
(2) Cunnilingus or anilingus, whether or not actual
penetration has occurred.

The State argues that Wood had a copy of the grand jury
transcripts. Its brief doesn't quote from the transcripts or
identify where in the record they appear. We don't know what
Wood could have learned from them.
The State argues that Wood attended the Hawaii Rules of
Evidence Rule 104 hearing in the case involving the other
complaining witness, during which CW testified about what Wood
did to her. Its brief doesn't quote CW's testimony or identify
where in the record the transcript appears. We don't know what
Wood could have learned from hearing CW's testimony.
Wood did have a copy of CW's handwritten statement,
which was sealed and filed with the State's memorandum opposing
Wood's motion to dismiss. CW wrote:

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

During a supervised visitation with Jason Wood me and my
children I was kidnapped and raped this happened in 2014.
. . . he entered my home at K and held me and my two kids
against our will. Eventually he raped me all night until
the morning. . . .

When Jason was raping me all night long he pushed me down on
the bed held me down with his body he would cover my mouth
so I could not yell for help I could barely breathe. He
forced his dick in my vagina and would thrust very hard and
violently with his pubic bone hitting my pubic bone it felt
like I was being killed down there. he would force with his
arms when he my legs to be spread wide like I'm doing the
splits. He would would say sick things about all the
[unreadable] that fucks me and he would get more turned on
and thrust with his dick in my vagina harder. He would
drool all over me. He constantly would suffocate me to get
me to fight for my life. He would get turned off on when I
would struggle more. I would disassociate to not suffer.
He slapped me to get more present so he could enjoy it more.

"The purpose of notice requirements is not . . . about
what statutory definitions should be included in a charging
document — it is, rather, to safeguard an accused's fundamental
right to know what they must defend against to avoid conviction."
Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i at 312, 574 P.3d at 777. CW's statement
sufficiently apprised Wood of the manner of "strong compulsion"
he is alleged to have used, and the particular "sexual
penetration" he allegedly perpetrated. It "state[d] the species
. . . and descend[ed] to particulars." Id. at 311, 574 P.3d at
776. The statutory definition of "dangerous instrument" was
superfluous because CW did not claim Wood used a dangerous
instrument. Under these circumstances, the circuit court erred
by dismissing count 3.

Count 4

HRS § 707-720 (2014) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of kidnapping if the
person intentionally or knowingly restrains another
person with intent to:

. . . .
(c) Facilitate the commission of a felony or flight
thereafter;
(d) Inflict bodily injury upon that person or
subject that person to a sexual offense; [or]
(e) Terrorize that person or a third person[.]

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Count 4 alleged:

On or about the 5th day of April, 2014, in the County
and State of Hawai#i, JASON KAPENA WOOD intentionally or
knowingly restrained another person, [CW], with intent to
facilitate the commission of a felony, to wit, felony sexual
assault, or flight thereafter and/or inflict bodily injury
upon [CW] and/or subject [CW] to a sexual offense and/or
terrorize [CW] thereby committing the offense of Kidnapping,
in violation of Section 707-720(1)(c), (d), and/or (e),
Hawai#i Revised Statutes, as amended.

Wood argued count 4 failed to allege the statutory
definition of "restrain" or allege the means used to "restrain"
CW. HRS § 707-700 (2014) provides:

"Restrain" means to restrict a person's movement in such a
manner as to interfere substantially with the person's
liberty:

(1) By means of force, threat, or deception; or

(2) If the person is under the age of eighteen or
incompetent, without the consent of the
relative, person, or institution having lawful
custody of the person.

CW's statement sufficiently apprised Wood of the force
she claimed he used to restrain her while subjecting her to a
sexual offense. Under these circumstances, the circuit court
erred by dismissing count 4.
The July 2, 2024 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 3-4 of the Indictment
for Failure to State an Offense is vacated. This case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this summary disposition order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 2, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Kelden B.A. Waltjen, Presiding Judge
Prosecuting Attorney,
Charles E. Murray III, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
County of Hawai#i,
for Plaintiff-Appellant. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge
Keith S. Shigetomi,
for Defendant-Appellee.

5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
02-JUN-2026
07:54 AM
Dkt. 45 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
JASON KAPENA WOOD, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Guidry, JJ.)

On March 10, 2020, a Third Circuit grand jury indicted
Jason Kapena Wood on two counts of sexual assault in the first
degree and two counts of kidnapping. The indictment alleged two
incidents involving different complaining witnesses. The circuit
court granted Wood's motion to sever. Counts 3 and 4 involving
the second complaining witness (CW) were refiled under a new case
number.
On April 26, 2024, Wood moved to dismiss counts 3
and 4. He argued they "fail to state an offense and are
defective." The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 3-4 of the Indictment for
Failure to State an Offense was entered on July 2, 2024.1 The
State of Hawai#i appeals. We have jurisdiction under Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-13(1) (2016). We vacate and remand
for further proceedings.

1
The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

A charge is supposed "to safeguard an accused's
fundamental right to know what they must defend against to avoid
conviction." State v. Aquino, 154 Hawai#i 388, 393, 550 P.3d
1246, 1251 (2024). Its sufficiency is determined "by whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he or she must be
prepared to meet." State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai#i 96, 100, 508
P.3d 1182, 1186 (2022) (cleaned up).
We review the dismissal of an indictment de novo.
State v. Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i 302, 309, 574 P.3d 767, 774
(2025). In addition to the charge, we look at other information
provided to the defendant "to the point where the court passes
upon the contention that his right has been violated[,]" State v.
Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 120, 680 P.2d 250, 251 (1984), "to determine
whether the defendant had actual knowledge of what the defendant
alleges was missing from a charge." Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i at
313, 574 P.3d at 778.

