Wolff, Ronald et al v. Kaul, Josh et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
RONALD G. WOLFF and
KARRI E. WOLFF,
Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
24-cv-176-wmc
JOSH KAUL and DENNIS CARROLL,
and
Unknown Persons 1–25 who are Agents and
Employees of the Division of Criminal
Investigation
or the Wisconsin Department of Justice,
and
Unknown Persons 26–50 who are Deputies or
Employees of the Outagamie County Sheriff’s
Department,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs, Ronald G. Wolff and Karri E. Wolff, have filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Pls.’ Compl. (dkt. #1)), alleging that defendants Josh Kaul, Dennis Carroll,
and various agents and employees of the Wisconsin Department of Justice and Outagamie
County Sheriff’s Department, violated their constitutional rights while executing a search
warrant. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ claims, arguing
that they are barred by claim preclusion because they were, or could have been, raised in a
previous case, and because the claims fail on the merits. (Dkt. #20). For the reasons
explained below, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 1 of 17

2
UNDISPUTED FACTS1
A. The Search
On March 22, 2022, defendant Agent Carroll and other law enforcement agents
executed a search warrant at three properties in Outagamie County owned by Ronald and
Karri Wolff. Before executing the searches, a special agent from Wisconsin Department
of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (“DCI”) led a briefing for the benefit of the
other agents on the search warrant, although Agent Carroll was not present at that briefing.
While executing the warrant, Agent Carroll and DCI Special Agent Jeffrey Wisch
met with Ronald and Karri Wolff in a meeting room at one of the properties described in
the warrant. At one point, Ms. Wolff attempted to leave the room against Agent Carroll’s
order to sit down. As Ms. Wolff was walking through an exit door, Agent Carroll grabbed
the hood of her sweatshirt to prevent her from leaving as he simultaneously stated, “no.”
(Dkt. #41, ¶ 60). Although then complying, Ms. Wolff claims she told Agent Carroll that
he hurt her neck.2
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth in this section are taken from the proposed findings
of fact that are undisputed by the parties as required by the court’s procedures on summary
judgment. See Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 274 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir.
2011) (the court considers only evidence set forth in a proposed finding of fact with proper
citation); Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (disregarding at summary
judgment “submissions that make legal arguments and assert legal conclusions, which are not
factual statements at all”). There is also video footage of the interaction between Karri Wolf and
Agent Carroll.
2 Ronald and Karri Wolff also represent that “[i]t was common knowledge in the community” that
Karri Wolff had a port inserted in her neck in 2020 as part of cancer treatment, (dkt. #41, ¶ 23),
but they offer no evidence that Agent Carroll knew of Ms. Wolff’s medical treatment.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 2 of 17

3
According to Agent Carroll, he grabbed Ms. Wolff’s hood because he was concerned
she would try to destroy evidence, obtain a weapon to hurt herself or others, or flee.
Security camera footage also shows that after Carroll released her hood, Ms. Wolff calmly
sat down and proceeded to answer the agents’ questions. (Dkt. #23-7.)3 The next day,
Ms. Wolff called a hospital because she was worried about her throat. A nurse informed
Ms. Wolff to come in if she developed problems breathing. Ultimately, she did not go to
the hospital or seek other medical care because her throat improved.
In executing the warrant, DCI logged and temporarily retained property seized from
the Wolffs, including documents, devices and electronic files. It is undisputed that DCI
logged the chain of custody for each item of the Wolffs’ seized property in its case
management system (“ACISS”). However, the parties dispute whether all of the Wolffs’
property was later returned. Defendants say that it returned all property seized except the
following items: drug paraphernalia; DCI-created computer media and evidence files; and
documents returned to the state circuit court after completion of Ronald Wolff’s criminal
prosecution. (Dkt. #38, ¶¶ 45–47) (citing Yerges Decl. (dkt. #24-2).) With these
exceptions, defendants point to ACISS logs showing that all of the Wolffs’ property,
including all documents, had been returned as of July 1, 2024.
In contrast, Ronald and Karri Wolff say not all property has been returned and
some returned property had been damaged. Specifically, the Wolffs represent that “copies”
3 While the court views the facts in “the light depicted in the videotape,” Jones v. Anderson, 116
F.4th 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2024), Ms. Wolff testified that the video showing the hoodie grabbing
“doesn’t look as bad as it looked in real life, I guess[,]” and that it “seemed worse than what it looks
in the video.” (Dkt. #38, ¶¶ 33–34).
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 3 of 17

