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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
18-NOV-2025
08:02 AM
Dkt. 162 MO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʿI

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DAWN N.S. CHANG in her official
capacity as Chairperson of the Board of Land and
Natural Resources, 1 ALEXANDER AND BALDWIN, INC.,
EAST MAUI IRRIGATION COMPANY, LLC, COUNTY OF MAUI,
MAHI PONO, LLC and MAHI PONO HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CC191000019)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)

This appeal arises out of a 2020 bench trial on
Plaintiff-Appellant Sierra Club's claims that Defendant-Appellee

1 Pursuant to Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
43(c)(1), Dawn N.S. Chang, in her official capacity as Chairperson of the
Board of Land and Natural Resources, is automatically substituted as
Defendant-Appellee herein in place of Suzanne Case.
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Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) breached its public
trust duties in Count 2 and violated its Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) Chapter 205A obligations in Count 3, by approving the
continuation of 2019 and 2020 annual permits (Permits) allowing
Defendants-Appellees Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. (A&B) and East
Maui Irrigation Company, LLC (EMI) (collectively, A&B/EMI) to
divert water from East Maui streams.
We hold that, because the claims in Counts 2 and 3
expressly and substantively challenged BLNR's decisionmaking on
the Permits, BLNR had exclusive original jurisdiction over the
claims; and Sierra Club was required to exhaust all corrective
procedures provided in BLNR's administrative process, including
an administrative appeal under HRS § 91-14. See Maui Lani
Neighbors, Inc. v. State (Maui Lani), 156 Hawaiʻi 520, 533, 542,
575 P.3d 610, 623, 632 (2025) (holding that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction to hear claims that challenged the substance
of the commission's approval of a county special use permit,
where plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to it under HRS § 91-14). 2 Alternative vehicles for
judicial review -- such as HRS § 632-1 declaratory relief, a
direct action for breach of trust under state constitutional
public trust provisions, or an original action for a Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) violation under HRS § 205A-6 -- were
not available under the circumstances of this case, and the
Environmental Court of the First Circuit (Environmental Court) 3
thus lacked jurisdiction over the claims. See id. Accordingly,
we vacate and remand for entry of an order of dismissal.

2
After the September 12, 2025 Maui Lani decision, we issued a
September 29, 2025 order requesting supplemental briefing on its impact, and
the parties filed their supplemental briefs on October 13, 2025.

3
The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.

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I. BACKGROUND
Sierra Club appeals from the (1) January 11, 2022
"Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (FOFs/COLs);
and (2) February 16, 2022 "Final Judgment," both filed and
entered by the Environmental Court. On appeal, Sierra Club
challenges the Environmental Court's trial rulings that BLNR did
not breach its public trust duties or violate its HRS Chapter
205A obligations in its decisionmaking on the 2019 and 2020
Permits. In the supplemental briefs regarding the impact of
Maui Lani on this case, A&B/EMI and BLNR contend that Maui Lani
applies to preclude judicial review outside of the
administrative remedy of an HRS Chapter 91 appeal; and Sierra
Club and the County of Maui (County) contend the opposite, that
Maui Lani is distinguishable with no application here. A&B/EMI
asserts that "[t]his case falls squarely within the precedent
set by Maui Lani" and therefore "should be dismissed."
2018 Decision on the 2019 Permits
On November 9, 2018, BLNR held a public meeting on the
continuation of the Permits for 2019. Sierra Club provided
written and oral testimony and requested a contested case
hearing "[i]f the conditions . . . and the due diligence" Sierra
Club suggested were not implemented. BLNR approved the
continuation of the Permits for 2019 (2018 Decision). On
November 19, 2018, Sierra Club filed a petition with BLNR
requesting a contested case hearing (2018 Petition), to address
whether BLNR "is fulfilling [its] duty under the constitutional
public trust and state law to protect public trust resources";
whether A&B/EMI "failed to provide sufficient information to the
BLNR"; and whether A&B/EMI's proposal violated HRS Chapter 205A.
The 2018 Petition was denied at a December 7, 2018 meeting. The
record reflects that Sierra Club did not file an HRS § 91-14