Count 3

HRS § 707-730 (2014) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
first degree if:

(a) The person knowingly subjects another person to
an act of sexual penetration by strong
compulsion[.]

Count 3 alleged:

On or about the 5th day of April, 2014, in the County
and State of Hawai #i, JASON KAPENA WOOD knowingly subjected
[CW] to an act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion,
thereby committing the offense of Sexual Assault in the
First Degree, in violation of Section 707-730(1)(a), Hawai #i
Revised Statutes, as amended.
"Strong compulsion" means the use of or attempt to use one
or more of the following to overcome a person:
(1) A threat, express or implied, that places a
person in fear of bodily injury to the individual or another
person, or in fear that the person or another person will be
kidnapped;
(2) A dangerous instrument; or

(3) Physical force.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Wood argued the indictment was defective because
count 3 failed to allege the statutory definitions of "bodily
injury," "dangerous instrument," and "sexual penetration," and
did not specify the kind of "sexual penetration" he allegedly
perpetrated. HRS § 707-700 (2014) contains these definitions:

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.
. . . .

"Dangerous instrument" means any firearm, whether loaded or
not, and whether operable or not, or other weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or
inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to
be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury.
. . . .

"Sexual penetration" means:

(1) Vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio,
deviate sexual intercourse, or any intrusion of any
part of a person's body or of any object into the
genital or anal opening of another person's body; it
occurs upon any penetration, however slight, but
emission is not required. As used in this definition,
"genital opening" includes the anterior surface of the
vulva or labia majora; or
(2) Cunnilingus or anilingus, whether or not actual
penetration has occurred.

The State argues that Wood had a copy of the grand jury
transcripts. Its brief doesn't quote from the transcripts or
identify where in the record they appear. We don't know what
Wood could have learned from them.
The State argues that Wood attended the Hawaii Rules of
Evidence Rule 104 hearing in the case involving the other
complaining witness, during which CW testified about what Wood
did to her. Its brief doesn't quote CW's testimony or identify
where in the record the transcript appears. We don't know what
Wood could have learned from hearing CW's testimony.
Wood did have a copy of CW's handwritten statement,
which was sealed and filed with the State's memorandum opposing
Wood's motion to dismiss. CW wrote:

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

During a supervised visitation with Jason Wood me and my
children I was kidnapped and raped this happened in 2014.
. . . he entered my home at K and held me and my two kids
against our will. Eventually he raped me all night until
the morning. . . .
When Jason was raping me all night long he pushed me down on
the bed held me down with his body he would cover my mouth
so I could not yell for help I could barely breathe. He
forced his dick in my vagina and would thrust very hard and
violently with his pubic bone hitting my pubic bone it felt
like I was being killed down there. he would force with his
arms when he my legs to be spread wide like I'm doing the
splits. He would would say sick things about all the
[unreadable] that fucks me and he would get more turned on
and thrust with his dick in my vagina harder. He would
drool all over me. He constantly would suffocate me to get
me to fight for my life. He would get turned off on when I
would struggle more. I would disassociate to not suffer.
He slapped me to get more present so he could enjoy it more.

"The purpose of notice requirements is not . . . about
what statutory definitions should be included in a charging
document — it is, rather, to safeguard an accused's fundamental
right to know what they must defend against to avoid conviction."
Kaakimaka, 156 Hawai#i at 312, 574 P.3d at 777. CW's statement
sufficiently apprised Wood of the manner of "strong compulsion"
he is alleged to have used, and the particular "sexual
penetration" he allegedly perpetrated. It "state[d] the species
. . . and descend[ed] to particulars." Id. at 311, 574 P.3d at
776. The statutory definition of "dangerous instrument" was
superfluous because CW did not claim Wood used a dangerous
instrument. Under these circumstances, the circuit court erred
by dismissing count 3.

Count 4

HRS § 707-720 (2014) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of kidnapping if the
person intentionally or knowingly restrains another
person with intent to:

. . . .
(c) Facilitate the commission of a felony or flight
thereafter;
(d) Inflict bodily injury upon that person or
subject that person to a sexual offense; [or]
(e) Terrorize that person or a third person[.]

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Count 4 alleged:

On or about the 5th day of April, 2014, in the County
and State of Hawai#i, JASON KAPENA WOOD intentionally or
knowingly restrained another person, [CW], with intent to
facilitate the commission of a felony, to wit, felony sexual
assault, or flight thereafter and/or inflict bodily injury
upon [CW] and/or subject [CW] to a sexual offense and/or
terrorize [CW] thereby committing the offense of Kidnapping,
in violation of Section 707-720(1)(c), (d), and/or (e),
Hawai#i Revised Statutes, as amended.

Wood argued count 4 failed to allege the statutory
definition of "restrain" or allege the means used to "restrain"
CW. HRS § 707-700 (2014) provides:

"Restrain" means to restrict a person's movement in such a
manner as to interfere substantially with the person's
liberty:
(1) By means of force, threat, or deception; or

(2) If the person is under the age of eighteen or
incompetent, without the consent of the
relative, person, or institution having lawful
custody of the person.

CW's statement sufficiently apprised Wood of the force
she claimed he used to restrain her while subjecting her to a
sexual offense. Under these circumstances, the circuit court
erred by dismissing count 4.
The July 2, 2024 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 3-4 of the Indictment
for Failure to State an Offense is vacated. This case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this summary disposition order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 2, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Kelden B.A. Waltjen, Presiding Judge
Prosecuting Attorney,
Charles E. Murray III, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
County of Hawai#i,
for Plaintiff-Appellant. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge
Keith S. Shigetomi,
for Defendant-Appellee.

5