4
of their property created by DCI were not returned, and that their cellphones and Mr.
Wolff’s HP Laptop were returned damaged. They also state the original “Willow Lane
documents,” along with documents related to Elsner Road and Mr. Wolff’s election
campaign, have not been returned.4 (Dkt. #41, ¶¶ 98–100). In her deposition, however,
Karri Wolff acknowledged that photocopies of the original Willow Lane documents were
returned and that the Wolffs were otherwise able to obtain copies from the appropriate
State of Wisconsin agency when the Wolffs needed original versions of the Willow Lane
documents. (Karri Wolff Dep. (dkt. #28) 5–6).) Also, Ms. Wolff was not sure whether
defendants took documents related to Elsner Road or Ronald Wolff’s election (Karri Wolff
Dep. (dkt. #28) 5–6), nor are those documents listed on the ACISS logs. (Yerges Decl.
(dkt. #24-2).) To the extent they were included in the ACISS logs, all documents listed
on the log have been returned. Id.
B. Prior Claims in Wolff I
On March 30, 2022, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Wolff v. Virgil, No. 22-CV-711-
WMC (“Wolff I”). In Wolff I, Ronald and Karri Wolff brought claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the then DCI administrator, Tina Virgil, special agent Jay Yerges, and
unknown agents and employees of the Wisconsin Department of Justice and Outagamie
County Sheriff’s Department (collectively, the “Wolff I Defendants”). Those claims arose
out of same search warrant and searches again put at issue in this case. Specifically, in
4 The Wolffs alleged in their Complaint that Ronald Wolff’s tower computer was not returned, but they
did not include this allegation in their proposed findings of fact. (Pl.’s Compl. (dkt. #1, ¶ 30)).
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 4 of 17

5
Wolff I, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights in
two ways: (i) the search warrant was overly broad and lacked particularity; and (ii) the
search warrant was executed in an unreasonable manner. Plaintiffs also claimed the search
warrant violated their due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
because they were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard before the search, a list
of the items taken, or instructions and an opportunity to reclaim those items. Finally, the
Wolffs asserted an excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment against an unnamed
DCI agent for pulling the hood of Karri Wolff’s sweatshirt.
Before final judgment, plaintiffs withdrew the latter claim against the unnamed
agent, and that claim was dismissed without prejudice in a June 26, 2023, order.5 Plaintiffs
also withdrew their due process claims, “perhaps realizing that the claim was subsumed by
their claims challenging the search and seizure.” (Wolff I Order on Mot. in Lim. (dkt. #
23-3, at 2).) This left only the plaintiffs’ claim that the search warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment for lacking particularity and being unreasonable. In its Wolff I order, this
court later granted summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs Fourth Amendment
claims and dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claims against defendants Tina Virgil and Jay
Yerges for her alleged refusal to return property seized during the search as barred by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment
entered in Wolff I, which remains pending before the Seventh Circuit.
5 Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs learned the identity of that unnamed agent to be Agent Carroll, but
never sought to reinstate their excessive-force claim.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 5 of 17

6
OPINION
In their current lawsuit (“Wolff II”), plaintiffs now assert four claims:
(1) defendants violated plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
by unreasonably seizing their property and failing to return certain property;
(2) plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation for the taking of their unreasonably
seized property under the Fifth Amendment;
(3) plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief for their seized property and for damages
under common law; and
(4) defendant Agent Carrol used excessive force against plaintiff Karri Wolff in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
As noted, defendants have moved for summary judgment on all four claims, contending
that plaintiffs’ claims fail both on the merits and claim preclusion, having been or could
have been brought in Wolff I. The court addresses each of plaintiffs’ property claims (claims
1, 2, and 3) and their excessive force claim (claim 4) below. Summary judgment is
appropriate if the material facts are not genuinely disputed and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986).
I. Property Claims (Claims 1, 2, and 3)
Plaintiffs’ first three claims are based on three property rights: due process,
unconstitutional taking, and equitable relief for return of property. For the following
reasons, these claims are barred by claim preclusion and fail on the merits.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 6 of 17

7
A. Claim Preclusion
Because plaintiffs’ property claims arose out of the same set of facts presented in
Wolff I and could have been asserted in that case, those claims are barred by claim
preclusion, which is a legal doctrine intended to foster predictability and eliminate
redundant litigation by prohibiting claims that were, or could have been, brought in a
previous action. Bell v. Taylor, 827 F.3d 699, 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2016). In particular,
preclusion works as a bar to suit if a claim satisfies the following three elements: “(1) an
identity of the causes of action; (2) an identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a final
judgment on the merits.” Id. at 706 (citation modified) (quoting Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato
Kagaku Co., Ltd., 121 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997)).
As for the first element, an identity of the causes of action is satisfied if a party’s
current claims are “based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations[,]” of those
in a previous suit. Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original); see also Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590
U.S. 405, 412 (2020) (the two claims must involve a “common nucleus of operative facts”).
To determine this, “courts should consider the totality of the claims, including the nature
of the claims, the legal basis for recovery, the law involved, and the respective factual
backgrounds,” Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 227 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up), but
are “not limited to the words in the complaint;.” Daza v. State, 2 F.4th 681, 684 (7th Cir.
2021).
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 7 of 17