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appeal from BLNR's 2018 Decision or BLNR's denial of Sierra
Club's 2018 Petition.
2019 Decision on the 2020 Permits
On October 11, 2019, BLNR held a public meeting on the
continuation of the Permits for 2020. Sierra Club provided
written and oral testimony and requested a contested case
hearing. BLNR approved the continuation of the Permits for 2020
(2019 Decision) and denied the request for a contested case
hearing. On October 17, 2019, Sierra Club filed a written
petition requesting a contested case hearing (2019 Petition), to
address whether BLNR "is fulfilling [its] duty under the
constitutional public trust and state law to protect public
trust resources." The 2019 Petition similarly argued, inter
alia, that A&B/EMI "failed to provide sufficient information to
the BLNR," and A&B/EMI's proposal violated HRS Chapter 205A.
The record contains no disposition of the 2019 Petition. The
record reflects that Sierra Club did not file an HRS § 91-14
appeal from BLNR's 2019 Decision, or BLNR's denial of Sierra
Club's oral request for a contested case hearing.
Current proceedings
Approximately two months after the November 9, 2018
BLNR meeting and 2018 Decision, Sierra Club filed the original
January 7, 2019 Complaint in this case. Approximately two
months after the October 11, 2019 BLNR meeting and 2019
Decision, Sierra Club filed its December 6, 2019 First Amended
Complaint (FAC) against, inter alia, BLNR, A&B/EMI, and the
County, adding allegations regarding the 2020 Permits. The FAC
included the breach of trust claim in Count 2, entitled "(BLNR,
DLNR and Chair Case Breached Their Trust Duties)"; and the HRS
Chapter 205A violation in Count 3, entitled "(BLNR, DLNR and

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Chair Case Violated Their HRS Chapter 205A Obligations)." 4
Counts 2 and 3 were premised on factual allegations of flaws and
deficiencies in BLNR's decisionmaking at the 2018 and 2019
public meetings on the 2019 and 2020 Permits. The FAC alleged
the Environmental Court's jurisdiction under, inter alia, HRS
§§ 205A-6 and 632-1, and Article XI §§ 1, 7, 9, and Article XII
§ 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution. 5 The FAC's prayer for relief
requested the Environmental Court to "[d]eclare that BLNR, DLNR
and Chair Case breached their public trust duties"; "[d]eclare
that BLNR, DLNR and Chair Case violated their HRS chapter 205A
obligations"; and "[d]eclare invalid the BLNR's November 2018
and October 2019 decisions approving the holdover of [the 2019
and 2020] Permits." Sierra Club also prayed for prospective
injunctive relief that the court "enjoin [A&B/EMI] from taking
more than 25.75 million gallons of water on any day from East
Maui" until, inter alia, "the proper issuance of a permit,
license or lease from the BLNR"; and "[o]rder BLNR, DLNR and
Chair Case to fulfill their public trust duties."

4 Count 1 was dismissed and is not relevant to this appeal.

5 HRS § 205A-6 (2017) provides for a civil cause of action by "any
person or agency" for noncompliance with the CZMA. Subsection (c) provides
that the court "in any action brought under this section, shall have
jurisdiction to provide any relief as may be appropriate[.]" Relevant here,
HRS § 205A-6(e) provides: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
that any person may have to assert any other claim or bring any other
action."

HRS § 632-1 (2016), the declaratory judgment statute, provides
for relief in civil cases. Relevant here, subsection (b) contains a
limitation on the availability of declaratory relief, and states: "Where
. . . a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of
case, that statutory remedy shall be followed . . . ."

Article XI §§ 1, 7 and Article XII § 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution
set forth the duties of the State under the public trust doctrine for natural
resources, water, and public lands, respectively. Article XI § 9 of the
Hawaiʻi Constitution sets forth a person's "right to a clean and healthful
environment[.]"

