Nautilus Insurance Company v. Linwood Community Day Care et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
NAUTILUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL NO. 2:25-cv-7
(KLEEH)
LINWOOD COMMUNITY DAY CARE, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ SNOWSHOE
MOUNTAIN, INC. AND TONY E DICKMAN [ECF No. 11] AND DEFENDANT
LINWOOD COMMUNITY DAY CARE’S [ECF No. 14] MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	Defendants 	Snowshoe 	Mountain,
Inc. 	and 	Tony 	E. 	Dickman’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	[ECF 	No. 	11] 	and
Defendant Linwood Community Day Care’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
14]. 	For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	herein, 	the 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	[ECF
No. 11, 14] are DENIED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 	April 	7, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	Nautilus 	Insurance 	Company
(“Plaintiff” or “Nautilus”) filed a Complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking
Declaratory 	Relief 	against 	Defendants 	Vanessa 	L. 	Blankenship
(“Blankenship”), 	Chance 	E. 	Holcomb 	(“Holcomb”), Tony 	E. 	Dickman
(“Dickman”), 	Linwood Community Day Care (“Linwood”), and Snowshoe
Mountain, 	Inc. 	(“Snowshoe”). 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	The 	Complaint 	sought 	a
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declaration 	by 	the 	Court 	of 	“the 	rights 	and 	responsibilities 	of
the parties relative to a contract of insurance issued by Nautilus
to Linwood. 	Id.
On 	July 	14, 	2025, 	Defendants 	Snowshoe 	and 	Dickman 	filed 	a
Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	or 	Abstain. 	ECF 	No. 	11. 	Plaintiff 	then 	filed
a 	Response 	to 	the 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	or 	Abstain 	on 	July 	28, 	2025.
ECF No. 12. 	On July 31, 2025, Defendant Linwood filed a Motion to
Dismiss 	or 	Abstain, 	joining 	Snowshoe 	and 	Mr. 	Dickman 	in 	their
previously 	filed 	motion 	[ECF 	No. 	11]. 	ECF 	No. 	14. 	Snowshoe 	and
Dickman 	subsequently 	filed 	a 	Reply 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Response 	[ECF
No. 	12] 	on 	August 	4, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	15. 	Lastly, 	Plaintiff 	filed
a Response to the Motion to Dismiss or Abstain filed by Linwood on
August 	14, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	16. 	The 	Motion 	is 	thus 	fully 	briefed
and ripe for review.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
On 	February 	10, 	2025, 	the 	underlying 	Plaintiffs, 	Blankenship
and 	Holcomb, 	filed 	suit 	in 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Randolph 	County,
West Virginia against Snowshoe, Linwood, and Dickman. 	ECF No. 1,
Ex. 	2. 	In 	the 	state 	court 	Complaint, 	Plaintiffs 	who 	are 	the 	co-
administrators of their decedent daughter Freya Holcomb’s estate,
allege 	that 	on 	or 	about 	September 	26, 	2024, 	their 	daughter, 	a
daycare 	student 	at 	Linwood, 	attended 	a 	field 	trip 	to 	Split 	Rock
1 The following facts are provided from Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No.
1] and the accompanying exhibits.
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Pools. 	ECF No. 1, at ¶ 17. 	During the field trip, Freya allegedly
drowned in the pool and passed away. 	Id. at ¶ 21.
At 	the 	time 	of 	the 	alleged 	incident, 	Linwood 	was 	insured 	by
Plaintiff 	Nautilus. 	Id. 	Linwood 	tendered 	the 	state 	court
Complaint to Nautilus for defense and indemnity under the insurance
policy. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	22. 	In 	response, 	Nautilus 	agreed 	to 	provide 	a
defense to Linwood, subject to a reservation of its right to deny
both 	the 	defense 	and 	indemnity 	under 	the 	policy. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	23.
Subsequently, 	pursuant 	to 	certain 	exclusions 	in 	the 	policy,2
Nautilus filed the subject action requesting this Court to declare
the claims asserted in the underlying Complaint are not covered by
the Nautilus policy. 	Id. at ¶ 53.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 	12(b)(1) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	allows
the 	Court 	to 	dismiss 	an 	action 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction. 	When 	a 	defendant 	files 	a 	12(b)(1) 	motion, 	the
plaintiff 	bears 	“the 	burden 	of 	proving 	that 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction 	exists.” 	Evans 	v. 	B.F. 	Perkins 	Co., 	166 	F.3d 	642,
647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Additionally, a defendant
may lodge a facial subject matter jurisdiction attack by contending
2 Nautilus contends that the underlying incident is not covered by the
issue 	policy 	subject 	to 	a 	“swimming 	pool 	exclusion,” 	that 	there 	is 	no
coverage available under the policy’s designated professional services
liability 	coverage 	extension, 	that 	there 	is 	no 	coverage 	for 	medical
payments, 	and 	that 	there 	is 	no 	coverage 	for 	punitive 	or 	exemplary
damages.
