USA v. JAMES

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE A.G. JAMES,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) Case No. 3:15-cr-0042
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Wayne A.G. James’s Motion to Reconsider,
docketed April 5, 2024. (Dkt. No. 316). The United States of America (the “Government”) filed
an opposition to the motion, see Dkt. No. 319, and Defendant filed a Response Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion to Reconsider (Dkt. No. 320). This matter is ripe for adjudication.
Defendant brings his motion under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and/or the Court’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7.3. Local Rule 7.3 provides: “A party
may file a motion asking the Court to reconsider its order or decision . . . based on . . . the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” LRCi 7.3(a)(3). Defendant argues
that the Court’s Order (Dkt. No. 312), entered March 19, 2024, denying his Section 2255
motion to vacate as moot, “contains a manifest error of law, in that it fails to apply the
distinction between post-conviction motions that challenge only the sentence the defendant
is serving, and post-conviction motions that challenge the conviction itself.” Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion to Reconsider (Mem.) (Dkt. No. 317) at 5-6. According to
Defendant, his motion is not moot because he challenges his underlying conviction, not his
sentence; therefore, he is entitled to the presumption of continuing collateral consequences
and need not prove the collateral consequences. Id. (citing “Harmon v. United States, 2021
WL 1168866, *8 (D. Del. 2021) quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 521 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) [sic].”1
1 The citations are reproduced here as they appear in Defendant’s memorandum, hence the quotation marks
and sic notation. The cases cited by Defendant are miscited, but they do support the proposition stated. The
correct citation for the Delaware case is Singletary v. United States, Crim. Act. No. 13-74-CFC-03; 13-74-CFC-04;
Case: 3:15-cr-00042-RAM-GAT Document #: 325 Filed: 10/14/26 Page 1 of 4

United States v. James
Case No. 3:15-cr-0042
Order
Page 2 of 4
The Government contends that the Court did not clearly err in finding Defendant’s
motion moot and that the cases on which Defendant relies for presumption of collateral
consequences do not apply to him because he is no longer serving a term of supervised
release. The Government bases its position upon Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.
2009), asserting that the precedent in this circuit is: “when the petitioner ‘is attacking a
sentence that has already been served, collateral consequences will not be presumed, but
must be proven.’” Dkt. No. 319 at 2 (quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). However, the Burkey
court was explaining its holding in United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).2
In Jackson, the appellant remained on supervised release and was challenging that
supervised release. In Burkey, the appellant was on supervised release and was challenging
his term of imprisonment, that already had been served. Neither of those cases is analogous
to the circumstances presented in this matter.
In his reply, Defendant maintains that, because he is challenging his conviction and
not his sentence, he is entitled to the presumption of continuing collateral consequences. He
Civ. Act. No. 17-1651-CFC; 17-1652-CFC, 2021 U.S. $0 $1 LX $3 $4 $5 *23-24, 2021 WL 1168866 (D. Del. Mar.
26, 2021). The Supreme Court case, Spencer v. Kemna, bears the proper title, but is reported at 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
2 The entire narrative is instructive:
Thus, collateral consequences will be presumed when the defendant is attacking his
conviction while still serving the sentence imposed for that conviction, but we also have held
that they will be presumed where the defendant is attacking that portion of his sentence that
is still being served. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).
In Jackson, we held that collateral consequences are presumed where the appellant was still
serving a term of supervised release and her challenge was to the reasonableness of the
supervised release term. Id. Where, however, the appellant is attacking a sentence that has
already been served, collateral consequences will not be presumed, but must be
proven. See United States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 1998).
Burkey has served his sentence but remains subject to a 3-year term of supervised release.
However, he did not challenge the validity or reasonableness of that term in his habeas corpus
petition, as did the appellant in Jackson. His challenge was more remote, attacking only what
the BOP had done, and urging it as the basis for the sentencing court to now afford him relief
against an indisputably valid term of supervised release. In such circumstances, he must
demonstrate that collateral consequences exist; they will not be presumed. Cf. Jackson, 523
F.3d at 241 (Cottman held that collateral consequences will not be presumed when "[a]
defendant who is serving a term of supervised release … challenges only his completed
sentence of imprisonment").
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009)
Case: 3:15-cr-00042-RAM-GAT Document #: 325 Filed: 10/14/26 Page 2 of 4

United States v. James
Case No. 3:15-cr-0042
Order
Page 3 of 4
accuses the Government of ignoring his citation to the Third Circuit case Leyva v. Williams.
Dkt. 320 at 2. As quoted by Defendant, Leyva holds:
After a petitioner's release from custody, we consider his habeas case moot
unless he "can demonstrate he will suffer some collateral consequences if his
conviction is allowed to stand." DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 441-42, 442 n.3.
Significantly, though, we may presume "collateral consequences when a
litigant challenges a criminal conviction." United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d
179, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889,
20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968)); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S. Ct.
978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998) ("In recent decades, we have been willing to
presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral
consequences . . . .").
Id. at 363.3
Here, Defendant challenges his felony conviction, not his sentence. Upon review, the
Court finds that it has applied an erroneous standard on the issue of collateral consequences
to Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. As articulated in Spencer and Leyva, Defendant is
entitled to the presumption of collateral consequences. As a result, the Court finds that
Defendant’s motion to vacate is not moot. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Wayne A.G. James’s Motion to Reconsider, Dkt. No. 316, is
GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that the Court’s Order, Dkt. No. 312, entered March 19, 2024, is VACATED;
it is further
3 This holding aligns with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), where it states:
An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always
satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction
imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction
and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict's sentence has expired,
however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or
parole -- some "collateral consequence" of the conviction -- must exist if the suit is to be
maintained. See, e.g., Carafas, supra, 391 U.S. 234 at 237-238. In recent decades, we have been
willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences
(or, what is effectively the same, to count collateral consequences that are remote and unlikely
to occur). See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968).
Id. at 7-8.
Case: 3:15-cr-00042-RAM-GAT Document #: 325 Filed: 10/14/26 Page 3 of 4

United States v. James
Case No. 3:15-cr-0042
Order
Page 4 of 4
ORDERED that Defendant Wayne A.G. James’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, Dkt. No. 307, is
REINSTATED and restored to the docket in the above-captioned matter; it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court SHALL re-open the companion case, James v. United
States, Case No. 3:22-cv-00038; it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court SHALL send a copy of this Order to Defendant by
certified mail, return receipt requested and file a copy of the return receipt on the docket.
Dated: October 13, 2026 /s/
Robert A. Molloy
ROBERT A. MOLLOY
CHIEF JUDGE
Case: 3:15-cr-00042-RAM-GAT Document #: 325 Filed: 10/14/26 Page 4 of 4