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At trial, Sierra Club argued that BLNR breached its
public trust duties when it approved the Permits for 2019 and
2020, allowed A&B/EMI to drain all of the water from the 13 East
Maui streams covered by the Permits, and did not impose
conditions to protect native aquatic species or address the
harmful diversion structures. Sierra Club argued that BLNR
"failed to scrutinize" A&B/EMI's request to continue the Permits
for 2019 and 2020 by not properly considering A&B/EMI's actual
needs for the water and their access to alternative resources,
and without balancing the reasonable and beneficial use of the
water against the harm being caused. Sierra Club presented an
expert witness in Hawaiian Stream Ecology to testify about
stream health and the diversion structures. Sierra Club
presented witnesses who testified about the state of the
streams, the diversion structures, the 2018 and 2019 BLNR
meetings, and the evidence presented before BLNR at those
meetings.
After the conclusion of the trial, the Environmental
Court filed its January 11, 2022 FOFs/COLs ruling against the
Sierra Club in Counts 2 and 3, and Sierra Club timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law
that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard." Maui
Lani, 156 Hawaiʻi at 532, 575 P.3d at 622 (citation omitted).
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time. Chun v. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of State of Haw., 73 Haw. 9, 13,
828 P.2d 260, 263 (1992).

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III. DISCUSSION
A. HRS § 632-1 declaratory relief was not available where
BLNR had exclusive original jurisdiction over Counts 2
and 3, and Sierra Club was required to exhaust all
corrective procedures in the administrative process,
including an appeal under HRS § 91-14.
In Maui Lani, the county planning commission approved
the permit at issue after a public hearing, at which future
members and officers of Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN)
testified. 156 Hawaiʻi at 526, 575 P.3d at 616. None of the
members or officers of MLN petitioned to intervene or maintained
an HRS § 91-14 appeal of the agency's decision to approve the
permit. Id. MLN later filed a circuit court complaint against
the commission alleging, inter alia, violations of zoning,
Hawaiʻi Constitution provisions, and due process, and requesting
declaratory relief that the permit was void as a matter of law.
Id. at 526-27, 575 P.3d at 616-17. Noting that the county's
application procedures expressly provided rights to intervene
and for judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14, the Hawaiʻi
Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the claims because MLN did not exhaust its administrative
remedies, where none of MLN's members and officers petitioned to
intervene or maintained an HRS § 91-14 appeal of the
commission's approval of the permit. Id. at 534-35, 575 P.3d at
624-25. The supreme court reasoned that MLN's claims challenged
the "substance" of the commission's decision to issue the
permit, which could have been properly addressed in an HRS
§ 91-14 appeal, and a "belated post-decision civil action for
declaratory relief is not a replacement for participation in a
hearing" before the agency. Id. at 539, 542, 575 P.3d at 629,
632 (citation omitted).
Maui Lani applied the "doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies" (exhaustion doctrine) "where a claim is

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cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency
alone." Id. at 533, 575 P.3d at 623 (citation omitted). Where
an agency has such "exclusive original jurisdiction over a
claim, 'judicial review of agency action will not be available
unless the party affected has taken advantage of all the
corrective procedures provided for in the administrative
process.'" Id. (citation omitted). In order for the exhaustion
doctrine to apply, "the statute, ordinance or regulation under
which the agency exercises its power must establish clearly
defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution
of complaints by aggrieved parties." Id. (citation modified).
1. BLNR had original exclusive jurisdiction over the
claims in Counts 2 and 3, which expressly and
substantively challenged BLNR's decisionmaking on
the Permits.

