Needs, Jr. v. Wesley R. Segawa & Associates, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
31-OCT-2025
07:52 AM
Dkt. 34 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

ERICH L. NEEDS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
WESLEY R. SEGAWA & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, and Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Erich L. Needs, Jr. (Needs), self-
represented, appeals from the October 9, 2023 "Order Granting
Defendant[-Appellee] Wesley R. Segawa & Associates, Inc.'s
[(WRSA)] Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed on June 29, 2023"
(Dismissal Order) and the November 15, 2023 "Final Judgment"
(Judgment) entered in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
(Circuit Court).1/ The Judgment dismissed with prejudice Needs's
June 29, 2023 "Civil Tort Complaint for Breach of Contract,
Unlawful Discharge and Discriminatory Practices" (Complaint).
Needs alleged in the Complaint that WRSA violated
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-2 when it terminated his
employment based on his arrest for an alleged assault committed
while he was on duty at WRSA's job site. He further alleged that
after the complaining witness (CW) passed away, the State of
Hawai#i filed a motion for nolle prosequi (voluntary dismissal)
without prejudice in Needs's criminal case, and WRSA failed to
reinstate him following the dismissal of that case. The

1/
The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Complaint asserted four claims based on these allegations:
breach of contract (Count I), unlawful discharge (Count II),
discriminatory practices (Count III), and presumption of
innocence (Count IV).
On July 19, 2023, WRSA filed a motion to dismiss the
Complaint under Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and under Rule 12(b)(1)
and (h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Following a September 15, 2023 hearing, the Circuit
Court entered the Dismissal Order, granting WRSA's motion to
dismiss and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.2/ The
Judgment followed on November 15, 2023.
On appeal, Needs contends that the Circuit Court erred
in dismissing his breach of contract, unlawful discharge and
discriminatory practices claims "when it prematurely granted
[WRSA's motion to dismiss], without first allowing [Needs] to
present evidence, following the [d]iscovery process." Needs does
not challenge the dismissal of his "presumption of innocence"
claim.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Needs's contentions as follows, and affirm.
We review a circuit court's ruling on a motion to
dismiss de novo, under the same standard applied by the circuit
court. Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i at 256-57, 428 P.3d at 768-69.
"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

2/
The Dismissal Order includes findings of fact ( FOFs) and
conclusions of law. A circuit court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim generally does not make findings of fact. The court's
consideration is limited to the allegations of the complaint, and the court
must deem those allegations to be true. See Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i 249, 257, 428 P.3d 769 (2018). However, the court
"is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence,
such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the
existence of jurisdiction." Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 74 Haw. 235,
240, 842 P.2d 634, 637 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, we may consider the
FOFs in the Dismissal Order that concern the Circuit Court's subject matter
jurisdiction.

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no set of facts . . . support[ing their] claim that would entitle
[them] to relief." Id. at 257, 428 P.3d at 769 (quoting Kealoha
v. Machado, 131 Hawai#i 62, 74, 315 P.3d 213, 225 (2013)).
(1) The Circuit Court did not err in dismissing Needs's
breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim.
Needs alleged in the Complaint that he was "fired for
violating the 'Rules of Conduct' . . . of the Employee
Handbook[,]" based on the alleged assault of the CW. In Count I,
he asserted that WRSA "[b]reached the implied contract of
Employment, based upon an arrest of [Needs] for an alleged
offense committed wh[i]le [Needs] was on duty at [WRSA's] job
site[,]" and "[t]o date [he] has NOT been convicted for the
alleged assault." The Complaint did not identify the source or
terms of the purported implied contract, did not allege that WRSA
assented to those terms, and did not state how those terms were
breached.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Needs
acknowledged that his employment was "at-will," stating that
"[he] seeks to confront the 'At-Will' clause in the hiring of
[him], in the sense that, though [WRSA] reserves the right to
terminate [him] for cause or no cause." Needs also argued:

Plaintiff entered an "implied contract" with the Defendant
that promised to pay Plaintiff for his work, and that as
long as the Plaintiff did his job, pursuant to the job
description, policy and procedures, that the Plaintiff would
remain on the job and be paid for his services. Plaintiff
further understood that while the Defendant could terminate
the Plaintiffs' employment for "No Reason", Plaintiff would
NOT be terminated for an unfounded and false allegation.

Thereby, Plaintiff asserts that terminating an
employee upon an unfounded and false allegation, is an
actionable claim, as it "Breaches" the terms and conditions
of an "implied contract".

