Kruize v. Kruize

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
08-AUG-2025
08:06 AM
Dkt. 38 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

CAROL ANN KRUIZE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
MUNCKO DERK KRUIZE, II, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1DV211006258)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Muncko Derk Kruize, II, (Muncko)

appeals from the June 29, 2023 Divorce Decree entered by the

Family Court of the First Circuit (Family Court).1 Muncko

challenges the Family Court's September 12, 2022 Order Granting

Ex Parte Motion to Reinstate Complaint for Divorce and

Declaration (Order Reinstating Complaint)2 and November 30, 2022

Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss).3

Muncko raises three points of error on appeal,

contending that the Family Court erred: (1) in finding good

1
The Honorable Robert J. Brown presided over the Divorce Decree.
2
The Honorable Elizabeth Paek-Harris presided over the Order
Reinstating Complaint.
3
The Honorable Paul T. Murakami presided over the Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

cause to reinstate the Complaint for Divorce (Complaint); (2)

when it determined that Plaintiff-Appellee Carol Ann Kruize

(Carol) was domiciled in Hawai i when she filed her Ex Parte

Motion to Reinstate [the Complaint]; and (3) when it determined

that the court continued to have subject matter jurisdiction.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Muncko's

points of error as follows:

(1) Muncko argues that the Family Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' divorce after the

Complaint was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Hawai i

Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 41(e)(2) and then reinstated by an

order entered less than thirty days later because, at that time,

allegedly, neither party was domiciled in Hawai i.

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 580-1(a)(2018) states in

relevant part:
§ 580-1 Jurisdiction; hearing. (a) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in matters of annulment, divorce, and
separation, subject to section 603-37 as to change of venue,
and subject also to appeal according to law, is conferred
upon the family court of the circuit in which the applicant
has been domiciled or has been physically present for a
continuous period of at least three months next preceding
the application therefor[.]

The statute is clear that for the purposes of

jurisdiction, one must have been domiciled (or physically

present) in the State at the time the application for divorce –

i.e., the complaint – is filed. Thus, the parties' domicile is

tested for the purpose of subject matter jurisdiction at the

beginning of the suit for divorce, and should the plaintiff

satisfy the requirements of the statute, the court has subject

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matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. That jurisdiction is

not later extinguished just because a party moved out of state.

See, e.g., CH v. JH, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 7167085, *5

(Haw. App. Dec. 23, 2019) ("When this durational requirement is

met, section 580-1 does not by its terms impose any additional

requirement that either party remain in Hawai i while the action

is pending or until entry of the divorce decree.").

It is undisputed that Carol was domiciled in Hawai i

and that the Family Court had jurisdiction at the time the

Complaint was filed. Muncko argues, without citation to any

authority, that the Family Court "lost jurisdiction" when the

Complaint was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to HFCR

Rule 41(e)(2). This rule provides, in relevant part:
Rule 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS.

. . . .

(e) Dismissal for want of service or prosecution.

. . . .

(2) In any case in which a final decree, judgment, or
order has not been made and filed prior to the expiration of
1 year from the date of the filing of the complaint or post-
judgment motion in said action, the same may be dismissed
unless a trial date has been set or an order has been filed
enlarging the time following a showing of good cause. Such
a dismissal may be set aside and the action or motion
reinstated by order of court for good cause shown on ex
parte motion duly filed in said action within 30 days of
service of the order of dismissal on JEFS Users through JEFS
or within 30 says of mailing of the order of dismissal to
the last known address of parties who are not represented by
an attorney and who are not JEFS Users.

(Emphasis added).

Here, the Family Court entered the order of dismissal

on August 30, 2022. On September 7, 2022, Carol filed her ex

parte motion to reinstate the Complaint. On September 12, 2022,

the Family Court granted the ex parte motion and the Complaint

was reinstated. Accordingly, although the Complaint was

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"dismissed," as contemplated by and in compliance with the rule,

the dismissal was set aside and the action on the Complaint

remained pending. Cf. In re Burns, 49 Haw. 20, 26, 407 P.2d 855,

889 (1965) (holding that vacating a divorce decree reinstates the

original pleadings without loss of the original jurisdiction of

the court). We conclude that the Family Court did not lack

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' divorce,

notwithstanding the HRCP Rule 41(e)(2) dismissal and

reinstatement.

(2) In light of our above conclusion, we need not

reach the issue of Carol's domicile at the time of the dismissal

and reinstatement of the Complaint. We nevertheless note that,

based on the evidence in the record before it, the Family Court

did not clearly err in its findings and conclusion that Carol was

still domiciled in Hawai i at the time of the dismissal and

reinstatement of the Complaint. See In re Estate of Marcos, 88

Hawai i 148, 154-55, 963 P.2d 1124, 1130-31 (1998) (holding that

Ferdinand Marcos was not domiciled in Hawai i at the time of his

death because, inter alia, it was not established that Marcos

intended to live in Hawai i permanently with the intent to

abandon his domicile in the Philippines).

(3) Muncko argues that the Family Court erred in

concluding that Carol established good cause to reinstate the

Complaint. More specifically, Muncko argues Carol deliberately

delayed the proceedings by "fail[ing] to take the necessary steps

to guide the matter toward a decree and/or order," and that

reinstating the case is prejudicial to him because he no longer

lives in Hawai i.

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"Good cause" should exist to set aside an entry of
default if: (1) the defendant did not deliberately fail to
plead or otherwise defend or engage in contumacious conduct;
or (b)[sic] if the defendant did deliberately fail to plead
or otherwise defend or engage in contumacious conduct, there
is no actual prejudice to the plaintiff that cannot be
addressed through lesser sanctions.

Chen v. Mah, 146 Hawai i 157, 180, 457 P.3d 796, 819 (2020)

(footnotes omitted).

Carol argued in the motion to reinstate that no further

steps had been taken in the case because the parties had been

engaged in settlement negotiations, and that if they failed to

come to an agreement, she intended to file a motion to set a

trial date. Muncko acknowledged that the parties had been

engaged in settlement discussions. The Family Court concluded

that Carol did not deliberately delay the divorce case or engage

in contumacious conduct, that there was no evidence of actual

prejudice to Muncko, and thus that there was good cause to set

aside the dismissal and reinstate the case.

Although it appears that Muncko had left the State

after the Complaint was filed, he presented no specific evidence

or argument as to how the delay, while the parties tried to

negotiate the terms of their divorce – and thereby avoid the

expense and uncertainty of trial – prejudiced him. 4 Muncko

points to no allegedly contumacious conduct on Carol's part,

other than the delay in prosecuting the case. We conclude that

the Family Court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in

determining that there was good cause to reinstate the case.

4
Indeed, although Muncko continued to maintain his jurisdictional
objection, the parties ultimately entered into an uncontested divorce
agreement – which Muncko confirmed he had read and agreed to of his own free
will – and the Family Court accepted and approved the agreement, entering the
Divorce Decree based on the parties' agreement. On appeal, Muncko does not
challenge any aspect of the Divorce Decree itself.

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For these reasons, the Family Court's June 29, 2023

Divorce Decree is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, August 8, 2025.

On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
Michael Sweetman,
Nina Tholl, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
(Law Offices of Einwechter & Associate Judge
Hyatt),
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge
A. Debbie Jew
(Ogawa, Lau, Nakamura & Jew),
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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