In Maui Lani, the supreme court held that where the
"adjudication of MLN's [zoning] claims first required a
decision" by the agency as to whether the proposed use violated
zoning ordinances or met the criteria for a permit, and the
decision granting the permit was made through the agency's
"procedures prescribed by ordinance and the [commission] Rules,"
"the appropriate means to review the [commission]'s decision was
through a chapter 91 appeal." Id. at 537, 575 P.3d at 627. The
court reaffirmed the rationale of a prior precedent, Kona Old
Hawaiian Trails Group By and Through Serrano v. Lyman (Kona
Old), 69 Haw. 81, 83-84, 93, 734 P.2d 161, 163, 169 (1987),
which held that regulatory "uniformity and consistency" is
secured through initial review by agencies "that are better
equipped than courts by specialization." Id. (brackets
omitted). The Maui Lani court reasoned that "[h]ere, allowing
MLN to challenge the substance of the [commission]'s decision
through an original action independent from an administrative

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proceeding under HRS § 91-14 would be counter to the uniform and
consistent regulation of land use contemplated" by county zoning
ordinances and HRS § 46-4, which vested zoning powers in the
counties. Id. (citation omitted). The court applied this same
reasoning to preclude the plaintiff's constitutional claims,
which were in the nature of HRS § 632-1 declaratory relief based
on their "substance" and sought the same relief as the zoning
claims. Id. at 541, 575 P.3d at 631. These constitutional
declaratory relief claims were likewise precluded because MLN
"had opportunity to raise those claims through the [permit]
process and on appeal pursuant to HRS § 91-14." Id.
Here, HRS § 171-55 (2011) conferred upon BLNR the
statutory authority to "issue permits for the temporary
occupancy of state lands." Sierra Club participated in the
administrative process before BLNR by presenting opposition
testimony at the 2018 and 2019 public meetings on the Permits
pursuant to Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR) § 13-1-11.1
(governing testimony at public meetings), and Sierra Club
followed the procedure set forth in HAR § 13-1-29 to timely
request a contested case hearing on both the 2019 and 2020
Permits. At the BLNR public meetings and within Sierra Club's
2018 and 2019 requests for a contested case hearing, Sierra Club
argued that BLNR's decisionmaking on the Permits breached
constitutional public trust duties and violated the CZMA under
HRS Chapter 205A. In Counts 2 and 3 of Sierra Club's
subsequently filed FAC, Sierra Club raised the same claims it
previously raised in the BLNR public meetings. Counts 2 and 3
thus expressly and substantively challenged BLNR's
decisionmaking on the Permits and sought invalidation of the
Permits. As in Maui Lani, "requiring relitigation of agency
decisions is inefficient and imposes an increased burden on the
State in contrast to resolving the challenge in the initial

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decision-making process." Id. at 542, 575 P.3d at 632 (citation
omitted). These concerns are evident here, where BLNR's 2018
and 2019 Decisions were litigated in a lengthy trial that lasted
nearly a month. Allowing Sierra Club to challenge BLNR's Permit
decisions in a subsequent trial rather than through an HRS
§ 91-14 appeal runs "counter to the uniform and consistent
regulation" by BLNR of HRS § 171-55 permits. Id. at 537,
575 P.3d at 627. We conclude the claims in Count 2 and 3 were
cognizable in the first instance by the administrative agency,
BLNR, alone; BLNR had "exclusive original jurisdiction" over
them; and BLNR's administrative process applied to their
resolution. See id. at 533, 575 P.3d at 623.

2. Sierra Club was required to exhaust all of the
corrective procedures provided for in the
administrative process, including an HRS § 91-14
appeal.
Sierra Club argues that Maui Lani has no application
here because it "asked for a contested case[,]" which was
denied, and there "[we]re no statutes or rules that provide for
any agency to review BLNR's decision." The County similarly
argues that there was "no immediate mechanism to appeal under
HRS § 91-14" from the denial of the contested case hearing.
A&B/EMI argues that Sierra Club failed to appeal the
2018 and 2019 Decisions and the denial of the contested case
hearing requests under HRS § 91-14; and that the relief sought
is "duplicative of the relief that would have been available
. . . through the administrative process." BLNR similarly
argues that Sierra Club "had available administrative remedies"
through "the administrative process and subsequent HRS § 91-14
appeal."
In this case, because BLNR had exclusive jurisdiction
over Sierra Club's claims in Counts 2 and 3, Sierra Club was