In its Dismissal Order, the Circuit Court concluded
that the Complaint "does not allege the requisite elements of
offer, acceptance or consideration establishing the existence of
a contract, does not allege any details of the contract, and does
not allege any provision of the contract Defendant purportedly
breached." The court acknowledged the assertions made in Needs's
response to the motion to dismiss, and concluded in part:

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5. Although Plaintiff asserts that he believed (1)
that as long as he "did his job" he would "remain on the
job" and (2) he would not be terminated for an "unfounded
and false allegation" . . . , Plaintiff has not alleged that
the parties discussed these terms, that Defendant assented
to these terms, or the existence of the mutual assent
required to give rise to such contractual obligations.
Plaintiff's unilateral beliefs do not constitute the meeting
of the minds necessary to establish a contractual
obligation.
6. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the
existence of an implied contract or any mutually agreed-upon
contractual provision that Defendant purportedly violated,
and as such, has failed to state a claim that a breach of
contract has occurred. Au v. Au, 63 Haw. 210, 221, 626 P.2d
173, 181 (1981) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss
because the plaintiff's "fail[ure] to specify what
provisions of the [contract] were breached" failed to
provide defendant with "fair notice of what [the] claim is
or the grounds upon which it rests").

On appeal, Needs does not contend that the Complaint
adequately alleged the existence of an implied contract or the
breach of such a contract. Rather, he contends that the Circuit
Court erred by "prematurely grant[ing]" the motion to dismiss
without first allowing him to conduct discovery. On this record,
we conclude that Needs failed to plead the required elements of a
claim for breach of an implied contract, and the Circuit Court
did not err in so ruling.
As to Needs's argument that the Circuit Court should
have afforded him an opportunity to conduct discovery before
granting the motion, he does not state where in the record he
made this request or explain how discovery would have saved his
claim. See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4);
Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co.,
100 Hawai#i 97, 107, 58 P.3d 608, 618 (2002) ("Legal issues not
raised in the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on
appeal."). He made no related argument in his response to the
motion to dismiss, and did not request a transcript of the
related hearing for the record on appeal. See Bettencourt v.
Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i 225, 230, 909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995) ("The
burden is upon appellant in an appeal to show error by reference
to matters in the record, and [they have] the responsibility of
providing an adequate transcript." (quoting Union Bldg. Materials
Corp. v. The Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw. App. 146, 151, 682 P.2d 82, 87
(1984))). On this record, we cannot conclude that the Circuit

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Court abused its discretion in dismissing the breach of contract
claim with prejudice.
(2) The Circuit Court did not err in dismissing Needs's
unlawful discharge claim for failure to state a claim.
Needs filed the Complaint on June 29, 2023, alleging
that he was fired by WRSA on September 1, 2020. In Count II, he
asserted that "[WRSA] violated HRS § 378-2 when [it] Unlawfully
Discharged [Needs] from his job with [WRSA], based upon an arrest
of [Needs] for an alleged offense committed wh[i]le [Needs] was
on duty at [WRSA's] job site[,]" and "[t]o date [he] has NOT been
convicted for the alleged assault." Needs did not further
elucidate this claim in his response to the motion to dismiss.
In its Dismissal Order, the Circuit Court concluded:

8. . . . To the extent Plaintiff asserts Count II
pursuant to section 378-2, it is duplicative of Plaintiff's
Count III for Discriminatory Practices also asserted under
section 378-2 and based on essentially the same allegations.

9. Construing Plaintiff's allegations in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, and instead interpreting Count
II as a claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy (i.e., a Parnar claim), Plaintiff's claim is
barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982) ("an employer may be held liable in tort where his
discharge of an employee violates a clear mandate of public
policy"); HRS § 657-7 ("Actions for the recovery of
compensation for damage or injury to persons or property
shall be instituted within two years after the cause of
action accrued, and not after . . . .").