8
Instead, the court examines “the complaint to discern the basis of the litigation,”
with “[a]nything falling within that common nucleus, whether or not actually raised,
fall[ing] within the scope of the claim and … thus subject to claim preclusion in a later
case.” Id. In other words, a plaintiff cannot avoid claim preclusion by adding new legal
theories for recovery in the second suit. Averhart v. Sheriff of Cook County Illinois, 752 F.3d
1104 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]ll legal theories that concern the same events [are] to be brought
in a single suit.”). Here, there is no dispute that plaintiffs’ suit is based on the same set of
facts as those in Wolff I because both suits arise out of the same searches. Additionally,
plaintiffs cannot avoid claim preclusion by adding new due process, takings, and equitable
relief theories to a second suit.
As for the second element of claim preclusion, an “identity of parties” is satisfied if
the parties in both suits were in privity or had a legal relationship such that the nonparty
in the original suit had its interests adequately represented by the original party. A party’s
representation of a nonparty is adequate if “(1) the interests of the nonparty and her
representative are aligned . . . and (2) either the party understood herself to be acting in a
representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the
nonparty.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900 (2008); see also Mandarino v. Pollard, 718
F.2d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[a] government and its officers are in privity for purposes
of res judicata.”). Here, the plaintiffs are identical in both suits and the defendants named
in plaintiffs’ property claims in Wolff II are in privity with the Wolff I defendants. Indeed,
all defendants are agents of the Wisconsin Department of Justice or the Outagamie County
Sheriff’s Department. More specifically, the named defendants in Wolff I included: Tina
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 8 of 17

9
Virgil, the DCI administrator working under the authority of now named defendant Josh
Kaul as the Wisconsin Attorney General; and DCI special agent Jay Yerges, a colleague of
now named defendant Dennis Carroll, a fellow agent who conducted the searches at issue
along with Yerges. The defendants in both suits have aligned interests in defeating
plaintiffs’ claims.
The third element -- a final judgment on the merits -- is satisfied if judgment in the
original case is final when the claim is raised again. Though a party may appeal a district
court’s final judgment, as here, “finality for purposes of appeal is not the same as finality
for purposes of preclusion.” Bell, 827 F.3d at 707. Instead, finality for claim preclusion
“turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.” Id. (quotation
omitted). In Wolff I, plaintiffs received an adequate hearing and final judgment was
entered by this court. Therefore, although plaintiffs have appealed, this court’s final
judgment is just that for claim preclusion purposes, at least absent reversal by the Seventh
Circuit. Id.
B. Merits
Even if plaintiff’s property claims were not precluded, they still fail on the merits.
1. Due Process Claims
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibits
deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.” Matamoros v. Grams,
706 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV). To establish a
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 9 of 17

10
procedural due process violation of a property right, a plaintiff must show there is “(1) a
cognizable property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) a denial of
due process.” Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hudson v. City of
Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004)). Certainly, plaintiffs had a property interest
in the property seized and were deprived of that property when seized. Thus, only the third
element is at issue: whether plaintiffs were denied due process.
Essentially, plaintiffs claims that defendants seized their property without due
process of law because “significant and important portions” of their property were seized
in a “per-se unreasonable” manner, the “time delay in the return of other items was
unreasonable[,]” and “some items have still not been returned,” including documents
relating to their Willow Lane property, their Elsner Road property, and Mr. Wolff’s
election. (Dkt. #1, ¶ 58). In response, defendants contend that this due process claim fails
on the record at summary judgment because DCI seized plaintiffs’ property pursuant to a
valid search warrant and such property was returned undamaged and in a timely manner.6
The court agrees.
First, this court has already decided that plaintiffs received adequate pre-deprivation
process and their property was seized in a reasonable manner. This is because defendants
acted under the authority of a valid search warrant. “A seizure arising from a criminal
investigation does not threaten due process where . . . the state requires a fair and reliable
6 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs waived this due process claim, along with the other property
claims, because plaintiffs failed to respond to the arguments against each claim included in
defendants’ opening brief. (Def.’s Reply (dkt. #39) 13) (citing Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d
461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010)). However, the court need not consider this argument because the claims
fail on the merits and, as already discussed, are barred by claim preclusion.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 10 of 17

