CourtListener 10711691

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
27-OCT-2025
07:58 AM
Dkt. 113 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARIANO TAMAYO GARCES JR., Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(2))

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Mariano Tamayo Garces Jr. appeals

the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's "Judgment of

Conviction and Sentence," entered September 26, 2024, for Murder

in the Second Degree in the November 19, 2022 death of Amie

Kaholoa‘a. 1

1 The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

On appeal, Garces challenges the admission of his

statements to the police during custodial interrogation. 2 Garces

argues (1) the State failed to show his statement was voluntary,

and (2) his waiver was defective.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve this

appeal as discussed below and affirm.

(1) First, Garces argues that the State failed to

meet its "particularly heavy" burden of proof that the waiver of

his rights under Miranda was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent

in light of his suicidality and "severely distressed mental

state" mere hours before being interviewed.

To support this argument, Garces points to his

suicidal statements to a Maui Police Department (MPD) 911

dispatcher (e.g., "I going up to the mountain to kill my -- I

going up the mountain now. I going kill myself now.") and an

MPD officer (e.g., "I gonna a run away. I gonna run away, brah.

Shoot me, brah. Shoot me, brah. Shoot me.").

2 Additionally, Garces argues that the admission of his involuntary
confessions at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring
vacatur and remand of his conviction. However, because, as discussed below,
we conclude the circuit court did not err in determining that Garces's
confessions were voluntary, we do not reach this issue.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

The United States and Hawai‘i Constitutions guarantee

that no one shall be compelled to testify against themselves in

a criminal case:

Under the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the [Hawai‘i]
Constitution, "[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against" himself or herself.
State v. Pau‘u, 72 Haw. 505, 509, 824 P.2d 833, 835 (1992).
When a confession or inculpatory statement is obtained in
violation of either of these provisions, the prosecution
will not be permitted to use it to secure a defendant's
criminal conviction. Id. (citing State v. Russo, 67 Haw.
126, 681 P.2d 553 (1984)).

State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 501-02, 849 P.2d 58, 69 (1993)

(footnote omitted).

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has explained that mental

instability does not, by itself, render a confession

involuntary:

"[I]n the absence of insanity or mental depletion, neither
the voluntary character nor the admissibility of a
confession is affected by the mental instability of the
person making it." State v. Kreps, 4 Haw. App. 72, 77, 661
P.2d 711, 715 (1983) (citations omitted). Rather, the
person's mental state is relevant only to the weight and
effect to be given to the confession by the trier of fact.
Id. at 78, 661 P.2d at 715 (citations omitted).

Id. at 503, 849 P.2d at 70.

Instead, appellate courts must "examine the entire

record and make an independent determination of the ultimate

issue of voluntariness based upon that review and the totality

of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] statement."

State v. Baker, 147 Hawai‘i 413, 422, 465 P.3d 860, 869 (2020)

(quoting Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 502, 849 P.2d at 69). We

therefore review "the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

confession" de novo. Id. (quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai‘i 17,

32, 881 P.2d 504, 519 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

Beyond his alleged suicidality, 3 Garces points to no

other indicia of coercion or overbearing of will suggesting his

confessions were involuntary. Instead, the circuit court found

that Garces "did not appear under the influence of any

substances prior to and during the interview and his demeanor

was clear and coherent." Garces does not challenge this

finding.

The circuit court further found that the detective who

interviewed Garces "did not use any threats, coercion, force or

promises to get [Garces] to make a statement." Rather, the

circuit court found that "[w]hile he was being processed at the

MPD [Moloka‘i] station, [Garces] requested to speak to MPD

officers." Garces does not challenge these findings.

On this record, there is no evidence that Garces's

statement was made under conditions that would "overbear" his

3 The circuit court determined that "[Garces]'s statements of a
suicidal nature, absent evidence of action upon those statements, were not
credible." While courts generally "appl[y] a 'clearly erroneous' standard of
review to the findings of fact made by the court in connection with a
voluntariness hearing," Baker, 147 Hawai‘i at 422, 465 P.3d at 869 (brackets
in original omitted), "[i]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not
pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of the evidence; this is the province of the trier of fact," State v.
Sprattling, 99 Hawai‘i 312, 317, 55 P.3d 276, 281 (2002) (brackets in original
omitted). To the extent that Garces asks this court to disturb the circuit
court's credibility determination, we decline to do so. See id.

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

will. See Baker, 147 Hawai‘i at 434, 465 P.3d at 881 (concluding

that the use of "multiple coercive tactics in conjunction to

overbear [defendant]'s will" rendered defendant's confession

involuntary).

Under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit

court did not err in determining that Garces's statement was

voluntarily made. See id. at 422, 465 P.3d at 869.

(2) Next, Garces challenges the admissibility of his

statement on the basis that his "Miranda waiver was

constitutionally deficient" because it "failed to explicitly

state that [he] could stop answering questions at any time or

that he did not have to answer questions at all." Nevertheless,

Garces acknowledges that he "is not aware of a case requiring

these advisements." Instead, Garces points to the Honolulu

Police Department's practice of providing such instructions in

its own Miranda waiver form and the United States Supreme

Court's favorable view of such or similar instructions.

As the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has recently explained,

"[u]nder the Hawai‘i Constitution, 'absent Miranda warnings and a

valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a person

subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are

inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against

that person.'" State v. Spies, 157 Hawaiʻi 75, 98, 575 P.3d 708,

5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

731 (2025) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 155 Hawai‘i 166, 172, 557

P.3d 895, 901 (2024)) (brackets in original omitted).

Our controlling caselaw requires "that each accused

was warned that he had a right to remain silent, that anything

said could be used against him, that he had a right to the

presence of an attorney, and that if he could not afford an

attorney one would be appointed for him." Id. at 86-87, 557

P.3d at 719-20 (quoting State v. Henderson, 80 Hawai‘i 439, 441-

42, 911 P.2d 74, 76-77 (1996)). Otherwise, no specific formula

or wording is required; instead, "[t]he crucial test is whether

the words in the context used, considering the age, background

and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a

clear, understandable warning of all of his rights." State v.

Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 432, 539 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1975) (quoting

Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967)).

The circuit court, in unchallenged findings of fact,

found that Garces was advised of the following Miranda rights:

a. "You have the right to remain silent."

b. "Anything you say can be used against you in
court."

c. "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before we ask you any questions and to have your
lawyer with you during questioning."

d. "If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be
appointed for you before any questioning."

6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

These warnings satisfy the "minimal safeguards" required under

the Hawai‘i Constitution. See Spies, 157 Hawaiʻi at 87, 575 P.3d

at 720.

Further, nothing in the record supports a finding that

Garces, by his age, background, or education, was unable to

understand the warning. See Maluia, 56 Haw. at 432, 539 P.2d at

1205. As such, Garces's waiver was not constitutionally

deficient. See Spies, 157 Hawaiʻi at 87, 575 P.3d at 720;

Maluia, 56 Haw. at 432, 539 P.2d at 1205.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

September 26, 2024 "Judgment of Conviction and Sentence[.]"

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, October 27, 2025.

On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Brandon M. Segal,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Associate Judge
Gerald K. Enriques,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
County of Maui, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.