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“that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject
matter jurisdiction can be based.” 	Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213,
1219 (4th Cir. 1982). 	Where the sufficiency of the facts alleged
are 	in 	dispute, 	“the 	district 	court 	accepts 	all 	allegations 	as
true 	and 	determines 	whether 	those 	allegations 	are 	sufficient 	to
invoke jurisdiction.” 	Evans v. United States, 105 F.4th 606, 615
(4th Cir. 2024).
Additionally, 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	abstention 	doctrines 	allow
“federal 	courts 	to 	decline 	to 	exercise 	jurisdiction 	over 	certain
classes of declaratory judgements.” 	Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996); see Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 	277, 	282 	(1995) 	(explaining 	that 	federal 	courts 	have
“discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action
under 	the 	Declaratory 	Judgment 	Act, 	even 	when 	the 	suit 	otherwise
satisfies 	subject 	matter 	jurisdictional 	prerequisites.”). 	The
United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	recognizes
that 	in 	some 	circumstances, 	hearing 	declaratory 	judgment 	actions
can 	be 	“‘uneconomical,’ 	‘vexatious,’ 	and 	risks 	a 	‘gratuitous
interference’ with state court litigation.” 	Med. Mut. Ins. Co. of
N. Carolina v. Littaua, 35 F.4th 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2022).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
In 	Defendants’ 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss, 	the 	parties 	request 	that
this 	Court 	dismiss 	the 	present 	action 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, 	or 	alternatively, 	abstain 	and 	decline 	to 	exercise
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jurisdiction. 	ECF 	No. 	11, 	14. 	In 	response, 	Plaintiff 	contends
that 	it 	properly 	established 	the 	existence 	of 	diversity
jurisdiction and that this Court should not abstain. 	ECF No. 12.
For the reasons stated herein, this Court agrees with Nautilus on
each 	point. 	The 	Court 	finds 	the 	pleadings 	are 	sufficient 	to
establish 	diversity 	jurisdiction 	and 	the 	Court 	declines 	to
exercise its discretion to abstain. 	Thus, the Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss [ECF No. 11, 14] are DENIED.
A. Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction is 	DENIED because there is 	sufficient evidence in
the record to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.
Diversity 	jurisdiction 	exists 	when 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy
exceeds 	$75,000, 	exclusive 	of 	interest 	and 	costs, 	and 	the
litigation 	is 	between 	citizens 	of 	different 	states. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1332(a). 	To 	lodge 	a 	“facial 	challenge” 	to 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, 	the 	Defendant 	can 	contend 	“that 	a 	complaint 	simply
fails to allege facts on which subject matter jurisdiction can be
based.” 	Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Under 	a 	facial 	challenge, 	the 	Plaintiff 	is 	“afforded 	the 	same
procedural 	protection 	as 	he 	would 	receive 	under 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6)
consideration.” 	Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that all the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed
to be true.).
Additionally, district “courts have an independent obligation
to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists.” 	Arbaugh v. Y
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& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 	Pursuant to this obligation,
the 	Court 	may 	consider 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	as 	well 	as 	their
responsive 	pleadings. 	See 	Burns 	v. 	WSSC 	Water, 	No. 	21-CV-02509,
2022 	WL 	3043412 	at 	*3 	(D. 	Md. 	Aug. 	2, 	2022) 	(explaining 	where
Plaintiff 	clarifies 	the 	source 	of 	jurisdiction 	in 	response 	to 	a
motion to dismiss, “great effort” must not be expended by the court
to 	locate 	the 	source 	of 	its 	jurisdiction 	and 	therefore 	it 	is
“pointless” to require an amended complaint).
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “[a]n individual is a
citizen 	of 	the 	state 	in 	which 	he 	or 	she 	is 	domiciled.” 	Bloom 	v.
Libr. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 3d 498, 502 (N.D.W. Va. 2015) (explaining
that domicile “requires physical presence, coupled with an intent
to 	make 	the 	State 	a 	home.”). 	Courts 	consider 	“all 	of 	the
circumstances surrounding an individual’s situation” to determine
the party’s domicile. 	Id. 	Additionally, “the legal representative
of 	the 	estate 	of 	a 	decedent 	shall 	be 	deemed 	to 	be 	a 	citizen 	only
of the same State as the decedent.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
Furthermore, 	to 	determine 	the 	citizenship 	of 	“an 	artificial
entity” 	that 	is 	not 	a 	corporation, 	the 	Courts 	must 	“consult 	the
citizenship of . . . all the entity’s members.” 	Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990). 	An unincorporated association’s
citizenship 	cannot 	be 	determined 	without 	looking 	into 	“[t]he
citizenship 	of 	all 	the 	members[.]” 	Clephas 	v. 	Fagelson,
Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1983).