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required to exhaust "all the corrective procedures provided for
in the administrative process." Id. at 533, 575 P.3d at 623
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Sierra Club partially used
the administrative process to litigate its claims before BLNR,
but did not exhaust "all the corrective procedures" available in
that process, because it did not pursue an HRS § 91-14 appeal.
Id. The parties disagree on whether the corrective procedure of
an HRS § 91-14 appeal was available to Sierra Club, where its
requests for a contested case hearing request were denied.
In a separate case, the supreme court recently held
that BLNR's denial of Sierra Club's request for a contested case
hearing regarding continuation of A&B/EMI's Permits for 2021,
and BLNR's subsequent decision to renew those Permits, "were a
final decision and order from which Sierra Club had the right to
appeal." Sierra Club v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 156 Hawai‘i
382, 399, 575 P.3d 472, 489 (2025) (citation omitted). Here, we
also conclude an HRS § 91-14 appeal was available as part of the
corrective procedures in BLNR's administrative process.
Because Sierra Club did not pursue its administrative
remedy under HRS § 91-14, it did not exhaust "all the corrective
procedures" required under the exhaustion doctrine. See Maui
Lani, 156 Hawaiʻi at 533, 575 P.3d at 623.
3. Declaratory relief under HRS § 632-1 is precluded
because HRS § 91-14 provided a special form of
remedy.
The declaratory relief statute, HRS § 632-1, contains
a limiting provision, which states: "where a statute provides a
special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that
statutory remedy shall be followed." Id. at 538, 575 P.3d at
628 (citation modified) (quoting HRS § 632-1(b)). The Maui Lani
court explained that:

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This court has interpreted this limitation as a bar to
jurisdiction. Punohu [v. Sunn], 66 Haw. [485,] 487, 666
P.2d [1133,] 1134 [(1983)] (citing Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
Haw. Roofing, Inc., 64 Haw. 380, 641 P.2d 1333 (1982)) ("We
have held that where such a statutory remedy exists,
declaratory judgment does not lie."). More, this court has
held that "the remedy of appeal" of a contested case
proceeding provided by HRS § 91-14, "is a statutorily
provided special form of remedy" such "that a declaratory
judgment action, pursuant to § 632-1, HRS, did not
lie." Id. at 487, 666 P.2d at 1135.

Id. at 538, 575 P.3d at 628. "HRS § 632-1 bars a declaratory
action where an administrative appeal is available because . . .
'it would be anomalous to permit a declaratory judgment action
to be submitted for an appeal from an agency determination in a
contested case.'" Id. at 542, 575 P.3d at 632 (quoting Punohu,
66 Haw. at 487, 666 P.2d at 1135). Holding that "HRS § 91-14 is
a special form of statutory remedy that precludes a declaratory
action[,]" the Maui Lani court held that HRS § 632-1 precluded
declaratory relief on MLN's zoning and constitutional claims
where MLN "had opportunity to raise those claims through the
[administrative] process and on appeal pursuant to HRS § 91-14."
Id. at 538-41, 575 P.3d at 628-31 (citation omitted).
Here, Sierra Club's claims in Counts 2 and 3
challenged the decisionmaking on the Permits, and BLNR's
administrative process, including an HRS § 91-14 appeal, applied
to the resolution of those claims. Because Sierra Club had a
special statutory remedy under HRS § 91-14, and Sierra Club had
opportunity to raise those claims through BLNR's administrative
process, Sierra Club is "thus precluded from bringing them in an
original action" under HRS § 632-1. See id. at 541, 575 P.3d at
631.