11
determination of probable cause as a condition to the seizure.” Mahnke v. Garrigan, 428
Fed. Appx. 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing to Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978); Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009)). A search
warrant issued during a criminal investigation satisfies due process because it follows a
judge’s finding of probable cause. Plaintiffs had every reason to dispute in Wolff I this
court’s determination that defendants reasonably seized plaintiffs’ property under a valid
search warrant.
In addition, defendants have established plaintiffs had access to adequate post-
deprivation process because state procedures for seeking the return of their property were
available. Specifically, “a state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements
when it has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to
avail himself of them.” Hudson v. City of Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir.1982)). In Wisconsin, the following statute
governs requests for seized property: “[a]ny person claiming the right to possession of
property . . . seized pursuant to a search warrant . . . may apply for its return to the circuit
court for the county in which the property was seized or where the search warrant was
returned.” Wis. Stat. § 968.20. Plaintiffs have failed to show that they even availed
themselves of this state procedure for requesting unreturned property, much less that the
process was unsuccessful. Therefore, plaintiffs’ due process claims fail and defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on those claims on the merits as well.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 11 of 17

12
2. Takings Claim
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits “private property be[ing] taken
for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Plaintiffs bring a
takings claim under the Fifth Amendment based on defendants’ “temporary and
permanent taking of their property.” (Pl.’s Compl. (dkt. # 1) ¶ 73).)
However, this claim fails for many of the same reasons plaintiffs’ due process claims
fail. First, there is again no factual dispute that defendants seized plaintiffs’ property
pursuant to a valid search warrant. The Seventh Circuit has explained that “the Takings
Clause does not apply when property is retained or damaged as a result of the government's
exercise of its authority pursuant to some power other than the power of eminent domain.”
Johnson v. Manitowoc Cnty., 635 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirmed in Hadley v. City
of South Bend, Indiana, 154 F.4th 549 (7th Cir. 2025)). Additionally, the Fifth Amendment
does not require compensation for property damaged by law enforcement while executing
a valid search warrant. Hadley, 154 F.4th at 556.
Further, plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that defendants have permanently taken their property. According to defendants,
plaintiffs’ property was logged into a computer system and later returned. Although
plaintiffs allege that they are still missing some copies of certain documents, they have no
evidence besides their own, speculative statements that defendants ever confiscated some
of those documents and concede others were returned. In particular, plaintiffs specifically
list the following property as unreturned: original Willow Lane documents, the Elsner Road
documents, and documents relating to Mr. Wolff’s election. (Dkt. #41, ¶¶ 98–100).
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 12 of 17

13
However, Ms. Wolff testified under oath that copies of the original Willow Lane
documents were returned and that the Wolffs were otherwise able to obtain copies from
the State of Wisconsin when they needed original versions. (Karri Wolff Dep. (dkt. #28)
5–6).) Regarding the Elsner Road and Ronald Wolff election documents, Ms. Wolff was
unsure whether defendants ever seized those documents. (Karri Wolff Dep. (dkt. #28) 5–
6).) Finally, even if these documents had been seized by defendants, it is undisputed for
purposes of summary judgment that the ACISS log tracked the chain of custody for all seized
items, (dkt. #38, ¶53), and that log shows all documents were returned. (Yerges Decl.
(dkt. #24-2).) Without some unequivocal evidence by either plaintiff that this is incorrect,
a reasonable jury would not find otherwise, and defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ takings claim as wll.
3. Common Law Return of Property
Finally, plaintiffs also bring a claim for return of property, requesting that the court
exercise its equitable power to order the return of seized property, citing Mr. Lucky Messenger
Service Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978). In Mr. Lucky, the plaintiff brought
a claim for the return of $65,000 of money seized by the government and held for over 17
months without any charges ever brought against plaintiff. Id., 587 F.2d at 16. In finding
the government likely violated the plaintiff’s rights, the Seventh Circuit explained in Mr.
Lucky that district courts have general equitable jurisdiction over the return of illegally
seized property. Id. at 16–17. Specifically, courts may exercise such jurisdiction where the
government withholds seized property in a manner that involves a “callous disregard for
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 13 of 17