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Lastly, in declaratory actions, the “amount in controversy is
measured 	by 	the 	value 	of 	the 	object 	of 	the 	litigation.” 	Francis
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). 	In the coverage issue context, the amount in controversy
is 	not 	“measured 	by 	the 	Liability 	Policy’s 	limits[,]” 	rather
“[w]here 	coverage 	of 	a 	particular 	occurrence 	is 	at 	issue, 	the
amount in controversy is the value of the underlying action.” 	Erie
Ins. 	Prop. 	& 	Cas. 	Co. 	v. 	Armitage, 	No. 	5:05CV24, 	2005 	WL 	8161961
at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 13, 2005).
Snowshoe and Dickman contend that Nautilus, in its Complaint,
failed 	to 	“allege 	sufficiently 	the 	citizenship” 	of 	Linwood, 	Mr.
Dickman, 	Mr. 	Holcomb, 	and 	Ms. 	Blankenship. 	ECF 	No. 	11, 	at 	p. 	5.
Additionally, 	Defendants 	argue 	the 	Complaint 	does 	not 	allege
sufficient 	facts 	to 	establish 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy
requirement is met. 	Id.
Here, with respect to Defendant Linwood, Nautilus has provided
a 	sufficient 	factual 	basis 	to 	support 	diversity 	of 	citizenship
between 	the 	parties. 	Nautilus 	did 	not 	specifically 	plead 	the
citizenship of each member of Linwood in its Complaint. 	Instead,
Nautilus 	provided 	that 	“Defendant 	Linwood 	is 	an 	unincorporated
non-profit 	organization 	organized 	under 	the 	laws 	of 	the 	State 	of
West 	Virginia, 	with 	its 	principal 	place 	of 	business 	[in 	West
Virginia}.” 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶ 	2. 	Nautilus 	later 	clarified 	in 	its
Response 	to 	Snowshoe 	Mountain’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss, 	that 	a 	Tracey
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Valach, 	who 	is 	domiciled 	in 	West 	Virginia, 	is 	the 	“sole
identifiable 	officer/member 	of 	Linwood.”3 	ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	p. 	3.
Therefore, 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Court’s 	independent 	obligation 	to
ensure 	that 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	exists, 	the 	Court 	finds
sufficient 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	to 	support 	diversity 	of
citizenship between Plaintiff Nautilus and Defendant Linwood, when
the 	totality 	of 	the 	record 	is 	considered. 	Arbaugh, 	546 	U.S. 	at
514; see also Burns, at *3.
Similarly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	Nautilus 	has 	established 	the
citizenship 	of 	Mr. 	Dickman, 	Mr. 	Holcomb, 	and 	Ms. 	Blankenship.
First, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	Mr. 	Dickman 	is 	an 	employee 	of 	Snowshoe
Mountain Inc., a West Virginia corporation with its principal place
of 	business 	in 	West 	Virginia, 	that 	he 	was 	the 	manager 	of 	Split
Rock 	Pool 	in 	West 	Virginia, 	and 	he 	was 	a 	resident 	of 	Randolph
County, West Virginia. 	ECF No. 1, at 	¶ 4. 	Additionally, in its
Response to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 12], Nautilus provided
further 	evidence 	of 	Mr. 	Dickman’s 	domicile.4 	Therefore,
considering 	all 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	Mr. 	Dickman’s
3 	This 	assertion 	is 	supported 	by 	exhibits 	titled 	“Linwood 	Community
Daycare Business Entity Details” [ECF No. 12, Ex. A], “Obituary of Teresa
White” [ECF No. 12, Ex. B], “West Virginia Real Estate Assessment Data”
[ECF No. 12, Ex. C], and “Tracey Valach Voter Registration Information”
[ECF No. 12, Ex. D].
4 Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Dickman currently resides in Monterville,
West Virginia [ECF No. 12, Ex. F], his vehicle and boat are registered
in his name to the same Monterville residence [ECF No. 12, Ex. F, at 1],
and 	in 	Dickman’s 	answer 	to 	the 	underlying 	state 	court 	complaint 	he
admitted these allegations [ECF No. 12, Ex. G].
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situation, 	this 	Court 	finds 	sufficient 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	to
support diversity of citizenship between Nautilus and Mr. Dickman.