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B. While a breach of trust claim may be brought by direct
action, under the circumstances of this case, Count 2
was subject to BLNR's administrative process,
including an HRS § 91-14 appeal.
Sierra Club argues the breach of trust claim in Count
2 is "originally cognizable in court, and is not dependent on
HRS § 632-1[,]" and is "based both on the common law (breach of
trust) as well as a violation of constitutional duties." Sierra
Club argues that its public trust claim relied on Hawaiʻi's
constitutional breach of trust provisions, for which prosecution
via direct action has been recognized in precedent, such as
Ching v. Case, 145 Hawaiʻi 148, 154, 449 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2019)
(involving a direct action for breach of public trust against
the State for failure to "take all necessary steps to ensure
compliance with the terms of [a] lease"); Kelly v. 1250
Oceanside Partners, 111 Hawaiʻi 205, 211-13, 140 P.3d 985, 991-93
(2006) (involving a direct action for breach of the public trust
against the department of health for failure to prevent a
developer from violating water quality standards relating to
coastal waters); Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 601,
837 P.2d 1247, 1262 (1992) (recognizing a "right to bring suit
under the Hawaii Constitution to prospectively enjoin the State
from violating the terms of the ceded lands trust"); Frankel v.
Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 155 Hawaiʻi 358, 364, 564 P.3d 1157,
1163 (App. 2025) (involving a direct action for breach of public
trust against BLNR for approving a revocable permit to a resort
that encroached on a portion of ceded public trust land
consisting of beach and swimming area), cert. rejected,
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 2025 WL 1713026 (Haw. June 19, 2025); Hall v.
Dep't of Land & Nat. Res., 128 Hawaiʻi 455, 473, 290 P.3d 525,
543 (App. 2012) (affirming the grant of summary judgment against
plaintiff's claim for breach of trust, where the plaintiff did

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not "cite any authority which support[ed] the application of the
public trust doctrine" to the instant case).
We conclude that the above cases upon which Sierra
Club relies do not have persuasive application here, based on
the nature of the claim in Count 2 challenging BLNR's
decisionmaking on the Permits, and where the HRS § 91-14
administrative process was available to Sierra Club. Ching and
Kelly are distinguishable because the agency's decisionmaking
had concluded and the administrative process was not available
to the plaintiffs in those cases; and both plaintiffs challenged
the enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of the agency's
decision, rather than the agency's decisionmaking itself. See
Ching, 145 Hawaiʻi at 154, 449 P.3d at 1152; Kelly, 111 Hawaiʻi
at 211-13, 140 P.3d at 991-93. Hall affirmed the dismissal of
the breach of public trust claim and has no persuasive value.
128 Hawaiʻi at 473, 290 P.3d at 543. We agree that the
procedural posture of the public trust claim in Frankel is
similar to this case, where the administrative process was
available and utilized, but no HRS § 91-14 appeal was filed.
155 Hawaiʻi at 364, 564 P.3d at 1163. The Frankel plaintiffs'
public trust claims similarly challenged the agency's
decisionmaking, but did so through the vehicle of a direct
action. Id. at 364-65, 564 P.3d at 1163-64. However, the
applicability of the exhaustion doctrine and whether the
Environmental Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the
breach of trust claims were not litigated by the parties or
determined by this court in Frankel. This court decided Frankel
in January 2025 -- before the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court's September
2025 Maui Lani decision that is binding upon this court.
We do not hold that a breach of trust claim may never
be brought in a direct action. Rather, our holding is limited