14
constitutional rights.” Id. at 17 (quoting Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir.
1974)).
However, the undisputed facts here do not support a claim for return of property
under Mr. Lucky. As already discussed, this court found in Wolff I that the seizure of
plaintiffs’ property was reasonable and plaintiffs have failed to present adequate evidence
for a reasonable jury to find that defendants retained any of their property. Thus,
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim well.
II. Excessive Force Claim (Claim 4)
As for plaintiffs remaining claim that Agent Carroll used excessive force against
Karri Wolff in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he pulled back the hood of her
sweatshirt during the search, plaintiffs allege that Agent Carroll’s use of force was
unreasonable because defendants were on notice that: “Karri Wolff was suffering from
cancer”; and “there was objectively no reason to use any force at all,” since and Karri Wolff
was not under arrest or resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”; and “pulling
the hood of a hooded sweatshirt cannot possibly be an acceptable tactic for an officer to
employ.” (Pl.’s Compl. (dkt. #1, ¶¶ 69–70).) At summary judgment, defendants argue
this claim fails on the merits because the undisputed evidence shows that Carroll did not
use excessive force and the claim is barred by qualified immunity.7 Both arguments have
merit.
7 Defendants also argue plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is barred by claim preclusion because
plaintiffs could have brought the same claim in Wolff I. While plaintiffs did bring an excessive force
claim, it was later dismissed without prejudice. The court need not resolve whether this dismissal
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 14 of 17

15
For an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment to prevail a plaintiff must
prove that the officer used “greater force than was reasonably necessary.” Becker v. Elfreich,
821 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2016); Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir.
2009). This determination is made from the perspective of a “reasonable officer” in light
of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer, without regard to his or her actual
intent or subjective beliefs. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Williams v.
Indiana State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2015); Abbott v. Sangamon County,
Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, to assess reasonableness, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances, “including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether [she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham,
490 U.S. at 396. As a result, “whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable
‘is a legal determination rather than a pure question of fact for the jury to decide.’” Dockery
v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678
F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)).
On the evidence provided by the parties at summary judgment, the court finds that
Agent Carroll used reasonable force in light of all the circumstances known to him at the
time, including the risk that Karri Wolff might be leaving the room to destroy evidence.
First, plaintiff’s description of defendant Agent Carroll’s use of force is largely discredited
without prejudice, and plaintiffs’ later failure to reinstate the claim after learning the identity of the
officer involved in Wolff I, should result in claim preclusion, because the claim so clearly fails on
the merits for the reasons addressed above.
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 15 of 17

16
by the video record.8 Instead, the video shows Agent Carroll briefly grabbing the hood of
Ms. Wolff’s sweatshirt and Ms. Wolff stopping any forward movement as soon as she felt
her sweatshirt being held. Noticeably absent is any evidence of the agent “pulling” her
backward as Ms. Wolff contends. Rather, she stops, steps back, and then calmly sat down
without any apparent discomfort. Moreover, while not ideal, an objective officer may have
reasonably concluded that lightly grabbing Ms. Wolff’s hood was necessary to prevent her
destroying evidence and because the DCI agents were still questioning her. Regardless,
plaintiffs provided no admissible evidence suggesting that Agent Carroll knew about Ms.
Wolff’s cancer diagnosis, much less was aware of any unique sensitivity in her neck area.
Therefore, Agent Carroll did not use excessive force against Karri Wolff by gently grabbing
the hood of her sweatshirt.
Regardless, plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is barred by the doctrince of qualified
immunity. For plaintiffs to overcome defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, they
must show that the defendant violated their “clearly established” constitutional right.
Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). And although qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense, plaintiffs bear the burden of defeating it. Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d
412, 418 (7th Cir. 2018). Controlling case law clearly establishes a claim for excessive
force if: (1) there is a “closely analogous case” holding that the specific type of force used
by the defendants is excessive; or (2) “a general constitutional rule already identified in the
8 Video evidence can sometimes “evaporate any factual dispute that would otherwise exist,” United
States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). It may do so when the video is so definitive
that there could be no reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts. Kailin v. Vill. Of
Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380)
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 16 of 17

17
decisional law applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.” Cibulka v.
City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
Plaintiffs have offered neither. Indeed, plaintiffs do not even attempt to cite a
closely analogous case establishing the type of force Agent Carroll used was excessive.
Instead, plaintiffs rely on the second option by arguing that a reasonable officer would
understand this type of force violates the Fourth Amendment. (see Pl.’s Resp. (dkt. # 36)
15).) In contrast, for the same reasons just discussed, this court finds Agent Carrol’s use
of force is at least arguably an objectively reasonable instinct given the totality of the
circumstances, however ill-advised. Therefore, plaintiffs have not overcome defendants’
qualified immunity defense, barring her claim for excessive force.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt. #20) is
GRANTED. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment for defendants and close this
case.
Entered this 4th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
Case: 3:24-cv-00176-wmc Document #: 44 Filed: 12/04/25 Page 17 of 17