Bloom, 112 F. Supp at 498.
Furthermore, 	sufficient 	evidence 	exists 	in 	the 	record 	to
support a finding that the decedent was domiciled in West Virginia.
First, 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	the 	decedent, 	Freya
Holcomb, 	attended 	Linwood 	Daycare, 	a 	West 	Virginia 	non-profit.
ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶ 	2, 	17. 	In 	addition, 	the 	decedent, 	who 	was 	two
years 	old 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	incident, 	allegedly 	shared 	the 	same
domicile as her mother. 	ECF No. 12, at 9; ECF No. 1, Ex. 2, at ¶
3. 	Further, decedent’s mother described herself as a resident of
West 	Virginia 	in 	the 	underlying 	state 	court 	complaint, 	and 	filed
real 	property 	taxes 	in 	Webster 	County, 	West 	Virginia 	in 	the 	year
2025. 	ECF No. 1, Ex. 2, ¶ 2; ECF No. 12, Ex. H. 	Therefore, there
are 	sufficient 	facts 	to 	support 	diversity 	of 	citizenship 	between
Nautilus 	and 	the 	decedent. 	Thus, 	the 	same 	is 	true 	of 	the 	co-
administrators 	of 	the 	decedent’s 	estate, 	Mr. 	Holcomb 	and 	Ms.
Blankenship.
Lastly, 	although 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	pleads 	the 	amount 	in
controversy 	by 	citing 	policy 	limits 	[ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶ 	8], 	this
deficiency was cured through its inclusion of the underlying state
court 	complaint 	as 	an 	exhibit5 	[ECF 	No. 	1, 	Ex. 	2]. 	Although 	a
5 While the state court complaint does not set forth a specific dollar
amount, 	it 	requests 	compensatory 	damages 	for 	the 	conscious 	pain 	and
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specific dollar amount is not offered, Plaintiff’s Complaint, and
the 	accompanying 	State 	Court 	Complaint, 	set 	forth 	facts 	that 	if
taken 	as 	true, 	would 	support 	the 	inference 	that 	the 	amount 	in
controversy requirement is met.
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	finds 	Plaintiff 	has 	provided 	adequate
evidence 	of 	the 	Court’s 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear 	the 	present
declaratory 	action. 	Accordingly, 	Defendants’ 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss
or Abstain [ECF No. 11, 14] are DENIED.
B. The 	Court 	declines 	to 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	to 	abstain 	from
hearing 	the 	declaratory 	action 	because 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit’s
Nautilus factors weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction.
Section 	2201(a) 	of 	the 	Declaratory 	Judgment 	Act 	states 	that
Federal 	Courts 	“may 	declare 	the 	rights 	and 	other 	legal 	relations
of 	any 	interested 	party 	seeking 	such 	declaration.” 	However, 	the
word 	“may” 	in 	the 	Declaratory 	Judgment 	Act 	confers 	on 	“federal
courts a unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to
declare the rights of litigants.” 	Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 277, 286 (1995)(the Act “confers a discretion upon the courts
rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.”).
In 	determining 	how 	to 	exercise 	this 	discretion, 	the 	Fourth
Circuit holds district courts must consider four factors:
(1) whether the state has a strong interest in
having 	the 	issues 	decided 	in 	its 	courts; 	(2)
suffering 	of 	the 	decedent, 	compensatory 	damages 	for 	the 	loss 	of
companionship of the legal beneficiaries, medical and funeral expenses,
all 	damages 	allowable 	under 	West 	Virginia 	Code 	§ 	55-7-6, 	punitive
damages, 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	litigation 	expenses, 	and 	pre- 	and 	post-
judgment interest.
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whether 	the 	state 	courts 	could 	resolve 	the
issues 	more 	efficiently 	than 	the 	federal
courts; 	(3) 	whether 	the 	presence 	of
“overlapping 	issues 	of 	fact 	or 	law” 	might
create unnecessary “entanglement” between the
state and federal courts; and (4) whether the
federal 	action 	is 	mere 	“procedural 	fencing,”
in 	the 	sense 	that 	the 	action 	is 	merely 	the
product of forum-shopping.
Id. at 208-209 (citing Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes,
Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 1994)).
First, the state’s interest is “weak” where the “contractual
coverage 	issue 	will 	not 	be 	decided 	by 	the 	state 	tort 	case, 	and
[the insurer] is not a party to the state case.” 	Allstate Vehicle
& 	Prop. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Pixler-Davis, 	No. 	1:21CV100, 	2022 	WL 	3221830
at 	*2 	(N.D.W. 	Va. 	Aug. 	9, 	2022) 	(citing 	Penn-America 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Coffey, 	368 	F.3d 	409, 	414 	(4th 	Cir. 	2004)). 	On 	the 	other 	hand,
states 	have 	a 	strong 	interest 	when 	the 	state 	law 	question 	is
“difficult, complex, or unsettled.” 	Littaua, 35 F.4th at 209.