See also Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State, 110 Hawai#i 338,
364, 133 P.3d 767, 793 (2006) (affirming dismissal of complaint
barred by the statute of limitations where the validity of the
affirmative defense was "apparent from the face of the pleading"
(quoting Romero v. Star Mkts., Ltd., 82 Hawai#i 405, 416, 922
P.2d 1018, 1029 (App. 1996))).
On appeal, Needs does not contend that Count II states
an independent claim (apart from his discriminatory practices
claim) or that, even if construed as a Parnar claim, it was not
time-barred. Rather, he contends that the Circuit Court erred by
"prematurely grant[ing]" the motion to dismiss without first
allowing him to conduct discovery. Again, he does not state
where in the record he made this request or explain how discovery

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would have saved Count II. On this record, we cannot conclude
that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in dismissing
Needs's unlawful discharge claim with prejudice.
(3) The Circuit Court did not err in dismissing
Needs's discriminatory practices claim for failure to exhaust the
necessary administrative remedies.
In Count III, Needs asserted that "[WRSA] violated HRS
§ 378-2 when [it] Discriminated against [Needs] by terminating
[Needs's] employment, based upon an arrest of [Needs] for an
alleged offense committed wh[i]le [Needs] was on duty at [WRSA's]
job site[,]" and "[t]o date [he] has NOT been convicted for the
alleged assault." Neither the Complaint nor Needs's later
response to the motion to dismiss asserted that Needs had
received a notice of right to sue on this claim from the Hawai#i
Civil Rights Commission (HCRC). See Simmons v. Aqua Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., 130 Hawai#i 325, 328–29, 310 P.3d 1026, 1029–30
(App. 2013) ("A person who wishes to file a judicial proceeding
in the circuit court for employment discrimination in a violation
of Part I of HRS Chapter 378 (1993) must first file a complaint
with the HCRC and receive a notice of right to sue from the
HCRC." (citing Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96
Hawai#i 408, 416 n.5, 32 P.3d 52, 60 n.5 (2001))).
In its Dismissal Order, the Circuit Court concluded:

12. The Court here does not need to look beyond the
pleadings to determine whether Plaintiff has exhausted the
required administrative remedies. The Complaint does not
allege that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the HCRC or the
[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC)] or that he
received a right to sue letter. Plaintiff admittedly did
not file a complaint with either administrative agency and
did not obtain a right to sue letter. As a result,
Plaintiff failed to exhaust the necessary administrative
remedies to bring his section 378-2 discrimination claim in
circuit court. Andrade v. Cnty. of Hawai#i, 145 Haw[ai#i]
265, 278, 451 P.3d 1, 14 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The Circuit Court
correctly ruled that Andrade failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies because Andrade did not initiate a
proceeding before the HCRC and did not obtain a right to sue
letter.").
13. The act of discrimination at issue here, i.e.,
Plaintiff’s termination, occurred on September 1, 2020.
Plaintiff had 180 days from that date to file a complaint
with the HCRC and/or EEOC. HRS § 368-11(c) ("No complaint
shall be filed after the expiration of one hundred eighty
days after the date: (1) Upon which the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practice occurred; or (2) Of the last

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occurrence in a pattern of ongoing discriminatory
practice."); Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc., 85
Haw[ai#i] 7, 18, 936 P.2d 643, 654 (1997) ("Furukawa
properly filed his discrimination complaint with the
commission within 180 days, pursuant to HRS § 368–11(c).").
Plaintiff did not do so, and any attempt by Plaintiff to
exhaust the necessary administrative remedies is now
time-barred, which cannot be cured.

On appeal, Needs does not contend that he filed a
complaint with the HCRC and received a notice of right to sue
before filing his discriminatory practices claim in the circuit
court.3/ Rather, he contends that the Circuit Court erred by
"prematurely grant[ing]" the motion to dismiss without first
allowing him to conduct discovery. Again, he does not state
where in the record he made this request or explain how discovery
would have saved Count III. On this record, we cannot conclude
that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in dismissing
Needs's discriminatory practices claim with prejudice.
For the reasons discussed above, the Dismissal Order
and the Judgment are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 31, 2025.

On the briefs:

Erich L. Needs, Jr., /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Self-presented Plaintiff- Chief Judge
Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Joseph A. Ernst and Associate Judge
D. Elliot Gonzalez
(Torkildson Katz) /s/ Sonja M. P. McCullen
for Defendant-Appellee. Associate Judge

3/
Nor does Needs contest the Circuit Court's FOF 6, which states:
"Plaintiff admittedly never filed a complaint with the [HCRC] or the [EEOC]
and never received a right to sue letter from either agency regarding the
claims asserted in this case." See supra note 2; Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of
Water Supply, 97 Hawai#i 450, 459, 40 P.3d 73, 82 (2002) ("unchallenged
factual findings are deemed to be binding on appeal").

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