Sloniker, Marilyn v. Educators Credit Union et al

3:26-cv-00170WiwdMar 5, 2026

Full text

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
_________________________________________________________________________________
MARILYN M. SLONIKER,
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v. 26-cv-170-wmc
EDUCATORS CREDIT UNION,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Representing herself, plaintiff Marilyn M. Sloniker has filed this civil action and
several others like it against Educators Credit Union (“ECU”) and John Does 1-50 to quiet
title to a piece of real property located in Beloit, Wisconsin. (Dkt. #1.) Sloniker has also
filed an emergency motion to vacate a state court foreclosure judgment obtained by ECU
in Rock County Circuit Court Case No. 2023CV1073 and a motion for a temporary
restraining order. (Dkts. ##3-4.) Because Sloniker seeks leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee (dkt. #6), the court must screen and dismiss any claim that is
legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks money damages from a defendant who by law cannot be sued for money damages.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In screening any complaint drafted by a non-lawyer, the court
applies a less stringent standard. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011).
Even under this lenient pleading standard, however, the court must dismiss this action for
lack of jurisdiction for reasons explained below.
Case: 3:26-cv-00170-wmc Document #: 8 Filed: 03/05/26 Page 1 of 4
2
OPINION
Plaintiff alleges that ECU claims an interest in a piece of real property located at
2442 W. Beloit Newark Rd. in Beloit, Wisconsin (dkt. #2), as the result of a foreclosure
judgment obtained by ECU in Rock County Circuit Court Case No. 2023CV1073. (Dkt.
#1, at 2.) Nevertheless, plaintiff claims a “superior interest” in the property and contends
that while ECU “may claim an interest in the mortgage” on this property, it has not
established that it was “the holder of the promissory note or entitled to enforce the note
at the time of foreclosure.” (Id.) Accordingly, plaintiff asks the court to enter a judgment
“quieting title to the subject property” in her favor and declaring that ECU has no “valid,
enforceable interest in the property.” (Id.)
This court has “an independent obligation to satisfy itself that federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists before proceeding to the merits in any case.” Smith v. Am. Gen. Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2003). Generally, federal courts have the
authority to hear two types of cases: (1) cases in which the plaintiff alleges a violation of
his or her constitutional rights or rights established under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331;
and (2) cases in which a citizen of one state alleges a state law claim against a citizen of
another state that amounts to more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As the party
invoking federal jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating its existence.
Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2006). “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Case: 3:26-cv-00170-wmc Document #: 8 Filed: 03/05/26 Page 2 of 4
3
Here, plaintiff seeks to quiet title to a piece of real property that was already the
subject of a foreclosure action, which is a state-law matter, not a federal one. Westby Co-
Op Credit Union v. Trails End Motel, LLC, No. 26-cv-84-jdp, 2026 WL 323639, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Feb. 6, 2026). In particular, this court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction because
there is no indication that defendant ECU (a Wisconsin-chartered credit union) is a citizen
of a different state from plaintiff or the real property at issue. Plaintiff does not otherwise
articulate facts in support of an exercise of federal-question jurisdiction. In any event, a
federal district court does not have jurisdiction to overturn the state court’s judgment of
foreclosure. See Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 765 (7th Cir.
2024) (en banc) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), as a jurisdictional bar to revisiting a state court judgment in federal court). Because
plaintiff is plainly asking the court to vacate a state foreclosure judgment obtained by ECU,
the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
While the Seventh Circuit has cautioned against dismissing a pro se plaintiff's case
without giving the plaintiff a chance to amend the complaint, Felton v. City of Chicago, 827
F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2016), the court will dismiss this action without prejudice and
without leave to amend, since any amended pleading would be futile under the essential
factual circumstances alleged. See Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir.
2009) (“courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment
would be futile”).
Case: 3:26-cv-00170-wmc Document #: 8 Filed: 03/05/26 Page 3 of 4
4
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1) The complaint filed by plaintiff Marilyn M. Sloniker is DISMISSED without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2) All of plaintiff’s motions are DENIED.
3) The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
Entered this 5th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
Case: 3:26-cv-00170-wmc Document #: 8 Filed: 03/05/26 Page 4 of 4

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.