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to the circumstances in this case. Here, Count 2 challenged
BLNR's decisionmaking on the Permits and was subject to BLNR's
administrative process that included an HRS § 91-14 appeal.
C. Because Count 3 was subject to BLNR's
administrative process, including an HRS § 91-14
appeal, the alternative remedy of an original
action under HRS § 205A-6 was not available.
Sierra Club argues that HRS § 205A-6 "allows for
parties to challenge agency actions directly through the court
system." In Maui Lani, the supreme court likewise noted "HRS §
205A-6 provides for an original action in court." 156 Hawaiʻi at
539, 575 P.3d at 629. Sierra Club's argument is not supported
by Hawaiʻi precedent that has applied the exhaustion doctrine to
HRS Chapter 205A claims for which an administrative process was
available.
In Kona Old, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of a plaintiff organization's challenge to the county
planning director's issuance of a permit on grounds that it
violated the CZMA. 69 Haw. at 83-84, 734 P.2d at 163. The
plaintiff contended that it had a right to judicial review under
both HRS § 91-14 and HRS § 205A-6. Id. at 89, 734 P.2d at 166-
67. The Kona Old court concluded that because the plaintiff
"did not avail itself" of the "opportunity for an agency
hearing" under HRS § 91-14, that avenue of relief was not
available to it. Id. at 92, 734 P.2d at 168. The court then
addressed HRS § 205A-6 and explained that the statute "affords
an interested party an alternative remedy for an agency's
noncompliance with the CZMA by authorizing a civil action in
which a circuit court" has jurisdiction to provide "any relief
as may be appropriate." Id. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169 (emphasis
added) (quoting HRS § 205A-6(c)). While the Kona Old court
acknowledged that HRS § 205A-6 created a cause of action

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"seemingly . . . originally cognizable in the courts[,]" because
the plaintiff's claim "involve[d] the issuance" of a permit, and
the permit's "enforcement" required the resolution of issues
placed within the agency's "special competence" "under the
regulatory scheme," the court held that the agency "regulating
the subject matter should not be passed over." Id. (citations
and brackets omitted). The Kona Old court concluded that
judicial review under HRS § 205A-6 was not available where the
plaintiff had not exhausted the HRS § 91-14 administrative
process available to it, stating as follows:
Exhaustion comes into play "where a claim is cognizable in
the first instance by an administrative agency alone;
judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has run its course." The exhaustion principle asks
simply that the avenues of relief nearest and simplest
should be pursued first. Judicial review of agency action
will not be available unless the party affected has taken
advantage of all the corrective procedures provided for in
the administrative process. Under this principle, Kona Old
clearly had no right to seek judicial review.

Id. (citation modified). The Maui Lani court similarly rejected
MLN's assertion that HRS § 46-4 provided for an original action
for MLN's zoning claims, holding that "the right of action
created under that statute [(HRS § 46-4)] is meant to supplement
the counties' enforcement authority and not to authorize a
collateral attack on an agency decision outside of the
administrative appeals process." 156 Hawaiʻi at 537, 575 P.3d at
627 (emphases added).
Here, HRS § 205A-6 is an "alternative remedy" for a
CZMA violation and may not be used to "authorize a collateral
attack on an agency decision outside of the administrative
process." See id.; Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169.
Because Count 3 challenged BLNR's decisionmaking on the Permits,
it was originally cognizable before BLNR and subject to
exhaustion of "all the corrective procedures provided for in

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[BLNR's] administrative process" including an HRS § 91-14
appeal. See Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169 (citation
omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Environmental
Court's January 11, 2022 FOFs/COLs and February 16, 2022 Final
Judgment, and remand for entry of an order dismissing the action
for lack of jurisdiction.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, November 18, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
David Kimo Frankel,
Chief Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Daniel A. Morris,
Associate Judge
Miranda C. Steed,
Deputy Attorneys General,
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Defendants-Appellees,
Associate Judge
Board of Land and Natural
Resources, Department of Land
and Natural Resources, and
Dawn N.S. Chang in her
official capacity as
Chairperson of the Board of
Land and Natural Resources.

Mallory T. Martin,
Trisha H.S.T. Akagi,
for Defendants-Appellees,
Alexander and Baldwin, Inc.,
and East Maui Irrigation
Company, LLC.

Caleb P. Rowe,
Mariana Lowy-Gerstmar,
Deputy Corporation Counsels,
for Defendant-Appellee,
County of Maui.