Second, the interest in efficiency is frustrated where a party
seeks 	to 	“try 	a 	controversy 	by 	piecemeal, 	or 	to 	try 	particular
issues 	without 	settling 	the 	entire 	controversy, 	or 	to 	interfere
with an action which has already been instituted.” 	Allstate Prop.
& 	Cas. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Cogar, 	945 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	681, 	687 	(N.D.W. 	Va.
2013) (punctuation omitted). 	When the related state court action
is 	underway, 	the 	district 	court 	“should 	specifically 	consider
whether 	the 	controversy 	‘can 	be 	better 	settled 	in 	the 	proceeding
pending 	in 	state 	court.’” 	Nautilus, 	15 	F.3d 	at 	377 	(citing
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Brillhart v. Excess Inc. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). A district
court 	should 	decline 	to 	grant 	declaratory 	relief 	when 	“another
suit 	is 	pending 	in 	a 	state 	court 	presenting 	the 	same 	issues, 	not
governed by federal law, between the same parties.” 	Nautilus, 15
F.3d 	at 	377. 	However, 	where 	the 	insurer 	is 	not 	a 	party 	in 	the
state action, the benefit of abstaining is “indeterminate[,]” and
“dismissing the federal coverage case [does not] advance any cause
of 	efficiency.” 	Penn-Am. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Coffey, 	368 	F.3d 	409, 	414
(4th Cir. 2004).
Lastly, 	where 	the 	insurer 	is 	not 	a 	party 	to 	the 	state 	court
action, 	and 	claims 	against 	the 	insurer 	would 	not 	be 	resolved 	in
the 	state 	court 	litigation, 	“there 	is 	no 	risk 	that 	‘overlapping
issues 	of 	fact 	or 	law’ 	will 	entangle 	the 	state 	court 	. 	. 	.
negligence 	claim 	and 	the 	federal 	court 	. 	. 	. 	coverage 	dispute.”
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sutton, No. 21-1277, 2022 WL 11112589
at 	*6 	(4th 	Cir. 	Oct. 	19, 	2022). 	The 	district 	court 	can 	“decide
whether 	the 	complaint’s 	allegations, 	if 	proved,” 	would 	warrant
exclusion under the insurance policy and define “the scope of the
contractual language[,]” without causing entanglement between the
state and federal court systems. 	Coffey, 368 F.3d at 413-14.
Here, the first three Nautilus factors weigh in favor of the
Court retaining jurisdiction in the present action and the fourth
factor, 	addressing 	concerns 	over 	forum-shopping, 	has 	not 	been
supported 	by 	evidence 	in 	the 	record. 	First, 	the 	State 	lacks 	a
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strong interest in the case because the coverage issue is not novel
and 	it 	does 	not 	present 	a 	“difficult, 	complex, 	or 	unsettled”
question 	of 	West 	Virginia 	law. 	Littaua, 	35 	F.4th 	at 	209.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Nautilus is not a party to the state case,
and 	the 	coverage 	issue 	is 	not 	before 	the 	state 	court. 	Pixler-
Davis, 	at 	*2. 	Additionally, 	Nautilus’s 	lack 	of 	involvement 	in
state 	proceedings 	means 	a 	decision 	here 	would 	not 	unnecessarily
entangle 	this 	Court 	with 	state 	court 	proceedings. 	The 	Court 	can
address the coverage question presented without becoming entangled
in the state law tort claims. 	See Sutton, at *6. 	Lastly, it would
be 	more 	efficient 	for 	this 	Court 	to 	decide 	the 	coverage 	question
now, 	rather 	than 	defer 	that 	decision 	until 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the
state litigation. 	See Coffey, 368 F.3d at 413-14.
Therefore, 	in 	following 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit’s 	guidance 	in
Nautilus, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to abstain
from 	hearing 	the 	present 	declaratory 	action. 	Accordingly,
Defendants’ 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	or 	Abstain 	[ECF 	No. 	11, 	14] 	are
DENIED, and the action will remain on the Court’s active docket.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds sufficient evidence
in 	the 	record 	to 	support 	the 	Court’s 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction
to 	hear 	the 	present 	action. 	Additionally, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to
abstain. 	Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss [ECF No. 11, 14] are
DENIED.
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It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.
DATED: 	March 30, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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